feat(jcode): add jcode as a run mode

jcode (1jehuang/jcode) joins the CLI registry as the `jcode` run mode:
Run menu, phone overview, TUI, quick-start and POST /api/sessions
(`jcodeConfig: { model?, resumeSessionId? }`), local, SSH and Docker
(dedicated agent-image layer), plus codeman doctor and install.sh
through the generated catalogue. Measured on a live jcode 0.98.1 pane.

- Work detection reads jcode's braille status row and `<n>>` composer;
  alt screen with mouse strip and PageUp/PageDown paging like opencode.
- Every jcode TUI is a client of one shared per-user daemon whose tools
  run with the daemon's env, so no agent skill injection and no JCODE_*
  envOverrides prefix.
- New `capabilities.sharedDaemon`: a session kill spares descendants
  outside the pane's process group, so closing the tab that started the
  daemon no longer cuts every other jcode session off (measured).
- last-response answers an honest empty for an external CLI with no
  transcript reader that the pane segmenter cannot read (jcode alone).
- GET /api/jcode/status via the generic registry resolver.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.changeset/jcode-mode.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+"aicodeman": minor
+---
+
+**jcode as a run mode.** Codeman can now start [jcode](https://github.com/1jehuang/jcode) sessions from the Run menu, the phone overview and the API (`mode: "jcode"`, with `jcodeConfig: { model?, resumeSessionId? }`), locally, over SSH and in Docker cases (the agent image installs it). Codeman reads jcode's spinner row to tell a working session from an idle one, the wheel pages jcode's own transcript, and `codeman doctor` and the installer find it. jcode runs every session's tools in one shared background daemon, so closing a jcode tab never stops that daemon, its sessions get no Codeman agent skill and take no `JCODE_*` environment overrides, and a jcode worker's answer is read from its terminal rather than `last-response`; see `docs/jcode-integration.md`.

.claude-plugin/marketplace.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
       "name": "codeman",
       "source": "./plugins/codeman",
       "description": "Drive Codeman from inside a Claude Code session: spawn worker sessions, prompt them, wait for them, read their answers, clean up. Acts inside a Codeman-managed session; outside one it only reads saved Codex conversations offline.",
-      "version": "1.49.0",
+      "version": "1.50.0",
       "author": {
         "name": "Ark0N",
         "url": "https://github.com/Ark0N"

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -80,6 +80,35 @@ jobs:
             CLI_DETECT_DONE=""; detect_all_clis
             offer_ai_cli_install >/dev/null 2>&1
             echo "bash $BASH_VERSION: skipping the AI CLI install menu continues"
+            # --ai-cli answers the same menu with no terminal: `none` carries on, and a
+            # name runs that one entry (bash 3.2 cannot expand an empty offer list under
+            # set -u, which is the guard the loop over it has to get right).
+            has_tty() { return 1; }
+            AI_CLI_CHOICE=none
+            offer_ai_cli_install >/dev/null 2>&1
+            AI_CLI_CHOICE=codex
+            k=0; while [[ $k -lt ${#CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[@]} ]]; do
+              CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$k]=""
+              k=$((k + 1))
+            done
+            offer_ai_cli_install >/dev/null 2>&1
+            echo "bash $BASH_VERSION: --ai-cli answers the menu, also with nothing to offer"
+            # What the desktop app runs: preflight on stdout, and only JSON there. These
+            # child runs must not inherit CODEMAN_INSTALL_SH_LIB, or they stop at the
+            # sourcing guard and print nothing. Each check ends in `|| exit 1`, because
+            # bash 3.2 does not let a false [[ ]] trip set -e.
+            out=$(env -u CODEMAN_INSTALL_SH_LIB bash /w/install.sh preflight --no-admin)
+            [[ "$out" == "{\"schema\":1,"* && "$out" == *"]}" ]] || { echo "preflight printed: $out"; exit 1; }
+            json_string "a\"b\\c" >/tmp/json-out
+            [[ "$(cat /tmp/json-out)" == "\"a\\\"b\\\\c\"" ]] || { echo "json_string printed: $(cat /tmp/json-out)"; exit 1; }
+            echo "bash $BASH_VERSION: preflight prints JSON"
+            # How the desktop app adds an agent: a real run of the subcommand, which stops
+            # on the missing npm before it could install anything.
+            if out=$(env -u CODEMAN_INSTALL_SH_LIB bash /w/install.sh agent codex --no-admin --progress 2>&1); then
+              echo "agent ran with no npm to run"; exit 1
+            fi
+            [[ "$out" == *"@@codeman phase agent"* && "$out" != *"@@codeman phase done"* ]] || { echo "agent printed: $out"; exit 1; }
+            echo "bash $BASH_VERSION: agent stops without saying done"
           '
           # Issue #382: the dsh identity probe builds an OPTIONAL `timeout` prefix as an
           # array, and on stock macOS there is no `timeout`, so the array is empty and the

.github/workflows/desktop-ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+name: Desktop app
+
+# Checks the native macOS app in packages/desktop on the pull requests and master
+# pushes that change it: formatting, clippy and the unit tests, on macOS. No
+# secret and a read-only token, because cargo runs the build script of every
+# crate in Cargo.lock. The release build, signing and notarization live in
+# desktop-dmg.yml.
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - 'packages/desktop/**'
+      - '.github/workflows/desktop-ci.yml'
+  push:
+    branches: [master]
+    paths:
+      - 'packages/desktop/**'
+      - '.github/workflows/desktop-ci.yml'
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: desktop-ci-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.sha }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+env:
+  # Keep in step with desktop-dmg.yml, which builds the release with it.
+  RUST_TOOLCHAIN: '1.99.1'
+
+jobs:
+  check:
+    name: fmt, clippy, test
+    runs-on: macos-26
+    timeout-minutes: 45
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: packages/desktop
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Rust toolchain
+        run: |
+          rustup toolchain install "$RUST_TOOLCHAIN" --profile minimal --component clippy --component rustfmt
+          rustup default "$RUST_TOOLCHAIN"
+          rustc --version
+          cargo --version
+
+      - name: Format
+        run: cargo fmt --check
+
+      # A test build bakes another installer in at compile time (option_env! in
+      # setup.rs), so neither variable may reach cargo.
+      - name: Clippy
+        run: |
+          unset CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALLER_URL CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALL_BRANCH
+          cargo clippy --locked --all-targets -- -D warnings
+
+      - name: Unit tests
+        run: |
+          unset CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALLER_URL CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALL_BRANCH
+          cargo test --locked
+
+      # /bin/bash on macOS is 3.2, the bash these scripts run under on a Mac.
+      - name: Scripts parse on bash 3.2
+        run: |
+          for script in scripts/*.sh; do
+            /bin/bash -n "$script"
+          done

.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+name: macOS app
+
+# Builds Codeman.app (Apple Silicon + Intel), signs it with the Developer ID,
+# has Apple notarize the app and the DMG, and attaches Codeman.dmg and
+# Codeman.dmg.sha256 to a Codeman release. The asset name never changes, so
+# https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg always
+# serves the newest app.
+#
+# Release calls this when npm took a Codeman release, with tag codeman@<version>,
+# and it builds the release commit. By hand, once this file is on master:
+#   gh workflow run desktop-dmg.yml                          # dry run of master: artifacts only
+#   gh workflow run desktop-dmg.yml --ref <branch>           # dry run of a branch that carries this file
+#   gh workflow run desktop-dmg.yml -f tag=codeman@1.50.0    # rebuild that tag, replace its Codeman.dmg
+# Only a run on master (or Release itself) attaches anything; every run leaves
+# the signed Codeman.dmg as an artifact on its run page. A rebuild takes only a
+# Codeman release tag whose commit is on master ("Check the tag", in build and
+# in sign).
+#
+# A dispatch runs its ref's copy of this file with the secrets, as every
+# repository secret reaches anyone with write access. A GitHub Environment
+# limited to master would not narrow the rebuild path (the job's ref is master
+# while it runs the tag's scripts) and would refuse the branch dry run above;
+# the tag check is what keeps a rebuild on master's history.
+#
+# Three jobs, so no job that holds a secret runs code from a crate:
+# - build runs cargo, and with it the build script of every crate in
+#   Cargo.lock. It has a read-only token and nothing else: no secret, no cache.
+# - sign gets the built app as an artifact and runs only Apple's tools and this
+#   repository's scripts on it. It alone holds the signing and notary secrets.
+# - attach has the one token that can write to a release, and no secret.
+
+on:
+  workflow_call:
+    inputs:
+      tag:
+        description: Release to attach Codeman.dmg to (codeman@x.y.z); empty attaches nothing
+        type: string
+        required: false
+        default: ''
+    secrets:
+      MACOS_CERT_P12:
+        description: The Developer ID Application certificate with its private key, a base64 .p12
+        required: true
+      MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD:
+        description: The .p12's password
+        required: true
+      APPLE_ID:
+        description: Apple ID of the developer team, for the notary service
+        required: true
+      APPLE_APP_PASSWORD:
+        description: An app-specific password for that Apple ID
+        required: true
+      APPLE_TEAM_ID:
+        description: The team ID the certificate belongs to
+        required: true
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      tag:
+        description: 'Release tag to rebuild and attach to, e.g. codeman@1.50.0. Empty: dry run, artifacts only'
+        type: string
+        required: false
+        default: ''
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+env:
+  # What the macos-26 image and the Mac mini that built every tested DMG both ran
+  # on 2026-11-08. Move it deliberately, together with desktop-ci.yml; Cargo.toml's
+  # rust-version is the floor.
+  RUST_TOOLCHAIN: '1.99.1'
+  # The commit to build: a rebuild by hand builds the tag it attaches to; Release
+  # (a push to master) and a dry run build the commit they ran on.
+  BUILD_REF: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.tag != '' && format('refs/tags/{0}', inputs.tag) || github.sha }}
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    name: Build Codeman.app
+    runs-on: macos-26
+    timeout-minutes: 60
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ env.BUILD_REF }}
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # A rebuild by hand builds the tag it names, and sign then runs that tag's
+      # scripts with the Developer ID key unlocked. So the tag must be a Codeman
+      # release (another package's tag would put Codeman.dmg on its release), and
+      # its commit must be on master's history, where those scripts were reviewed.
+      # aicodeman@ is the tag a failed rename leaves (Release's retag step).
+      # A tag can move between jobs, so build and sign each check their own
+      # checkout. Inline on purpose: a script from the checkout would be the
+      # tag's own code. Kept the same as the step in sign.
+      - name: Check the tag
+        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.tag != ''
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
+        run: |
+          TAG_RE='^(ai)?codeman@[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'
+          if ! [[ $TAG =~ $TAG_RE ]]; then
+            echo "::error::The tag input is not a Codeman release tag (codeman@x.y.z)"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+          # behind: an ancestor of master's tip; identical: the tip itself.
+          STATUS=$(gh api "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/compare/master...$SHA" --jq .status)
+          case "$STATUS" in
+            behind | identical) echo "$TAG ($SHA) is on master's history" ;;
+            *)
+              echo "::error::$TAG ($SHA) is not on master's history (compare says $STATUS)"
+              exit 1
+              ;;
+          esac
+
+      - name: Rust toolchain
+        run: |
+          rustup toolchain install "$RUST_TOOLCHAIN" --profile minimal \
+            --target aarch64-apple-darwin --target x86_64-apple-darwin
+          rustup default "$RUST_TOOLCHAIN"
+          rustc --version
+          cargo --version
+
+      # A release installs Codeman from getcodeman.com/install and master. A test
+      # build bakes another installer in at compile time (option_env! in setup.rs),
+      # so neither variable may reach cargo here, and setup.rs's tests pin the default.
+      - name: Unit tests
+        working-directory: packages/desktop
+        run: |
+          unset CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALLER_URL CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALL_BRANCH
+          cargo test --locked
+
+      - name: Bundle Codeman.app (signed ad hoc)
+        working-directory: packages/desktop
+        run: |
+          unset CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALLER_URL CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALL_BRANCH SIGN_IDENTITY
+          ./scripts/bundle-macos.sh --universal
+
+      - name: Check the build
+        working-directory: packages/desktop
+        run: |
+          BIN=dist/Codeman.app/Contents/MacOS/codeman-desktop
+          lipo "$BIN" -verify_arch arm64 x86_64
+          codesign --verify --strict dist/Codeman.app
+          strings -a "$BIN" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/strings.txt"
+          if grep -E 'raw\.githubusercontent\.com|test/desktop-' "$RUNNER_TEMP/strings.txt"; then
+            echo "::error::A test installer URL or branch is baked into the app"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          grep -q 'https://getcodeman.com/install' "$RUNNER_TEMP/strings.txt"
+
+      # ditto keeps the bundle's modes, symlinks and extended attributes; an
+      # artifact of the bare folder would not (upload-artifact sets every file to
+      # 644). The artifact is a zip around this zip: download-artifact unpacks the
+      # outer one and leaves the ditto zip as it was.
+      - name: Archive Codeman.app
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/unsigned"
+          ditto -c -k --sequesterRsrc --keepParent packages/desktop/dist/Codeman.app "$RUNNER_TEMP/unsigned/Codeman.app.zip"
+
+      - name: Upload the unsigned app
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
+        with:
+          name: codeman-app-unsigned
+          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/unsigned/Codeman.app.zip
+          if-no-files-found: error
+          retention-days: 7
+          overwrite: true
+
+  sign:
+    name: Sign and notarize
+    needs: build
+    runs-on: macos-26
+    # Two notary submissions; each usually takes minutes, and sign-macos.sh
+    # gives each at most 45.
+    timeout-minutes: 120
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    steps:
+      # For sign-macos.sh, make-dmg.sh and macos/entitlements.plist only. Nothing
+      # here builds or runs code from the app or its crates.
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ env.BUILD_REF }}
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # The same check as in build, on this job's own checkout, before anything
+      # here touches a secret. Kept the same as the step in build.
+      - name: Check the tag
+        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.tag != ''
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
+        run: |
+          TAG_RE='^(ai)?codeman@[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'
+          if ! [[ $TAG =~ $TAG_RE ]]; then
+            echo "::error::The tag input is not a Codeman release tag (codeman@x.y.z)"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+          # behind: an ancestor of master's tip; identical: the tip itself.
+          STATUS=$(gh api "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/compare/master...$SHA" --jq .status)
+          case "$STATUS" in
+            behind | identical) echo "$TAG ($SHA) is on master's history" ;;
+            *)
+              echo "::error::$TAG ($SHA) is not on master's history (compare says $STATUS)"
+              exit 1
+              ;;
+          esac
+
+      - name: Download the unsigned app
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
+        with:
+          name: codeman-app-unsigned
+          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/unsigned
+
+      # The build job ran every crate's build script, so its zip is checked before
+      # this job, which holds the secrets, unpacks it: entries only under
+      # Codeman.app/ (and the __MACOSX/ folder where ditto keeps attributes), no
+      # "..", and no symlink, which the app never has and which could point an
+      # unpack or a later write outside the app.
+      - name: Unpack Codeman.app
+        run: |
+          ZIP="$RUNNER_TEMP/unsigned/Codeman.app.zip"
+          ENTRIES=$(zipinfo -1 "$ZIP")
+          LISTING=$(zipinfo "$ZIP")
+          if printf '%s\n' "$ENTRIES" | grep -vE '^(Codeman\.app|__MACOSX)/' \
+            || printf '%s\n' "$ENTRIES" | grep -E '(^|/)\.\.(/|$)' \
+            || printf '%s\n' "$LISTING" | grep '^l'; then
+            echo "::error::The build artifact holds an entry outside Codeman.app, a '..' or a symlink"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/app"
+          ditto -x -k "$ZIP" "$RUNNER_TEMP/app"
+          if [ -n "$(find "$RUNNER_TEMP/app" -type l)" ]; then
+            echo "::error::The unpacked app holds a symlink"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          test -x "$RUNNER_TEMP/app/Codeman.app/Contents/MacOS/codeman-desktop"
+
+      # A keychain of its own under RUNNER_TEMP, with a random password, holds the
+      # Developer ID key for the length of this job. The last step deletes it and
+      # the decoded .p12, whatever happened before. All five secrets are checked
+      # here, so a missing one stops the job before any work.
+      - name: Signing keychain
+        env:
+          MACOS_CERT_P12: ${{ secrets.MACOS_CERT_P12 }}
+          MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD }}
+          APPLE_ID: ${{ secrets.APPLE_ID }}
+          APPLE_APP_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.APPLE_APP_PASSWORD }}
+          APPLE_TEAM_ID: ${{ secrets.APPLE_TEAM_ID }}
+        run: |
+          for name in MACOS_CERT_P12 MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD APPLE_ID APPLE_APP_PASSWORD APPLE_TEAM_ID; do
+            if [ -z "${!name}" ]; then
+              echo "::error::The repository secret $name is empty or not set"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+          done
+          KEYCHAIN="$RUNNER_TEMP/codeman-signing.keychain-db"
+          P12="$RUNNER_TEMP/codeman-signing.p12"
+          trap 'rm -f "$P12"' EXIT
+          KEYCHAIN_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
+          echo "::add-mask::$KEYCHAIN_PASSWORD"
+
+          # Line breaks out first: an encoder that wraps its output (GNU base64
+          # without -w0) leaves some that macOS's base64 refuses.
+          printf '%s' "$MACOS_CERT_P12" | tr -d '\r\n ' | base64 --decode > "$P12"
+          security create-keychain -p "$KEYCHAIN_PASSWORD" "$KEYCHAIN"
+          # Locks after six hours, not after the default five idle minutes, which
+          # a notarization wait can outlast.
+          security set-keychain-settings -lut 21600 "$KEYCHAIN"
+          security unlock-keychain -p "$KEYCHAIN_PASSWORD" "$KEYCHAIN"
+          security import "$P12" -k "$KEYCHAIN" -f pkcs12 -P "$MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD" -T /usr/bin/codesign
+          rm -f "$P12"
+          security set-key-partition-list -S apple-tool:,apple:,codesign: -s -k "$KEYCHAIN_PASSWORD" "$KEYCHAIN" > /dev/null
+          # First on the search list, ahead of the runner's own keychains.
+          SEARCH=()
+          while IFS= read -r line; do
+            line=${line#*\"}
+            line=${line%\"*}
+            if [ -n "$line" ]; then SEARCH+=("$line"); fi
+          done < <(security list-keychains -d user)
+          security list-keychains -d user -s "$KEYCHAIN" "${SEARCH[@]}"
+
+          # The identity by its SHA-1 hash, which no other certificate can match.
+          IDENTITIES=$(security find-identity -v -p codesigning "$KEYCHAIN")
+          MATCHES=$(printf '%s\n' "$IDENTITIES" | grep '"Developer ID Application: ' || true)
+          COUNT=$(printf '%s' "$MATCHES" | grep -c . || true)
+          if [ "$COUNT" != 1 ]; then
+            printf '%s\n' "$IDENTITIES"
+            echo "::error::MACOS_CERT_P12 holds $COUNT valid Developer ID Application identities; it needs exactly one"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          HASH=$(printf '%s\n' "$MATCHES" | awk '{ print $2 }')
+          IDENTITY=$(printf '%s\n' "$MATCHES" | sed 's/^[^"]*"\(.*\)"$/\1/')
+          case "$IDENTITY" in
+            *"($APPLE_TEAM_ID)") ;;
+            *)
+              echo "::error::The certificate in MACOS_CERT_P12 ($IDENTITY) is not one of team APPLE_TEAM_ID"
+              exit 1
+              ;;
+          esac
+          echo "Signing as $IDENTITY ($HASH)"
+          echo "SIGN_IDENTITY=$HASH" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+
+      # The notary login goes to notarytool on its command line (sign-macos.sh's
+      # APPLE_ID path), in this job only, which already holds the signing key.
+      - name: Sign, notarize and staple
+        env:
+          APPLE_ID: ${{ secrets.APPLE_ID }}
+          APPLE_APP_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.APPLE_APP_PASSWORD }}
+          APPLE_TEAM_ID: ${{ secrets.APPLE_TEAM_ID }}
+        run: packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh "$RUNNER_TEMP/app/Codeman.app" "$RUNNER_TEMP/out"
+
+      # A dry run's result: codeman-dmg on the run page (gh run download <run-id>
+      # -n codeman-dmg). attach takes it from here too.
+      - name: Upload Codeman.dmg
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
+        with:
+          name: codeman-dmg
+          path: |
+            ${{ runner.temp }}/out/Codeman.dmg
+            ${{ runner.temp }}/out/Codeman.dmg.sha256
+          if-no-files-found: error
+          retention-days: 30
+          overwrite: true
+
+      - name: Remove the signing keychain
+        if: always()
+        run: |
+          KEYCHAIN="$RUNNER_TEMP/codeman-signing.keychain-db"
+          if [ -e "$KEYCHAIN" ]; then
+            security delete-keychain "$KEYCHAIN" || true
+          fi
+          rm -f "$KEYCHAIN" "$RUNNER_TEMP/codeman-signing.p12"
+
+  attach:
+    name: Attach to the release
+    needs: sign
+    # Release runs on pushes to master, so github.ref is master both there and for
+    # a rebuild started by hand on master. A dry run from any other branch, or a
+    # fork, attaches nothing.
+    if: inputs.tag != '' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' && github.repository == 'Ark0N/Codeman'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+    steps:
+      - name: Download Codeman.dmg
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
+        with:
+          name: codeman-dmg
+          path: out
+
+      - name: Upload to the release
+        id: upload
+        working-directory: out
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          REQUESTED_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
+        run: |
+          sha256sum -c Codeman.dmg.sha256
+          TAG=$REQUESTED_TAG
+          # Release's retag step ignores its own errors, so a release whose rename to
+          # codeman@ failed still carries the tag changesets gave it.
+          if ! gh release view "$TAG" -R "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+            case "$TAG" in
+              codeman@*) TAG="aicodeman@${TAG#codeman@}" ;;
+            esac
+            gh release view "$TAG" -R "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" > /dev/null
+            echo "::warning::Attaching to $TAG: there is no release $REQUESTED_TAG"
+          fi
+          gh release upload "$TAG" Codeman.dmg Codeman.dmg.sha256 --clobber -R "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
+          echo "tag=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Check the download links
+        working-directory: out
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          TAG: ${{ steps.upload.outputs.tag }}
+        run: |
+          EXPECTED=$(cut -d' ' -f1 Codeman.dmg.sha256)
+          check() {
+            curl -fsSL --retry 6 --retry-delay 10 --retry-all-errors -o "$RUNNER_TEMP/served.dmg" "$1"
+            echo "$EXPECTED  $RUNNER_TEMP/served.dmg" | sha256sum -c --quiet -
+            echo "$1 serves this build"
+          }
+          check "https://github.com/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/download/$TAG/Codeman.dmg"
+          LATEST=$(gh api "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/latest" --jq .tag_name)
+          if [ "$LATEST" = "$TAG" ]; then
+            check "https://github.com/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg"
+          else
+            echo "::warning::Latest is $LATEST, so releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg does not serve $TAG"
+          fi

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ jobs:
       pull-requests: write
     outputs:
       published: ${{ steps.changesets.outputs.published }}
+      # Set only when aicodeman itself was published: `published` is also true for
+      # a release that moved only xterm-zerolag-input.
+      codeman_version: ${{ steps.codeman.outputs.version }}
     steps:
       - name: Checkout repo
         uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -89,6 +92,38 @@ jobs:
           git tag -d "$OLD_TAG" 2>/dev/null || true
           git push origin "$NEW_TAG" ":refs/tags/$OLD_TAG" 2>/dev/null || true
 
+      # The macOS app job below runs only for a Codeman release, so it reads the
+      # version from the list of packages this run published. Never fails the job:
+      # npm has published by now, and a bad list only means no app build.
+      - name: Codeman version published by this run
+        id: codeman
+        if: steps.changesets.outputs.published == 'true'
+        env:
+          PUBLISHED_PACKAGES: ${{ steps.changesets.outputs.publishedPackages }}
+        run: |
+          VERSION=$(printf '%s' "$PUBLISHED_PACKAGES" | jq -r '.[] | select(.name == "aicodeman") | .version' || true)
+          echo "version=$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "Codeman version published: ${VERSION:-none (no macOS app build)}"
+
+      # releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg (the Mac app's stable link) serves
+      # whichever release holds Latest. GitHub gives Latest to the release created
+      # last, and a publish that moved only xterm-zerolag-input creates one the
+      # retag above never touches, so Latest goes back to the newest Codeman
+      # release after every publish. A failure warns and leaves npm, the tag and
+      # the MCP publish alone.
+      - name: Keep Latest on the Codeman release
+        if: steps.changesets.outputs.published == 'true'
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          VERSION=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")
+          RELEASE_ID=$(gh release view "codeman@${VERSION}" --json databaseId -q .databaseId 2>/dev/null || true)
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_ID" ]; then
+            echo "::warning::No codeman@${VERSION} release to mark Latest"
+          elif ! gh api -X PATCH "repos/${{ github.repository }}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}" -f make_latest=true > /dev/null; then
+            echo "::warning::Could not mark codeman@${VERSION} Latest"
+          fi
+
   # Its own job: this one alone holds id-token, and a registry failure shows as itself
   # without touching the npm publish or the tag above.
   mcp-registry:
@@ -99,3 +134,29 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
       id-token: write
     uses: ./.github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml
+
+  # Builds, signs and notarizes the Mac app and attaches Codeman.dmg to the
+  # release (.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml), only when Codeman itself was
+  # published. Its own job, so a failed DMG shows as itself and never touches
+  # npm, the tag or the MCP publish; `gh workflow run desktop-dmg.yml -f
+  # tag=codeman@<version>` reruns it. It gets the five secrets it uses and no
+  # other: never `secrets: inherit`, which would hand it NPM_TOKEN.
+  macos-app:
+    name: macOS app
+    needs: release
+    if: needs.release.outputs.codeman_version != ''
+    # The ceiling for the called jobs; only its attach job asks for write. A job in
+    # desktop-dmg.yml that asks for a permission not granted here (id-token or
+    # attestations for a provenance attestation, say) makes GitHub refuse this
+    # whole Release run at startup, npm publish included: widen both together.
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml
+    with:
+      tag: codeman@${{ needs.release.outputs.codeman_version }}
+    secrets:
+      MACOS_CERT_P12: ${{ secrets.MACOS_CERT_P12 }}
+      MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD }}
+      APPLE_ID: ${{ secrets.APPLE_ID }}
+      APPLE_APP_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.APPLE_APP_PASSWORD }}
+      APPLE_TEAM_ID: ${{ secrets.APPLE_TEAM_ID }}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,42 @@
 # aicodeman
 
+## 1.50.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- ### Thanks
+  - @irisitymichaelgrundberg for the Files panel following an agent into a worktree outside the session's folder, and for the rules that keep that second folder narrow (#780).
+  - @Randalix for keeping two tests independent of the host's locale and git ignore file (#776).
+
+  **Codeman for Mac (#763).** A small native macOS app opens Codeman in its own window: it opens the Codeman running on this Mac, starts it when it is stopped, installs it when it is missing, or connects to Codeman on another machine, with that password kept in the Keychain. It is one universal app for Apple Silicon and Intel on macOS 11.3 or later, and a client of the web UI like a browser tab, so the server and the API do not change for it. Every release from this one carries it as `Codeman.dmg`, signed with a Developer ID and notarized, so it opens after macOS's usual question about a downloaded app ([1.50.0's copy](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/download/codeman@1.50.0/Codeman.dmg)). The app keeps its own version (0.1.0) and does not update itself yet.
+
+  **Your MacBook's Apple logo blinks with your agents (#781).** On a MacBook Pro with a PROLED XDR display, whose lid logo lights up, _View > Blink Apple Logo_ gives each agent state its own rhythm: one for _While Working_, one for _Waiting for You_ (a yellow tab) and one for _Needs Permission_ (a red tab), each picked from Calm, Slow, Wink, Heartbeat, Fast and Alarm. Set Heartbeat for work, Wink for a finished turn and Alarm (three sharp flashes, then a rest) for a permission dialog, and the lid tells you from across the room which one it is. All three are off until you choose one, the menu shows only on a Mac with that logo, and no style flashes more than three times a second. It uses a private macOS setting, so a macOS update can take the menu away.
+
+  **Install from the app, with no Terminal and no password (#773).** On a Mac without Codeman, the app runs the installer's no-admin route in its own window, shows the steps as a checklist and opens Codeman once it answers. If the Mac has no coding agent it offers one, and _Add a coding agent_ (also in the app menu) adds one later without touching a running Codeman. The This Mac tab now lists every Codeman of this user already running on the Mac. The install needs macOS 15 or a tmux that is already there; on an older Mac the app offers Terminal instead. For this, `install.sh` gained `preflight`, `agent <id>`, `--ai-cli` and `--progress`.
+
+  **The Files panel follows a worktree outside the session's folder (#780).** Since 1.49.0 the panel follows an agent into a worktree inside the session's folder. It now also follows one of the same repository beside it, such as `git worktree add ../feature`, when the session's own repository vouches for it, and files there preview, edit and open from terminal links like workspace files. It follows none while attachment workspace confinement is on, and none at or around a blocked or sensitive folder, in a Docker case workspace, at the home folder or above, or outside the owner's space in multi-user mode. The API stays compatible: `liveWorktree` and `root=live` keep their 1.49.0 meaning, and an outside worktree comes as the new `outsideWorktree` field, listed by `root=live-any` with absolute paths.
+
+  **A coding model that runs on your Mac (#784, experimental).** On an Apple silicon Mac, **Run a local model** on the welcome screen opens a window that shows which local coding model fits the machine and with which agent, installs a pinned Ollama runtime and the model, checks it, and ends on an agent session that runs on it through a Custom Model Endpoint. The catalogue covers every Apple silicon memory size from 8 to 512 GB, and every model carries memory figures of its own: a 9B coding model (labelled limited) from 18 GB, Qwen3.8 27B or Qwen3.6 35B-A3B from 36 GB, Ornith 1.5 122B from 128 GB, while 8 and 16 GB get a plain sentence on why nothing fits. _Recommended_ appears only for a pairing run on a Mac like yours, so far Qwen3.6 35B-A3B with OpenCode on an M5 Pro with 48 GB; every other figure is computed from the model's architecture and shown as an estimate. No account or API key is needed, and the session's prompts go to the model on this Mac rather than a cloud provider. On any other machine nothing is offered, and in multi-user mode only an admin can install. A weekly check in CI compares every catalogue model and the pinned runtime with what a Mac would download and opens one issue when something moved. The routes and their payloads may change in any release; the guide is `docs/local-models.md`.
+
+  **Claude in the cloud, a model on your Mac (#784, experimental).** The codeman skill can hand work to that local model: `local_model` says what is installed and whether it runs, `spawn_worker <name> local` starts a worker on it (and the runtime, when it is stopped), and `sendmark` gives the worker a task and reads back the answer it writes. A Claude Code session plans and reviews while the Mac does the bulk: summaries, first drafts, files that should stay on the machine.
+
+  **Ralph starts from Session Options (#783).** The start screen no longer has a Start Ralph Loop button. Behaviour change: start a Ralph loop from Session Options, Ralph / Todo. The wizard that button opened can no longer be reached.
+
+  **The Codeman agent skill is on by default (#787).** New sessions get the skill where their CLI looks for skills (`.claude/skills/codeman/` for Claude Code, `.agents/skills/codeman/` for Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Antigravity, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP; none for Pi, GitHub Copilot or a plain shell), so an agent can start and drive workers without an install step. The copy ignores itself in git (a `.gitignore` of `*` inside it, written once and never overwritten), so it never shows up as a new file in your repository, and a symlinked `reference/` folder inside it is refused. **Behaviour change:** every App Settings save on 1.49.0 or earlier stored this switch as off whether or not you touched it, so the first start of 1.50.0 switches a stored off on, once per data directory, and the startup log says when it did. Turn it off under App Settings, Agents & CLIs, All agent CLIs, **Codeman Agent Skill**: an off set after that first start stays off. Reload any tab left open from before the upgrade before you save App Settings there. Turning it off removes no copy already written; `codeman skill uninstall --case <name>` does.
+
+  **Fixes.**
+  - **No developer tools window on a Mac without Xcode (#779).** There `/usr/bin/git` is Apple's placeholder, and the server ran it on the first page load, so a 1.49.0 no-admin install opened macOS's "install the command line developer tools" window right after it finished, and again after every server start. Every git the server starts now checks first and treats that placeholder as no git, and installing the tools later needs no restart.
+  - **A new agent shows up as soon as the installer adds it (#778).** A running Codeman remembered a missing CLI for up to 5 minutes, so Run still said it was not installed after `install.sh agent <id>` or the app had added it. The installer now touches `~/.codeman/cli-installed`, and the server looks again when that file changes.
+  - **The approvals list leaves a brand-new dialog alone (#782).** In a dialog's first 3 seconds, before Claude Code has drawn it, `GET /api/approvals` could resolve it, which cleared its red tab on every device and left the push notification's Approve button with nothing to answer. The list now waits as long as the inbox does.
+  - **Custom model endpoints survive concurrent writes.** The endpoint routes and the 5-minute discovery sweep wrote `custom-model-hosts.json` through one shared temp file, so two at once could tear it or drop a record. Every write is serialized now, and a file that does not parse is refused with 409 instead of replaced. Behaviour change: the endpoint id `local-ollama` is reserved for the model Codeman runs on this Mac.
+  - **Clearing a custom endpoint relaunches on the session's own model.** A selection no longer writes its launch model into the session's stored CLI config, so a cleared session starts on the model it was created with, not on the endpoint's model id against the CLI's own backend. Only API callers could reach this.
+
+  **Fixes applied while landing.** An adopted session never follows a worktree outside its folder, like a remote or Docker session (#780). The worktree test also keeps the system gitconfig away from the code under test (#776).
+
+  The Release workflow now builds, signs, notarizes and attaches `Codeman.dmg` (`.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml`, #785), publishes each version to the official MCP registry (`io.github.Ark0N/codeman`) with GitHub's OIDC token, and rebuilds the GitHub release page from this changelog. Pull requests that touch `packages/desktop` run `cargo fmt`, clippy and `cargo test` on macOS.
+
+  **Docs and tests.** The README, the Chinese README and the wiki's Installation page gained a section on the Mac app (#786), the Autonomous Loops page no longer points at the removed wizard, and `docs/local-models.md` covers the local model install. Two tests no longer depend on the host's locale or git ignore file (#776).
+
 ## 1.49.0
 
 ### Minor Changes

CLAUDE.md

@@ -52,13 +52,13 @@ Uses [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) (`MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`) via `@chan
 
 When the user says **COM** (`COM` = patch, `COM minor`, `COM major`): **Read [`docs/releasing.md`](docs/releasing.md) and follow every step in order**; never improvise a release from memory. It covers the changeset, `npm run version-packages`, the `**Version**` line below, the branch check and explicit-path commit, deploy, the getcodeman.com badge, watching BOTH CI workflows, the MCP registry publish, and the Discussions announcement.
 
-**Version**: 1.49.0 (must match `package.json`)
+**Version**: 1.50.0 (must match `package.json`)
 
 ## Project Overview
 
 Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph Loop. Spawns Claude CLI via PTY, streams via SSE, supports respawn cycling for 24+ hour autonomous runs.
 
-**Tech Stack**: TypeScript (ES2022/NodeNext, strict mode), Node.js, Fastify, node-pty, xterm.js. Supports Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex (OpenAI), Gemini (Google, enterprise-only since Google's June 2026 consumer cutover), Antigravity (`agy`, Google), Pi (pi.dev), Grok Build (`grok`, xAI), DeepSeek Harness (`dsh`), OMP (`omp`) and GitHub Copilot (`copilot`, npm `@github/copilot`) CLIs via pluggable CLI resolvers (`SessionMode = 'claude' | 'shell' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini' | 'antigravity' | 'pi' | 'grok' | 'deepseek' | 'omp' | 'copilot'`).
+**Tech Stack**: TypeScript (ES2022/NodeNext, strict mode), Node.js, Fastify, node-pty, xterm.js. Supports Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex (OpenAI), Gemini (Google, enterprise-only since Google's June 2026 consumer cutover), Antigravity (`agy`, Google), Pi (pi.dev), Grok Build (`grok`, xAI), DeepSeek Harness (`dsh`), OMP (`omp`), GitHub Copilot (`copilot`, npm `@github/copilot`) and jcode (`jcode`) CLIs via pluggable CLI resolvers (`SessionMode = 'claude' | 'shell' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini' | 'antigravity' | 'pi' | 'grok' | 'deepseek' | 'omp' | 'copilot' | 'jcode'`).
 
 **TypeScript Strictness** (see `tsconfig.json`): `noUnusedLocals`, `noUnusedParameters`, `noImplicitReturns`, `noImplicitOverride`, `noFallthroughCasesInSwitch`, `allowUnreachableCode: false`, `allowUnusedLabels: false`.
 
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 - **Instance isolation / multi-instance attach danger** — the data dir (`~/.codeman`) and tmux socket (`tmux -L codeman`) are PROCESS-WIDE and shared by every Codeman on the machine, derived from `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` via `src/config/instance.ts`. ⚠️ A 2nd instance on the SAME socket **discovers and attaches PTYs to the first instance's live sessions**, resizing and mutating them. `$HOME` isolation is NOT enough because tmux is system-global. To run two instances, give each a distinct `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` (scopes dir + socket together), or set `CODEMAN_TMUX_SOCKET` + `CODEMAN_DATA_DIR` individually; `scripts/run-beta.sh` does this for a beta alongside prod. **Any new `~/.codeman/...` path MUST go through `dataPath()`**, never `join(homedir(), '.codeman', …)`, and **any new `tmux -L` caller through `resolveTmuxSocketName()`** (both in `config/instance.ts`): the TUI shells out to tmux from a second process, and a hardcoded `codeman` there would point a beta instance at prod's panes. → [architecture-invariants#instance-isolation-and-the-multi-instance-attach-danger](docs/architecture-invariants.md#instance-isolation-and-the-multi-instance-attach-danger)
 - **The prefix table on Codeman's socket holds only `<prefix> send-prefix`** — browser tabs are tmux attach clients, and tmux's stock bindings let Ctrl+B `)`/`s` move a tab onto another session. `createSession` resets the table, and `reconcileSessions()` at boot for sessions that survived an upgrade (`src/tmux-prefix-table.ts`); `root` and `C-<letter> detach-client` (the TUI attach's way out) are left alone, so F1 and that alias reach browser tabs for the length of an attach. Alt+1..9 are `if-shell` bindings that `switch-client` only for the TUI's own client (`client_tty` plus a one-shot pid hook), so a browser tab's Esc-then-digit does not move it. Docker and owned-remote nested servers get the same reduction (`C-q send-prefix` only) in their create chain. ⚠️ So `Ctrl+B d` does not exist there: anything attaching a user's terminal claims its own detach key (F1 in `root`, as `codeman tui` and `scripts/tmux-manager.sh` do). → [architecture-invariants#the-prefix-table-on-codemans-socket-holds-only-send-prefix](docs/architecture-invariants.md#the-prefix-table-on-codemans-socket-holds-only-send-prefix)
 - **node-pty's macOS `spawn-helper` ships without `+x`** (issues #6, #204): `node-pty@1.1.0` publishes `prebuilds/darwin-<arch>/spawn-helper` as mode 0644, and macOS launches every PTY through it, so a stock macOS install fails every session start with `Error: posix_spawnp failed.` **Linux can never reproduce it**: `spawn-helper` is an `OS=="mac"` gyp target and node-pty ships no Linux prebuild, so node-gyp always emits an executable helper there. ⚠️ The flip side of that: since Linux has no prebuild, `npm install` **needs a C/C++ toolchain there** (`make`, `g++`, `python3`), so `install.sh` checks for and installs one alongside Node/tmux/git — a stock Ubuntu 24 server has none and died inside node-gyp with `not found: make`. Do not drop that step. (The installer's no-admin route cannot install one, so there it stops before downloading anything and names what is missing.) ⚠️ Look in **`prebuilds/<platform>-<arch>/`**, not just `build/Release/`, which does not exist on macOS. Repair is a chmod, never a mandatory rebuild (that would require Xcode CLI tools and deletes `prebuilds/` before compiling): `npm run fix:node-pty` chmods every helper then proves it by really opening a PTY. `spawnPtyWithHelperRepair()` (`utils/node-pty-repair.ts`) wraps every `pty.spawn()` in `session.ts` and self-heals a broken install on the first failure. → [architecture-invariants#node-ptys-macos-spawn-helper-must-be-executable](docs/architecture-invariants.md#node-ptys-macos-spawn-helper-must-be-executable)
+- **Never start `git` without `gitSpawnAllowed()`** (`utils/git-availability.ts`): on a Mac without the developer tools `/usr/bin/git` is Apple's placeholder, and running it, even as `git --version`, opens macOS's "install the command line developer tools" window. The server did that on the first page load after a no-admin install (`isGitAvailable()` from `renderIndexHtml`) and would have again at every start. The gate resolves `git` on the PATH itself and, for the placeholder, proves the tools first with `xcode-select -p`, which never opens a window; a refusal is answered as ENOENT (`gitMissingError()`), which every caller already reads as "git is not installed". `test/git-spawn-gate.test.ts` pins the list of spawn sites, so a new one fails until it is gated. `install.sh` follows the same rule for the same reason.
 - **User-chosen paths are probed BOUNDED, never with `existsSync`/`statSync`** (#516): a linked case or a `workingDir` can sit on a network mount that stopped answering. A synchronous check there freezes the whole server, and an unbounded async `stat`/`lstat`/`readFile` holds one of libuv's threadpool workers (4 by default, shared with every `fs`, `dns.lookup` and `crypto` call) until the mount returns. On a request or spawn path use `probePath()`/`probePathKind()` (`utils/bounded-path-probe.ts`, read its `@fileoverview`). ⚠️ `unknown` is NEVER `absent`: nothing is created, scaffolded or 404'd on it. Bulk scans keep the stall cap; a request for ONE path the user named may pass `{ pastCap: true }`, which still stops at the ceiling that keeps one worker free; and a helper that would otherwise touch the path skips whatever is still `unknown`. User-facing errors for it go through `describeUnknownPath()`, so a refused probe is not reported as a broken folder.
 - **Headless screenshots: `deviceScaleFactor` MUST be 1, and write unique filenames** — under DSF=2 xterm's WebGL renderer draws glyphs at ~2× nominal size while still *reporting* nominal cell dims, so only the pixels reveal it and only the terminal font looks wrong. And overwriting a fixed output path leaves OS image viewers showing the old render, which reads as "the fix didn't work"; `scripts/capture-real-overview.mjs` mints a timestamped filename per run. Seed the per-device `localStorage` keys (`codeman:skin`, `codeman-font-size`, `codeman-app-settings`) so the capture matches a real device. → [architecture-invariants#headless-screenshot-capture](docs/architecture-invariants.md#headless-screenshot-capture)
 
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 **Input**: `session.writeViaMux()` for programmatic/curl input via one tmux bracketed paste (`paste-buffer -p`) + `send-keys Enter`; a multi-line prompt keeps its line breaks inside that paste. A single character is typed with `send-keys -l` instead, because selection dialogs ignore a pasted digit. Interactive **browser** input goes through a durable **exactly-once** layer: a stable `clientId` + monotonic per-session `seq` persisted to localStorage until the server ACKs, so a dropped link cannot lose or double-deliver a prompt. `ws-connection-registry.ts` supersedes only same-TAB reconnects, so two tabs on one session coexist. → [architecture-invariants#input-delivery-and-ws-resilience](docs/architecture-invariants.md#input-delivery-and-ws-resilience)
 
-**Agent wait primitives**: bounded long-polls: `GET /api/sessions/:id/wait`, `GET .../wait-output` (literal substring, **never** regex) and `wait`/`waitTimeout` on `POST .../input`. Registry `session-wait-registry.ts` (pure), bounds `config/agent-wait.ts`. ⚠️ A timeout is a 200 (`wait.timedOut`). ⚠️ `stop` exists for `claude` and `deepseek` ONLY, and never for an adopted session (rule lives in `hooksAvailableForMode()`), `blocked` also for a CLI declaring `capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine` (codex, read off the screen; `blockedSignalAvailable()`): explicit request elsewhere is a 400. ⚠️ Send-and-wait registers the waiter BEFORE the write; teardown must `notifySignal('exit')` BEFORE `cancelAll()`; hangup abort listens on `reply.raw` (guarded by `writableFinished`), never `req.raw`; liveness comes from `isPaneDead`, never `session.pid`. ⚠️ Signals are edge-triggered with no history: gather fan-outs via send-and-wait or `wait-output` markers. Packaged as the `skills/codeman` skill (`codeman skill install`, plugin marketplace, or injection behind `agentSkillEnabled`, SYNCED, default OFF, into the directory each CLI scans: `capabilities.agentSkillDir`, `.claude/skills` for claude, `.agents/skills` for the others, none for pi): injection is add-only, marker-owned (`applyAgentSkill`), refuses symlinks, and refreshes a marker-owned user-level copy (`refreshUserAgentSkill`). → [architecture-invariants#agent-wait-primitives](docs/architecture-invariants.md#agent-wait-primitives), `docs/api-reference.md`
+**Agent wait primitives**: bounded long-polls: `GET /api/sessions/:id/wait`, `GET .../wait-output` (literal substring, **never** regex) and `wait`/`waitTimeout` on `POST .../input`. Registry `session-wait-registry.ts` (pure), bounds `config/agent-wait.ts`. ⚠️ A timeout is a 200 (`wait.timedOut`). ⚠️ `stop` exists for `claude` and `deepseek` ONLY, and never for an adopted session (rule lives in `hooksAvailableForMode()`), `blocked` also for a CLI declaring `capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine` (codex, read off the screen; `blockedSignalAvailable()`): explicit request elsewhere is a 400. ⚠️ Send-and-wait registers the waiter BEFORE the write; teardown must `notifySignal('exit')` BEFORE `cancelAll()`; hangup abort listens on `reply.raw` (guarded by `writableFinished`), never `req.raw`; liveness comes from `isPaneDead`, never `session.pid`. ⚠️ Signals are edge-triggered with no history: gather fan-outs via send-and-wait or `wait-output` markers. Packaged as the `skills/codeman` skill (`codeman skill install`, plugin marketplace, or injection behind `agentSkillEnabled`, SYNCED, **default ON since 1.50.0**, into the directory each CLI scans: `capabilities.agentSkillDir`, `.claude/skills` for claude, `.agents/skills` for the others, none for pi or copilot): injection is add-only, marker-owned (`applyAgentSkill`), refuses symlinks, and refreshes a marker-owned user-level copy (`refreshUserAgentSkill`). ⚠️ An ABSENT key means ON on both sides (server `!== false`, the page's switch `!== false`, or a Save writes the old default back); only an explicit false is off, and turning it off still sweeps nothing (`codeman skill uninstall --case <name>` removes copies). ⚠️ Existing installs that stored off are switched on once at the first 1.50.0 start (every Save up to 1.49.0 wrote `false`); turning it off afterwards sticks. That is `migrateAgentSkillDefault()` (`web/agent-skill-default-migration.ts`, from `WebServer.start()` before the first settings read and before listen, skipped in test mode, through `mutateSettingsFile()` only): it stores `true`, never deletes the key (the page's merge keeps a device's own `false` for a key the server lacks, and the next Save would write it back; the page also drops its copy when the server has no key), and its "done" marker is its own file, `agent-skill-default-migrated.json` in the data dir, never a settings key (so no Save sends or drops it, the `.strict()` schema never sees it, and a config-backup restore leaves it alone). ⚠️ Every managed copy ignores itself in git: a `.gitignore` of `*` written FIRST with `wx` (never overwritten, never part of `readAgentSkillSource()`, so never in `skills/codeman/` or the plugin mirror), removed by uninstall only when it is the last file left; never touch the user's own ignore files for it. → [architecture-invariants#agent-wait-primitives](docs/architecture-invariants.md#agent-wait-primitives), `docs/api-reference.md`
 
 **Agent CLI (`codeman agent …`, `src/cli-agent.ts`)**: the command-line client for the wait primitives and the session verbs, for agents the skill does not reach (pi, shell, no `jq`; `seedAgentSessionPreamble` covers every local session whose CLI takes the skill, `capabilities.agentSkillDir`; every pane still exports `CODEMAN_MUX`/`CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`/`CODEMAN_API_URL`). It is an HTTP CLIENT: inspection and guarded stage/submit use the ownership-checked `agent-session-routes.ts` module (experimental, behind `agentCoordinationEnabled`, SYNCED, default OFF: all three routes answer `403 FORBIDDEN` naming it while off, and the CLI shows that verbatim); the other verbs reuse existing routes, with no second transport (the plan's "Socket API" non-goal stands), every call carries `X-Codeman-Parent-Session`, only `spawn`'s quick-start carries `X-Codeman-Agent-Origin` (pinned in test/cli-agent.test.ts), while `spawn` without a case (cwd or `--working-dir`) is `POST /api/v1/sessions` plus `/interactive` or `/shell` without that header, so no agent-case marker, and refuses (exit 4, before any request) an empty `--working-dir` and a bare spawn from a HOME cwd, since it always sends an explicit `workingDir` and the server's no-`workingDir` hooks skip cannot apply (test/cli-agent-project-spawn.test.ts), auth (`src/codeman-credentials.ts`, shared with `codeman attach` and the TUI) from `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` or the data dir's `.env` (the same reader `codeman attach` uses — `readCodemanEnvFile`). Verbs return exit codes (`0` ok / `1` error / `2` timeout / `3` exited / `4` refused) instead of calling `process.exit`, so `test/cli-agent.test.ts` drives every verb against a recording fake transport plus the real `httpRequest` against a local server. ⚠️ Three guards live in code, not prose, and the tests pin them: refuse without `CODEMAN_MUX=1`+`CODEMAN_API_URL` (never guess a URL); `send` transmits printable text + `\r` only (`inputRefusal`: any byte < 0x20 or DEL refuses BEFORE the transport — opencode's `Ctrl+C` is `app_exit`), ESC exists solely as `interrupt` with no `\r`; `rm` fails closed (`deleteRefusal`: empty id, self shorter than 8, prefix match in EITHER direction, re-checked on the resolved id). ⚠️ The routes accept FULL ids only — an 8-char prefix is a 404 (measured live) — while `ls` prints prefixes, so `resolveSessionId` maps a short id through `GET /api/v1/sessions` and refuses an ambiguous one. It also refuses any id under 8 characters (exit 4, on every verb, before any request), the same floor as the server's `PARENT_SESSION_ID_MIN_PREFIX`, so `rm 9` can never pick an arbitrary session. ⚠️ A 400 for `--until stop` on a hook-less mode is passed through verbatim, never papered over: the marker path is the answer there. `spawn` on a readiness timeout exits 2 and LEAVES the session for inspection (the skill's `spawn_worker` deletes it; the CLI's caller is often a human); its stdout is the id ALONE (prose on stderr) so `SID=$(…)` works. ⚠️ Two server answers that look like success and are not: `delivered:false` without `duplicate` (the bytes went into a dead pane — the field exists so a client says "restart" instead of "wait longer") and `wait.ended:true, signal:null` (the worker died during a `stop`/`idle` wait: the registry satisfies only waiters that listed `exit`, then cancels the rest) — both exit 3, checked BEFORE the happy paths in `waitExitCode`. → README "`codeman agent`", `docs/api-reference.md`
 
@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 **CLI registry** (`src/config/cli-registry/`): every run mode is a `CliEntry` (discovery, launch argv template, env handling, `capabilities`, and the `overlays` behind remote/docker pane commands). **No code outside `stock.ts` may branch on a CLI id**: use a capability field or a NAMED PROFILE (`profiles.ts`); `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` and `test/frontend-cli-no-id-branching.test.ts` enforce it. ⚠️ Config holds typed argv tokens, never shell text; literals are validated at LOAD time and a bad one rejects the whole entry. ⚠️ Keep `external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` independent; never derive one from another. ⚠️ Config regexes (`discovery.version.regex`, `capabilities.workDetect.workingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.watchingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.awaitingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.composerFooterLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.composerPopupLine`, `capabilities.modelDetect.screenLine`) must compile through `compileVersionRegex()`. ⚠️ `privilegedParams[].param` names a LAUNCH PARAM, not the legacy `<Mode>Config` field (bridged only by `launch.legacyConfigAliases`); a wrong name silently clamps nothing. ⚠️ Resolve the registry AT CALL TIME, never in a module-level const. ⚠️ Remote claude/omp arms of `buildRemoteLaunchCommand` are not covered by the pane-command golden. `~/.codeman/clis.json` overrides entries. It is WRITTEN only by the opt-in CLI management routes (`cliManagementEnabled`, default OFF; `/api/clis`, `cli-registry-routes.ts`), and only through `mutateRegistryFile()` in `registry-writer.ts` (the one exception: a config-backup restore of `clis.json`, which then calls `reloadCliRegistry()`), which serializes mutations and refuses (409) a file that does not parse or has group/world permission bits rather than overwriting it. Importing the registry still writes nothing. → [architecture-invariants#cli-registry](docs/architecture-invariants.md#cli-registry), `docs/cli-registry.md`
 
-**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP, Copilot)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` gates Claude-specific behavior off (Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token parsing, ❯ readiness; readiness is output stabilization); work detection is per-CLI `capabilities.workDetect` data, not this gate. All nine **require tmux, no direct PTY fallback** (secrets go via socket-scoped `tmux setenv`, never the command line). ⚠️ `run*()` in `session-ui.js` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope. ⚠️ **Codex uses predictive write-through echo, never the buffer overlay**: `_predictHookOnData` must never `return` (wire path stays byte-identical), and flushed text and a bracketed paste must go out as separate delayed writes. ⚠️ **Pi**: no bypass flag, never invent one; `approveProjectTrust` executes repo code, so it is in the clamp's **materialize** branch; never wire `--api-key`. ⚠️ **Grok**: `alwaysApprove` is stripped for non-granted owners (only-if-sent). ⚠️ **DeepSeek**: the agent is a PROFILE (Run gates on `isDeepSeekRunnable()`); the permission switch is the `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` env var, so `clampEnvOverridesForOwner()` must DROP `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE`, `DSH_HOME` and `DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL` for non-granted owners; `hooksAvailableForMode()` is per-SESSION for it (pass `sessionHookOptions(session)`) and is never a stand-in for `mode === 'claude'`; answers come from `deepseek-transcript.ts`, paired by header `cwd` + boot window, never newest-mtime. ⚠️ **OMP**: `OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL`/`_TOKEN` are clamped the same way. ⚠️ **Copilot**: `allowAll` (`--yolo`) is a `privilegedParam` and `COPILOT_HOME`/`COPILOT_ALLOW_ALL`/`COPILOT_PROVIDER_*`/`COPILOT_MODEL` are privileged env keys, and so is every other `COPILOT_*` variable the CLI reads that switches approvals, runs code with no approval row or sends its sign-in token elsewhere (the 1.0.98 list is in `stock.ts`; the prefix admits whatever a later release adds, so re-read the bundle whenever the measured version moves); the resume id must start with a letter or digit (`path-segment`), since `--resume`'s value is optional and `--resume --yolo` would otherwise make `--yolo` its own flag; `--name` is dropped next to `--resume`/`--continue` (Copilot refuses the pair); its mouse DECSETs are stripped (`strip-mux-and-mouse`) so a drag selects and the wheel is forwarded by `_shouldForwardWheelToApp` while `cliMouseTracking` is on; `composerReadyMark` is the footer hint `/ commands · ? help`, NOT `❯` (the folder-trust dialog draws `❯ 1. Yes`); `last-response` reads the pane's visible screen (`transcriptNeedsScreenCapture`) through a per-CLI `PANE_DIALECTS` row, because its stream is cursor moves, not lines (a prompt row scrolled off by a tall answer reads as the answer's tail unless a banner/trust dialog is on screen, and typed composer text is not a prompt); Docker seeds no Copilot credential (`config.json` holds a plain-text token without a keyring). → [architecture-invariants#external-cli-modes-opencode-codex-gemini-antigravity-pi-grok-deepseek-omp](docs/architecture-invariants.md#external-cli-modes-opencode-codex-gemini-antigravity-pi-grok-deepseek-omp)
+**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP, Copilot, jcode)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` gates Claude-specific behavior off (Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token parsing, ❯ readiness; readiness is output stabilization); work detection is per-CLI `capabilities.workDetect` data, not this gate. All ten **require tmux, no direct PTY fallback** (secrets go via socket-scoped `tmux setenv`, never the command line). ⚠️ `run*()` in `session-ui.js` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope. ⚠️ **Codex uses predictive write-through echo, never the buffer overlay**: `_predictHookOnData` must never `return` (wire path stays byte-identical), and flushed text and a bracketed paste must go out as separate delayed writes. ⚠️ **Pi**: no bypass flag, never invent one; `approveProjectTrust` executes repo code, so it is in the clamp's **materialize** branch; never wire `--api-key`. ⚠️ **Grok**: `alwaysApprove` is stripped for non-granted owners (only-if-sent). ⚠️ **DeepSeek**: the agent is a PROFILE (Run gates on `isDeepSeekRunnable()`); the permission switch is the `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` env var, so `clampEnvOverridesForOwner()` must DROP `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE`, `DSH_HOME` and `DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL` for non-granted owners; `hooksAvailableForMode()` is per-SESSION for it (pass `sessionHookOptions(session)`) and is never a stand-in for `mode === 'claude'`; answers come from `deepseek-transcript.ts`, paired by header `cwd` + boot window, never newest-mtime. ⚠️ **OMP**: `OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL`/`_TOKEN` are clamped the same way. ⚠️ **Copilot**: `allowAll` (`--yolo`) is a `privilegedParam` and `COPILOT_HOME`/`COPILOT_ALLOW_ALL`/`COPILOT_PROVIDER_*`/`COPILOT_MODEL` are privileged env keys, and so is every other `COPILOT_*` variable the CLI reads that switches approvals, runs code with no approval row or sends its sign-in token elsewhere (the 1.0.98 list is in `stock.ts`; the prefix admits whatever a later release adds, so re-read the bundle whenever the measured version moves); the resume id must start with a letter or digit (`path-segment`), since `--resume`'s value is optional and `--resume --yolo` would otherwise make `--yolo` its own flag; `--name` is dropped next to `--resume`/`--continue` (Copilot refuses the pair); its mouse DECSETs are stripped (`strip-mux-and-mouse`) so a drag selects and the wheel is forwarded by `_shouldForwardWheelToApp` while `cliMouseTracking` is on; `composerReadyMark` is the footer hint `/ commands · ? help`, NOT `❯` (the folder-trust dialog draws `❯ 1. Yes`); `last-response` reads the pane's visible screen (`transcriptNeedsScreenCapture`) through a per-CLI `PANE_DIALECTS` row, because its stream is cursor moves, not lines (a prompt row scrolled off by a tall answer reads as the answer's tail unless a banner/trust dialog is on screen, and typed composer text is not a prompt); Docker seeds no Copilot credential (`config.json` holds a plain-text token without a keyring). ⚠️ **jcode**: every pane is a client of ONE shared per-user daemon and the tools run in the daemon with ITS env, so jcode gets no agent skill and no `JCODE_*` envOverrides prefix (a per-session value would act as another session or reach every one); `last-response` is an honest empty (external + `transcript: 'none'`, never the segmenter or the Claude scan); ⚠️ that daemon is a descendant of whichever pane started it, so `capabilities.sharedDaemon` makes `killSession` spare descendants outside the pane's process group (`descendantsInPaneGroup()`, `proc-tree.ts`), or closing that one tab cuts every other jcode session off; it resolves through the generic registry resolver, with no per-CLI resolver module (`docs/jcode-integration.md`). → [architecture-invariants#external-cli-modes-opencode-codex-gemini-antigravity-pi-grok-deepseek-omp](docs/architecture-invariants.md#external-cli-modes-opencode-codex-gemini-antigravity-pi-grok-deepseek-omp)
 
 **DeepSeek web UI** (`POST`/`GET`/`DELETE /api/deepseek/web`, `deepseek-web-server.ts`): the Run menu's "DeepSeek web UI..." entry supervises ONE background `dsh web` child process, deliberately **NOT a shell session**. ⚠️ Every piece is load-bearing: exactly one server (a second click REUSES it), restarted when the browser authority changes (`--trusted-host`, last asker wins), killed on shutdown via `stopDeepSeekWeb()` (the detached child would otherwise outlive Codeman and hold its port), and failures returned to the caller. ⚠️ Never hardcode the port: search from 3080 across 40, detect free ports by BINDING, then wait for the server to really answer. ⚠️ Both `POST` and `DELETE` must stay behind `canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands` (booting a profile runs its plugin code; the server is shared). → [architecture-invariants#deepseek-web-ui](docs/architecture-invariants.md#deepseek-web-ui)
 
@@ -234,17 +235,17 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 **Prompt uploads** (`POST /api/sessions/:id/paste-image`: clipboard paste, drop, the Compose Attach key and the phone toolbar's Attach button; client wiring in `image-input.js` and `keyboard-accessory.js`): a pick is written to `<workspace>/.codeman-uploads/` and its path lands on the prompt as unsent text. The folder is IN the workspace because that is the only path identical for a local and a container agent, FLAT because `<workspace>/.codeman/` would BE the data dir when the workspace is the home directory, and self-ignoring through a `.gitignore` of `*` written ONCE with `wx` (a file already there is the user's and is never overwritten; the user's own ignore file is never touched). ⚠️ The directory names live ONLY in `paste-image-gc.ts` (`UPLOAD_DIR_NAMES`): the pre-move `.claude-images/` receives nothing but stays readable for one release, so the GC sweep and the delete cleanup (through `uploadDirs()`) and the image watcher's ignore filter (reading the names) cover BOTH; retire the legacy entry there, never by hand elsewhere. ⚠️ `uploadDirs()` is async and probes the workspace BOUNDED first (`probePathKind()`, the #516 rule: an `unknown` path is skipped, never touched; the sweep keeps the stall cap and the delete passes `pastCap`), then returns only REAL directories (lstat, so a planted symlink is never one), none that is or contains `getDataDir()` (one strictly inside it only holds uploads and is listed), and none for a remote session, since both consumers delete; the check is made at list time, and the same-user race after it is accepted. Images are buffered in memory under `MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES` (50MB) after a client-side canvas re-encode; a DOCUMENT (pdf, docx, pptx, xlsx, zip and the text family txt/md/csv/tsv/json/log/yaml/yml/xml; the curated `ALLOWED_DOCUMENT_EXTS`, never `SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` or `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS`, which carry sh/py/js/html) is admitted by its name's extension alone, buffered like an image, judged on its bytes by the same fail-closed `imageMagicMatchesExt` (`%PDF-`, `PK\x03\x04` for the OOXML trio and zip, UTF-8 without a NUL byte for text: a SIGNATURE or ENCODING check, never a structure or content check, so generic zip bytes pass as `.docx` and a script renamed `.txt` is text; the sh/py/js/html exclusion is a SCOPE choice by extension, keeping the server from storing what it would serve or run, not a content filter: the agent can already write any of those) and saved as `paste-<ts>-<hex>-<stem><ext>` with a sanitized stem (`[A-Za-z0-9._-]`, 40 chars, a wholly non-ASCII name leaves no stem; the `paste-` prefix is what the GC matches). A VIDEO is never buffered: `?kind=video` streams it to disk under `MAX_PASTE_VIDEO_BYTES` (1GB, env `CODEMAN_MAX_PASTE_VIDEO_BYTES`), judges the container on the first 12 bytes as they arrive (ISO BMFF / QuickTime atom, EBML for webm, Ogg for ogv; a mislabeled body is drained unwritten from there, never parked on disk first) and unlinks on any failure, a dead transfer included. ⚠️ The flag is the ONLY way onto that path and admits video types alone (the registry's `VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS`, single-sourced: mp4/webm/mov/m4v/ogv, so an uploaded video is one the file viewer can also play; 3gp/mkv are out, since a phone's camera roll produces neither and neither previews), so an image can never ride the larger cap through memory; without it the route is byte-identical to the image-only version. Busboy takes its size limit before the part is seen, which is why the choice rides the URL and not the file. ⚠️ A video draws on its OWN per-(IP, session) rate bucket (`consumeVideoToken`, 3/min) beside the image bucket (`consumePasteToken`, 30/min): at 1GB each, 30/min would be 30GB of disk a minute, so the lower rate bounds it to 3GB; the image path keeps the 30/min bucket and is unchanged without the flag. A remote (SSH) session is refused (400) before any disk touch: its `workingDir` is the remote path, so the file would land on THIS host where the agent cannot read it (Docker is fine, the workspace is bind-mounted at the same absolute path). ⚠️ A live session's workspace can still sit on a network mount that stopped answering, so the route probes it BOUNDED (`probePathKind(session.workingDir, { pastCap: true })`, the #516 rule) before the first disk touch and refuses an `unknown` mount through `describeUnknownPath()` (OPERATION_FAILED), the way session create does, so a mount already unreachable cannot freeze a libuv worker on every upload (a mount that dies after the probe is the same residual race create accepts). ⚠️ Dispatch mirrors the client: an `image/*` MIME takes the IMAGE path whatever the name says (a GIF named `animation.txt` stays a GIF), a document extension takes the document branch, and anything else takes the image path exactly as before, where the HEIC sniff still recovers a HEIC under a generic name; a foreign extension with no image MIME gets its `Unsupported file type` 400 only AFTER that sLine truncated
 
-**File-path links (terminal + chat)**: a path an agent prints is clickable on BOTH surfaces and opens the file-preview overlay. ⚠️ ONE pattern (`FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN` / `absoluteFilePathPattern()` in constants.js) feeds the xterm link provider AND `_linkifyFilePaths()`, a fresh instance per call (`lastIndex`). Both call `findFilePathLinks()`, which reserves spaced-path spans first (an unlinkable one only while its last word holds a `/`; any label, before an absolute or relative path, must be an explicit path label, prose after that label stays out, and an earlier connective or verb such as `and` or `has` (`SPACED_PATH_PROSE_WORD`) makes any candidate prose; rules and trade-offs in the architecture-invariants paragraph linked below), then adds rooted, `~/`, relative and folder paths without overlapping a reservation, earlier match or URL; a relative path resolves against the pane's live directory `SessionState.paneCwd` when known, else `workingDir` (`relativeResolutionBase()` + `resolveLinkedFilePath`; `paneCwd` is only a BASE, never a confinement root: routing and the file routes still judge against `workingDir`, and remote/docker/direct-PTY/rediscovered sessions never get one, scoped by `paneExitApplies`), `~/` only server-side on the session's host (attachment route), and `terminalPathLine()` joins a path a program hard-wrapped short of the edge. ⚠️ A folder link opens the **folder grid**: `POST /api/sessions/:id/folders` guards + GRANTS the folder (`folder-listing.ts`, own registry, never the 200-capped attachment registry), files come by bare name via `…/folders/:folderId/files/:name/*` through `resolveServableAttachmentPath` plus the same extension/regular-file gate on the symlink's resolved target, so no browser request carries a path; `~/` is refused in a Docker case (the container's home is not this host's). The chat linkifier walks TEXT NODES with DOM APIs, never rebuilds sanitized markup as a string. ⚠️ An out-of-workspace path goes through the ATTACHMENT routes (`POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` with `notify: false`), never by widening `file-content`/`file-raw` or `file-stream-manager`'s `tail -f` allowlist. An ambiguous parenthesised hard wrap is checked only on activation, original first: only a 404 permits a spaced-path lookup, and only a registered alternative is opened; every other original result uses the normal opener, never an attachment-policy gate on workspace files, and hover performs no lookup. ⚠️ `TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS` (never a second list), and widening READ must never widen RUN: `html`/`htm`/`svg` stay download-only, other text is inert `text/plain`+`nosniff`. ⚠️ The ONE place HTML renders is `/html-view/<cap>/...` (`html-view-routes.ts`, `html-view-capabilities.ts`): `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` mints a capability for the file's own directory, every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT `allow-same-origin` (opaque origin even as a top-level tab, so the page can never read Codeman or drive its API) and with NO fetch directive (open network, owner decision 2026-10-13: never restrict it or add `allow-same-origin` without the owner), and only non-dot, asset-allowlisted files under that directory are served (GET/HEAD only; capabilities revoked with the web-tab ones on logout). That tree is served recursively, so minting is refused for a hidden directory or a broad root (`isBroadHtmlViewRoot`); the preview renders by default and the **Page** pill (or a refused mint) falls through to the source view and its Edit button. Never serve HTML same-origin anywhere else. Tests: `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts`. Media extensions are single-sourced in `attachment-registry.ts`. ⚠️ **XLSX previews parse in the BROWSER**, never on the server; the admission limits that keep a hostile workbook from freezing the worker live in `src/web/CLAUDE.md` (Spreadsheet preview). → [architecture-invariants#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer)
+**File-path links (terminal + chat)**: a path an agent prints is clickable on BOTH surfaces and opens the file-preview overlay. ⚠️ ONE pattern (`FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN` / `absoluteFilePathPattern()` in constants.js) feeds the xterm link provider AND `_linkifyFilePaths()`, a fresh instance per call (`lastIndex`). Both call `findFilePathLinks()`, which reserves spaced-path spans first (an unlinkable one only while its last word holds a `/`; any label, before an absolute or relative path, must be an explicit path label, prose after that label stays out, and an earlier connective or verb such as `and` or `has` (`SPACED_PATH_PROSE_WORD`) makes any candidate prose; rules and trade-offs in the architecture-invariants paragraph linked below), then adds rooted, `~/`, relative and folder paths without overlapping a reservation, earlier match or URL; a relative path resolves against the pane's live directory `SessionState.paneCwd` when known, else `workingDir` (`relativeResolutionBase()` + `resolveLinkedFilePath`; `paneCwd` is only a BASE, never a confinement root: routing and the file routes still judge against `workingDir`, or against a followed worktree for an absolute path inside it, and remote/docker/direct-PTY/rediscovered sessions never get one, scoped by `paneExitApplies`), `~/` only server-side on the session's host (attachment route), and `terminalPathLine()` joins a path a program hard-wrapped short of the edge. ⚠️ A folder link opens the **folder grid**: `POST /api/sessions/:id/folders` guards + GRANTS the folder (`folder-listing.ts`, own registry, never the 200-capped attachment registry), files come by bare name via `…/folders/:folderId/files/:name/*` through `resolveServableAttachmentPath` plus the same extension/regular-file gate on the symlink's resolved target, so no browser request carries a path; `~/` is refused in a Docker case (the container's home is not this host's). The chat linkifier walks TEXT NODES with DOM APIs, never rebuilds sanitized markup as a string. ⚠️ An out-of-workspace path goes through the ATTACHMENT routes (`POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` with `notify: false`), never by widening `file-content`/`file-raw` or `file-stream-manager`'s `tail -f` allowlist. The one exception is an absolute path inside a followed worktree outside `workingDir` (`SessionState.outsideWorktree`), which the file routes serve as a second root (see Files panel in a worktree). An ambiguous parenthesised hard wrap is checked only on activation, original first: only a 404 permits a spaced-path lookup, and only a registered alternative is opened; every other original result uses the normal opener, never an attachment-policy gate on workspace files, and hover performs no lookup. ⚠️ `TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS` (never a second list), and widening READ must never widen RUN: `html`/`htm`/`svg` stay download-only, other text is inert `text/plain`+`nosniff`. ⚠️ The ONE place HTML renders is `/html-view/<cap>/...` (`html-view-routes.ts`, `html-view-capabilities.ts`): `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` mints a capability for the file's own directory, every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT `allow-same-origin` (opaque origin even as a top-level tab, so the page can never read Codeman or drive its API) and with NO fetch directive (open network, owner decision 2026-10-13: never restrict it or add `allow-same-origin` without the owner), and only non-dot, asset-allowlisted files under that directory are served (GET/HEAD only; capabilities revoked with the web-tab ones on logout). That tree is served recursively, so minting is refused for a hidden directory or a broad root (`isBroadHtmlViewRoot`); the preview renders by default and the **Page** pill (or a refused mint) falls through to the source view and its Edit button. Never serve HTML same-origin anywhere else. Tests: `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts`. Media extensions are single-sourced in `attachment-registry.ts`. ⚠️ **XLSX previews parse in the BROWSER**, never on the server; the admission limits that keep a hostile workbook from freezing the worker live in `src/web/CLAUDE.md` (Spreadsheet preview). → [architecture-invariants#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer)
 
 The terminal provider scans `terminalLinkLine()`, which extends `terminalPathLine()` for URL continuations in indented paragraphs and table cells. List markers, bare numbers, version tokens, whole email addresses, labels ending in `:`, measurements and clock times (`45%`, `12.3ms`, `10:00:00`) and a `name=value` field under a URL ending in `/` never continue a URL; a token with only `-`, `_` or `.` is also refused when it carries a call paren (`client.get()`) or ends a sentence (`Done.`). A URL in the last column of a space-aligned table never takes the next row's first cell: a continuation row must start inside the URL's own cell, so a gap of two or more spaces between its indent and where the URL starts on the row above means it is the next record. `terminalCellWrappedPaths()` follows each table cell independently: a fragment carries on into the next row only when it ends its cell on `/` or `-` (where a wrapper breaks a path; codex's cell wrap never breaks at `_`), the continuation row is blank to the left of the cell (a wrapper wraps every column of a table row together, so a label there such as `Entry` or `│ Log │` is the next record, unless a left column's path continued on that row too; a left column of wrapped prose, as in a `Description | Path` table, fills that row as well, so the path beside it keeps its per-row fragment links, the safe direction), the next row's token passes `pathContinuation()`, and the cell is no wider than the one above. So a directory that is a whole cell value (`/home/u/proj` over `config.yaml`, or `/home/u/proj/app/` over a labelled `main.py`) keeps its folder link and the next row keeps its own file link. With no label to tell them apart, a directory written with its trailing slash over a relative path in the same column (`/home/u/proj/src/` over `lib/util.ts`) still joins, a known trade-off: it reads exactly like a wrap at `/`. Accepted paths displace other links on their cells. Full-width divider rows stop `terminalLogicalLine()` stitching for both links and touch selection. OSC 8 links confirm the real target URI before the shared opener runs.
 
 **Filesystem path picker** (every Add Case "Browse": Link Existing, Create New's custom folder, Clone Repo, Docker; + the mobile keyboard's `📁 Path` key): lazy one-directory browsing via `GET /api/filesystem/browse`, with `GET /api/filesystem/preview` for the tapped file (Docker's Container Workdir picker lists through its own `fetchListing` over `POST /api/docker-cases/browse` instead, so the allowlist, blocked-tree and ownership rules below do not apply to it). A Browse fills its form field; the Path key inserts the path **without** Enter, so the prompt is never submitted; the sibling `⌫ All` key clears only the unsent prompt and must never send the agent's `/clear`. ⚠️ This is a **second file-serving surface and inherits neither the attachment confinement nor its ownership scoping**: it allowlists Home, `CASES_DIR`, `/mnt/d` and `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS`, blocks sensitive trees, and rejects symlink escapes **after** `realpath`. ⚠️ The optional `sessionId` is an ownership boundary that must be `canAccessOwned`-checked by hand (it does not go through `findSessionOrFail`), and in multi-user mode a non-admin gets only their own `userSpacePath` as a root: per-user spaces live INSIDE `homedir()`, so a `Home` root exposes every other user's workspace. Previews go through the same global conversion limiter, and Markdown/TXT/JSON are served as inert `text/plain`. **New folder** (opt-in per caller, `allowNewFolder`; Link Existing, Create New's custom folder and Clone Repo's parent folder have it): `POST /api/filesystem/mkdir` `{ path, name, sessionId? }` creates ONE folder (non-recursive) directly inside a folder the picker may browse, resolved through the same roots, ownership and blocked-tree rules as browse (`403` outside them or in a blocked tree or unwritable, `404` missing parent, `409` exists, `400` a parent that is a file, or a name outside letters, digits, space and `_ - . ~`, containing `..`, starting with a dot or a tilde or over 255 bytes, so every name it accepts is one Link Existing accepts, and `400` a parent that is a cases directory, where a folder is already a case (Add Case > Create New with no custom folder makes one there); `showHidden` is forwarded like browse's); the picker reloads the folder and selects the new one. A picker that browses somewhere this route cannot create in (the container-workdir picker, `fetchListing`) must not set the flag. → [architecture-invariants#filesystem-path-picker](docs/architecture-invariants.md#filesystem-path-picker)
 
-**File Viewer edit mode** (issue #212): the file-preview overlay edits workspace text files in place: `GET .../file-content?edit=1` + `PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content`, policy in `src/config/file-editing.ts`. This is a **third file surface and the only one that writes file contents** (the path picker's New folder creates folders only): read-path confinement (realpath + workspace + ownership) plus sensitive/blocked/`.git` denies and an extension **allowlist**; writes are `wx`-temp + rename (no `O_CREAT` anywhere = edit-in-place is structural); optimistic concurrency via sha256 `baseHash` → 409. ⚠️ `edit=1` never truncates and the client must never save a plain-preview buffer (the 500-line truncation would silently delete the rest). ⚠️ CRLF/UTF-8 guards: EOL re-applied server-side, non-UTF-8 refused via round-trip compare. → [architecture-invariants#file-viewer-edit-mode](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-viewer-edit-mode), `docs/file-viewer-edit-plan.md`
+**File Viewer edit mode** (issue #212): the file-preview overlay edits workspace text files in place: `GET .../file-content?edit=1` + `PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content`, policy in `src/config/file-editing.ts`. This is a **third file surface and the only one that writes file contents** (the path picker's New folder creates folders only): read-path confinement (realpath + workspace + ownership, where an absolute path inside a followed outside worktree (`SessionState.outsideWorktree`) counts as a second workspace root) plus sensitive/blocked/`.git` denies and an extension **allowlist**; writes are `wx`-temp + rename (no `O_CREAT` anywhere = edit-in-place is structural); optimistic concurrency via sha256 `baseHash` → 409. ⚠️ `edit=1` never truncates and the client must never save a plain-preview buffer (the 500-line truncation would silently delete the rest). ⚠️ CRLF/UTF-8 guards: EOL re-applied server-side, non-UTF-8 refused via round-trip compare. → [architecture-invariants#file-viewer-edit-mode](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-viewer-edit-mode), `docs/file-viewer-edit-plan.md`
 
 **Files panel search** (COD-236, the `q` param on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): `compileFileQuery()` (`utils/file-query.ts`, pure) compiles the query into a predicate the server-side walk prunes with; a query returns a FLAT match list and the walk recurses past non-matching directories. An empty, whitespace-only or overlong (`MAX_QUERY_LENGTH`, 256) query compiles to `null`, keeping the default tree response byte-identical. ⚠️ **Never compile a glob into a RegExp** (`*a*a*a…` backtracks and freezes the event loop for the whole server): `globMatch()` is a two-pointer wildcard walk. Tree and search share one walk shape: a per-directory round-robin (breadth-first, so fair per directory, not per subtree) over one 5,000-node budget, where a folder's own files count as one share beside the subfolders it just found (`walkTurnEnd()`). ⚠️ That budget caps what is LISTED, never what is read: a read keeps only what the listing can use (`readWalkFolder()`) and `MAX_WALK_ENTRIES_READ` (250,000) stops opening folders, or one GET reads the whole workspace into memory. ⚠️ A folder below the walk's root is probed (#516) before its `readdir`, and anything but `directory` is skipped unflagged. ⚠️ A directory has its node before it is read, so every cursor still queued or unread when the walk ends must get `incomplete: true` or it reads as an empty folder. → [architecture-invariants#files-panel-search](docs/architecture-invariants.md#files-panel-search)
 
-**Files panel in a worktree** (#765, `src/live-worktree.ts`, `root=live` on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): Claude's EnterWorktree moves the process, and `paneCwd` follows it (tmux reads the process cwd, measured on 2.1.318, back out on ExitWorktree too), while `workingDir` stays the session's identity. `refreshLiveWorktree()` (server.ts) turns a changed `paneCwd` into `SessionState.liveWorktree` by reading the `.git` FILE (never spawning git), walking up and stopping at `workingDir`, a repository or submodule of its own, or anything unreadable. ⚠️ The security argument has two halves. The lookup only ever answers a folder strictly below `workingDir`, but that is a LEXICAL judgement made when the pane moves, and a symlink can replace the folder or a parent later without moving the pane, so `root=live` re-checks on every request (`canWalkLiveWorktree()`, file-routes.ts: walk the worktree only when it resolves strictly inside the resolved `workingDir`, else walk `workingDir`). The walk starts there, returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir`, and the routes keep confining to `workingDir`, so never make `liveWorktree` a confinement root (a worktree outside the folder stays unfollowed). ⚠️ Only that check uses resolved paths: the walk keeps the session's spelling, or a workspace reached through a symlink stops producing paths relative to `workingDir`. ⚠️ A plain subfolder is deliberately no answer, or a `cd` in a shell would re-root the panel. ⚠️ A listing reports `worktree` whichever folder it walked, even when the worktree has gone or the check refused it: `_followFileBrowserWorktree()` compares that with the session's state, and an absent report would reload forever. Tests: `test/live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/file-browser-worktree.test.ts`. → [architecture-invariants#files-panel-in-a-worktree](docs/architecture-invariants.md#files-panel-in-a-worktree)
+**Files panel in a worktree** (#765, `src/live-worktree.ts`, `root=live` and `root=live-any` on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): Claude's EnterWorktree moves the process, and `paneCwd` follows it (tmux reads the process cwd, measured on 2.1.318, back out on ExitWorktree too), while `workingDir` stays the session's identity. `refreshLiveWorktree()` (server.ts) turns a changed `paneCwd` into `SessionState.liveWorktree` by reading the `.git` FILE (never spawning git), walking up and stopping at `workingDir`, a repository or submodule of its own, or anything unreadable. That is the lookup for a pane inside `workingDir`; a pane outside it goes to `findOutsideWorktree()`, described below. ⚠️ The security argument has two halves. For a worktree inside `workingDir` the lookup only answers a folder strictly below it, but that is a LEXICAL judgement made when the pane moves, and a symlink can replace the folder or a parent later without moving the pane, so `root=live` re-checks on every request (`canWalkLiveWorktree()`, file-routes.ts: walk the worktree only when it resolves strictly inside the resolved `workingDir`, else walk `workingDir`). The walk starts there, returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir`, and the routes keep confining to `workingDir`, so never make an INSIDE `liveWorktree` a confinement root. ⚠️ Only that check uses resolved paths: the walk keeps the session's spelling, or a workspace reached through a symlink stops producing paths relative to `workingDir`. ⚠️ A plain subfolder is deliberately no answer, or a `cd` in a shell would re-root the panel. ⚠️ A listing reports `worktree` whichever folder it walked, even when the worktree has gone or the check refused it: `_followFileBrowserWorktree()` compares that with the session's state, and an absent report would reload forever. The one exception is a listing without `root=live-any`, which omits an outside worktree; while the session folder is pinned, the panel compares with the worktree it pinned away from (`pinnedWorktree`, panels-ui.js). ⚠️ **A worktree OUTSIDE `workingDir` (`git worktree add ../feature`, or an EnterWorktree placed beside the repo) IS a second root**, answered only through `findOutsideWorktree()` with `outside: true` and published on the wire as `SessionState.outsideWorktree`, never in `liveWorktree`, which stays inside-only: the session's own repository must vouch for it by FILE READS (`workingDir` must be the top of its repository or worktree, so a session in a subfolder follows nothing outside it; the candidate's `.git` FILE names `<common dir>/worktrees/<id>` and that entry's `gitdir` names the candidate back, or its `.git` FOLDER is the session's common dir itself, which is the main worktree for a session started in a linked one, and a symlinked `.git` is refused; never spawn git from the pane watcher). It is refused at `/`, home or above, around `workingDir` and at/inside/around a Docker case workspace (an unreadable Docker list follows nothing). It is refused while attachment workspace confinement is on. It is also refused at, inside or around an attachment blocked tree, and at a root that is itself a sensitive folder such as `~/.ssh` (a child probe, since the sensitive patterns describe file locations). These rules are judged when the pane moves like the Docker rule, and multi-user mode applies `folderAllowedForUser`. The routes also re-check confinement and the blocked trees on every request (`isOutsideWorktreeRootRefused()`), so turning confinement on or blocking the folder stops serving it at once. ⚠️ `validateLocalSessionFilePath()` also refuses any file there that `isSensitivePath()` blocklists, so a root such as a credential folder can never serve its keys. Walking it is opt-in: only `root=live-any` (which the panel sends) lists it, with ABSOLUTE `path`s, while `root=live` never walks an outside worktree: it walks `workingDir` with relative paths, and its listing omits `worktree` for an outside one. An absolute path inside it is confined to it, falling back to `workingDir` when the worktree root refuses it (`validateLocalSessionFilePath()`, route-helpers.ts), while a relative path still resolves against `workingDir` alone. ⚠️ It is recorded as a REAL path, and every request re-checks that the folder still resolves to exactly that path (`outsideWorktreeRootFor()`, `canWalkOutsideWorktree()`), or a symlink swapped in would re-root the routes anywhere. Tests: `test/live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/live-worktree-outside.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-outside-worktree.test.ts`, `test/file-browser-worktree.test.ts`, `test/file-browser-outside-worktree.test.ts`. → [architecture-invariants#files-panel-in-a-worktree](docs/architecture-invariants.md#files-panel-in-a-worktree)
 
 **Git status indicator** (`showGitStatus`, per-device, default OFF; `src/git-workspace-status.ts`, `routes/git-status-routes.ts`, `git-status-ui.js`): the bottom-bar indicator and its panel read `GET /api/sessions/:id/git-status` and `/git-diff`, read-only and offline on its own (it never fetches; fetching is the separate path below). ⚠️ git never runs on a repository at or inside a Docker case workspace (walk-up, scan and diff alike, and a cached repository list is re-checked against the CURRENT Docker roots), since a container could plant a clean filter that runs on the host; remote and Docker sessions answer `unsupported`. ⚠️ `git-diff` takes `repo`/`path`/`kind` only as keys matched against the workspace's own repository list (`findWorkspaceRepo()`) and that repository's current status, never as paths. ⚠️ Keep `--no-optional-locks`, `core.fsmonitor=false` and `log.showSignature=false` on every call and `--no-ext-diff --no-textconv` on diffs; clean filters still run, which is why the Docker rule exists. ⚠️ An enclosing repository at `$HOME` or above is ignored (`isUnrelatedAncestor()`), and is identified by one cached `rev-parse` before any full status runs. Everything git supplies renders via `textContent`. Tests: `test/git-workspace-status.test.ts`, `test/routes/git-status-routes.test.ts`, and `test/git-status.browser.test.ts` (browser suite, not in the gate).
 
@@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ One module per domain in `src/web/routes/` (plus a barrel; `ls src/web/routes/`
 
 ## State Files
 
-All in `~/.codeman/`: `state.json` (sessions, settings, respawn, orchestrator, cron jobs/runs, owner tab layouts, case default groups), `mux-sessions.json` (tmux recovery), `settings.json` (user prefs), `push-keys.json` + `push-subscriptions.json`, `session-lifecycle.jsonl` (audit log), `update-status.json` (self-updater progress, polled across the service restart), `docker-env-applied.json` (Compose deployment only: sha256 of the Dockerfile + compose file the running container was built from, written by `Start-Codeman.sh`, read by the self-updater's environment gate), `docker-build-source.json` (Compose deployment only: the checkout's HEAD commit and `package-lock.json` hash the `codeman-node-modules`/`codeman-dist` volumes currently reflect, written by both `Start-Codeman.sh` and a successful in-place self-update, compared to detect and refresh a volume left stale by an externally-triggered rebuild), `linked-cases.json`, `webviews.json` (saved web-tab dashboard URLs), `remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json`, `docker-hosts.json` + `docker-cases.json` + `docker-exports/`, `subagent-window-states.json` + `subagent-parents.json` (subagent window layout, GET/PUT `/api/subagent-window-states`/`-parents`), `hook-secret` (per-instance), `users.json` (multi-user, mode 0600) + `admin-audit.jsonl`, `intents.json` (Read My Mind intent profiles, mode 0600), `agent-inbox.json` (agent inbox snapshot, only while `agentInboxPersistEnabled` is on, mode 0600), `edit-history/<id>.json` (Edit history panel, one store per session, every diff an agent wrote, mode 0600), `webhook.json` (webhook notifications: enabled/service/scope plus the ntfy/Slack/Discord URL, a bearer secret, so mode 0600, kept out of `settings.json` and never returned by `/api/webhook`, which is admin-only in multi-user mode), `discord.json` (Discord bridge: bot token, a bearer secret, so mode 0600, never returned by `/api/discord`, admin-only in multi-user mode) + `discord-bridge.json` (sessionId to Discord thread id), `local-model.json` (local model install: state, step, model, port, pid, digest, the previous `customModelEndpointsEnabled` value; mode 0600, holds no path, not part of a config backup) + `local-model/` (the pinned runtime, the model store and the runtime's private HOME, removed by `DELETE /api/local-model`), `config-backup-id` (the random id config backups record as each manifest's `origin`, so instances sharing a backup folder keep to their own snapshots; mode 0600, never tracked or restored, and deleting it unlists this instance's earlier snapshots), `backups/config/` (the default config-backup folder, moved by `configBackupDir`: `cfg-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS/` snapshots, 0700 with 0600 files, each with a `manifest.json` of SHA-256s, the origin and the retention in force (`keepCount`/`keepDays`), which a pass falls back to when `settings.json` lacks a retention key), `certs/` (self-signed TLS for `--https`), `.env` (CODEMAN_USERNAME/PASSWORD fallback for the `codeman attach` CLI), `install.log` (installer step output, written by `install.sh`'s `run_step`) `tailscale-rename` (the node name before `install.sh` renamed it, so uninstall can offer it back) and `runtime/` (the Node.js and tmux `install.sh` downloaded on its no-admin route, linked from `~/.local/bin`; all three installer-route only). Transient: `self-update-runner.sh`. Multi-user case spaces live OUTSIDE the data dir at `~/codeman-users/<username>/cases` (shared across instances like `~/codeman-cases`, override `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR`).
+All in `~/.codeman/`: `state.json` (sessions, settings, respawn, orchestrator, cron jobs/runs, owner tab layouts, case default groups), `mux-sessions.json` (tmux recovery), `settings.json` (user prefs), `push-keys.json` + `push-subscriptions.json`, `session-lifecycle.jsonl` (audit log), `update-status.json` (self-updater progress, polled across the service restart), `docker-env-applied.json` (Compose deployment only: sha256 of the Dockerfile + compose file the running container was built from, written by `Start-Codeman.sh`, read by the self-updater's environment gate), `docker-build-source.json` (Compose deployment only: the checkout's HEAD commit and `package-lock.json` hash the `codeman-node-modules`/`codeman-dist` volumes currently reflect, written by both `Start-Codeman.sh` and a successful in-place self-update, compared to detect and refresh a volume left stale by an externally-triggered rebuild), `linked-cases.json`, `webviews.json` (saved web-tab dashboard URLs), `remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json`, `docker-hosts.json` + `docker-cases.json` + `docker-exports/`, `subagent-window-states.json` + `subagent-parents.json` (subagent window layout, GET/PUT `/api/subagent-window-states`/`-parents`), `hook-secret` (per-instance), `users.json` (multi-user, mode 0600) + `admin-audit.jsonl`, `intents.json` (Read My Mind intent profiles, mode 0600), `agent-inbox.json` (agent inbox snapshot, only while `agentInboxPersistEnabled` is on, mode 0600), `edit-history/<id>.json` (Edit history panel, one store per session, every diff an agent wrote, mode 0600), `webhook.json` (webhook notifications: enabled/service/scope plus the ntfy/Slack/Discord URL, a bearer secret, so mode 0600, kept out of `settings.json` and never returned by `/api/webhook`, which is admin-only in multi-user mode), `discord.json` (Discord bridge: bot token, a bearer secret, so mode 0600, never returned by `/api/discord`, admin-only in multi-user mode) + `discord-bridge.json` (sessionId to Discord thread id), `local-model.json` (local model install: state, step, model, port, pid, digest, the previous `customModelEndpointsEnabled` value; mode 0600, holds no path, not part of a config backup) + `local-model/` (the pinned runtime, the model store and the runtime's private HOME, removed by `DELETE /api/local-model`), `agent-skill-default-migrated.json` (written once by the 1.50.0 boot migration of `agentSkillEnabled`; while it exists the migration never runs again, so deleting it would switch a stored off on at the next start; never tracked or restored), `config-backup-id` (the random id config backups record as each manifest's `origin`, so instances sharing a backup folder keep to their own snapshots; mode 0600, never tracked or restored, and deleting it unlists this instance's earlier snapshots), `backups/config/` (the default config-backup folder, moved by `configBackupDir`: `cfg-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS/` snapshots, 0700 with 0600 files, each with a `manifest.json` of SHA-256s, the origin and the retention in force (`keepCount`/`keepDays`), which a pass falls back to when `settings.json` lacks a retention key), `certs/` (self-signed TLS for `--https`), `.env` (CODEMAN_USERNAME/PASSWORD fallback for the `codeman attach` CLI), `install.log` (installer step output, written by `install.sh`'s `run_step`) `tailscale-rename` (the node name before `install.sh` renamed it, so uninstall can offer it back), `cli-installed` (empty, touched by `install.sh` when it installs a CLI: a running server reads only its mtime, and a change ends that CLI's negative-cache backoff) and `runtime/` (the Node.js and tmux `install.sh` downloaded on its no-admin route, linked from `~/.local/bin`; all four installer-route only). Transient: `self-update-runner.sh`. Multi-user case spaces live OUTSIDE the data dir at `~/codeman-users/<username>/cases` (shared across instances like `~/codeman-cases`, override `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR`).
 
 **Generated top-level dirs** (all gitignored — don't edit or commit): `dist/` (esbuild output), `out/`, `coverage/`, `test-results/`, `tmp/`, `screenshots-echo-diag/`. The committed gesture bundle (`src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js`) IS tracked, but its runtime wasm/model assets (`src/web/public/gesture/wasm/`, `*.task`) are fetched and gitignored.
 
@@ -392,6 +393,6 @@ Two constraints worth knowing before you touch them: the env-derived PTY buffer
 
 ## Scripts & Tunnel
 
-**`install.sh`** (repo root) is the public `curl | bash` installer: it installs Node/tmux/git/build tools, clones to `~/.codeman/app`, builds, and offers a systemd/launchd service, asking every question BEFORE the unattended build (log in `~/.codeman/install.log`). Network access is Tailscale / LAN / local-only; re-runs preserve the existing binding AND password (`read_existing_binding()`). ⚠️ Compose the hand-start env only in `start_command_hint`/`export_bind_env`, and call `stop_background_helpers` before `exec`. ⚠️ Tailscale rename is opt-in (default NO, never under `--yes`/non-interactive); NEVER `tailscale serve reset`, touch a mapping it did not create, run `tailscale funnel` or advertise a Service (`test/install-sh-invariants.test.ts`). ⚠️ **No-admin route** (`--no-admin` / `CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN`, taken by itself when the account has no administrator rights): Node.js (nodejs.org, checked against `SHASUMS256.txt`) and tmux (`tmux/tmux-builds`, digests pinned in `tmux_build_sha256`: bump `TMUX_BUILD_VERSION` and all four together) go into `~/.codeman/runtime`, and without a working git the source is an archive that updates by a re-run (built beside the old tree, swapped in after the build). Nothing in that section may run `sudo`, Homebrew or `xcode-select --install`, a download is verified before it is unpacked, the route is never decided by `sudo -v`, `/usr/bin/git` on a Mac is never executed before `xcode-select -p` proves the developer tools, and `no_admin_blocker` stops BEFORE the first download for what it cannot supply (a Linux toolchain, macOS below 15). ⚠️ Stay **bash 3.2** clean (no `declare -A`, `mapfile`, namerefs, `${x,,}`, here-strings, empty-array expansion under `set -u`). ⚠️ Execute only commands from the generated CLI block (`CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED`, `npm run generate:cli-catalog`). → [architecture-invariants#installsh-the-public-installer](docs/architecture-invariants.md#installsh-the-public-installer)
+**`install.sh`** (repo root) is the public `curl | bash` installer: it installs Node/tmux/git/build tools, clones to `~/.codeman/app`, builds, and offers a systemd/launchd service, asking every question BEFORE the unattended build (log in `~/.codeman/install.log`). Network access is Tailscale / LAN / local-only; re-runs preserve the existing binding AND password (`read_existing_binding()`). ⚠️ Compose the hand-start env only in `start_command_hint`/`export_bind_env`, and call `stop_background_helpers` before `exec`. ⚠️ Tailscale rename is opt-in (default NO, never under `--yes`/non-interactive); NEVER `tailscale serve reset`, touch a mapping it did not create, run `tailscale funnel` or advertise a Service (`test/install-sh-invariants.test.ts`). ⚠️ **No-admin route** (`--no-admin` / `CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN`, taken by itself when the account has no administrator rights): Node.js (nodejs.org, checked against `SHASUMS256.txt`) and tmux (`tmux/tmux-builds`, digests pinned in `tmux_build_sha256`: bump `TMUX_BUILD_VERSION` and all four together) go into `~/.codeman/runtime`, and without a working git the source is an archive that updates by a re-run (built beside the old tree, swapped in after the build). Nothing in that section may run `sudo`, Homebrew or `xcode-select --install`, a download is verified before it is unpacked, the route is never decided by `sudo -v`, `/usr/bin/git` on a Mac is never executed before `xcode-select -p` proves the developer tools, and `no_admin_blocker` stops BEFORE the first download for what it cannot supply (a Linux toolchain, macOS below 15). ⚠️ Stay **bash 3.2** clean (no `declare -A`, `mapfile`, namerefs, `${x,,}`, here-strings, empty-array expansion under `set -u`). ⚠️ Execute only commands from the generated CLI block (`CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED`, `npm run generate:cli-catalog`). ⚠️ Codeman Desktop drives it with no terminal (`--no-admin --progress --ai-cli <id>|none`, `install.sh preflight`, `install.sh agent <id>` to add one agent next to a running Codeman, `packages/desktop/src/gui_install.rs`): `cli_offerable` is the one rule for what can be installed, `preflight` stdout is JSON only, `agent` says `done` only when THAT agent landed, and the `progress_phase` order is pinned against `connect.html`, with `done` last. → [architecture-invariants#installsh-the-public-installer](docs/architecture-invariants.md#installsh-the-public-installer)
 
 Other key scripts: `scripts/tmux-manager.sh` (safe tmux mgmt), `scripts/tunnel.sh [quick|named] start|stop|status|url` (quick = random trycloudflare URL, default; `named setup|enable` = fixed-hostname tunnel via `scripts/codeman-tunnel-named.service`; bare `start|stop|url` still means quick), `scripts/run-beta.sh` (isolated beta instance), `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (docker base image), `scripts/self-update.sh` (detached updater). Production services: `scripts/codeman-web.service`, `scripts/codeman-tunnel.service`. **Always set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`** before exposing via tunnel.

README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 <h2 align="center">Mission control for AI coding agents</h2>
 
 <p align="center">
-  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex &bull; Antigravity &bull; Gemini &bull; Pi &bull; Grok &bull; DeepSeek &bull; OMP &bull; Copilot &bull; Terminal - One Dashboard &bull; Any Device</em>
+  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex &bull; Antigravity &bull; Gemini &bull; Pi &bull; Grok &bull; DeepSeek &bull; OMP &bull; Copilot &bull; jcode &bull; Terminal - One Dashboard &bull; Any Device</em>
+</p>
+
+<p align="center">
+  <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Download_for_Mac-Codeman.dmg-2f6fe0?style=for-the-badge&logo=apple&logoColor=white&labelColor=000000" alt="Download Codeman for Mac (Codeman.dmg)" width="354"></a>
+  <br>
+  <sub>The native Mac app: signed and notarized, Apple Silicon and Intel, macOS 11.3 or later. <a href="#on-a-mac-the-codeman-app">What it does</a></sub>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -17,7 +23,6 @@
   <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/stargazers"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=eab308" alt="GitHub stars"></a>
   <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/graphs/contributors"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/contributors/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=3b82f6" alt="Contributors"></a>
   <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/commits/master"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/commit-activity/t/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=1e3a5f" alt="Total commits"></a>
-  <a href="https://github.com/NipunaRanasinghe/awesome-ai-agents"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Featured_in-Awesome_AI_Agents-2ea44f?style=flat-square" alt="Featured in Awesome AI Agents"></a>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -28,7 +33,7 @@
   <img src="docs/images/tiles-crt-stats-1600-20261010.gif" alt="Codeman tile grid: six live agents (DeepSeek Harness, Claude Code, Pi, Codex, OpenCode and a shell) powering on and off with the CRT animation, with the live header strip showing CPU, memory and Claude plan usage" width="800">
 </p>
 
-**Codeman** is a self-hosted mission control for AI coding agents. It spawns Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Antigravity, Gemini, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek Harness, OMP, or GitHub Copilot CLI inside persistent tmux sessions, streams the real terminal to any browser, and keeps agents productive after you walk away: it re-prompts on idle, resumes when a usage limit resets, runs scheduled jobs, and shows every background agent working in real time.
+**Codeman** is a self-hosted mission control for AI coding agents. It spawns Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Antigravity, Gemini, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek Harness, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI, or jcode inside persistent tmux sessions, streams the real terminal to any browser, and keeps agents productive after you walk away: it re-prompts on idle, resumes when a usage limit resets, runs scheduled jobs, and shows every background agent working in real time.
 
 Get started in one line (macOS & Linux, Windows via WSL):
 
@@ -43,7 +48,9 @@ codeman web
 
 The installer asks before every system change, and re-running the same line updates in place. Full details: [Quick Start - Installation](#quick-start---installation).
 
-- **One dashboard, ten CLIs** - run [Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Antigravity, Gemini, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP, or GitHub Copilot](#more-features) per session (plus plain shell), locally, [in Docker](#isolated-docker-sessions), or [over SSH](#remote-ssh-sessions), with your own dashboards open as [web tabs](#more-features) beside them
+On a Mac you can skip the terminal: [download Codeman.dmg](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg), and the app installs Codeman for you, opens the one already running, or connects to one on another machine. More in [On a Mac: the Codeman app](#on-a-mac-the-codeman-app).
+
+- **One dashboard, eleven CLIs** - run [Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Antigravity, Gemini, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP, GitHub Copilot, or jcode](#more-features) per session (plus plain shell), locally, [in Docker](#isolated-docker-sessions), or [over SSH](#remote-ssh-sessions), with your own dashboards open as [web tabs](#more-features) beside them
 - **Truly phone-friendly** - a [touch-optimized terminal](#mobile-optimized-web-ui) with instant local echo, QR login, swipe navigation, and push notifications
 - **Runs while you sleep** - [idle detection + respawn cycling](#respawn-controller) and auto-resume when a subscription limit resets, for 24+ hour unattended runs
 - **See your agents think** - [live floating windows](#live-agent-visualization) for every subagent and teammate, with real-time transcripts
@@ -72,7 +79,7 @@ This installs Node.js, tmux and a build toolchain if missing (node-pty ships no
 - **No administrator rights needed.** On an account without `sudo`, one whose `sudo` rights the installer cannot confirm (outside the `sudo`, `wheel` and `admin` groups, with a password still required) or a Mac account that is not an administrator and has no Homebrew it can write to, the installer downloads Node.js from nodejs.org and the tmux project's own build into `~/.codeman/runtime`, each checked against its SHA-256, and takes the source as an archive when there is no working git. `--no-admin` forces that route and `CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN=0` turns it off. Two limits: Linux needs make, a C++ compiler and python3 to be there already, and the tmux download needs macOS 15 or newer. Details in the [wiki](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/wiki/Installation#without-administrator-rights).
 - **Flags for the impatient.** `curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash -s -- --tailscale --service` answers the questions from the command line (`--lan`, `--local`, `--run`, `--no-start`, `--name <n>`, `--port <n>`, `--yes` too). **CI / headless:** without a terminal attached, steps that would change your system abort with instructions instead of running silently; set `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` to approve them for automation.
 
-You'll need at least one AI coding CLI installed — [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli), [Antigravity](https://antigravity.google), [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli), [Pi](https://pi.dev), [Grok Build](https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build), [DeepSeek Harness](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness), [OMP](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi), or [GitHub Copilot CLI](https://github.com/github/copilot-cli) (any combination works; Gemini CLI is enterprise-only since Google's consumer cutover, and Antigravity is its successor). The installer detects whichever of the ten is present; if none is found, it offers to install any of them from a menu (DeepSeek excepted, since its npm package installs only a launcher with no runnable profile), or you can skip and install one yourself later. After install:
+You'll need at least one AI coding CLI installed — [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli), [Antigravity](https://antigravity.google), [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli), [Pi](https://pi.dev), [Grok Build](https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build), [DeepSeek Harness](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness), [OMP](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi), [GitHub Copilot CLI](https://github.com/github/copilot-cli), or [jcode](https://jcode.sh) (any combination works; Gemini CLI is enterprise-only since Google's consumer cutover, and Antigravity is its successor). The installer detects whichever of the eleven is present; if none is found, it offers to install any of them from a menu (DeepSeek excepted, since its npm package installs only a launcher with no runnable profile), or you can skip and install one yourself later. After install:
 
 ```bash
 codeman web
@@ -97,6 +104,21 @@ bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh
 
 The first run asks three questions (data folder, port, password; Enter takes the default, including a generated password), writes `docker/.env` for you, builds the image and ends on the URL once Codeman answers. The image already includes Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI and OpenCode. Codeman runs in a container and spawns Docker cases as sibling containers through the host socket. To update, use **App Settings → Updates**, or `git pull` and run the script again rather than a plain `docker compose up`, so the rebuilt image, refreshed volumes and entrypoint arrive together. See the [Docker deployment guide](docker/README.md) for Unraid, direct Compose commands, storage and networking options.
 
+### On a Mac: the Codeman app
+
+**[Download Codeman.dmg](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg)** · one universal app for Apple Silicon and Intel · macOS 11.3 or later
+
+A small native app that opens Codeman in its own window. On a Mac without Codeman it installs it for you, with no Terminal and no administrator password, shows the install as a checklist, and offers to install a coding agent if the Mac has none yet. On a Mac that already runs Codeman it finds the server and opens it, or starts it when it is stopped. Under **Another machine** it connects to Codeman on your Mac mini, a home server or your tailnet, with the password kept in the Keychain, and can start an install over there through SSH. On a MacBook Pro with a PROLED XDR display, whose lid logo lights up, **View > Blink Apple Logo** blinks the logo by what your agents are doing, with a style of your own for working, for waiting for you and for needing permission; all three stay off until you choose. The app is Rust around macOS's own WebKit, not a bundled browser, so the download is under 5 MB.
+
+Open `Codeman.dmg`, drag Codeman into Applications and open it from there. macOS asks once whether to open an app downloaded from the internet: click **Open**.
+
+- **Quitting the app doesn't stop Codeman.** An install from the app runs Codeman as a LaunchAgent that starts at login, so your agents keep working with the window closed, and your browser and phone reach it as before.
+- **Codeman's page needs the WebKit of Safari 16.4.** The app starts on macOS 11.3, but Codeman itself needs macOS 13.3 or later, or macOS 11 or 12 with Safari 16.4 or later installed. On an older WebKit the app says so and does not connect.
+- **The install from the app needs macOS 15, or a tmux that is already there.** tmux comes from the tmux project's own builds, which need macOS 15. On an older Mac without tmux the app offers Terminal instead, where Homebrew installs it (that takes an administrator once).
+- **Updating.** The app doesn't update itself yet: download the new `Codeman.dmg` and drag it over the old copy.
+
+First launch, known limits and how to build it yourself: [Installation](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/wiki/Installation#on-a-mac-the-codeman-app) in the wiki and [packages/desktop/README.md](packages/desktop/README.md).
+
 <details>
 <summary><strong>Keep it running in the background</strong></summary>
 
@@ -268,7 +290,7 @@ Click **+ New Session** (or **Quick Start**). A session is one AI CLI running in
 | Field                        | What it does                                                                                                        |
 | ---------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | **Working directory / case** | The folder the agent operates in. A "case" is just a named working dir Codeman remembers. **Add Case** creates one from scratch, links an existing folder, or clones a GitHub repo straight into one (**Clone Repo**). |
-| **CLI / run mode**           | `Claude` (default), `OpenCode`, `Codex`, `Antigravity`, `Gemini`, `Pi`, `Grok`, `DeepSeek`, `OMP`, `Copilot`, or `Terminal` (plain shell). |
+| **CLI / run mode**           | `Claude` (default), `OpenCode`, `Codex`, `Antigravity`, `Gemini`, `Pi`, `Grok`, `DeepSeek`, `OMP`, `Copilot`, `jcode`, or `Terminal` (plain shell). |
 | **Model**                    | Per-session model (App Settings → Models → New Claude sessions). A soft default — `/model` still works in-session.                  |
 | **Effort / Ultracode**       | Reasoning effort (`low`–`max`) or `ultracode` for dynamic multi-agent workflows. Switchable anytime with `/effort`. |
 
@@ -473,7 +495,7 @@ PTY Output → 16ms Server Batch → DEC 2026 Wrap → SSE → Client rAF → xt
 - **Clone a GitHub repo as a case** — paste a repository URL into **Add Case → Clone Repo** and Codeman clones it into `~/codeman-cases/<name>` and registers it as a normal case, ready to run an agent in. It preflights the URL while you type (tells you whether it can be cloned anonymously and offers the repo's real branches and tags for the optional branch/tag field), fills the case name in from the URL, and lets you pick which CLI the Run button should use. Public repositories over `https://`; Codeman never collects or stores credentials
 - **Create a case in a custom folder** — tick **Create in a custom folder** in **Add Case → Create New**, pick a parent folder (Browse included) and a name, and Codeman scaffolds the new case there instead of `~/codeman-cases`. The target must be a new or empty folder; system directories, your home folder itself, credential trees such as `~/.ssh`, and Codeman's own data folder are refused. Admin only in multi-user mode.
 - **Open a tmux session you started by hand**: a tmux session started outside Codeman shows up on the home screen, on this machine automatically and in your Docker cases' containers or on your saved SSH hosts when you scan for them. One click opens it as a tab. Closing the tab only detaches, and Codeman will not respawn or relaunch an agent it did not start. See [Opened outside Codeman](docs/wiki/The-Dashboard.md#opened-outside-codeman).
-- **Multi-CLI** — run **Claude Code**, **OpenCode**, **Codex**, **Antigravity**, **Gemini**, **Pi**, **Grok**, **DeepSeek Harness**, **OMP**, or **GitHub Copilot CLI** per session; env-var prefixes auto-gate (`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vs `OPENCODE_*` vs `CODEX_*` vs `ANTIGRAVITY_*` vs `GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*` vs `PI_*` vs `GROK_*`/`XAI_*` vs `DSH_*`/`DEEPSEEK_*` vs `OMP_*` vs `COPILOT_*`). See [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md), [`docs/pi-integration.md`](docs/pi-integration.md), [`docs/grok-integration.md`](docs/grok-integration.md), [`docs/deepseek-integration.md`](docs/deepseek-integration.md) [`docs/omp-integration.md`](docs/omp-integration.md) and [`docs/copilot-integration.md`](docs/copilot-integration.md)
+- **Multi-CLI** — run **Claude Code**, **OpenCode**, **Codex**, **Antigravity**, **Gemini**, **Pi**, **Grok**, **DeepSeek Harness**, **OMP**, **GitHub Copilot CLI**, or **jcode** per session; env-var prefixes auto-gate (`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vs `OPENCODE_*` vs `CODEX_*` vs `ANTIGRAVITY_*` vs `GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*` vs `PI_*` vs `GROK_*`/`XAI_*` vs `DSH_*`/`DEEPSEEK_*` vs `OMP_*` vs `COPILOT_*`). See [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md), [`docs/pi-integration.md`](docs/pi-integration.md), [`docs/grok-integration.md`](docs/grok-integration.md), [`docs/deepseek-integration.md`](docs/deepseek-integration.md), [`docs/omp-integration.md`](docs/omp-integration.md), [`docs/copilot-integration.md`](docs/copilot-integration.md) and [`docs/jcode-integration.md`](docs/jcode-integration.md) (jcode takes no env prefix: its tools run in one shared daemon)
 - **Custom model endpoints** _(new in 1.29.0, HTTP API for now)_ — point a session's CLI at any OpenAI-compatible endpoint instead of its native backend: a local llama.cpp, llama-swap, Ollama or vLLM box, or a cloud gateway such as Azure AI Foundry or OpenRouter. Save an endpoint once (`POST /api/model-endpoints`; its models are discovered from `/v1/models`), apply it to a session (`POST /api/sessions/:id/custom-model`), and the CLI restarts in place on that endpoint. Verified live for Claude, OpenCode, Pi, Grok and OMP; Codex, Gemini and DeepSeek have documented gaps, Antigravity has no mechanism. A toolbar picker is the follow-up. See [`docs/custom-model-endpoints.md`](docs/custom-model-endpoints.md)
 - **A model on this Mac** _(experimental, new in 1.50.0)_: on a Mac with Apple silicon, **Run a local model** on the welcome screen shows which coding model fits, installs it with its runtime and a coding agent, and starts a session on it: no account, no API key, and the prompts and files of that session go to a model on this Mac, not to a cloud provider. Then mix cloud and local: through the [codeman skill](#the-agent-skill-start-here) a Claude Code session hands work to that model (`spawn_worker <name> local`, `sendmark`) and reads the answer back, so Claude plans and reviews in the cloud while the Mac does the bulk: summaries, first drafts, files that should stay here. See [`docs/local-models.md`](docs/local-models.md)
 - **Web tabs** — open Grafana, Uptime Kuma, a Vite dev server or any dashboard URL as a tab beside your sessions (Run dropdown → **Web / URL** → **Add URL**). Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, so an `http://` target works from a phone over HTTPS and through the tunnel, single-page apps route on their own paths, and a frame that reloads recovers itself. A `localhost` link an agent prints opens as a web tab automatically. See [`docs/web-tabs.md`](docs/web-tabs.md)
@@ -776,13 +798,15 @@ Everything in this section also ships as an **agent skill**, [`skills/codeman`](
 
 #### Step 1: install it
 
+Usually there is nothing to install: since 1.50.0 every new session gets the skill in its folder, where its CLI looks for skills (the web UI row below, on by default). The copy ignores itself in git, so your repository never lists it as a new file. The other routes are for pi, or for a copy that does not depend on that setting.
+
 | How            | Command                                                    | Scope                                                                                      |
 | -------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | Skills CLI     | `npx skills add Ark0N/Codeman --skill codeman -g`          | Global, for any skills-aware agent ([skills.sh](https://skills.sh)); the way to give it to pi |
 | Claude Code plugin | `/plugin marketplace add Ark0N/Codeman` then `/plugin install codeman@codeman` | Global, through Claude Code's plugin manager; `/plugin update codeman` follows releases. Pick this OR a `codeman skill install`, not both: a Claude Code with both lists the skill twice (`codeman` and `codeman:codeman`). |
 | Bundled CLI    | `codeman skill install`                                    | Global (`~/.claude/skills/codeman`), for npm installs that never cloned the repo            |
 | Bundled CLI    | `codeman skill install --case <name> [--mode <mode>]`      | One case only; `--mode codex` (or any other run mode) writes it where that CLI looks for skills |
-| Web UI         | App Settings → Agents & CLIs → All agent CLIs → **Codeman Agent Skill** | Auto-injects into each case on session create, where that session's CLI looks: `.claude/skills/` for Claude Code, `.agents/skills/` for Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Antigravity, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP; not pi, whose project skills trigger a trust prompt (`agentSkillEnabled`, SYNCED, default off) |
+| Web UI         | App Settings → Agents & CLIs → All agent CLIs → **Codeman Agent Skill** | Auto-injects into each case on session create, where that session's CLI looks: `.claude/skills/` for Claude Code, `.agents/skills/` for Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Antigravity, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP; not pi, whose project skills trigger a trust prompt (`agentSkillEnabled`, SYNCED, **on by default** since 1.50.0; a Claude Code that also has the plugin lists the skill twice, both work, so drop one if the duplicate bothers you) |
 
 `codeman skill uninstall [--case <name>]` reverses the CLI installs (with `--case`, every Codeman-managed copy in that case, whichever CLI's directory it sits in), and never touches a `skills/codeman` you wrote yourself.
 
@@ -850,7 +874,7 @@ Every recipe in there was verified against a live server, and the comments recor
 - **It self-gates.** It acts inside a Codeman-managed session. Outside one (`CODEMAN_MUX` unset) it only reads saved Codex conversations offline (`codeman history read`) and refuses everything else, and it never guesses an API URL, so a global install costs an unrelated Claude Code session nothing.
 - **It is deliberately conservative.** Unprompted, it may only spawn sessions, prompt them, and delete ones **it created in that same conversation, by exact id**, through a fail-closed guard that refuses to delete the agent's own session. Deleting a case (which erases a real directory of your code), bulk kills, respawn/ralph/cron/orchestrator changes and settings writes all require you to ask, naming the target.
 
-⚠️ Turning `agentSkillEnabled` back off **does not remove already-injected copies** (a create-time sweep would yank the skill out from under other live sessions sharing that workspace). Remove them per case with `codeman skill uninstall --case <name>`.
+⚠️ The web UI injection is **on by default** since 1.50.0. A `settings.json` without the `agentSkillEnabled` key means on. Existing installs that stored off are switched on once at the first 1.50.0 start (every App Settings save on 1.49.0 or earlier wrote the old default, `false`, whether or not you touched this switch); turning it off afterwards sticks. Turning it off **does not remove already-injected copies** (a create-time sweep would yank the skill out from under other live sessions sharing that workspace). Remove them per case with `codeman skill uninstall --case <name>`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -953,7 +977,7 @@ for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
 done
 printf '%s\n' "$TXT"
 
-# 5b. Other modes (shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot) have no transcript:
+# 5b. Other modes (shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot/jcode) have no transcript:
 #     read the terminal. ⚠️ Use terminal?tail=, NOT /output: the latter's textOutput
 #     is empty for every tmux-backed (i.e. every interactive) session. tail counts
 #     BYTES, and what comes back is terminal data, ANSI included.
@@ -1194,7 +1218,7 @@ flowchart TB
         end
 
         subgraph External["External"]
-            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex / Antigravity / Gemini / Pi / Grok / DeepSeek / OMP / GitHub Copilot</small>"]
+            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex / Antigravity / Gemini / Pi / Grok / DeepSeek / OMP / GitHub Copilot / jcode</small>"]
             BG["Background Agents<br/><small>(Task tool)</small>"]
         end
     end

README.zh-CN.md

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 <h2 align="center">AI 编程智能体的任务控制中心</h2>
 
 <p align="center">
-  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex &bull; Antigravity &bull; Gemini &bull; Pi &bull; Grok &bull; DeepSeek &bull; OMP &bull; Copilot &bull; 终端 —— 统一仪表盘 &bull; 任意设备</em>
+  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex &bull; Antigravity &bull; Gemini &bull; Pi &bull; Grok &bull; DeepSeek &bull; OMP &bull; Copilot &bull; jcode &bull; 终端 —— 统一仪表盘 &bull; 任意设备</em>
+</p>
+
+<p align="center">
+  <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/%E4%B8%8B%E8%BD%BD_Mac_%E7%89%88-Codeman.dmg-2f6fe0?style=for-the-badge&logo=apple&logoColor=white&labelColor=000000" alt="下载 Mac 版 Codeman（Codeman.dmg）" width="281"></a>
+  <br>
+  <sub>原生 Mac 应用：已签名并经过 Apple 公证，支持 Apple 芯片和 Intel，macOS 11.3 或更高版本。<a href="#在-mac-上codeman-应用">它能做什么</a></sub>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -21,7 +27,6 @@
   <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/stargazers"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=eab308" alt="GitHub stars"></a>
   <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/graphs/contributors"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/contributors/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=3b82f6" alt="Contributors"></a>
   <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/commits/master"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/commit-activity/t/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=1e3a5f" alt="Total commits"></a>
-  <a href="https://github.com/NipunaRanasinghe/awesome-ai-agents"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Featured_in-Awesome_AI_Agents-2ea44f?style=flat-square" alt="Featured in Awesome AI Agents"></a>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -30,7 +35,7 @@
 
 > 本文档由英文版 [`README.md`](README.md) 翻译而来。如有出入，以英文版为准。
 
-**Codeman** 是一个自托管的 AI 编程智能体任务控制中心。它在持久化的 tmux 会话里拉起 Claude Code、OpenCode、Codex、Antigravity、Gemini、Pi、Grok、DeepSeek Harness、OMP 或 GitHub Copilot CLI，把真实的终端流式传到任意浏览器，并在你离开之后让智能体继续干活：空闲时重新提示、用量限额重置后自动续跑、按计划执行任务，还能实时展示每一个后台智能体的工作。
+**Codeman** 是一个自托管的 AI 编程智能体任务控制中心。它在持久化的 tmux 会话里拉起 Claude Code、OpenCode、Codex、Antigravity、Gemini、Pi、Grok、DeepSeek Harness、OMP、GitHub Copilot CLI 或 jcode，把真实的终端流式传到任意浏览器，并在你离开之后让智能体继续干活：空闲时重新提示、用量限额重置后自动续跑、按计划执行任务，还能实时展示每一个后台智能体的工作。
 
 一行命令即可安装（macOS 和 Linux，Windows 通过 WSL）：
 
@@ -45,7 +50,9 @@ codeman web
 
 安装器在每次系统改动前都会先询问；重跑同一条命令即可原地更新。详见[快速开始 — 安装](#快速开始--安装)。
 
-- **一个仪表盘，十个 CLI**：每个会话可选 [Claude Code、OpenCode、Codex、Antigravity、Gemini、Pi、Grok、DeepSeek、OMP 或 GitHub Copilot](#更多特性)（外加普通 shell），在本机、[Docker 容器](#隔离的-docker-会话)或 [SSH 远程主机](#远程-ssh-会话)上运行，你自己的仪表盘也能作为 [Web 标签页](#更多特性)并排打开
+在 Mac 上可以不用终端：[下载 Codeman.dmg](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg)，这个应用会替你安装 Codeman、打开已在运行的 Codeman，或者连接另一台机器上的 Codeman。详见[在 Mac 上：Codeman 应用](#在-mac-上codeman-应用)。
+
+- **一个仪表盘，十一个 CLI**：每个会话可选 [Claude Code、OpenCode、Codex、Antigravity、Gemini、Pi、Grok、DeepSeek、OMP、GitHub Copilot 或 jcode](#更多特性)（外加普通 shell），在本机、[Docker 容器](#隔离的-docker-会话)或 [SSH 远程主机](#远程-ssh-会话)上运行，你自己的仪表盘也能作为 [Web 标签页](#更多特性)并排打开
 - **真正的手机友好**：[触控优化的终端](#移动端优化的-web-ui)，即时本地回显、二维码登录、滑动导航与推送通知
 - **睡觉时也在跑**：[空闲检测 + 重生循环](#重生控制器respawn-controller)，订阅限额重置后自动续跑，支持 24 小时以上的无人值守运行
 - **看见智能体在想什么**：每个子智能体和团队成员都有[实时浮动窗口](#实时智能体可视化)，附带实时活动记录
@@ -74,7 +81,7 @@ curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash
 - **无需管理员权限。** 在没有 `sudo` 的账户、安装器无法确认 `sudo` 权限的账户（不在 `sudo`、`wheel`、`admin` 组内，且 `sudo` 需要密码）或不是管理员、也没有可写入的 Homebrew 的 Mac 账户上，安装器会把 nodejs.org 的 Node.js 和 tmux 项目自己的构建下载到 `~/.codeman/runtime`，两者都会校验 SHA-256；没有可用的 git 时，则以归档包的方式获取源码。`--no-admin` 强制走这条路线，`CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN=0` 则将其关闭。两个限制：Linux 上必须已有 make、C++ 编译器和 python3，tmux 下载需要 macOS 15 或更新版本。详见 [wiki](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/wiki/Installation#without-administrator-rights)。
 - **给急性子的参数。** `curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash -s -- --tailscale --service` 直接在命令行上回答这些问题（还有 `--lan`、`--local`、`--run`、`--no-start`、`--name <n>`、`--port <n>`、`--yes`）。**CI / 无终端环境：** 没有终端时，涉及系统改动的步骤会带着说明中止，而不是静默执行；在自动化场景设置 `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` 即可批准这些步骤。
 
-你至少需要安装一个 AI 编程 CLI —— [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)、[OpenCode](https://opencode.ai)、[Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)、[Antigravity](https://antigravity.google)、[Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli)、[Pi](https://pi.dev)、[Grok Build](https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build)、[DeepSeek Harness](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness)、[OMP](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi) 或 [GitHub Copilot CLI](https://github.com/github/copilot-cli)（任意组合均可；自 Google 面向消费者停售后，Gemini CLI 仅限企业版，Antigravity 是其继任者）。安装器会自动检测这十个中已安装的任意一个；若一个都没有，会给出一个菜单让你安装其中任意一个（DeepSeek 除外，它的 npm 包只装一个启动器，没有可运行的 profile），也可以选择跳过、稍后自行安装。安装完成后：
+你至少需要安装一个 AI 编程 CLI —— [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)、[OpenCode](https://opencode.ai)、[Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)、[Antigravity](https://antigravity.google)、[Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli)、[Pi](https://pi.dev)、[Grok Build](https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build)、[DeepSeek Harness](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness)、[OMP](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi)、[GitHub Copilot CLI](https://github.com/github/copilot-cli) 或 [jcode](https://jcode.sh)（任意组合均可；自 Google 面向消费者停售后，Gemini CLI 仅限企业版，Antigravity 是其继任者）。安装器会自动检测这十一个中已安装的任意一个；若一个都没有，会给出一个菜单让你安装其中任意一个（DeepSeek 除外，它的 npm 包只装一个启动器，没有可运行的 profile），也可以选择跳过、稍后自行安装。安装完成后：
 
 ```bash
 codeman web
@@ -99,6 +106,21 @@ bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh
 
 详见下文[多用户模式](#多用户模式可选启用)。
 
+### 在 Mac 上：Codeman 应用
+
+**[下载 Codeman.dmg](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg)** · 同一个通用应用，适用于 Apple 芯片和 Intel · macOS 11.3 或更高版本
+
+一个小巧的原生应用，在它自己的窗口里打开 Codeman。在还没有 Codeman 的 Mac 上，它会替你安装，不用终端，也不需要管理员密码，用一张清单显示安装进度；如果这台 Mac 上还没有编程智能体，它还会提出帮你装一个。在已经运行 Codeman 的 Mac 上，它会找到服务器并打开；服务器停着时则替你启动。在 **Another machine** 下，它可以连接你的 Mac mini、家用服务器或 tailnet 上的 Codeman，密码保存在钥匙串里，还能通过 SSH 在那台机器上开始安装。在配备 PROLED XDR 显示屏、机盖 Apple 标志会发光的 MacBook Pro 上，**View > Blink Apple Logo** 会让标志按智能体在做的事闪烁：工作中、等你回复、需要权限各用一种你自己选的样式；在你选定之前，三种都保持关闭。这个应用用 Rust 写成，套在 macOS 自带的 WebKit 外面，不捆绑浏览器，所以下载不到 5 MB。
+
+打开 `Codeman.dmg`，把 Codeman 拖进「应用程序」文件夹，再从那里打开。macOS 会问一次是否打开这个从互联网下载的应用：点**打开**。
+
+- **退出应用不会停止 Codeman。** 通过应用安装的 Codeman 以 LaunchAgent 的形式运行，登录时自动启动，所以关掉窗口后智能体照样工作，浏览器和手机也和以前一样能访问它。
+- **Codeman 的页面需要 Safari 16.4 的 WebKit。** 应用本身在 macOS 11.3 上就能启动，但 Codeman 需要 macOS 13.3 或更高版本，或者装有 Safari 16.4 或更高版本的 macOS 11 或 12。WebKit 更旧时，应用会说明原因，并且不会连接。
+- **在应用里安装需要 macOS 15，或者机器上已有 tmux。** tmux 来自 tmux 项目自己的构建，而这些构建需要 macOS 15。在没有 tmux 的旧 Mac 上，应用会改为提供终端安装方式，由 Homebrew 在终端里安装 tmux（这需要管理员操作一次）。
+- **更新。** 应用暂时不会自我更新：下载新的 `Codeman.dmg`，拖过去覆盖旧的那份即可。
+
+首次启动、已知限制以及如何自行构建：见 wiki 的 [Installation](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/wiki/Installation#on-a-mac-the-codeman-app)（英文）和 [packages/desktop/README.md](packages/desktop/README.md)（英文）。
+
 <details>
 <summary><strong>让它在后台一直运行</strong></summary>
 
@@ -270,7 +292,7 @@ codeman service install           # systemd/launchd 服务：重启后自动回
 | 字段                   | 作用                                                                                        |
 | ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | **工作目录 / case**    | 智能体操作的文件夹。「case」就是一个 Codeman 记住的命名工作目录。**Add Case** 可以从零创建、链接一个已有文件夹，或把一个 GitHub 仓库直接克隆成 case（**Clone Repo**）。 |
-| **CLI / 运行模式**     | `Claude`（默认）、`OpenCode`、`Codex`、`Antigravity`、`Gemini`、`Pi`、`Grok`、`DeepSeek`、`OMP`、`Copilot` 或 `Terminal`（普通 shell）。 |
+| **CLI / 运行模式**     | `Claude`（默认）、`OpenCode`、`Codex`、`Antigravity`、`Gemini`、`Pi`、`Grok`、`DeepSeek`、`OMP`、`Copilot`、`jcode` 或 `Terminal`（普通 shell）。 |
 | **模型**               | 每会话模型（App Settings → Models → New Claude sessions）。软默认值 —— 会话内 `/model` 依然有效。 |
 | **Effort / Ultracode** | 推理力度（`low`–`max`），或用 `ultracode` 开启动态多智能体工作流。随时可用 `/effort` 切换。 |
 
@@ -475,7 +497,7 @@ PTY 输出 → 16ms 服务端批处理 → DEC 2026 包裹 → SSE → 客户端
 - **把 GitHub 仓库克隆成 case** —— 在 **Add Case → Clone Repo** 里粘贴一个仓库 URL，Codeman 会把它克隆到 `~/codeman-cases/<name>` 并注册为普通 case，随时可以跑智能体。输入时它会预检 URL（告诉你能否匿名克隆，并为可选的分支/标签字段提供仓库真实的分支与标签），从 URL 里填好 case 名，还让你选 Run 按钮该用哪个 CLI。支持 `https://` 的公开仓库；Codeman 绝不收集或保存凭据
 - **在自定义文件夹里创建 case**：在 **Add Case → Create New** 里勾选 **Create in a custom folder**，选一个父文件夹（可用 Browse 浏览）和一个名字，Codeman 就会在那里而不是 `~/codeman-cases` 里搭建新 case。目标必须是一个新的或空的文件夹；系统目录、你的主目录本身、`~/.ssh` 这类凭据目录，以及 Codeman 自己的数据目录都会被拒绝。多用户模式下仅管理员可用
 - **打开你手动启动的 tmux 会话**：在 Codeman 之外启动的 tmux 会话会出现在主屏幕上：本机的会自动列出，Docker case 容器内和已保存 SSH 主机上的会在你扫描时列出。点一下即可作为标签页打开。关闭标签页只会分离，Codeman 不会重生或重启并非由它启动的智能体。详见 [Opened outside Codeman](docs/wiki/The-Dashboard.md#opened-outside-codeman)。
-- **多 CLI** —— 每个会话可选 **Claude Code**、**OpenCode**、**Codex**、**Antigravity**、**Gemini**、**Pi**、**Grok**、**DeepSeek Harness**、**OMP** 或 **GitHub Copilot CLI**；环境变量前缀自动隔离（`CLAUDE_CODE_*`、`OPENCODE_*`、`CODEX_*`、`ANTIGRAVITY_*`、`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`、`PI_*`、`GROK_*`/`XAI_*`、`DSH_*`/`DEEPSEEK_*`、`OMP_*` 与 `COPILOT_*`）。详见 [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md)、[`docs/pi-integration.md`](docs/pi-integration.md)、[`docs/grok-integration.md`](docs/grok-integration.md)、[`docs/deepseek-integration.md`](docs/deepseek-integration.md)、[`docs/omp-integration.md`](docs/omp-integration.md) 与 [`docs/copilot-integration.md`](docs/copilot-integration.md)
+- **多 CLI** —— 每个会话可选 **Claude Code**、**OpenCode**、**Codex**、**Antigravity**、**Gemini**、**Pi**、**Grok**、**DeepSeek Harness**、**OMP**、**GitHub Copilot CLI** 或 **jcode**；环境变量前缀自动隔离（`CLAUDE_CODE_*`、`OPENCODE_*`、`CODEX_*`、`ANTIGRAVITY_*`、`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`、`PI_*`、`GROK_*`/`XAI_*`、`DSH_*`/`DEEPSEEK_*`、`OMP_*` 与 `COPILOT_*`）。详见 [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md)、[`docs/pi-integration.md`](docs/pi-integration.md)、[`docs/grok-integration.md`](docs/grok-integration.md)、[`docs/deepseek-integration.md`](docs/deepseek-integration.md)、[`docs/omp-integration.md`](docs/omp-integration.md)、[`docs/copilot-integration.md`](docs/copilot-integration.md) 与 [`docs/jcode-integration.md`](docs/jcode-integration.md)（jcode 不接受环境变量前缀：它的工具运行在一个共享的守护进程里）
 - **自定义模型端点**（1.29.0 新增，目前仅 HTTP API）—— 让某个会话的 CLI 指向任意 OpenAI 兼容端点，而不是它自己的官方后端：本地的 llama.cpp、llama-swap、Ollama 或 vLLM 机器，也可以是 Azure AI Foundry、OpenRouter 这类云端网关。端点只需保存一次（`POST /api/model-endpoints`，模型列表从它的 `/v1/models` 自动发现），再应用到会话（`POST /api/sessions/:id/custom-model`），CLI 就会在原地重启并接上该端点。Claude、OpenCode、Pi、Grok 与 OMP 已实测通过；Codex、Gemini 与 DeepSeek 存在已记录的缺口，Antigravity 没有可用机制。工具栏选择器是下一步。详见 [`docs/custom-model-endpoints.md`](docs/custom-model-endpoints.md)
 - **Web 标签页** —— 把 Grafana、Uptime Kuma、一个 Vite 开发服务器或任何仪表盘 URL 作为标签页打开在会话旁边（Run 下拉菜单 → **Web / URL** → **Add URL**）。仪表盘通过 Codeman 自己的源代理，因此 `http://` 目标在手机上走 HTTPS 也能用、走隧道也能用；单页应用能在自己的路径上正常路由，页面自己重载后也能自行恢复。智能体打印出的 `localhost` 链接会自动以 Web 标签页打开。详见 [`docs/web-tabs.md`](docs/web-tabs.md)
 - **Docker 会话** —— 在隔离且加固的容器中运行 case。**Create New** 上勾选一个复选框即可用合理的默认值启动容器并在其中启动智能体；同一 case 的多个会话共享一个容器，也可以把 case 挂到你已经在跑的容器上；可将容器连同工作区导出为可移植的 `.tar.gz`，迁移到另一台机器。详见 [`docs/docker-cases.md`](docs/docker-cases.md)
@@ -775,13 +797,15 @@ Web UI 仍是主要界面；完整指南见 **[docs/tui.md](docs/tui.md)**（英
 
 #### 第 1 步：安装
 
+通常什么都不用装：从 1.50.0 起，每个新会话都会在自己的文件夹里、在它的 CLI 查找技能的位置拿到这个技能（即下表的 Web UI 一行，默认开启）。这份副本会让 git 忽略它自己，所以你的仓库永远不会把它列为新文件。其他方式适用于 pi，或者你想要一份不依赖这个设置的副本的情况。
+
 | 方式             | 命令                                                       | 范围                                                                                       |
 | ---------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | Skills CLI       | `npx skills add Ark0N/Codeman --skill codeman -g`          | 全局，任何支持技能的智能体都能用（[skills.sh](https://skills.sh)）；给 pi 装技能就用这个方式 |
 | Claude Code 插件 | `/plugin marketplace add Ark0N/Codeman`，然后 `/plugin install codeman@codeman` | 全局，通过 Claude Code 自带的插件管理器；`/plugin update codeman` 跟随新版本。与 `codeman skill install` 二选一：两者都装会让技能出现两次（`codeman` 和 `codeman:codeman`） |
 | 内置 CLI         | `codeman skill install`                                    | 全局（`~/.claude/skills/codeman`），给那些从 npm 安装、从未克隆过仓库的用户                |
 | 内置 CLI         | `codeman skill install --case <name> [--mode <mode>]`      | 仅一个 case；`--mode codex`（或任何其他运行模式）会把它写到那个 CLI 查找技能的位置          |
-| Web UI           | App Settings → Agents & CLIs → All agent CLIs → **Codeman Agent Skill** | 每次创建会话时自动注入到 case 里该会话的 CLI 查找技能的位置：Claude Code 是 `.claude/skills/`，Codex、Gemini CLI、OpenCode、Antigravity、Grok、DeepSeek 和 OMP 是 `.agents/skills/`；pi 除外，因为它的项目级技能会触发信任提示（`agentSkillEnabled`，跨设备同步，默认关闭） |
+| Web UI           | App Settings → Agents & CLIs → All agent CLIs → **Codeman Agent Skill** | 每次创建会话时自动注入到 case 里该会话的 CLI 查找技能的位置：Claude Code 是 `.claude/skills/`，Codex、Gemini CLI、OpenCode、Antigravity、Grok、DeepSeek 和 OMP 是 `.agents/skills/`；pi 除外，因为它的项目级技能会触发信任提示（`agentSkillEnabled`，跨设备同步，从 1.50.0 起**默认开启**；同时装了插件的 Claude Code 会把技能列出两次，两个都能用，嫌重复就去掉其中一个） |
 
 `codeman skill uninstall [--case <name>]` 可以撤销 CLI 安装（带 `--case` 时，删除该 case 里所有由 Codeman 管理的副本，不论它在哪个 CLI 的目录里），并且绝不会碰你自己写的 `skills/codeman`。
 
@@ -848,7 +872,7 @@ deleted 9f2d8e5f, aff9c691, be9f1f15    标签消失
 - **它会自我门禁。** 它在 Codeman 管理的会话里工作。不在这样的会话里（`CODEMAN_MUX` 未设置）时，它只会离线读取已保存的 Codex 对话（`codeman history read`），其他一律拒绝，也从不去猜 API 地址，所以全局安装对无关的 Claude Code 会话没有任何代价。
 - **它刻意保守。** 未经提示，它只会拉起会话、给它们发提示，并删除**它在同一段对话里自己创建的**会话（按精确 id，经由一个拒绝删除智能体自身会话的失败即关闭守卫）。删除 case（会抹掉一个真实的代码目录）、批量杀会话、改动 respawn/ralph/cron/orchestrator 以及写设置，都需要你开口并指名目标。
 
-⚠️ 把 `agentSkillEnabled` 关回去**不会删掉已经注入的副本**（在创建时做清扫，会把技能从共用同一个工作区的其他活动会话脚下抽走）。要删就按 case 删：`codeman skill uninstall --case <name>`。
+⚠️ 从 1.50.0 起，Web UI 注入**默认开启**。`settings.json` 里没有 `agentSkillEnabled` 这个键就表示开启。已经存了关闭的旧安装，会在第一次启动 1.50.0 时被打开一次（1.49.0 及更早版本每次保存 App Settings 都会写入旧默认值 `false`，不管你有没有动过这个开关）；之后你再把它关掉，就会一直保持关闭。把它关掉**不会删掉已经注入的副本**（在创建时做清扫，会把技能从共用同一个工作区的其他活动会话脚下抽走）。要删就按 case 删：`codeman skill uninstall --case <name>`。
 
 ---
 
@@ -947,7 +971,7 @@ for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
 done
 printf '%s\n' "$TXT"
 
-# 5b. 其他模式（shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot）没有 transcript，读终端。
+# 5b. 其他模式（shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot/jcode）没有 transcript，读终端。
 #     ⚠️ 用 terminal?tail=，不要用 /output：后者的 textOutput 对每个由 tmux 承载的
 #     （也就是每个交互式）会话都是空的。tail 按字节计，返回的是含 ANSI 的终端数据。
 curl -s "$API/api/sessions/$SID/terminal?tail=8000" | jq -r '.data.terminalBuffer'
@@ -1168,7 +1192,7 @@ flowchart TB
         end
 
         subgraph External["外部"]
-            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex / Antigravity / Gemini / Pi / Grok / DeepSeek / OMP / GitHub Copilot</small>"]
+            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex / Antigravity / Gemini / Pi / Grok / DeepSeek / OMP / GitHub Copilot / jcode</small>"]
             BG["后台智能体<br/><small>(Task 工具)</small>"]
         end
     end

config/clis.stock.json

@@ -305,5 +305,34 @@
         "docsUrl": "https://github.com/github/copilot-cli"
       }
     }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "jcode",
+    "label": "jcode",
+    "shortBadge": "JC",
+    "enabled": true,
+    "order": 110,
+    "kind": "agent",
+    "discovery": {
+      "binaries": [
+        "jcode"
+      ],
+      "searchDirs": [
+        "~/.local/bin",
+        "/usr/local/bin",
+        "~/bin"
+      ],
+      "install": {
+        "command": {
+          "linux": "curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash",
+          "darwin": "curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash"
+        },
+        "docsUrl": "https://jcode.sh/docs",
+        "agentImageLayer": {
+          "kind": "dedicated",
+          "reason": "Not on npm: jcode ships a standalone Rust binary through jcode.sh/install, whose launcher is a script that execs the binary beside it."
+        }
+      }
+    }
   }
 ]

config/mcp-registry/server.json

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   "name": "io.github.Ark0N/codeman",
   "title": "Codeman",
   "description": "Start, prompt and read AI coding agent sessions (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI and more) in Codeman",
-  "version": "1.49.0",
+  "version": "1.50.0",
   "websiteUrl": "https://getcodeman.com",
   "repository": {
     "url": "https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman",
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
     {
       "registryType": "npm",
       "identifier": "aicodeman",
-      "version": "1.49.0",
+      "version": "1.50.0",
       "transport": {
         "type": "stdio"
       },

config/test-suites.ts

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ export const BROWSER_TEST_GLOBS = [
   'test/fullscreen-tab-switch-capture.browser.test.ts',
   'test/terminal-touch-swipe-axis.browser.test.ts',
   'test/phone-press-feedback.browser.test.ts',
+  'test/desktop-connect-page.browser.test.ts', // no server: the page is served by request interception
   'test/local-model-ui.browser.test.ts',
 ];
 

docker/agent.Dockerfile

@@ -203,6 +203,21 @@ RUN curl -fsSL https://omp.sh/install | sh \
  && rm -f /root/.local/bin/omp \
  && omp --version
 
+# jcode is NOT on npm: a standalone Rust binary via jcode.sh's installer, which
+# writes $HOME/.jcode/builds/versions/<v>/ and links $HOME/.local/bin/jcode to it.
+# The linked `jcode` is a small sh LAUNCHER that resolves its own path and execs
+# the `jcode-<os>-<arch>.bin` beside it, so (unlike grok/omp above) the whole
+# version directory is copied, to /opt/jcode, and /usr/local/bin/jcode links the
+# launcher there. Root's ~/.jcode is dropped in the same layer so the image does
+# not carry the ~160MB binary twice. JCODE_SKIP_SERVER_RELOAD: there is no jcode
+# daemon at build time to hand off to.
+RUN curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | JCODE_SKIP_SERVER_RELOAD=1 bash \
+ && mkdir -p /opt/jcode \
+ && cp -a "$(dirname "$(readlink -f /root/.local/bin/jcode)")/." /opt/jcode/ \
+ && ln -sfn /opt/jcode/jcode /usr/local/bin/jcode \
+ && rm -rf /root/.jcode /root/.local/bin/jcode \
+ && jcode --version
+
 # `agent` user (gid 0) with an arbitrary-uid-writable HOME. The uid is
 # auto-assigned (node:22-slim already occupies uid 1000 with its `node` user); at
 # runtime Codeman overrides with `--user <hostUid>:0` on Linux, so the baked uid

docs/agent-control-plan.md

@@ -8,6 +8,17 @@ see [§7 Build log](#7-build-log-what-actually-happened) for what shipped, what
 verification round found, and the two items that genuinely remain open (§2.4's footgun
 guard and the Part 3 deferrals).
 
+**Update 2026-11-08 (1.50.0)**: `agentSkillEnabled` is now **on by default** (owner decision:
+"enable the codeman skill by default"), the flip §2.2 planned for after dogfooding. An absent
+key means on in both readers (server `getAgentSkillEnabled()` and the App Settings switch, both
+`!== false`); an explicit false is off. Existing installs that stored off are switched on once at
+the first 1.50.0 start (every App Settings Save up to 1.49.0 wrote `false`); turning it off
+afterwards sticks (`src/web/agent-skill-default-migration.ts`, a "Behaviour change" in the
+release notes). To keep users' repositories clean, every managed copy
+now carries a `.gitignore` of `*` (written once with `wx`, removed by uninstall only when it is
+the last file left). Turning the setting off still sweeps nothing. The sections below record the
+original default-off decision as it was made.
+
 **Date**: 2026-08-08
 **Scope**: Part 1 (agent skill) and Part 2 (wait primitives) were specified and built.
 Parts 3 to 5 are captured so they are not lost, but remain deliberately deferred.
@@ -119,7 +130,7 @@ Install paths, in order of how a user gets it:
 
 Setting name: `agentSkillEnabled`. Synced (not per-device), since it changes on-disk case
 content rather than display. Default: **ON after the dogfooding phase, OFF in the first
-release**. Rationale for starting OFF: Claude Code loads every skill's name and description
+release** (flipped to ON in 1.50.0, see the Status update at the top). Rationale for starting OFF: Claude Code loads every skill's name and description
 into context on every turn, so an always-on skill has a small permanent token cost, and we
 should measure that we are buying something with it first.
 
@@ -543,6 +554,7 @@ without the wait endpoints, so the wait work goes first.
 1. ✅ `skills/` at the repo root: accepted (built that way; the install one-liner depends on it).
 2. ✅ `agentSkillEnabled` default: **OFF** for the first release, per §2.2's rationale (skills
    cost context on every turn; measure before defaulting on). Flip later if dogfooding earns it.
+   **Flipped to ON in 1.50.0** (2026-11-08), with the copy made self-ignoring in git.
 3. ✅ Both: global install via `npx skills add` / `codeman skill install`, AND per-case
    auto-injection behind the (default-off) setting. Injection is add-only at session create and
    marker-guarded, so a user-authored copy is never touched.
@@ -681,9 +693,9 @@ Built to the §2.6 file list, mirroring the statusLine mechanism throughout:
 | ----- | ----- |
 | `applyAgentSkill(casePath, enabled)` + `installAgentSkillInto` / `removeAgentSkillFrom` | `src/hooks-config.ts` |
 | `codeman skill install` / `skill uninstall` (`--global` default, `--case <name>`) | `src/cli.ts` |
-| `agentSkillEnabled` (SYNCED, default OFF) | `schemas.ts` (`SettingsUpdateSchema`), `getAgentSkillEnabled()` on `ConfigPort`/`server.ts`, checkbox in `index.html` + `settings-ui.js` |
+| `agentSkillEnabled` (SYNCED, default OFF; ON since 1.50.0) | `schemas.ts` (`SettingsUpdateSchema`), `getAgentSkillEnabled()` on `ConfigPort`/`server.ts`, checkbox in `index.html` + `settings-ui.js`; the one-time 1.50.0 boot migration of a stored false in `src/web/agent-skill-default-migration.ts` |
 | Injection call sites (Claude mode only) | `POST /api/sessions` next to `refreshStaleCodemanHooks`; `POST /api/quick-start` after the case-create/self-heal blocks (local + docker cases; remote skipped, its path lives on another host) |
-| Tests | `test/agent-skill.test.ts` (10 unit), `test/quick-start.test.ts` (real server: default-off, PUT accepts key, injection on create, shell-mode skipped) |
+| Tests | `test/agent-skill.test.ts` (unit, incl. the self-ignoring `.gitignore` against real git since 1.50.0), `test/quick-start.test.ts` (real server: default-off at first, default-on since 1.50.0 incl. a partial PUT and an explicit false, injection on create, shell-mode skipped), `test/agent-skill-setting-ui.test.ts` (the App Settings switch reads an absent key as on, and a device blob holding the old false follows the server), `test/agent-skill-default-migration.test.ts` (the boot migration: once per data dir, marker outside settings.json) |
 
 Decisions worth keeping:
 

docs/api-reference.md

@@ -988,11 +988,12 @@ the web UI uses as the base for a relative path printed in the terminal. It is
 never restored after a restart (it is written to `state.json` with the rest of the
 session state but not read back), absent for remote,
 Docker, adopted, direct-PTY and rediscovered sessions and for a session split into several panes,
-and never a confinement root: file routes stay confined to `workingDir`.
+and never a confinement root. File routes stay confined to `workingDir`, except for an
+absolute path inside an `outsideWorktree`, described in the next section.
 tmux reports the resolved directory, so for a workspace reached through a symlink a
 directory at or under the resolved workspace is reported in `workingDir`'s spelling.
 
-## Live worktree (`liveWorktree`)
+## Live worktree (`liveWorktree`, `outsideWorktree`)
 
 Session state (`GET /api/v1/sessions`, the `session:updated` event) may carry `liveWorktree`,
 the linked git worktree the session's pane is in now, for example after Claude Code's
@@ -1003,17 +1004,54 @@ EnterWorktree moved the running session:
 ```
 
 It is derived from `paneCwd`, so it is absent wherever that is, and it is only ever a folder
-strictly below `workingDir`: a worktree elsewhere is never reported. `path` is in `workingDir`'s
-spelling. Like `paneCwd` it is never restored after a restart and never a confinement root.
+strictly below `workingDir`: a worktree elsewhere is never reported in it. `path` is in
+`workingDir`'s spelling. Like `paneCwd` it is never restored after a restart and never a
+confinement root.
+
+Session state may also carry the optional `outsideWorktree`: a
+worktree of the session's repository OUTSIDE `workingDir`, such as `git worktree add ../feature`.
+It can be a linked worktree, or the repository's main worktree for a session started in a linked
+one. It carries `"outside": true`, and `path` is the folder's real path. A session has at most one
+of `liveWorktree` and `outsideWorktree`:
+
+```json
+"outsideWorktree": { "name": "repo-feature", "path": "/home/me/repo-feature", "outside": true }
+```
+
+Like `liveWorktree`, it is never restored after a restart.
+
+Such a worktree is a second root for the session's file routes. `file-content` (read and edit),
+`file-raw`, `file-preview`, `file-thumbnail`, `GET /api/v1/download` and
+`POST /api/v1/sessions/:id/html-view` accept an ABSOLUTE path inside it, while a relative path
+still resolves against `workingDir` only. A file there that the sensitive-path blocklist names
+(`.env`, `.aws/credentials`, `users.json` and the like) is refused on every one of those routes.
+Codeman reports the worktree only when the session's own repository lists it, and only when `workingDir` is the top of that repository or of a linked worktree, so a session started in a subfolder of its repository reports none. It never reports:
+
+- `/`, the home folder or above, or a folder holding `workingDir`;
+- a folder at, inside or around a Docker case workspace;
+- in multi-user mode, a worktree outside the owner's folder rule (their own space or the session
+  folder; an admin owner is not limited);
+- any outside worktree while attachment workspace confinement is on;
+- a folder at, inside or around a blocked attachment tree, or a folder that is itself a
+  sensitive folder such as `.ssh`.
+
+The file routes also apply confinement and the blocked trees on every request, so a setting changed later takes effect at once, and a listing then walks `workingDir`. `html-view` also applies the attachment guard to such a path on every request.
 
 `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/files` takes an optional `root=live`, which starts the listing, or a
-`q` search, at that worktree instead of at `workingDir`. The response's `root` names the folder
+`q` search, at a worktree inside `workingDir` instead of at `workingDir`. `root=live` never walks
+an outside worktree. `root=live-any` does the same and also walks an outside worktree, whose
+listing carries ABSOLUTE `path`s. The response's `root` names the folder
 that was walked: it stays `workingDir` when the session is in no worktree, when the worktree has
-gone, and when the folder no longer resolves inside `workingDir`. A `path` in the response stays
-relative to `workingDir` either way, so it works unchanged on `file-content` and `file-raw`,
-while a `q` containing `/` is matched against paths relative to the folder walked. The response
-also carries `worktree`, the same `{ name, path }`, whenever the session has a `liveWorktree`,
-whichever folder was walked and with or without `root=live`.
+gone, and when the folder no longer resolves inside `workingDir` (for an outside worktree, when it
+no longer resolves to its recorded `path`). A `path` in the response stays relative to
+`workingDir` either way, except in a `root=live-any` listing of an outside worktree, where every `path` is
+absolute. A relative `path` and an absolute `path` inside an outside worktree both work on
+`file-content`, `file-raw`, `file-preview`, `file-thumbnail`, `/api/v1/download` and `html-view`.
+A `q` containing `/` is matched against paths relative to the folder walked. The response
+also carries `worktree`, the session's `liveWorktree` object (`{ name, path }`) whenever the
+session has one, whichever folder was walked and with or without `root=live` or `root=live-any`.
+An `outsideWorktree` (`{ name, path, outside: true }`) is reported in `worktree` only for
+`root=live-any`.
 
 The walk lists at most 5,000 files and folders and opens no more folders once it has read 250,000
 directory entries (the folder that crosses that line is read whole). It sets `truncated` when it
@@ -1599,6 +1637,23 @@ Read and write the CLI registry (`docs/cli-registry.md`). Every **write** route
 | `PUT`    | `/api/clis/custom/:id`        | `{ label, shortBadge, binaries, argv, enabled? }`       | Replace an existing custom entry. An absent `enabled` keeps the entry's current state. `400` for a stock id, `404` for an unknown one. |
 | `DELETE` | `/api/clis/:id`               | none                                                    | Delete a custom entry. `400` for a stock id, `404` for an unknown one.                                  |
 
+### Per-CLI availability probes
+
+Each agent CLI has a read-only probe, `GET /api/<mode>/status`, which answers
+`{ available, path }` for the binary the server would launch (no session needed, not gated).
+`pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot` and `jcode` add `version`, since their binary names are short or shared
+with unrelated programs and the resolver rejects a candidate whose `--version` has the wrong
+shape; `deepseek` answers a wider shape (`runnable`, `profiles`, ...). `GET /api/jcode/status`
+is answered by the generic registry resolver, the same one a jcode spawn uses, so it applies
+the entry's `jcode v<semver>` version anchor.
+
+A jcode session takes `jcodeConfig: { model?, resumeSessionId? }` on `POST /api/sessions`
+and `POST /api/quick-start` (`--model`, `--resume`; the resume value is a jcode session id or
+short name and must start with a letter or digit). jcode takes no `envOverrides` prefix, and
+`GET /api/sessions/:id/last-response` answers an empty `text` (and `messages: []` with
+`?context=full`) for it: read its screen with `GET /api/sessions/:id/terminal?tail=` instead.
+See `docs/jcode-integration.md`.
+
 ## MCP server sync
 
 Copies MCP servers between the agent CLIs' own user-level config files (`docs/cli-registry.md`, "MCP server sync"). **Opt-in:** both routes answer `403 FORBIDDEN` while the synced `mcpSyncEnabled` setting is off (the default), and for a non-admin in multi-user mode, because the routes write files in the server user's home. A second `POST` while one is running answers `409 CONFLICT`.

docs/architecture-invariants.md

@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ Pure helpers unit-tested in `test/base-path.test.ts` + `test/webview-proxy.test.
 
 ## Session launch modes
 
-**Terminal colour env** — the stock registry decides each CLI's colour vars. Claude, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP export `COLORTERM=truecolor`; `shell` and `opencode` unset it. All of those except Claude also unset `NO_COLOR`, so a user who exports `NO_COLOR` globally keeps monochrome Claude panes. The variable matters because a CLI inheriting no `COLORTERM` quantizes every RGB color it draws down to whatever palette `TERM` alone implies, and the pane's `TERM` is not a constant. ⚠️ Codeman sets no `default-terminal` and passes tmux no `-f`, so it is tmux's default (`tmux-256color` since 3.2) unless the user's own `~/.tmux.conf` says otherwise, which Codeman's server DOES read. At `tmux-256color` supports-color reports 256 colors and `rgb(55, 55, 55)` lands on `ESC[48;5;237m`: visible, but not the color the theme named. Where `TERM` resolves to a 16-color entry instead (tmux older than 3.2, or a conf setting `default-terminal screen`) every dark background collapses to `ESC[40m`, the terminal's own black, and the block disappears entirely. That is why the same Claude theme looks different on two machines, and why a bug report here is worth pairing with the reporter's `tmux -V` and their pane's real `TERM`. ⚠️ These declarations reach the local tmux pane via `buildEnvExports()`, its attach client via `cliExportsTruecolor()`, and the direct-PTY fallback via `buildClaudeEnv()` — they do NOT reach a remote pane, which `buildRemoteLaunchCommand()` builds with no env exports at all. A Docker pane takes `COLORTERM=truecolor` from the hardcoded `envCreate`/`execEnv` in `tmux-manager.ts`, which apply to every mode including the two the registry says must unset it. A `~/.codeman/clis.json` override replaces these arrays wholesale (`deepMerge`), so a custom entry can drop either list. That is why both consumers apply the entry BEFORE Codeman's own variables rather than after: `buildEnvExports()` emits `...cliEnv` ahead of `export CODEMAN_MUX=1`, and `buildClaudeEnv()` assigns `PATH`/`TERM`/`CODEMAN_*` after its unset/export loop. Reversed, a config-supplied `unset` naming `CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` would strip it on one path and not the other.
+**Terminal colour env** — the stock registry decides each CLI's colour vars. Claude, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP and jcode export `COLORTERM=truecolor`; `shell` and `opencode` unset it. All of those except Claude also unset `NO_COLOR`, so a user who exports `NO_COLOR` globally keeps monochrome Claude panes. The variable matters because a CLI inheriting no `COLORTERM` quantizes every RGB color it draws down to whatever palette `TERM` alone implies, and the pane's `TERM` is not a constant. ⚠️ Codeman sets no `default-terminal` and passes tmux no `-f`, so it is tmux's default (`tmux-256color` since 3.2) unless the user's own `~/.tmux.conf` says otherwise, which Codeman's server DOES read. At `tmux-256color` supports-color reports 256 colors and `rgb(55, 55, 55)` lands on `ESC[48;5;237m`: visible, but not the color the theme named. Where `TERM` resolves to a 16-color entry instead (tmux older than 3.2, or a conf setting `default-terminal screen`) every dark background collapses to `ESC[40m`, the terminal's own black, and the block disappears entirely. That is why the same Claude theme looks different on two machines, and why a bug report here is worth pairing with the reporter's `tmux -V` and their pane's real `TERM`. ⚠️ These declarations reach the local tmux pane via `buildEnvExports()`, its attach client via `cliExportsTruecolor()`, and the direct-PTY fallback via `buildClaudeEnv()` — they do NOT reach a remote pane, which `buildRemoteLaunchCommand()` builds with no env exports at all. A Docker pane takes `COLORTERM=truecolor` from the hardcoded `envCreate`/`execEnv` in `tmux-manager.ts`, which apply to every mode including the two the registry says must unset it. A `~/.codeman/clis.json` override replaces these arrays wholesale (`deepMerge`), so a custom entry can drop either list. That is why both consumers apply the entry BEFORE Codeman's own variables rather than after: `buildEnvExports()` emits `...cliEnv` ahead of `export CODEMAN_MUX=1`, and `buildClaudeEnv()` assigns `PATH`/`TERM`/`CODEMAN_*` after its unset/export loop. Reversed, a config-supplied `unset` naming `CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` would strip it on one path and not the other.
 
 ### External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP)
 
-**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` (`mode === 'opencode' || 'codex' || 'gemini' || 'antigravity' || 'pi' || 'grok' || 'deepseek'`) gates Claude-specific behavior — Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token/CLI-info parsing, and ❯-prompt readiness detection are all skipped (these CLIs render their own TUIs; readiness = output stabilization instead). ⚠️ **Work detection left this gate in #385** and is now per-CLI `capabilities.workDetect` data (`promptGlyph` + `workingLine`), because gating it on the mode left every Codex session reporting `idle` for its entire life; a CLI declaring neither falls back to Claude's pair, which is logic-identical to the pre-registry behaviour. All seven modes **require tmux — no direct PTY fallback** — because secrets are injected via `tmux setenv` (socket-scoped `${this.tmux()} setenv`, never on the spawn command line): OpenCode gets `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT` etc., Codex gets `OPENAI_API_KEY`/`CODEX_API_KEY`/`CODEX_HOME` (`setCodexEnvVars`), Gemini gets `GEMINI_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`/`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`/`GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI` etc. (`setGeminiEnvVars`, all in `tmux-manager.ts`). Codex specifics: command built by `buildCodexCommand()` (`--no-daemon` behind the `noDaemonFlag` gate at 0.162.0, measured against codex's own version, local launches only; `--model`, `--config model_reasoning_effort=<level>` from `reasoningEffort`, `--config sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=true` from `networkAccess` (the **Allow network access** app setting `codexNetworkAccess`, a launch default and a privileged param; ⚠️ with it on, a command in codex's sandbox can call Codeman's API and start a session outside that sandbox, password or not), `--config tui.animations=<bool>` from `animations`, `resume <id>`, `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` from the `codexConfig` payload / `codexDangerouslyBypassApprovals` app setting; `renderMode` is schema-coerced to `'hybrid'`, the only supported mode). Gemini specifics: command built by `buildGeminiCommand()` (`--skip-trust` always, `--approval-mode <default|auto_edit|yolo|plan>` defaulting to `yolo` for parity with Claude's `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--model`, `--resume` from the `geminiConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/gemini/status` — session/quick-start routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`npm install -g @google/gemini-cli`) when missing. Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP export `COLORTERM=truecolor` and unset `NO_COLOR`; `opencode` unsets `COLORTERM`. **Terminal colour env** under Session launch modes covers Claude and says which panes those declarations actually reach. Gemini joins `isAltScreenStripMode()` (Codex/Claude/Gemini are Ink TUIs that repaint inline → strip alt-screen/`3J` so scrollback survives). Codex availability via `GET /api/codex/status`. Antigravity specifics: command built by `buildAntigravityCommand()` (`--model`, `--conversation <id>` resume, `--dangerously-skip-permissions` from the `antigravityConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/antigravity/status` — routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash`) when missing. Unlike the other three it is NOT an npm package (standalone binary, `~/.local/bin/agy`), which is why `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it with its own `--dir /usr/local/bin` step rather than in the `npm install -g` line, and why it does NOT join `isAltScreenStripMode()`. Frontend: run-mode dropdown → `runCodex()`/`runGemini()` in `session-ui.js` ("Run CX"/"Run GM" labels), App Settings → Agents & CLIs → Codex; Respawn/Ralph options are Claude-only, so session options open on the Session tab for external CLI sessions. ⚠️ `run*()` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope (`(await res.json()).data.available` / `data.data.sessionId`) — reading the raw shape silently breaks the run. Tests: `test/run-mode-ui.test.ts` + `test/gemini-mode.test.ts` (vm-sandbox harness, no real DOM). Grok specifics: command built by `buildGrokCommand()` (`--always-approve` from `grokConfig.alwaysApprove` — grok's `bypassPermissions` permission mode, deny rules still apply; `--model`; `--resume <id>` / `--continue`, id-regexed so grok's resume-by-TITLE feature can never put an arbitrary string on the spawn line); availability via `GET /api/grok/status`, which carries `version` because the resolver version-probes candidates (`grok` has npm squatters, e.g. @vibe-kit/grok-cli — `GROK_VERSION_REGEX` is shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode agree). Like antigravity it is a standalone binary (xAI installer → `~/.grok/bin`, symlinked into `~/.local/bin`), so `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it in its own step (copy to `/usr/local/bin`, drop root's `~/.grok` in the same layer) and it stays OUT of `isAltScreenStripMode()` (fuLine truncated
+**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP, Copilot, jcode)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` (`mode === 'opencode' || 'codex' || 'gemini' || 'antigravity' || 'pi' || 'grok' || 'deepseek'`) gates Claude-specific behavior — Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token/CLI-info parsing, and ❯-prompt readiness detection are all skipped (these CLIs render their own TUIs; readiness = output stabilization instead). ⚠️ **Work detection left this gate in #385** and is now per-CLI `capabilities.workDetect` data (`promptGlyph` + `workingLine`), because gating it on the mode left every Codex session reporting `idle` for its entire life; a CLI declaring neither falls back to Claude's pair, which is logic-identical to the pre-registry behaviour. All seven modes **require tmux — no direct PTY fallback** — because secrets are injected via `tmux setenv` (socket-scoped `${this.tmux()} setenv`, never on the spawn command line): OpenCode gets `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT` etc., Codex gets `OPENAI_API_KEY`/`CODEX_API_KEY`/`CODEX_HOME` (`setCodexEnvVars`), Gemini gets `GEMINI_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`/`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`/`GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI` etc. (`setGeminiEnvVars`, all in `tmux-manager.ts`). Codex specifics: command built by `buildCodexCommand()` (`--no-daemon` behind the `noDaemonFlag` gate at 0.162.0, measured against codex's own version, local launches only; `--model`, `--config model_reasoning_effort=<level>` from `reasoningEffort`, `--config sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=true` from `networkAccess` (the **Allow network access** app setting `codexNetworkAccess`, a launch default and a privileged param; ⚠️ with it on, a command in codex's sandbox can call Codeman's API and start a session outside that sandbox, password or not), `--config tui.animations=<bool>` from `animations`, `resume <id>`, `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` from the `codexConfig` payload / `codexDangerouslyBypassApprovals` app setting; `renderMode` is schema-coerced to `'hybrid'`, the only supported mode). Gemini specifics: command built by `buildGeminiCommand()` (`--skip-trust` always, `--approval-mode <default|auto_edit|yolo|plan>` defaulting to `yolo` for parity with Claude's `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--model`, `--resume` from the `geminiConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/gemini/status` — session/quick-start routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`npm install -g @google/gemini-cli`) when missing. Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP export `COLORTERM=truecolor` and unset `NO_COLOR`; `opencode` unsets `COLORTERM`. **Terminal colour env** under Session launch modes covers Claude and says which panes those declarations actually reach. Gemini joins `isAltScreenStripMode()` (Codex/Claude/Gemini are Ink TUIs that repaint inline → strip alt-screen/`3J` so scrollback survives). Codex availability via `GET /api/codex/status`. Antigravity specifics: command built by `buildAntigravityCommand()` (`--model`, `--conversation <id>` resume, `--dangerously-skip-permissions` from the `antigravityConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/antigravity/status` — routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash`) when missing. Unlike the other three it is NOT an npm package (standalone binary, `~/.local/bin/agy`), which is why `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it with its own `--dir /usr/local/bin` step rather than in the `npm install -g` line, and why it does NOT join `isAltScreenStripMode()`. Frontend: run-mode dropdown → `runCodex()`/`runGemini()` in `session-ui.js` ("Run CX"/"Run GM" labels), App Settings → Agents & CLIs → Codex; Respawn/Ralph options are Claude-only, so session options open on the Session tab for external CLI sessions. ⚠️ `run*()` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope (`(await res.json()).data.available` / `data.data.sessionId`) — reading the raw shape silently breaks the run. Tests: `test/run-mode-ui.test.ts` + `test/gemini-mode.test.ts` (vm-sandbox harness, no real DOM). Grok specifics: command built by `buildGrokCommand()` (`--always-approve` from `grokConfig.alwaysApprove` — grok's `bypassPermissions` permission mode, deny rules still apply; `--model`; `--resume <id>` / `--continue`, id-regexed so grok's resume-by-TITLE feature can never put an arbitrary string on the spawn line); availability via `GET /api/grok/status`, which carries `version` because the resolver version-probes candidates (`grok` has npm squatters, e.g. @vibe-kit/grok-cli — `GROK_VERSION_REGEX` is shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode agree). Like antigravity it is a standalone binary (xAI installer → `~/.grok/bin`, symlinked into `~/.local/bin`), so `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it in its own step (copy to `/usr/local/bin`, drop root's `~/.grok` in the same layer) and it stays OUT of `isAltScreenLine truncated
 
 **DeepSeek Harness (`dsh`) specifics** — the mode that breaks three of the assumptions the six above share, so read this before changing anything about it.
 
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ Model is NOT a session field: it is a composition entry in the profile's config
 
 **OMP (`omp`, Oh My Pi) specifics** (`docs/omp-integration.md`): architecturally the simplest of the family — omp owns its own auth, provider routing, and trust decisions entirely in `~/.omp` config files (default `tools.approvalMode: yolo`), so `buildOmpCommand()` only ever emits `--model`/`--resume <id>`/`--continue`, and there is no bypass-permissions flag for Codeman to wire or clamp. ⚠️ **That does NOT make the multi-user clamp a no-op**: `OMP_*` is an allowlisted `envOverrides` prefix and admits `OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL`/`OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN` (where omp resolves credentials from), both dropped for a non-granted owner in `clampEnvOverridesForOwner()` — the same shape as `DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL` — even though, unlike DeepSeek, Codeman forwards no operator-held key into an omp pane today (found in Ark0N/Codeman#353 review). `--continue` alone is ambiguous the moment any other omp conversation has touched the same working directory more recently, since it just picks the newest session file on disk — `resolveAndClaimOmpSessionId()` (`src/utils/omp-session-resolver.ts`) resolves and PINS the real id instead, verifying each candidate's own file header (`{"type":"session","id",cwd"}`, not just the mangled-directory match) and tracking already-claimed ids in a process-wide registry so two omp tabs in the same case dir can't alias onto each other's conversation. ⚠️ Resolution/pinning happens ONLY at the point a respawn is actually confirmed (`_pinOmpRespawnId()`, called from `_setupOrAttachMuxSession()`'s dead-pane branch and `reattachRemote()`) — earlier code resolved eagerly while merely building respawn options, which could mis-pin a still-ALIVE session's id purely from boot-recovery timing. `src/omp-transcript.ts` independently scans `~/.omp/agent/sessions/**/*.jsonl` for Past Sessions history, the omp analog of Claude's own transcript scan, so a conversation survives even a full "Kill Tmux". ⚠️ omp's own env knobs are mostly `PI_*`, not `OMP_*` (`PI_CONFIG_DIR`, `PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR`, `PI_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR`, `PI_SUBPROCESS_CMD`, `PI_SHELL_PREFIX`), and `PI_*` is already allowlisted globally for pi — so a redirected `PI_CONFIG_DIR` silently moves the `~/.omp` tree the resolver and transcript scanner hardcode, degrading pinning/history with no error; a known gap shared with pi, not fixed here. ⚠️ Docker: `appendResumeFlag()`'s `case 'omp'` keys off the top-level `resumeSessionId`, which Docker panes never receive for omp (built from `defaultDockerCommandForMode`, with no `ompConfig` threaded through) — host-side history recovery and pinning work through the shared `sessions/` mount, but `--resume` does not currently reach an in-container omp process on respawn (flagged in review, not yet fixed). Stays out of `isAltScreenStripMode()` (narrow scrollback strip, alt-screen toggles only) and lands on the `'buffer'` local-echo policy via the `_updateLocalEchoState` fallthrough, same as grok and pi. Resolver: `omp-cli-resolver.ts` version-probes like pi/grok (`omp` is a short, generic name) and requires `omp/<semver>`-shaped output; `OMP_SEARCH_DIRS` leads with `~/.local/bin` (omp.sh's installer targets `$HOME/.local/bin` with no `--dir` override — verified against a real `--no-cache` Docker build, `~/.omp/bin` was the wrong first guess). Tests: `test/omp-mode.test.ts`, `test/omp-cli-resolver.test.ts`, `test/omp-session-resolver.test.ts`, `test/omp-fresh-run-no-resume.test.ts`.
 
+**jcode specifics** (`docs/jcode-integration.md`): every jcode TUI is a CLIENT of one shared per-user daemon (`jcode serve`, `setsid`, but still the first client's child by parent pid, so ⚠️ `capabilities.sharedDaemon` makes `killSession` spare descendants outside the pane's process group via `descendantsInPaneGroup()` in `proc-tree.ts`; without it, closing the tab that started the daemon cut every other jcode session off, measured), and the agent's tools run in the DAEMON with the daemon's environment (measured: a second client's env var read back empty from its bash tool). So ⚠️ the agent skill is NOT injected (`agentSkillInjection: false`: the tools would carry the `CODEMAN_*` identity of whichever session started the daemon), and ⚠️ `JCODE_*` is NOT an `envOverrides` prefix (`allowedPrefixes: []`: that namespace is daemon-read and includes `JCODE_HOOK_*`, `JCODE_SPAWN_HOOK`, `JCODE_*_COMMAND` and `JCODE_*_API_BASE`, so a per-session value does nothing or reaches every jcode session). No approval prompts and no bypass flag (pi-shaped: `privilegedParams: []`, no `blockedLine`). ⚠️ `last-response` answers an honest empty for it: the generic rule `capabilities.external && transcript === 'none'` placed AFTER the pane-segmenter branch (it matches jcode alone today) keeps it off the segmenter, which served jcode's welcome banner as the answer, and off the Claude transcript scan, which could adopt a Claude conversation from the same folder. Binary resolution is the generic registry resolver (`/api/jcode/status` included); there is no per-CLI resolver module.
+
 **Codex input path (issues #218/#219/#220/#222)**: codex-mode sessions use **predictive write-through echo, never the buffer overlay**. The buffer overlay stays disabled exactly as 1.12.2 left it (`_updateLocalEchoState` in terminal-ui.js, same branch as shell; `_localEchoEnabled` remains false for codex), and the additive `_localEchoPolicy` field selects `'predict'` for codex when `localEchoEnabled` is on. Codex's composer is interactive per keystroke: typing "/" pops a live-filtering command picker (#222 was "picker never appears" because the "/" sat in the overlay until Enter), the composer grows/rewraps as it fills (#220: a long typed prompt existed ONLY in the overlay DOM, so codex never grew the composer), arrows and Ctrl+Backspace edit server-side state (#218: arrows were forwarded to an EMPTY composer while the typed text sat pending; the `\x08` control-char flush then left the overlay stateless so `\x7f` was swallowed as "nothing to remove"), and pastes arrive bracketed (#219: `terminal.paste()` wraps in `\x1b[200~..201~`, which the multi-byte-ESC branch forwarded WITHOUT flushing pending text, so the paste landed before it). The shared overlay branch (claude/gemini/opencode still buffer) gained three fixes: bracketed pastes flush pending text first, composer nav keys (`isComposerNavKey` allowlist in `CodemanTerminalInput` — arrows/Home/End/Delete/PgUp/PgDn incl. modifiers, deliberately excluding DA/CPR/DSR query responses) flush and hand the session to **pass-through** (plain PTY echo until Enter/Ctrl+C, because after cursor movement the append-only overlay cannot track edits), and a backspace that finds no overlay state is FORWARDED instead of swallowed. ⚠️ **Codex drops keystrokes that arrive in the same PTY read as a bracketed paste** (upstream `bottom_pane/paste_burst.rs` holds rapid chars for paste classification; verified against codex 0.147.0 by writing `hello\x1b[200~PASTED\x1b[201~` into the tmux client PTY in one write → composer shows only `PASTED`, while a 100ms gap yields `helloPASTED`), so the flush sends the typed text immediately and delays the paste sequence by 80ms — the same two-phase shape as the Enter branch's delayed `\r`. Related protocol fact: xterm.js sends `0x08` for Ctrl+Backspace, which codex's keymap binds to delete-ONE-char (`ctrl(Char('h'))`); real word-delete needs the kitty CSI-u encoding (`\x1b[127;5u`), which xterm.js 6.0.0 cannot emit (kitty support lands in 6.1.0-beta) — an upstream limitation, not a Codeman bug. E2E technique: codex 0.147 reaches its composer with any dummy key in `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json` (`{"OPENAI_API_KEY":"sk-test-..."}`), so a real TUI can be driven headlessly (envOverrides `CODEX_HOME` rides the `CODEX_*` allowlist) without real credentials. **Predictive write-through echo invariants** (the codex echo mode, `PredictiveEchoAddon` in `packages/xterm-zerolag-input`): (1) the onData hook `_predictHookOnData` is a PLAIN STATEMENT between the buffer block and Normal Mode — no `return`, try/catch-wrapped, never touches `_pendingInput` — so the wire path is byte-identical with the predictor active, absent or throwing (pinned at vm level and by an end-to-end trace-equality E2E); (2) it ships as a SEPARATE bundle `vendor/xterm-predictive-echo.js` so the zerolag bundle stays byte-identical, and a missing/broken bundle degrades codex to plain 1.12.2 echo (`typeof PredictiveEchoOverlay !== 'undefined'` guard); (3) predictions paint only while the cursor sits on the measured composer row (`isCodexComposerRow`, `CODEX_COMPOSER_ROW_RE = /^› /` — matches the empty-composer placeholder, typing, and the slash picker; rejects modal rows and 2-space wrapped continuation rows, the #220 ghost zone, which deliberately fall back to real echo); (4) reconciliation reads the PARSED buffer with `baseY + row` (xterm's `cursorY` is baseY-relative; `viewportY` only coincides while scrolled to bottom), confirms prefix-only on cell match PLUS cursor advance, cascades only on TWO consecutive foreign NON-BLANK passes (blanks are neutral: codex clears its placeholder on first echo), and TTL-bounds the rest; (5) after an UNPREDICTED wire edit (backspace into echoed text, any 'clear'-classified input, an IME/plain-paste 'text' commit, or every bypass send incl. `_handleCjkInput`) the addon holds new predictions until the next PARSED write: the displayed cursor is stale for one RTT and anchoring on it paints ghosts one cell off; (6) the per-device `localEchoEnabled` toggle is the kill switch returning exact 1.12.2 behavior. Measured constants + fixtures: `docs/predictive-echo-plan.md`, recorded via `scripts/dev/record-codex-frames.mjs` through the production tmux+strip pipeline. Tests: `test/local-echo-codex-gating.test.ts` (vm harness: nav-key + predict classifier truth tables, policy matrix, wire-neutrality pins), `packages/xterm-zerolag-input/test/` (addon laws, real-fixture replay, seeded fuzz), `test/codex-predictive-echo.test.ts` (E2E vs real codex incLine truncated
 
 Further detail: with the registry, a CLI that declares its own composer glyph and working line in `capabilities.workDetect` gets the same screen-probed idle confirmation claude gets (see the ❯ note in CLAUDE.md's idle-detection paragraph), and one that declares neither keeps the output-stabilization behaviour. The tmux-only rule now covers all EIGHT external modes (OMP included): none has a direct PTY fallback, because secrets are injected via socket-scoped `tmux setenv` and never on the spawn command line.
@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ Spawn commands are pinned as literal strings in `test/cli-registry-spawn-golden.
 
 Further detail: `stop`/`blocked` now fire for **`claude` and `deepseek`** (`shell` installs no hooks either); asking for one explicitly on any other mode is a 400 and the default set silently drops them. `deepseek` qualifies because the DeepSeek Harness TUI REPORTS idle/working/blocked to its supervisor and Codeman is that supervisor (`deepseek-status-shim.ts`), so its signals are definitive rather than inferred, and `hooksAvailableForMode()` in `session-wait-registry.ts` is the one place that rule lives (see the External CLI modes section for the per-session `statusReporting` wrinkle and the two dsh traps baked into the skill preamble: boot `idle` landing ~300 ms before the composer paints, and `sendwait` asking for `wait:"stop,exit"`). That is also why `deepseek` is the one non-claude mode the skill drives like claude: `spawn_workers alpha beta:deepseek` is a mixed fleet in one call, and `sendwait`/`last_text` need no variant. ⚠️ **`blocked` alone has a second source**: a CLI with no hook for it can declare the dialogs it blocks on (`capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine`, codex), and `blockedSignalAvailable()` (hooks OR that field) is the rule for that one signal; `stop` stays hooks-only, since nothing on a screen says a turn ended. A screen-read `blocked` is a LEVEL the server keeps reading (`Session.screenBlocked`), so the wait route answers it immediately (`currentSignalForWait()`) when the caller asked for `blocked`, and only then: such a pane is also `idle`, and `until=idle` must keep answering `idle`. See [Screen-read blocked dialogs](#screen-read-blocked-dialogs-codex).
 
-**Packaging as the `skills/codeman` agent skill.** The primitives are packaged as the `skills/codeman` agent skill, installable three ways: via `codeman skill install [--case <name>]` / `skill uninstall`; as a Claude Code plugin from the repo's own marketplace (`/plugin marketplace add Ark0N/Codeman` + `/plugin install codeman@codeman`, see the root-files note in CLAUDE.md); or auto-injected into a case on session create behind `agentSkillEnabled` (SYNCED, default OFF). ⚠️ WHERE it lands is registry data, `capabilities.agentSkillDir` (absent with `agentSkillInjection: true` = `.claude/skills`): `.claude/skills/codeman` for claude, `.agents/skills/codeman` for every other CLI that takes it (pi does not: a project skill triggers its trust prompt). `agentSkillDir` is a CLOSED enum (`AGENT_SKILL_DIRS`, schema.ts) because `clis.json` can set it and it decides where the server writes. The per-session preamble is seeded for every local session whose CLI takes the skill, and `codeman skill uninstall --case` removes the copy from every distinct registry directory (`registryAgentSkillDirs()`, cli.ts). ⚠️ Plugin skills are namespaced, so a Claude Code holding BOTH the plugin and a user-level or per-case copy lists the skill twice, `codeman` and `codeman:codeman` (measured 2026-09-14: neither shadows the other, both work); the docs tell users to pick one route.
+**Packaging as the `skills/codeman` agent skill.** The primitives are packaged as the `skills/codeman` agent skill, installable three ways: via `codeman skill install [--case <name>]` / `skill uninstall`; as a Claude Code plugin from the repo's own marketplace (`/plugin marketplace add Ark0N/Codeman` + `/plugin install codeman@codeman`, see the root-files note in CLAUDE.md); or auto-injected into a case on session create behind `agentSkillEnabled` (SYNCED, default ON since 1.50.0, default OFF before). ⚠️ An ABSENT key means on in BOTH readers, the server's `getAgentSkillEnabled()` and the App Settings switch (both `!== false`): a page that showed an absent key as off would write `false` on the next Save of any other setting. Only an explicit false is off. Existing installs that stored off are switched on once at the first 1.50.0 start; turning it off afterwards sticks. Every App Settings Save up to 1.49.0 wrote `false` (the switch loaded an absent key as off and Save sends the whole form), so without that the default would never reach anyone who had ever saved. ⚠️ The migration (`migrateAgentSkillDefault()`, `web/agent-skill-default-migration.ts`) runs from `WebServer.start()` before the first settings read (and the 2 s `readSettings()` cache, which it drops after a write) and before listen, never in test mode, and writes only through `mutateSettingsFile()`; a `settings.json` that does not parse is left alone with one log line and no marker, so the next start after the fix tries again (and switches on an off saved between the fix and that start, since the migration has not run yet). It cannot tell a deliberate off from the old default (accepted, a "Behaviour change" in the release notes). ⚠️ It stores `true` rather than deleting the key: `loadAppSettingsFromServer()` overwrites only the synced keys the server HAS, so every device that saved on 1.49 would keep its own `false`, show the switch off and write `false` back on its next Save (`true` also wins in a browser still running a cached settings-ui.js); for a server with no key the page drops the device's copy too. ⚠️ Its "done" marker is its own file, `agent-skill-default-migrated.json` in the data dir via `dataPath()`, checked before anything is read and written only after the settings write landed (a crash between the two is harmless: the next start finds `true`). Never a settings key: `GET /api/settings` never returns it, so no Save can send it back (the `.strict()` `SettingsUpdateSchema` would 400) or drop it (which would re-arm the migration and switch a later off back on), and it is outside `CONFIG_BACKUP_FILES`, so once the migration has run, a restored settings.json, even a pre-1.50 one holding `false`, stays as restored. One data dir is one server, so in multi-user mode it runs once for the server. A device whose pages were all loaded before the upgrade still holds the old `false` in its localStorage blob until a page load refreshes it, and an App Settings Save from such a page writes that back (accepted; the release note says to reload). Tests: `test/agent-skill-default-migration.test.ts`, `test/agent-skill-setting-ui.test.ts`. Turning it off sweeps nothing. ⚠️ Every managed copy ignores itself in git, which is what makes the default safe in a user's repository: `installAgentSkillInto()` writes `<copy>/.gitignore` holding `*` FIRST (so a `git status` mid-install never lists it), with `wx` (a file already there is the user's and is never overwritten; a symlink at the name is refused), and outside the content list `readAgentSkillSource()` compares, so it never appears in `skills/codeman/` or the plugin mirror. A copy injected before 1.50.0 gains it on its next install (`refreshed`). `removeAgentSkillFrom()` deletes it only when it is the last entry left and holds exactly `*`, so a user's extra files there stay ignored. The repository's own `.gitignore` and `info/exclude` are never touched for it (the managed-worktree exclude in git-worktrees.ts is a separate, older line and still added). Measured against Claude Code 2.1.319: its skill discovery runs `git check-ignore` only on directories at or above `.claude/skills` (the nested-skills walk), never on a skill folder or its SKILL.md, and a `*` inside `codeman/` ignores the folder's contents, not the folder, so the skill still loads; codex 0.162 has no gitignore check on skills. Checked live on 2026-11-08 with the ignore file in place: Claude Code 2.1.319 (`--debug` reports `project: 1`), Codex 0.162 (app-server `skills/list`), OpenCode 1.3.0 (`opencode debug skill`) and Grok 1.0.52 (`grok --trust inspect`) all list `codeman`; agy, dsh, gemini and omp were not measured. ⚠️ Install and uninstall refuse (`symlink`) a link at the copy, at its `skills/` parent, and at a folder INSIDE the copy (`reference/`, `agentSkillSubdirIsSymlink()`): a cloned repository can commit one and a Docker case's container can plant one in the bind-mounted workspace, and a write or unlink of `referenLine truncated
 
 Injection is ADD-ONLY at create, marker-owned (`applyAgentSkill` in `hooks-config.ts` never touches an unmarked user copy) and refuses symlinks (this repo's own `.claude/skills/codeman` is a symlink to the source, which the injector must never write through). ⚠️ Claude Code loads a same-named USER-LEVEL skill (`~/.claude/skills/codeman`, written once by `codeman skill install` with no `--case`) over the per-case copy, and nothing used to refresh it: a stale Aug-9 user copy shadowed every fresh injection (2026-08-14: agents ran the old recipes, spawned workers serially and lost their lineage arcs), so session create now also refreshes a marker-owned user copy (`refreshUserAgentSkill`; refresh-only, never installs, foreign/symlink refused).
 
@@ -229,7 +231,7 @@ History: before the tree, every pair got a U-bridge bezier hanging below the str
 
 **Title and composition.** `deriveAutoSessionName()` strips CSI/control bytes, refuses slash commands by the `/^\/[a-z][a-z0-9_:-]*(\s|$)/i` shape (a path has a second slash where the whitespace should be, so `/home/me/notes.txt what is this` is a prompt) and `!` shell escapes, cuts at the first sentence terminator only past 8 code points ("e.g. fix this now" is not "e.g."), drops a trailing full stop, and caps at 72 code points on a word boundary. `composeAutoSessionName()` prepends the placeholder (`w3-myapp: fix the login redirect`) and fits the result into `MAX_SESSION_NAME_LENGTH` in UTF-16 units, the unit the rename route caps in.
 
-**Opt-in, and the listener orders its checks for cost.** The prompt lands in the tab name, `mux-sessions.json`, every `session:updated` broadcast, the TUI, both home screens and `/api/search` (which matches on `sessionName`), while Read My Mind deliberately keeps prompts 0600 and out of search because prompts can carry secrets; so `autoNameSessions` is synced and default OFF, like `agentSkillEnabled`, `approvalsInboxEnabled` and `readMyMindEnabled`. The listener checks `nameSource` and derives the title BEFORE reading `settings.json`, so an already-named session costs nothing per prompt.
+**Opt-in, and the listener orders its checks for cost.** The prompt lands in the tab name, `mux-sessions.json`, every `session:updated` broadcast, the TUI, both home screens and `/api/search` (which matches on `sessionName`), while Read My Mind deliberately keeps prompts 0600 and out of search because prompts can carry secrets; so `autoNameSessions` is synced and default OFF, like `approvalsInboxEnabled` and `readMyMindEnabled`. The listener checks `nameSource` and derives the title BEFORE reading `settings.json`, so an already-named session costs nothing per prompt.
 
 **`nameSource` also decides what claude is told to call the conversation.** `--name` is the prompt-box label, the `/resume` picker entry and the terminal title at once, and a pinned title stops Claude generating its own, so by default only a `manual` name is passed (`Session.cliPinnedName`); pinning the `w1-myapp` placeholder gave every conversation of a case the same `/resume` entry, because `_nextCaseSessionStartNumber()` numbers from the highest OPEN tab and restarts once a case's tabs are closed. The opt-in synced `pinCliSessionName` (default OFF) pins every non-blank tab name for users who want the CLI labels to match their tabs; it is read fresh at every claude create and respawn (`readPinCliSessionNameEnabled()`, hooks-config.ts, like `readPlanUsageTelemetryEnabled()`), so a toggle applies from the next spawn with no restart. ⚠️ Its cost: Claude stops generating its own titles for those sessions, and a rename holds only until the next turn, because a pane spawned with `--name` re-appends its in-memory title after every turn (`claude-session-title.ts`); a server restart re-attaches the live pane without respawning it. A rename through `PUT /api/sessions/:id/name` is carried into `/resume` by appending the `custom-title` row `/rename` writes (`claude-session-title.ts`), for local transcripts only: a remote pane's lives on the remote host and a docker pane's inside the container. The route returns early on an unchanged name, because the Session Options field saves on blur and recomposes the same placeholder, which would otherwise flip it to `manual` and re-pin it.
 
@@ -249,7 +251,7 @@ Further detail: the `<prefix>: <title>` form (`w3-myapp: fix the login redirect`
 
 ### Terminal scrollback: strip flavors and wheel/touch forwarding
 
-**Three strip flavors, one carry** (#205, `session.ts:_handleTerminalOutput`): the FULL strip (`isAltScreenStripMode` = codex/claude/gemini) removes alt-screen toggles, `3J`, and mouse-tracking DECSETs. The MOUSE strip (`isMuxMouseStripMode` = opencode, copilot and pi) removes alt-screen toggles AND the mouse DECSETs but KEEPS `3J` — the middle case, for a mouse-capable full-screen TUI: its tracking DECSETs reach the browser (tmux `mouse off` passes the pane's modes through to the client), xterm obeys them, and then every DRAG is reported to the TUI instead of selecting text — so mark-and-copy silently did nothing (measured 62 `none` / 18 `any` over 16s, 5/5 dead drags while `any`) and the obvious fallback, Ctrl+C, is opencode's `app_exit`. Copilot is the same shape (measured on 1.0.95: alt screen, mouse reporting on): left on the narrow strip, Auto Copy and copy-on-select did nothing and only Shift+drag selected. `3J` stays because a TUI is not a `clear` consumer. Every other mode (shell/antigravity/grok/deepseek/omp) gets the NARROW strip (`isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode`) — alt-screen toggles ONLY — and only when tmux-backed (`useMux`). Rationale: the tmux CLIENT emits `smcup` as its first bytes at attach, before any program runs, parking xterm in the scrollback-less alternate buffer for the whole session (touch scrolling no-ops; xterm's own wheel handler converts the wheel to Up/Down arrows = readline history cycling — both #205 symptoms). tmux never forwards a pane program's alt-screen toggles to its client (it repaints instead; measured — vim/less inside a pane emit zero to the client), so the only thing the narrow strip ever removes is tmux's own smcup. It keeps `3J` (a user's `clear` is a deliberate scrollback wipe) and the mouse DECSETs (tmux passes those through even with `mouse off`; stripping them would break htop/vim mouse support — which is exactly why the mouse strip is opt-in per CLI and not part of the narrow flavour). ⚠️ The `useMux` gate is load-bearing: `startShell()`/`startInteractive()` fall back to a DIRECT PTY when mux creation fails, and there the inner program's own `?1049h` really does reach xterm — stripping it would break vim/less/htop for real. The replay path (`session-routes.ts`, via `session.usesMux`) applies the same three branches; the frontend gate (`_shouldReportMouseToCli()`) keeps no mode list at all: it reads only the published `cliMouseTracking`, which the server sets solely in a DECSET-stripping branch (full or mouse), so it can only be true for a mode whose DECSETs are stripped — the modes where the browser's hand-encoded tap (`_sendSyntheticSgrTap`) is the only way a click still reaches the CLI. Whichever modes the registry strips, the browser follows (pinned in `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`). The chunk-boundary carry (`_altScreenSeqCarry`) runs for all three flavors. Tests: `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`, `test/terminal-touch-tap.test.ts`.
+**Three strip flavors, one carry** (#205, `session.ts:_handleTerminalOutput`): the FULL strip (`isAltScreenStripMode` = codex/claude/gemini) removes alt-screen toggles, `3J`, and mouse-tracking DECSETs. The MOUSE strip (`isMuxMouseStripMode` = opencode, copilot, pi and jcode) removes alt-screen toggles AND the mouse DECSETs but KEEPS `3J` — the middle case, for a mouse-capable full-screen TUI: its tracking DECSETs reach the browser (tmux `mouse off` passes the pane's modes through to the client), xterm obeys them, and then every DRAG is reported to the TUI instead of selecting text — so mark-and-copy silently did nothing (measured 62 `none` / 18 `any` over 16s, 5/5 dead drags while `any`) and the obvious fallback, Ctrl+C, is opencode's `app_exit`. Copilot is the same shape (measured on 1.0.95: alt screen, mouse reporting on): left on the narrow strip, Auto Copy and copy-on-select did nothing and only Shift+drag selected. `3J` stays because a TUI is not a `clear` consumer. Every other mode (shell/antigravity/grok/deepseek/omp) gets the NARROW strip (`isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode`) — alt-screen toggles ONLY — and only when tmux-backed (`useMux`). Rationale: the tmux CLIENT emits `smcup` as its first bytes at attach, before any program runs, parking xterm in the scrollback-less alternate buffer for the whole session (touch scrolling no-ops; xterm's own wheel handler converts the wheel to Up/Down arrows = readline history cycling — both #205 symptoms). tmux never forwards a pane program's alt-screen toggles to its client (it repaints instead; measured — vim/less inside a pane emit zero to the client), so the only thing the narrow strip ever removes is tmux's own smcup. It keeps `3J` (a user's `clear` is a deliberate scrollback wipe) and the mouse DECSETs (tmux passes those through even with `mouse off`; stripping them would break htop/vim mouse support — which is exactly why the mouse strip is opt-in per CLI and not part of the narrow flavour). ⚠️ The `useMux` gate is load-bearing: `startShell()`/`startInteractive()` fall back to a DIRECT PTY when mux creation fails, and there the inner program's own `?1049h` really does reach xterm — stripping it would break vim/less/htop for real. The replay path (`session-routes.ts`, via `session.usesMux`) applies the same three branches; the frontend gate (`_shouldReportMouseToCli()`) keeps no mode list at all: it reads only the published `cliMouseTracking`, which the server sets solely in a DECSET-stripping branch (full or mouse), so it can only be true for a mode whose DECSETs are stripped — the modes where the browser's hand-encoded tap (`_sendSyntheticSgrTap`) is the only way a click still reaches the CLI. Whichever modes the registry strips, the browser follows (pinned in `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`). The chunk-boundary carry (`_altScreenSeqCarry`) runs for all three flavors. Tests: `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`, `test/terminal-touch-tap.test.ts`.
 
 ⚠️ **What a mouse-DECSET strip (full or mouse) removes, it must REMEMBER.** Stripping the mouse DECSETs means xterm's `modes.mouseTrackingMode` is permanently `'none'` for those modes, so the browser hand-encodes click reports to compensate (`_sendSyntheticSgrTap`). With no state to consult it did that on EVERY click, which delivered mouse reports to programs that never asked for them: the same pane runs a plain shell whenever the CLI has exited or a `shell` was started inside a claude-mode session, and a shell prints the report as literal text (`[<0;88;20M`), garbling the next line typed. `_recordStrippedMouseMode()` therefore records each stripped sequence as it goes and publishes `cliMouseTracking` through `toState()`, and `_shouldReportMouseToCli()` requires it. ⚠️ Only the TRACKING modes count (1000/1001/1002/1003): 1005/1006 select an ENCODING and 1007 is alt-scroll, and counting those would put the stray reports straight back. ⚠️ The change broadcasts IMMEDIATELY rather than through `broadcastSessionStateDebounced`, because the flag flips when a dialog opens and the user can click that dialog inside the 500ms debounce window. Measured on a live claude 2.x: the CLI holds a tracking mode on continuously in fullscreen (so clicks keep being reported exactly as before; the default inline renderer holds none, measured on 2.1.283 even with `/model` open), while a bash prompt in the same stripped mode reports nothing. Fails toward silence: after a server restart the flag is false until the CLI re-emits, which tmux does at client attach.
 
@@ -308,7 +310,7 @@ So: `_confirmIdle()` (session.ts) requires the pane to go quiet, and then asks t
 
 ⚠️ **The workspace-trust dialog is not a composer.** Its `❯` sits on `No, exit`, so it arms the confirmation, and the dialog is quiet with no working line, so a fresh case used to be concluded idle about 4 s after launch while the dialog was still up (measured on Claude Code 2.1.294: `GET .../wait?until=idle` answered `idle` at 3.8 s in 6 of 12 fresh-dir launches). An agent that waited for idle and then prompted typed into the dialog, and the prompt's Enter confirmed `No, exit`: the pane died and the wait reported `exit`. `_probePaneWorking()` therefore also records whether its capture shows `isTrustDialogScreen()` (a failed capture keeps the last answer, since it proves nothing), and `_confirmIdle()` re-checks on `PANE_PROBE_RECHECK_MS` instead of concluding while it does, but only inside the auto-accept's own `TRUST_DIALOG_WINDOW_MS`: a later screen that merely quotes the dialog must not hold a session busy. The status is left alone rather than marked working, since nothing is running. Tests: `test/session-trust-dialog.test.ts`.
 
-⚠️ **The composer glyph and the working line are per-CLI registry DATA** (`capabilities.workDetect`, #385), not Claude constants: claude declares `❯` plus the pattern above, codex declares `›` plus `[Ee]sc to interrupt`, pi declares its composer rule `─` plus the spinner it embeds there, opencode declares its composer bar `┃` plus its 8-cell footer spinner `[⬝■]{8}`, omp declares its input row `╰─` plus the spinner and elapsed time that replace the `π` in its status bar, gemini declares its composer's bottom bar `▀` plus its `(esc to cancel, <n>s)` spinner line, antigravity declares the head of its footer hint `? for shortcuts` (`? for sh`, drawn only at rest, so nothing arms the idle check during a turn and a pending shell approval reads as working until it is answered; the composer's `>` is also the echoed prompt's) plus its 8-dot braille spinner row `⣯  Generating...`, and a CLI that declares neither falls back to Claude's pair, which is what every session used before the registry carried one. Before that, this whole mechanism was gated Claude-mode-only on the reasoning that an external CLI has no `❯`, which was true and still left every Codex session reporting `idle` for its entire life.
+⚠️ **The composer glyph and the working line are per-CLI registry DATA** (`capabilities.workDetect`, #385), not Claude constants: claude declares `❯` plus the pattern above, codex declares `›` plus `[Ee]sc to interrupt`, pi declares its composer rule `─` plus the spinner it embeds there, opencode declares its composer bar `┃` plus its 8-cell footer spinner `[⬝■]{8}`, omp declares its input row `╰─` plus the spinner and elapsed time that replace the `π` in its status bar, gemini declares its composer's bottom bar `▀` plus its `(esc to cancel, <n>s)` spinner line, antigravity declares the head of its footer hint `? for shortcuts` (`? for sh`, drawn only at rest, so nothing arms the idle check during a turn and a pending shell approval reads as working until it is answered; the composer's `>` is also the echoed prompt's) plus its 8-dot braille spinner row `⣯  Generating...`, jcode declares the bare `>` of its `<n>> ` composer (the one cell its turn-ending repaint redraws) plus a braille spinner row carrying an elapsed time, and a CLI that declares neither falls back to Claude's pair, which is what every session used before the registry carried one. Before that, this whole mechanism was gated Claude-mode-only on the reasoning that an external CLI has no `❯`, which was true and still left every Codex session reporting `idle` for its entire life.
 
 ⚠️ `workingLine` is config-supplied (a user `clis.json` can set it) and the compiled pattern runs on the PTY hot path, so it goes through `compileVersionRegex()` in BOTH the schema refine and `_workingLinePattern()`: a nested quantifier there is a ReDoS against the event loop, and the helper returns null rather than throwing so the fallback is structural.
 
@@ -425,13 +427,13 @@ A file path an agent prints is a link on both surfaces it can appear on, and cli
 
 **The chat linkifier walks text nodes.** `_linkifyFilePaths()` builds anchors with `createElement`/`textContent` on the rendered subtree, never by rebuilding sanitized markup as a string — the source is model output. Subtrees already inside an `<a>` are skipped (marked autolinks URLs; a nested anchor would swallow the click), and the anchor's text is the path verbatim so "copy code" still yields what the agent printed. Before the walk it also rewrites existing anchors whose href is a scheme-less, non-`//` path (Codex cites files as `[label](/abs/path.json)`, which otherwise opens as a same-origin URL) into the same `a.rv-path` shape, plus `rv-path-link` so the label keeps the prose font, on purpose without `FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN`'s root and extension filter: the href is a link target the agent chose. The anchors the walk builds carry `dir="ltr"`, so a path at the head of a right-to-left sentence does not decide that sentence's direction; a rewritten link keeps no `dir`, since its label is prose (#715). ⚠️ `_applyBlockDirection()` runs after the linkifier in both consumers, never before it: a block already carrying `dir="auto"` re-resolves its direction on every text node replaced under it. `test/response-viewer-file-links.test.ts` pins both properties and the anchor rewrite, `test/response-viewer-rtl.test.ts` the direction and the order.
 
-**Out-of-workspace paths go through the attachment routes, not the file routes.** `file-content`/`file-raw` resolve against `workingDir` and 404 anything that escapes it, which is correct and unchanged — but the paths agents most often print (a `/tmp` capture, Claude's own scratchpad, another checkout) are exactly that, so clicking one used to report "File not found" for a file sitting on disk. `openFilePreview()` now detects the case (`_isExternalPreviewPath`, a string compare for ROUTING only; the real decision stays server-side) and registers the path via `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` first, rendering by id. ⚠️ That registration passes `notify: false`, which suppresses ONLY the `attachment:detected` broadcast — the guard, the registry entry and the by-id routes are identical either way. Without it every click also popped an attachment card announcing the file already filling the screen. ⚠️ The click is an explicit user action on the **explicit, Origin-guarded** registration route, which is why it may cross the workspace boundary at all; the passive magic-link scanner stays force-confined. A type outside `SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` (`.svg`, `.bmp`) is refused with a message naming what IS previewable, rather than the registry's own policy term.
+**Out-of-workspace paths go through the attachment routes, not the file routes.** `file-content`/`file-raw` resolve against `workingDir` and 404 anything that escapes it, except an absolute path inside a followed worktree outside `workingDir` (see Files panel in a worktree), which they serve as a second root. For every other path that is correct and unchanged — but the paths agents most often print (a `/tmp` capture, Claude's own scratchpad, another checkout) are exactly that, so clicking one used to report "File not found" for a file sitting on disk. `openFilePreview()` now detects the case (`_isExternalPreviewPath`, a string compare for ROUTING only; the real decision stays server-side) and registers the path via `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` first, rendering by id. ⚠️ That registration passes `notify: false`, which suppresses ONLY the `attachment:detected` broadcast — the guard, the registry entry and the by-id routes are identical either way. Without it every click also popped an attachment card announcing the file already filling the screen. ⚠️ The click is an explicit user action on the **explicit, Origin-guarded** registration route, which is why it may cross the workspace boundary at all; the passive magic-link scanner stays force-confined. A type outside `SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` (`.svg`, `.bmp`) is refused with a message naming what IS previewable, rather than the registry's own policy term.
 
 ⚠️ **The terminal routes an out-of-workspace path to the preview, not the log viewer.** The log viewer spawns `tail -f` and allows only the workspace, `/var/log` and `~/logs`, so an external `.log`/`.json`/code path answered `Path must be within working directory or allowed log directories` while the SAME path clicked in the response viewer previewed fine. `activate()` now checks `_isExternalPreviewPath` alongside `previewsInFileViewer`. In-workspace text keeps the tail viewer, which is the point of it (live follow), except markdown (`.md`/`.markdown`, in `FILE_PREVIEW_EXTENSIONS` since the owner's 2026-10-13 decision, rendered as a document) and `.html`/`.htm` (`rendersAsPage()`, rendered as a page, see below), which always go to the preview; nothing widened `file-stream-manager`'s allowlist, so no `tail -f` is spawned on an arbitrary host path.
 
 **Path forms beyond the rooted one.** `findFilePathLinks(text)` (constants.js) is the single entry point both consumers call; it reserves spaced candidates first (including unlinkable spans), then detects rooted matches, then `~/` and relative paths (`RELATIVE_FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN`, same extension list, pinned equal by `test/link-provider-regex.test.ts`), then folder paths, each only where it overlaps neither an earlier match nor an `http(s)` URL. A relative match must start at a boundary (line start, whitespace, quote, bracket, `=`, `,`, `>`), so it can never begin inside a word, an absolute path or a URL; brackets, `=` and `,` end it (`(shot.png)`, `OUT=shots/a.png`). `resolveLinkedFilePath()` resolves a relative path against a base (`.`/`..` collapsed, so `../x.png` lands outside and routes like any external path) and passes absolute and `~/` paths through. ⚠️ `~` is the home of the SESSION'S host, which only the server knows: `~/` paths always take the attachment route, where `registerExternalAttachment` expands them (`homedir()` locally, `$HOME` inside the remote probe script), and the guard runs on the expanded, realpath-resolved path as before. ⚠️ Programs hard-wrap their own output short of the terminal edge (Claude Code breaks tool output at 59-118 columns), so xterm's `isWrapped` never fires. `terminalPathLine()` (link provider only; touch selection keeps `terminalLogicalLine`) joins the next row when the previous row ends in a path token with a `/` and no extension and the join reaches an extension; a row that starts a new path is never joined: rooted or `~/`, `./`/`../`, or a relative one that opens on the same top directory the broken token did (the next entry of `git ls-files`/`find`/`ls -R`: `src/components` + `src/index.ts` are two paths, not `src/componentssrc/index.ts`), while a wrapped path continues INSIDE a name, so `…/captures/2` + `026-10-10/…` still joins; a 3+ row chain is kept only if a later row completes the path, and the broken row must be at least as long as the continuing one (keeps `cd /mnt/foo` + a longer next line apart). Tests: `test/file-path-link-forms.test.ts`.
 
-**The relative base is the pane's directory.** The base is `relativeResolutionBase(session)`: the pane's live directory `SessionState.paneCwd` when known, else `workingDir`, which is fixed at create time and never follows a `cd`. `paneCwd` is `#{pane_current_path}` from the pane-exit watcher's existing batched `list-panes -a` read (`derivePaneCurrentPaths()`, single-pane sessions and absolute paths only; no new tmux call and no new SSE event: the server applies it on the `paneExitsUpdated` tick and broadcasts `session:updated` only on a change). tmux reports the cwd of the pane's FOREGROUND process-group leader, so a shell's `cd` moves it, while an agent CLI's tool subprocesses (Claude's Bash tool, codex's exec) do not: for those sessions it stays the CLI's own directory. ⚠️ `paneCwd` is a resolution BASE only, never a confinement root: `_isExternalPreviewPath`, `file-content`/`file-raw` and the log viewer's `tail -f` allowlist all still judge against `workingDir`, so a pane that `cd`s outside the workspace sends its relative links through the attachment routes like any other external path, and what can be opened is unchanged (an absolute path to the same file already opened). ⚠️ `Session.setPaneCwd()` uses the `paneExitApplies` scoping rule and fails closed the same way: a remote session's local pane runs the ssh client and a docker case's runs `docker exec`, so their pane directory is a host directory the agent was never in; direct-PTY and rediscovered sessions get none either, and the browser re-checks `remote`/`docker`. ⚠️ tmux reads the directory from `/proc/<pgrp>/cwd`, always the RESOLVED path, while `workingDir` keeps the spelling the case was created with (a symlinked `~/codeman-cases`, a case linked through a symlink, macOS `/tmp`), and `_isExternalPreviewPath` compares lexically, so `setPaneCwd()` writes a reading at or under the workspace's resolved path back in `workingDir`'s spelling. The resolution runs once per session in the background, bounded (`probePathKind()` first, then a `realpath()` raced against the same timeout, never on the watcher tick and never `realpathSync`); an `unknown` probe or a failed or slow `realpath()` leaves the reading untranslated and retries after `WORKSPACE_REALPATH_RETRY_MS`. Until it settles, only a reading lexically inside `workingDir` is taken, so the first tick cannot mis-route links. ⚠️ Never restored after a restart: written to `state.json` by `toState()` like the rest of the session state but never read back, and a directory change alone never persists. A failed or empty read keeps every last directory, and a blank `#{pane_current_path}` on a single-pane session keeps that session's (`derivePaneCurrentPaths()` carries it forward); an authoritative read that lists the session as split into several panes, or not at all, clears it, so a hand-split session falls back to `workingDir`. The server applies the manager's answer as given, `undefined` included, and `setPaneCwd()` reports a clear once. Trade-off: the base is the pane's directory at CLICK time, so a relative path printed before a `cd` resolves against the new directory. Tests: `test/pane-cwd-tracking.test.ts`.
+**The relative base is the pane's directory.** The base is `relativeResolutionBase(session)`: the pane's live directory `SessionState.paneCwd` when known, else `workingDir`, which is fixed at create time and never follows a `cd`. `paneCwd` is `#{pane_current_path}` from the pane-exit watcher's existing batched `list-panes -a` read (`derivePaneCurrentPaths()`, single-pane sessions and absolute paths only; no new tmux call and no new SSE event: the server applies it on the `paneExitsUpdated` tick and broadcasts `session:updated` only on a change). tmux reports the cwd of the pane's FOREGROUND process-group leader, so a shell's `cd` moves it, while an agent CLI's tool subprocesses (Claude's Bash tool, codex's exec) do not: for those sessions it stays the CLI's own directory. ⚠️ `paneCwd` is a resolution BASE only, never a confinement root: `_isExternalPreviewPath`, `file-content`/`file-raw` and the log viewer's `tail -f` allowlist all still judge against `workingDir`, except that `_isExternalPreviewPath` and `file-content`/`file-raw` also admit an absolute path inside a followed outside worktree (`outsideWorktree` in session state), so a pane that `cd`s outside the workspace sends its relative links through the attachment routes like any other external path, and what can be opened is unchanged (an absolute path to the same file already opened). ⚠️ `Session.setPaneCwd()` uses the `paneExitApplies` scoping rule and fails closed the same way: a remote session's local pane runs the ssh client and a docker case's runs `docker exec`, so their pane directory is a host directory the agent was never in; direct-PTY and rediscovered sessions get none either, and the browser re-checks `remote`/`docker`. ⚠️ tmux reads the directory from `/proc/<pgrp>/cwd`, always the RESOLVED path, while `workingDir` keeps the spelling the case was created with (a symlinked `~/codeman-cases`, a case linked through a symlink, macOS `/tmp`), and `_isExternalPreviewPath` compares lexically, so `setPaneCwd()` writes a reading at or under the workspace's resolved path back in `workingDir`'s spelling. The resolution runs once per session in the background, bounded (`probePathKind()` first, then a `realpath()` raced against the same timeout, never on the watcher tick and never `realpathSync`); an `unknown` probe or a failed or slow `realpath()` leaves the reading untranslated and retries after `WORKSPACE_REALPATH_RETRY_MS`. Until it settles, only a reading lexically inside `workingDir` is taken, so the first tick cannot mis-route links. ⚠️ Never restored after a restart: written to `state.json` by `toState()` like the rest of the session state but never read back, and a directory change alone never persists. A failed or empty read keeps every last directory, and a blank `#{pane_current_path}` on a single-pane session keeps that session's (`derivePaneCurrentPaths()` carries it forward); an authoritative read that lists the session as split into several panes, or not at all, clears it, so a hand-split session falls back to `workingDir`. The server applies the manager's answer as given, `undefined` included, and `setPaneCwd()` reports a clear once. Trade-off: the base is the pane's directory at CLICK time, so a relative path printed before a `cd` resolves against the new directory. Tests: `test/pane-cwd-tracking.test.ts`.
 
 Spaced paths are considered first by `findFilePathLinks()`: accepted candidates reserve their entire span even when unlinkable, so later detectors cannot link fragments. Relative and `~/` spaced paths require an explicit path label (`Path:`, `File:`, `Files:`, `Saved to:`, `Saved as:`, `Wrote:`, `Written to:`, `Output:`, `Created:`, `Location:`, `Attachment:`), optionally preceded by a marker. Generic labels and bare bullets defer to ordinary detection, including slash-containing prose such as `CI/CD` or `45/45`. A later `/`, `~/`, `./` or `../` word starts a separate path; an earlier word ending in `/` is a separate folder. Absolute paths keep the own-line and marker forms plus the same path labels; any other label (`Error:`, `Note:`, `Saved the report to:`) defers an absolute path too. A rooted candidate needs a directory before its first space, so `/review the changes in src/a.ts` is prose. An earlier word holding a known extension anywhere (`a.ts#L12 foo.ts`) ends the path at that word, a `:` followed by a digit inside an earlier word is a line suffix (`a.ts:42:See b.md`, grep and compiler output) and ends the path there, a run of spaces is a column gap rather than a name, and a leading run of `./` or `../` is not a segment (`Saved to: ../My Docs/plan.md` links whole; an interior `..` is still refused). An unlinkable candidate reserves its span only while its last word holds a `/`, so `/usr/bin/env node build.js` keeps its ordinary links while `/etc/secret files/passwords.txt` links nothing. A path label vouches that a path follows, not for the words before it: a relative candidate whose only `/` word is its last is prose after the label (`Wrote: 120 lines to src/foo.ts`, `Path: see src/foo.ts`) and defers to the ordinary detectors. The cost is a labelled relative path whose only space is in its top directory, `Saved to: My Docs/plan.md` (and `Saved to: 03 Attachments/plan.pptx`), which splits as on master; `03 Attachments/Build SIPOC Design/Build-SIPOC.pptx`, `notes/a b/c.md`, `~/`, `./` and `../` forms and absolute paths still link whole. An earlier word that is a lowercase connective or verb (`SPACED_PATH_PROSE_WORD`: `and`, `or`, `to`, `in`, `the`, `is`, `has`, `contains`, `then`, `as` and a few more) or a bare `=` makes the candidate a sentence, in every shape: `/home/me/proj contains a.md`, `- /tmp/out has the logs in run.log`, `Path: /home/me/proj/out contains a.md`, `Files: src/components and utils/x.ts`, `Wrote: 3 files to docs/design notes/overview.md`. The cost is a name that uses one of those words (`Pros and Cons.md`, `How to deploy.md`, `Documents and Settings`), which splits as on master; `at` (`Screenshot 2026-10-24 at 10.00.00.png`) and `of` (`Copy of report.docx`) are left out of the list on purpose. What remains ambiguous is an own-line absolute path followed by words that hold none of them (`/home/me/proj/out report.pdf` reads like `/home/me/docs/Read Me.txt`), which links as one path. A command line is refused too: a first word that is an executable under `bin/`, `.bin/`, `scripts/` or `tools/` (`/opt/homebrew/bin/node server.js`, `/home/me/proj/scripts/deploy prod.yml`) or any `-x`/`--x` flag word (`/home/me/proj/node_modules/.bin/tsc -p tsconfig.json`); a bare `-` (`Docs - Copy`, `OneDrive - Contoso`) is not a flag. So is a shell prompt that prints an absolute working directory (WSL's `/mnt/c/...` is outside `$HOME`, so every earlier command in a shell's scrollback has one): a first word ending in `$` (`/home/me/proj$ cat notes.md`) and any earlier word with no letter or digit other than a bare `-` (`/mnt/c/proj ❯ code notes.md`, `/home/me/proj $ cat notes.md`, `/home/me/proj/out ✓ report.pdf`) refuse the candidate, while `Program Files (x86)` and `Docs - Copy` still link whole. The response viewer carries any leading `<strong>` label in a paragraph or list item, or one starting a later line of a paragraph (after a `<br>`, since chat renders with `breaks: true`), into detection without changing the label or displayed text, and `spacedFilePathOnLine()` judges it as it judges the same line in the terminal (`**Note:** /home/me/proj/out report.pdf` splits). A text node that follows any other inline element starts mid-line, so a placeholder word stands in for what precedes it (``Use `--config` /home/me/proj/cfg data.json`` splits as in the terminal), while a path inside inline code still links whole; paths split across inline elements remain detected per text node. Tests feed vendored marked output into the jsdom linkifier, so consumed bullets and bold labels are covered. Trailing whitespace uses linear `trimEnd()` before the length cap.
 
@@ -800,23 +802,37 @@ Frontend `readmymind-ui.js`: header 🧠 marker-hidden (`btn-readmymind--hidden`
 
 ⚠️ **Globs are never compiled into a RegExp**: `*a*a*a…` translated to `^.*a.*a.*a…$` is a classic backtracking blowup evaluated synchronously against every walked path, so one pathological query would freeze the event loop for the whole server (the same reason `search-service.ts` is regex-free). `globMatch()` is a two-pointer wildcard walk instead, O(text · pattern) with both operands short by construction, and an overlong query (`MAX_QUERY_LENGTH`, 256) also compiles to `null` rather than running.
 
-Matching semantics: a query containing `/` matches the path relative to the folder being walked (`workingDir`, or the worktree of a `root=live` listing; the returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir` either way), otherwise the bare entry name; globs match anchored and case-insensitively (`*` spans any run, slashes included, `?` exactly one character), everything else is a plain case-insensitive substring.
+Matching semantics: a query containing `/` matches the path relative to the folder being walked (`workingDir`, or the worktree of a `root=live` or `root=live-any` listing; the returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir`, except in a `root=live-any` listing of a worktree outside it, whose `path`s are absolute), otherwise the bare entry name; globs match anchored and case-insensitively (`*` spans any run, slashes included, `?` exactly one character), everything else is a plain case-insensitive substring.
 
 ### Files panel in a worktree
 
-**Files panel in a worktree** (#765, `src/live-worktree.ts`, `root=live` on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): Claude Code's EnterWorktree moves the running process into `<repo>/.claude/worktrees/<name>`, while `Session.workingDir` is the session's identity and stays on the main checkout, so the panel kept listing a tree the agent had left. `paneCwd` does follow, in both directions, because tmux reads the process cwd (measured on 2.1.318). Hook payloads are the wrong signal: their `cwd` follows every `cd` in a Bash call too.
+**Files panel in a worktree** (#765, `src/live-worktree.ts`, `root=live` and `root=live-any` on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): Claude Code's EnterWorktree moves the running process into `<repo>/.claude/worktrees/<name>`, while `Session.workingDir` is the session's identity and stays on the main checkout, so the panel kept listing a tree the agent had left. `paneCwd` does follow, in both directions, because tmux reads the process cwd (measured on 2.1.318). Hook payloads are the wrong signal: their `cwd` follows every `cd` in a Bash call too.
 
 When `paneCwd` changes, `refreshLiveWorktree()` (server.ts) runs `findLiveWorktree()`, which walks up from the pane and recognises a linked worktree by its `.git` FILE (`gitdir: .../worktrees/<id>`). It never runs git, since this fires from the pane watcher and a file read starts no process, config or filter. The walk stops at `workingDir`, at a repository or submodule of its own and at anything it cannot read; probes are bounded (#516), and a `.git` that is a symlink or a FIFO is refused before anything opens it. The answer is published as `SessionState.liveWorktree`. A plain subfolder is deliberately no answer, or a `cd` in a shell would re-root the panel.
 
-⚠️ **That answer is lexical and goes stale.** It is judged only when the pane moves, and a symlink can take the place of the folder, or of a parent, afterwards without moving the pane, while `probePathKind()` and `readdir` both follow one. So `root=live` checks again on every request: `canWalkLiveWorktree()` (file-routes.ts) probes the folder, resolves it and `workingDir`, and the walk starts at the worktree only when that resolves strictly inside the resolved `workingDir`; otherwise it starts at `workingDir`, as it does for a worktree that has gone. The 1.49.0 release review reproduced the escape end to end on tmux 3.4: without this check a symlink swapped in after the lookup listed the names and sizes of a folder outside the workspace, though `file-content` and `file-raw` refused those paths. The root is the only place this can happen, because the walk does not follow a symlink below it (`Dirent.isDirectory()` is false for one). A swap between the check and the `readdir` is the same check-then-use race any path route accepts.
+⚠️ **That answer is lexical and goes stale.** It is judged only when the pane moves, and a symlink can take the place of the folder, or of a parent, afterwards without moving the pane, while `probePathKind()` and `readdir` both follow one. So `root=live` and `root=live-any` check again on every request: `canWalkLiveWorktree()` (file-routes.ts) probes the folder, resolves it and `workingDir`, and the walk starts at the worktree only when that resolves strictly inside the resolved `workingDir`; otherwise it starts at `workingDir`, as it does for a worktree that has gone. The 1.49.0 release review reproduced the escape end to end on tmux 3.4: without this check a symlink swapped in after the lookup listed the names and sizes of a folder outside the workspace, though `file-content` and `file-raw` refused those paths. The root is the only place this can happen, because the walk does not follow a symlink below it (`Dirent.isDirectory()` is false for one). A swap between the check and the `readdir` is the same check-then-use race any path route accepts.
 
 ⚠️ **Only the check uses resolved paths.** The walk keeps the session's spelling, or a workspace reached through a symlink stops producing paths relative to `workingDir`, and the listing's `path`s stop working on the file routes.
 
-⚠️ `liveWorktree` only moves where a listing STARTS, so never make it a confinement root. Returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir`, which is why `file-content`, `file-raw` and the edit route need nothing new. Serving a worktree outside the folder (`git worktree add ../feature`) would need a second root, so those stay unfollowed, and so does a worktree of a session started below the repository's top, because Claude Code puts it at the top, outside the session's folder.
+⚠️ A `liveWorktree` inside `workingDir` only moves where a listing STARTS, so never make it a confinement root. Returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir`, which is why `file-content`, `file-raw` and the edit route need nothing new for it.
 
-⚠️ A listing reports `worktree` whichever folder it walked, even when the worktree has gone or the check refused it: `_followFileBrowserWorktree()` compares that report with the session's state, and an absent report would reload forever.
+**A worktree outside the session's folder** (`git worktree add ../feature`, or an EnterWorktree that the user's own tooling places beside the repository) is the one case that IS a second confinement root, and it is published as `SessionState.outsideWorktree` (carrying `outside: true`), never in `liveWorktree`, which stays inside-only on the wire. `refreshLiveWorktree()` passes `findLiveWorktree()` the outside rules (`outsideWorktreeOptions()`, server.ts; none for a remote or Docker session), and `findOutsideWorktree()` answers only when all of these hold:
 
-Two surfaces do not move with it. The Git panel keeps working from `workingDir`, so it shows the main checkout's branch while the strip names the worktree. And `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` applies its dot-segment rule below `workingDir`, so while the session's folder is the main checkout a page under `.claude/worktrees/<name>` is refused and opens as source (a session started in the worktree renders it). Tests: `test/live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/file-browser-worktree.test.ts`.
+- The session's `workingDir` is the top of its repository or of a linked worktree (its `.git` sits there), so its git common dir is known. A session started in a subfolder follows no worktree outside it.
+- The nearest `.git` at or above the pane is a FILE naming `<common dir>/worktrees/<id>`, and that registry entry's own `gitdir` file names the candidate back. Or it is a `.git` FOLDER that is the common dir itself, which is the main worktree seen from a session started in a linked one. These are the files `git worktree list` reads; git is never run, because this fires from the pane watcher on every directory change. A forged `.git` file pointing at a real entry fails the back link.
+- The candidate's real path is not `/`, not the home folder or above it, and does not hold `workingDir`.
+- It is not at, inside or around a Docker case workspace. An unreadable `docker-cases.json` follows nothing, since it could hide a container's workspace.
+- Attachment workspace confinement (`attachmentConfineToWorkspace` / `CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_CONFINE`) is off.
+- It is not at, inside or around an attachment blocked tree (`attachmentBlockedPaths` / `CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_BLOCKED_PATHS`, plus the defaults), and not a sensitive folder: the sensitive patterns describe file locations, so `outsideWorktreeOptions()` also probes a child of the root, which refuses a root such as `~/.ssh`. The routes judge both guard rules again on every request (`isOutsideWorktreeRootRefused()`), so turning confinement on or blocking the folder stops serving it at once. The Docker and multi-user rules are judged only when the pane moves.
+- In multi-user mode, the owner's `folderAllowedForUser` rule admits it (an admin owner is not limited by it).
+
+Every comparison uses real paths, except that a home folder or Docker workspace that cannot be resolved is compared as written, and the recorded `path` is the real path. ⚠️ **The routes must re-check it on every request**: `outsideWorktreeRootFor()` (route-helpers.ts) and `canWalkOutsideWorktree()` (file-routes.ts) accept the folder only while `realpath` returns exactly the recorded path, so a symlink swapped in later serves nothing from it. ⚠️ Walking it is opt-in: only `root=live-any` (which the panel sends) lists it, with ABSOLUTE `path`s, while `root=live` never walks an outside worktree: it walks `workingDir` with relative paths, and its listing omits `worktree` for an outside one. An absolute path inside it is confined to it, falling back to `workingDir` when the worktree root refuses it or when `isSensitivePath()` names the file, so `.env`, `.aws/credentials` and `users.json` are never served from it (`validateLocalSessionFilePath()`, used by `file-content`, the edit route, `file-raw`, `file-preview`, `file-thumbnail`, `/api/download` and `html-view`). `html-view` also runs the attachment guard for such a path and mints its capability as outside the workspace, so the serve route's per-request confinement re-check covers it. A relative path still resolves against `workingDir` alone, so `../feature/x` is refused. A symlink inside the worktree into `workingDir` is served, since `workingDir` is served anyway. ⚠️ The browser routes a path inside it to those routes, not to the read-only attachment routes (`_isOutsideWorktreePath()`, panels-ui.js), and the terminal opens it in the preview, because the log viewer's `tail-file` stays confined to `workingDir`.
+
+A worktree of a session started below the repository's top is not followed, because Claude Code puts it at the top, outside the session's folder, and that session has no common dir to check it against.
+
+⚠️ A listing reports `worktree` whichever folder it walked, even when the worktree has gone or the check refused it: `_followFileBrowserWorktree()` compares that report with the session's state, and an absent report would reload forever. A listing without `root=live-any` is the exception: it omits an outside worktree. While the session folder is pinned, the panel compares with the worktree it pinned away from (`pinnedWorktree`, panels-ui.js).
+
+Two surfaces do not move with a worktree inside `workingDir`. The Git panel keeps working from `workingDir`, so it shows the main checkout's branch while the strip names the worktree. And `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` applies its dot-segment rule below `workingDir`, so while the session's folder is the main checkout a page under `.claude/worktrees/<name>` is refused and opens as source (a session started in the worktree renders it). For a worktree outside `workingDir` the Git panel also stays on `workingDir`, while `html-view` serves its pages as described above. Tests: `test/live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/file-browser-worktree.test.ts`, `test/live-worktree-outside.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-outside-worktree.test.ts`, `test/file-browser-outside-worktree.test.ts`.
 
 ### Raw file bodies: streamed and range-aware
 
@@ -1387,6 +1403,8 @@ On this route Node.js comes from nodejs.org (`latest-v<major>.x/SHASUMS256.txt`
 
 ⚠️ `no_admin_blocker` runs before the first download and stops for what this route cannot supply: a C/C++ toolchain on Linux (node-pty 1.1.0 compiles there; a node-pty with Linux prebuilds is what would lift this, and it is a dependency decision, not an installer one), musl, a platform nodejs.org or tmux-builds has no build for, and macOS below 15 (the tmux build's deployment target). ⚠️ Nothing between the "No-admin route" header and "End of the no-admin route" may run `sudo`, `ensure_sudo`, `run_as_root`, Homebrew or `xcode-select --install`; `run_as_root` itself refuses while `NO_ADMIN=1`, so a missed call site fails instead of prompting.
 
+**Driving the installer from a program** (`--ai-cli`, `--progress`, `install.sh preflight`, 2026-11-06). Codeman Desktop installs with no terminal: it runs `install.sh --no-admin --service --progress --ai-cli <id>|none` with `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` and its stdin closed, and asks the two questions in its own window (`packages/desktop/src/gui_install.rs`). `--ai-cli` answers the agent menu, so the one thing `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE` used to decide by itself (the first entry of the catalogue) is the user's. ⚠️ `cli_offerable` is the ONE rule for what can be installed here: the menu, `--ai-cli` and `preflight`'s `installable` all read it, so the app's list and the menu cannot disagree. A name that is not offerable here warns and carries on, and never falls back to another CLI; a typo dies in `parse_flags` before anything runs. `install.sh agent <id>` installs one CLI and nothing else, for Codeman Desktop's *Add a coding agent*: no service, no source, no build, so it may run next to a live server, and an agent already there is a success that runs nothing. ⚠️ It calls `run_offered_cli`, checks `CLI_FOUND_PATH` of that one entry itself and only then prints `done`: `install_offered_cli`'s gate is fatal only when NO CLI is left, which is right for a first install and would report success here, where another CLI is usually present. ⚠️ The app passes `--no-admin` to both `preflight` and `agent`, because that flag decides what `cli_offerable` allows; pinned in `gui_install.rs`. ⚠️ The app runs it from a folder of its own (`Run::Agent`), so `ps` never reads an agent run as "Codeman is being installed". A running server remembers a missing CLI for up to 5 minutes (`cliResolveRetryDelayMs`), and Run reads that memory, so `mark_cli_installed` touches `cli-installed` in the data dir and `resolve()` leaves the backoff when that file's mtime changes. ⚠️ That check is one `stat` inside the backoff branch and buys one run of the chain. Never replace it with a re-walk of PATH during the backoff: that puts a synchronous stat of every PATH entry on the request path (#516) and executes candidates already refused. The app never restarts the service for this. Only `install.sh` writes the marker, always under `~/.codeman`, so a CLI installed by hand, or another `CODEMAN_INSTANCE`, waits out the backoff as before, and so does a server older than this. ⚠️ `preflight` prints only JSON on stdout and changes nothing; `schema` moves only when a field changes meaning, because the app ships on its own and refuses a number it does not know. Fields may be added freely. ⚠️ `progress_phase` writes to stderr, not stdout, because a function can run inside a `$( )` that captures stdout. The phases must stay in the order of `PHASES` in `connect.html` (pinned by test), `done` must stay the last thing `main()` reports, since a run that ends without it failed, and an unknown phase is ignored by the app, so a new phase needs no new app. ⚠️ `error()` carries the text as `@@codeman error`, and the app shows the FIRST one: the ones after it are consequences (`Installation failed. Partial...`).
+
 ⚠️ **git is judged by whether it works, never by `command -v`.** On a Mac without the Xcode Command Line Tools `/usr/bin/git` is a stub that opens Apple's install dialog, so `check_git` judges that path by `xcode-select -p` and never executes it; any other git is asked for `--version`. `scripts/git-hooks.mjs` has the matching guard (no `.git`, no `git` call), because postinstall runs it on every `npm install`. Without a working git the source is an archive (`fetch_source_archive`, GitHub's `archive/<ref>.tar.gz` or `CODEMAN_TARBALL_URL`) and the install directory carries the marker `.install-source`, which `detectInstallKind` reads as `archive` (the name is pinned across both files by `test/install-sh-invariants.test.ts`). ⚠️ An archive install is replaced as a WHOLE, never patched in place: nothing says which files a newer version dropped, and a stale `src/*.ts` would be compiled. The new tree is fetched and built in `<install dir>.new` and `finish_source_swap` moves it into place only after `npm run build` succeeded, so a failed update leaves the running install untouched; a re-run on a machine that has gained a working git stages a clone instead, which turns the install back into a git one. ⚠️ `download`/`download_to_stdout` resolve `DOWNLOADER` themselves (`require_downloader`): only `main()` used to set it, so a subcommand that downloads died on `set -u` with the message swallowed by the step log.
 
 ## Agent inspection and guarded submission

docs/cli-registry.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # The CLI registry
 
-Every run mode Codeman can launch — Claude Code, Terminal/Shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek Harness, OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI — is a `CliEntry`: a data record describing how to find the binary, how to build its command line, what environment it needs, and what it can do. Code that used to ask "which CLI is this?" asks the entry instead.
+Every run mode Codeman can launch — Claude Code, Terminal/Shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek Harness, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI and jcode — is a `CliEntry`: a data record describing how to find the binary, how to build its command line, what environment it needs, and what it can do. Code that used to ask "which CLI is this?" asks the entry instead.
 
 ## Where it lives
 
@@ -227,7 +227,9 @@ still reading. A caller that asked only for `idle` keeps getting `idle`.
 | --- | --- |
 | claude | `.claude/skills/codeman` |
 | codex, gemini, opencode, antigravity, grok, deepseek, omp | `.agents/skills/codeman` |
-| pi, shell | none |
+| pi, shell, jcode | none |
+
+jcode reads `.agents/skills` too, but it is left out (`agentSkillInjection: false`): its tools run in one shared per-user daemon with the CODEMAN_* identity of whichever session started it, so an injected skill would act as that session ([jcode-integration.md](jcode-integration.md#the-shared-daemon)).
 
 Measured 2026-10-11 against the installed builds or their source: every CLI in the middle row scans `<workspace>/.agents/skills/` (gemini only in its cwd, dsh only at the git root, else cwd), and Claude Code does not read it, so a case shared with a claude session lists the skill once there (opencode, grok and omp read both directories and see the same skill twice, identical, under one name). ⚠️ pi is left out on purpose: any project-level `.agents/skills` or `.pi/skills` makes pi ask "Trust project folder?" at startup, which would stall a spawned worker on a dialog; it reads the user-level `~/.agents/skills` without the prompt (`npx skills add Ark0N/Codeman --skill codeman -g`). A codex, gemini or other session's copy in a case that pi sessions also use triggers that prompt once for the human there. ⚠️ `agentSkillDir` is a closed enum (`AGENT_SKILL_DIRS`, schema.ts), never a free path: `clis.json` can set it and it decides where the server writes. ⚠️ Two codex traps the skill names rather than fixes: codex's default sandbox blocks network even to loopback (the skill needs **Bypass approvals and sandbox**), and codex 0.162 runs tool commands through a shared `app-server` daemon whose environment (`CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`, `CODEMAN_API_URL`) is that of the session that started it.
 
@@ -235,6 +237,10 @@ Measured 2026-10-11 against the installed builds or their source: every CLI in t
 
 `capabilities.newline` (`'line-feed'` | `'esc-enter'`, absent = line feed) is the byte sequence the `send-key` route types into the pane for Shift+Enter. A line feed (`0x0a`, also Ctrl+Enter) is what Claude Code's Ink input reads as "insert a newline"; `esc-enter` (`ESC CR`, the Option/Alt+Enter chord) is there for a composer that ignores a bare line feed. No stock CLI declares it today: the bytes are typed by tmux on the server, so the browser's OS cannot change what a CLI reads, and Codex 0.147.0 was checked to take a line feed (a Shift+Enter that submits is the keypress leak fixed in #520, not a byte problem). A user `clis.json` can set it for a CLI that needs it. It is an enum rather than a byte string on purpose: config never carries bytes that get typed into a pane. Settings → Terminal & Input → **Key tester** prints what a browser reports for keydown/keypress/keyup, to see whether a device is sending what you think.
 
+## A CLI with a shared daemon
+
+`capabilities.sharedDaemon: true` says the CLI's TUI is a client of one per-user daemon that its first client starts (in its own session and process group) and every later session shares. jcode is the one stock entry that declares it. A session kill normally signals every descendant of the pane by parent pid, and the daemon is still a descendant of the pane that started it, so closing that one tab cut every other session of the CLI off (measured with jcode). With the flag set, `killSession` signals only the descendants still in the pane's own process group (`descendantsInPaneGroup()` in `src/proc-tree.ts`, one bounded `ps -o pid=,pgid=` lookup; a lookup that fails keeps the full kill). `test/proc-walk-bounds.test.ts` pins that jcode alone declares it, so no other CLI's kill changes.
+
 ## Arg-template safety
 
 The composed command line is interpolated into `bash -c "…"` inside tmux, which makes command construction a security boundary. Four independent layers keep config out of it:
@@ -368,7 +374,7 @@ A module-level const freezes at first import, and the failure is asymmetric: a C
 
 ## MCP server sync
 
-`capabilities.mcpConfig` (`{ path, format, relocation? }`, `path` relative to the home directory) names the file a CLI keeps its user-level MCP server list in and the dialect it is written in. `src/mcp-sync.ts` reads that list from every ENABLED CLI that declares one, and that is installed or already has the file (a CLI that is neither is reported `absent`, never created), and adds any server a CLI is missing from the others. It writes other tools' own config, so it is **opt-in**: `mcpSyncEnabled` (synced, default OFF) gates `GET`/`POST /api/mcp-sync` (403 while off) and the Settings → Agents & CLIs → MCP servers controls. Declared today for claude, gemini, codex, opencode and antigravity (and GitHub Copilot CLI, below); every format was checked against what the CLI's own `mcp add` writes, except opencode's (documented, not installed to check). A CLI with no entry (pi, grok, omp, deepseek) is not guessed at: it is listed as `unsupported` in the result when enabled. Adding one is a registry entry plus a small adapter in `mcp-sync.ts`, and a verified fixture in `test/mcp-sync.test.ts`.
+`capabilities.mcpConfig` (`{ path, format, relocation? }`, `path` relative to the home directory) names the file a CLI keeps its user-level MCP server list in and the dialect it is written in. `src/mcp-sync.ts` reads that list from every ENABLED CLI that declares one, and that is installed or already has the file (a CLI that is neither is reported `absent`, never created), and adds any server a CLI is missing from the others. It writes other tools' own config, so it is **opt-in**: `mcpSyncEnabled` (synced, default OFF) gates `GET`/`POST /api/mcp-sync` (403 while off) and the Settings → Agents & CLIs → MCP servers controls. Declared today for claude, gemini, codex, opencode and antigravity (and GitHub Copilot CLI, below); every format was checked against what the CLI's own `mcp add` writes, except opencode's (documented, not installed to check). A CLI with no entry (pi, grok, omp, deepseek, jcode) is not guessed at: it is listed as `unsupported` in the result when enabled. Adding one is a registry entry plus a small adapter in `mcp-sync.ts`, and a verified fixture in `test/mcp-sync.test.ts`.
 
 **Tools that are not run modes, or that declare no `mcpConfig`.** `src/mcp-sync-targets.ts` declares such tools as plain data (`MCP_SYNC_ONLY_TOOLS`: id, label, config path, dialect, relocation var, the binary whose presence means "installed"). They join the registry CLIs as sync targets (listed after them, so a registry CLI's definition wins a same-name difference), under the same rules: installed or already configured, otherwise `absent`. GitHub Copilot CLI is both: its registry entry declares `mcpConfig`, so while the run mode is enabled the sync-only row is skipped, and it applies only if the run mode is disabled. Copilot's dialect is `copilot-json` (`~/.copilot/mcp-config.json`, relocated by `COPILOT_HOME`; checked against `copilot mcp add` 1.0.94): `mcpServers`, each entry with `tools` (`["*"]` = all), `type` `local` | `http` | `sse`, `command`/`args`/`env` or `url`/`headers`. `copilot mcp disable` does not mark the entry: it lists the name under `disabledMcpServers` in `settings.json` beside the config. Sync reads that list (never writes it) so a disabled server is not copied, and reports the target `unreadable` if `settings.json` is not valid JSON rather than guessing.
 

docs/docker-cases.md

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ must not change what is inside an image tagged `codeman/agent:base`, or two mach
 that tag hold different images and every cache decision downstream is a lie. Each entry's
 `enabled` flag IS honoured, so a CLI that ships disabled is never baked in.
 
-Five CLIs keep hand-written layers, for two different reasons that are easy to conflate.
-`antigravity`, `grok` and `omp` declare no `npmPackage` at all, so they never enter the shared
+Six CLIs keep hand-written layers, for two different reasons that are easy to conflate.
+`antigravity`, `grok`, `omp` and `jcode` declare no `npmPackage` at all, so they never enter the shared
 npm layer and each gets a vendor-installer layer instead. `pi` and `deepseek` ARE on npm but
 carry `discovery.install.agentImageLayer` in `stock.ts` (a REGISTRY field, rather than an
 id-keyed table duplicated between the two producers of the image's build args), which pulls
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ them out of the shared layer because a plain `npm install -g` is not enough for
 | `deepseek` | Needs `pnpm` alongside it (`dsh plugin`, issue #352) plus a `dsh-tui` profile install. |
 | `antigravity` | Not on npm — Google ships a standalone binary (~190MB, the largest layer). |
 | `grok`, `omp` | Not on npm — standalone vendor installers. |
+| `jcode` | Not on npm: jcode.sh's installer, then the WHOLE version directory copied to `/opt/jcode` (the launcher is an `sh` script that execs the binary beside it). |
 
 `test/docker-agent-image-coverage.test.ts` requires every special case to carry a written
 reason AND still be present in the Dockerfile, so an exclusion cannot silently become an
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ A zero exit code only proves the layers ran, not that the toolchain works. Verif
 
 ```bash
 docker run --rm codeman/agent:base bash -lc \
-  'for c in claude codex gemini opencode agy pi grok dsh omp; do printf "%-9s " $c; $c --version 2>&1 | head -1; done'
+  'for c in claude codex gemini opencode agy pi grok dsh omp jcode; do printf "%-9s " $c; $c --version 2>&1 | head -1; done'
 ```
 
 ⚠️ `dsh --version` is the one line above that answers a different question than the
@@ -81,6 +82,8 @@ Antigravity (`agy`) and Grok (`grok`) are the two CLIs not installed from npm (G
 
 Pi's credentials are seeded per-FILE rather than as a whole directory (`auth.json`, `settings.json`, `trust.json`, `models.json`, `models-store.json` out of `~/.pi/agent`), because that directory also holds `sessions/`, `extensions/`, `skills/` and the installed package trees — gigabytes on an active host. Consequence: in-container pi sessions are invisible host-side, so `pi -c` inside a Docker case only sees that container's own history. See [`pi-integration.md`](./pi-integration.md). Grok is seeded per-file for the same reason (`auth.json`, `config.toml`, `pager.toml` out of `~/.grok`, which also holds `sessions/`, `memory/` and the ~160MB binary under `downloads/`), with the same consequence for `grok -c`. See [`grok-integration.md`](./grok-integration.md). OMP is the one CLI in this family where `sessions/` is the EXCEPTION rather than the rule: `~/.omp/agent/{config.yml,mcp.json,models.yml,settings.yml}` are seeded per-file (the dir also holds SQLite caches and `terminal-sessions/`), but `~/.omp/agent/sessions/` is shared RW like codex's, not seeded, because Codeman reads it host-side for history recovery and `--resume` pinning. See [`omp-integration.md`](./omp-integration.md).
 
+jcode's credentials are not seeded at all: `~/.jcode` keeps its OAuth tokens beside ~160MB of builds, its sessions and SQLite caches, and its API keys live in `~/.config/jcode`, so there is no small set of files to copy. Sign in to jcode inside the container (`docs/jcode-integration.md`).
+
 The image can also carry the GitHub CLI (`gh`) and the Azure CLI (`az` + the `azure-devops` extension, in `AZURE_EXTENSION_DIR=/opt/az-extensions` so it stays out of the seeded HOME), wired into the system git config as credential helpers for github.com and dev.azure.com / *.visualstudio.com, exactly as in `docker/server.Dockerfile`. Their sign-ins are seeded per-FILE like pi's: `~/.config/gh/{hosts.yml,config.yml}` and `~/.azure/{azureProfile.json,msal_token_cache.json,service_principal_entries.json,clouds.config,config}`, never `~/.azure`'s logs, command index or extensions. A token kept in a desktop keyring, or in the encrypted MSAL cache az uses on Windows/macOS, is not in those files and does not carry. None of the three is version-pinned; the `--no-cache` rebuild recommended above is also what refreshes them. Both CLIs are opt-in and OFF by default: `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH=1` / `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_AZ=1` in the environment of `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs`, or of the Codeman server for its own auto-build (in the Compose deployment, `environment:` in `docker-compose.override.yml`), become the `CODEMAN_INSTALL_GH` / `CODEMAN_INSTALL_AZ` build args and put that CLI, its extension and its helper entry into the image. Unset passes nothing, so a default build's argv is unchanged and the image has neither. The sign-in seeds follow the same switches, read when a case container is created: `.config/gh` only with `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH=1`, `.azure` only with `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_AZ=1` (`enabledByEnv` in `CRED_STORES`), never merely because the files exist. Seeds are create-time mounts and deliberately not part of the config hash (hashing them would trip the drift gate for every case), so an existing case container picks them up only when it is recreated.
 
 Set `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_GIT_USER_NAME` and `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_GIT_USER_EMAIL` together to configure the agent image's Git identity. Rebuild an existing `codeman/agent:base` with `node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs --no-cache`, then recreate Docker-case containers so they use the rebuilt image.

docs/extending-codeman.md

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ agent skill instead of teaching it these calls by hand: `skills/codeman` in the
 (`npx skills add Ark0N/Codeman --skill codeman -g`, or `codeman skill install
 [--case <name>] [--mode <mode>]`, or the synced `agentSkillEnabled` App Setting for
 automatic per-case injection on session create, into the directory each CLI scans for
-skills). The skill carries the guard, the safety rules, and verified
+skills, on by default since 1.50.0). The skill carries the guard, the safety rules, and verified
 wait/orchestration recipes.
 
 If the caller speaks the Model Context Protocol (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Codex, any MCP

docs/jcode-integration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+# jcode sessions
+
+Codeman can drive [jcode](https://github.com/1jehuang/jcode) (1jehuang/jcode, MIT, a
+coding-agent TUI written in Rust) as a session backend, alongside Claude Code, OpenCode,
+Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP and GitHub Copilot. `jcode` is its own **run mode**:
+its own PTY, its own tmux session, its own tab identity (amber, `JC` badge, a plain ring
+standing in for jcode's halftone donut). It is not a location overlay like Docker or
+remote-SSH cases, and it is not a web tab.
+
+Everything here was measured against jcode v0.98.1 on 2026-10-16 (see
+[How it was measured](#how-it-was-measured)). The registry entry in
+`src/config/cli-registry/stock.ts` carries the same facts in its comments and is the
+source of truth when the two disagree.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash
+```
+
+The installer downloads a checksummed release binary into
+`~/.jcode/builds/versions/<version>/` and links `~/.local/bin/jcode` (its
+`JCODE_INSTALL_DIR` default) to it. The linked `jcode` is a small `sh` **launcher** that
+resolves its own path and execs the `jcode-<os>-<arch>.bin` beside it, so the version
+directory is what matters, not the single file the link points at.
+
+Codeman resolves the binary through the generic registry resolver (there is no
+jcode-specific resolver module): the server PATH, then `~/.local/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`
+and `~/bin`, then an interactive login shell. npm carries an unrelated package also called
+`jcode`, so a PATH hit is not trusted on its own: `jcode --version` must print
+`jcode v<semver>` (the real one prints `jcode v0.98.1 (1c7426eb1)`), and anything else
+counts as absent. Check what it resolved:
+
+```bash
+curl -s localhost:3000/api/jcode/status | jq
+# { "available": true, "path": "/home/you/.local/bin", "version": "0.98.1" }
+```
+
+## Authenticate
+
+jcode keeps its own logins: OAuth accounts in `~/.jcode/auth.json`, API keys in
+`~/.config/jcode/<provider>.env`, the default provider and model in `~/.jcode/config.toml`.
+Set them up with jcode itself (`jcode login`, `/login` inside the TUI, or
+`jcode provider add <name> --base-url ... --model ...` for an OpenAI-compatible server).
+jcode can also offer to reuse logins other CLIs left behind; it asks before reading any of
+them. Codeman forwards no credentials into a jcode pane.
+
+## What Codeman wires up
+
+`JcodeConfig` (per session, persisted in `state.json`, round-trips through respawn and
+server restart):
+
+| Field             | Flag            | Notes                                                                        |
+| ----------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `model`           | `--model <v>`   | e.g. `claude-opus-4-8`, `gpt-5.5`                                            |
+| `resumeSessionId` | `--resume <v>`  | a session id (`session_fox_1792160401272_f5b47ce47d631006`) or its short name (`fox`) |
+
+Both values are regex-validated at the route and checked again by the argv engine, and a
+value that fails is **dropped**, never escaped into the command. `resumeSessionId` uses the
+`path-segment` pattern (a leading letter or digit) on purpose: jcode's `--resume` takes an
+OPTIONAL value (a bare `--resume` opens its session picker), so a value starting with `-`
+would be parsed as a flag of its own (`--resume --no-update` is two flags).
+
+The Run button sends **no** `jcodeConfig`: jcode has no approval prompts and no bypass
+flag, so there is nothing to opt into (the same shape as pi). A bare spawn is just `jcode`.
+
+There is **no** `envOverrides` prefix for jcode: `JCODE_*` is not allowlisted. See
+[The shared daemon](#the-shared-daemon) for why.
+
+## The shared daemon
+
+Every jcode TUI is a CLIENT of one shared per-user daemon (`jcode serve`). The first client
+starts it, in its own session and process group (`setsid`), and every later client attaches
+to it. It stays the first client's CHILD by parent pid, though, which is what the
+[session kill](#closing-a-tab-never-takes-the-daemon-down) has to account for. The agent and its tools run in the DAEMON, with the daemon's
+environment. Measured: a second client started with `CODEMAN_PROBE=second-client` asked its
+bash tool to `echo "probe=[$CODEMAN_PROBE]"` and got `probe=[]`.
+
+Three things follow, and each one is a deliberate decision:
+
+- **The agent skill is not injected.** jcode does read `./.agents/skills` (and
+  `./.jcode/skills`, `./.claude/skills`), but a jcode agent's tools see the
+  `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`, `CODEMAN_API_URL` and `CODEMAN_MUX` of whichever session started
+  the daemon, or none at all if it was started outside Codeman. An injected skill would act
+  as THAT session: spawn children under the wrong parent, prompt another session's
+  workers. A user-level copy of the skill (`~/.agents/skills`, which jcode also reads) has
+  the same problem; this is the same trap as codex's shared `app-server`, only it is jcode's
+  normal case rather than an edge.
+- **No `JCODE_*` envOverrides prefix.** Most of that namespace is read by the daemon, so a
+  per-session value would do nothing, and where it did act (in the session that happens to
+  start the daemon) it would reach every jcode session on the machine. The namespace
+  includes variables that run code or redirect traffic: `JCODE_HOOK_*`, `JCODE_SPAWN_HOOK`,
+  `JCODE_*_COMMAND`, `JCODE_*_API_BASE`. Configure jcode in `~/.jcode/config.toml`, or in
+  the Codeman server's own environment.
+- **Deleting a Codeman jcode session leaves the daemon running**, by design: the other
+  sessions live there (next section). `jcode server stop --force` stops it by hand.
+
+### Closing a tab never takes the daemon down
+
+Codeman's session kill signals every descendant of the pane (by parent pid), so it used to
+kill the shared daemon whenever the closed tab happened to be the one that started it.
+Measured on a beta before the fix: two jcode sessions, the first one deleted, and the second
+one's client looped on `Connection lost - retrying (attempt 9) - server closed the
+connection` with its prompt queued (`⏳`), while a send-and-wait on it timed out.
+
+The jcode entry declares `capabilities.sharedDaemon: true`, and for such a CLI the kill
+signals only the descendants still in the pane's own process group
+(`descendantsInPaneGroup()`, `src/proc-tree.ts`, one bounded `ps -o pid=,pgid=`). The daemon
+left that group when it called `setsid`, and everything it runs inherits its group, so the
+daemon and its tools are spared while the client and anything else in the pane's group are
+killed as before. A lookup that fails keeps the old behaviour (kill every descendant). Every
+other CLI is unaffected. Measured after the fix: the kill logs `Sparing 1 process(es)
+outside pane <pid>'s group (the CLI's shared daemon)`, the daemon keeps its pid, and the
+remaining session answered a send-and-wait in 5 s.
+
+The flip side: a process a jcode agent started (a dev server, a watcher) is a child of the
+daemon, not of the pane, so closing the tab does not stop it. That is how jcode behaves in a
+plain terminal too.
+
+## Approvals and multi-user mode
+
+jcode has no approval dialog. Its bash tool runs ungated apart from jcode's own model-side
+reflection gate on risky commands and a hard deny on catastrophic paths. So there is no
+bypass flag to clamp, nothing for the multi-user clamp to force off, and no dialog for
+Codeman to read as `blocked`. In multi-user mode a jcode session is like a pi session: an
+agent that runs tools without asking, under the one OS account every session shares.
+
+## Terminal behavior
+
+jcode is a **full-screen alternate-screen TUI with mouse tracking on** (tmux
+`alternate_on=1`, `mouse_any_flag=1`, `mouse_sgr_flag=1`). It takes the opencode strip,
+`altScreen: 'strip-mux-and-mouse'`: the mouse DECSETs are stripped, so a drag selects text
+locally (Auto Copy and copy-on-select work) instead of being reported to jcode.
+
+Scrolling: jcode pages its own transcript on PageUp/PageDown and also scrolls on SGR wheel
+reports (both measured). It declares `transcriptPageKeys: true`, so over the hollow
+alt-screen buffer a wheel or a swipe becomes PageUp/PageDown instead of doing nothing.
+
+Input: a long prompt sent the way Codeman sends one (a bracketed paste, then a separate
+Enter) submits cleanly (measured with a 170-character prompt).
+
+### How Codeman reads a working pane
+
+At rest the composer row is `<n>> ` (the prompt number, then `>`); a submitted prompt is
+echoed into the transcript as `<n>› <text>`. While a turn runs the composer row reads
+`<n>…` and a status row appears directly above it: a braille spinner (the gemini/omp frame
+set, about 12 fps), then the phase and the elapsed time:
+
+```
+⠋ sending… 0s
+⠦ thinking… 2s · https
+⠼ waiting for response… 3s · https
+⠸ running bash · <detail> · 12s · Alt+B bg
+⠼ 12s · 45.1 tps · ↑16k ↓20            (streaming: the time comes first)
+↻ network disconnected, waiting to retry · … · 5s
+```
+
+Past a minute the time reads `1m 3s`, past an hour `1h 2m`. At rest that row is empty or a
+dim tip, never a spinner, and the turn leaves a summary row (`  21s · 199.6 tps · ↑17k ↓2k`)
+that has a time but no spinner. The `workingLine` pattern therefore needs a spinner (or the
+`↻ network disconnected` row) at the start of a row AND an elapsed time on it.
+
+The composer glyph is the bare `>`. tmux redraws only the cells that changed, and on the
+composer row at the end of a turn that is the `…` turning into `>` (the recorded client
+stream carries `\x1b[43;2H...> `), never the prompt number, so `>` is what reliably arrives.
+Mid-turn stream chunks never contain it. The glyph only ARMS the idle check; the screen and
+the silence decide.
+
+Silence is a sound signal for jcode: the spinner repaints the pane at least every 100 ms for
+the whole turn, and at rest jcode sends nothing at all (12 seconds recorded: zero bytes).
+
+The submit verifier stays inert for jcode, which is what it wants (it has no early-Enter
+defect): every composer row starts with its prompt number, so no screen row starts with
+`>` the way the verifier requires.
+
+### Reading a jcode worker's answer
+
+`GET /api/sessions/:id/last-response` returns an **honest empty** (`text: ""`, and
+`messages: []` with `?context=full`) for jcode. The pane segmenter the other TUIs use cannot
+read a repainting alternate-screen stream (measured: it served jcode's welcome banner as
+"the answer"), and without this the route would fall through to the Claude transcript scan,
+which could adopt a Claude conversation from the same folder. Read a jcode worker's screen
+instead:
+
+- `codeman agent read <id> --tail 3000`
+- MCP `read_output` with `source: "terminal"`
+- `GET /api/sessions/:id/terminal?tail=3000`
+
+There are no `stop`/`blocked` hook signals for jcode: wait for `idle`, or use `wait-output`
+markers, as with every hook-less CLI.
+
+## First run: the onboarding wizard
+
+A fresh jcode install opens an onboarding wizard ("Welcome to jcode onboarding / Log in to
+OpenAI?") instead of the composer, on every launch, until its launch counter passes 5 or
+10 sessions exist. A prompt typed into the wizard is lost (measured: it wedged that client).
+Before driving jcode from Codeman, run `jcode` once in a terminal and finish or skip the
+wizard, or press Esc in the Codeman pane.
+
+## jcode's own defaults Codeman does not change
+
+- **Telemetry** is on by default in jcode (install count, version, OS, session activity,
+  tool counts; jcode's `TELEMETRY.md`). Opt out with `jcode telemetry disable`, or set
+  `JCODE_NO_TELEMETRY=1` in the Codeman SERVER's environment (it is not a per-session env
+  override, see above).
+- **Auto-update** is on by default for release builds; `--no-update` is jcode's own flag and
+  Codeman does not pass it.
+- **Self-dev mode**: jcode switches into it when started inside a checkout of jcode itself.
+
+## Docker cases
+
+jcode is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in a dedicated Dockerfile step through
+jcode.sh's installer, then copies the WHOLE version directory to `/opt/jcode` (the launcher
+execs the binary beside it, so copying only the linked file, as the grok and omp steps do,
+would leave a launcher with nothing to run) and links `/usr/local/bin/jcode` to the launcher.
+Root's `~/.jcode` is dropped in the same layer so the image does not carry the ~160 MB
+binary twice. Verified in `node:22-bookworm-slim`, including `jcode --version` as the
+unprivileged `agent` user. Rebuild with the mandatory `--no-cache`:
+
+```bash
+node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs --no-cache
+```
+
+No credentials are seeded into the container: `~/.jcode` holds the OAuth tokens beside the
+builds, sessions and SQLite caches, and API keys live in `~/.config/jcode`. Sign in inside
+the container instead.
+
+## Remote SSH cases
+
+`jcode` mode is routed through an interactive login shell
+(`exec "$SHELL" -i -l -c 'jcode'`), because sshd's remote-command PATH does not include
+`~/.local/bin`. Per-session config does not cross ssh and is rejected rather than silently
+ignored; a host whose `jcode` lives elsewhere takes the per-host `commands.jcode` override.
+
+## Not supported yet, and why
+
+- **A transcript reader** (a real `last-response`, Response Viewer content). jcode writes
+  sessions as `~/.jcode/sessions/session_<name>_<ms>_<hex>.json` plus a `.journal.jsonl`,
+  which is easy to parse, but pairing a Codeman pane with ITS session file is ambiguous: the
+  session JSON's `last_pid` is the shared daemon's, not the pane's, so two jcode panes in
+  one folder cannot be told apart from the files alone.
+- **Custom Model Endpoint Profiles** (`customModelInjection: unsupported`). jcode's provider
+  is resolved in the daemon, not the pane, so a per-session redirect has nothing reliable
+  to land on.
+- **The model in tile headers** (`modelDetect`). The status bar names provider and model
+  (`qwen5090 qwen3.8 27b`), but its layout varies by provider and width and was not
+  measured enough to anchor a pattern on. A session shows its launch model, if any.
+- **Hook-based `stop`/`blocked` signals.** jcode has lifecycle hooks (`session_start`,
+  `turn_start`, `turn_end`, `session_end`), but they run in the daemon too, with the
+  daemon's environment, so they cannot tell Codeman which session they belong to.
+- **Ralph, respawn heuristics, token/CLI-info parsing and the `❯` readiness probe are off**
+  for jcode, as for every external CLI.
+
+A per-session daemon (`jcode --socket <path>`) would give each pane its own environment,
+but it gives up the shared daemon that is jcode's main design point (cross-session swarm
+awareness, a few MB per extra session), so it was not done here.
+
+## How it was measured
+
+- jcode installed with its own installer into a scratch `HOME` with telemetry off
+  (`DO_NOT_TRACK=1`, `JCODE_NO_TELEMETRY=1`) and a short `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` (the daemon's
+  Unix socket path must stay under the `SUN_LEN` limit), so nothing touched the real home.
+- A provider set up with `jcode provider add` pointing at a local OpenAI-compatible server
+  (an RTX 5090 serving Qwen 3.8 27B), so no subscription login was involved.
+- jcode run in a scratch tmux socket at 160x45; `tmux capture-pane -p` every 200 ms through
+  real turns (a plain reply, a bash tool call, a streamed answer); `pipe-pane` at rest; and a
+  tmux CLIENT attached through a PTY to record exactly what Codeman's PTY reads.
+- PageUp/PageDown sent with `send-keys`; SGR wheel reports (`\x1b[<64;40;10M`) pasted raw.
+- A second client with its own environment to prove where tools run.
+- The Docker step run in a throwaway `node:22-bookworm-slim` container.
+- End to end through an isolated beta Codeman built from this branch (its own
+  `CODEMAN_INSTANCE`, port and tmux socket): `POST /api/quick-start` with `mode: "jcode"`,
+  `/api/jcode/status`, send-and-wait (`wait: "idle"` returned after the turn, 12.7 s for a
+  turn with a 5 s tool call, not during it), two sessions with the first deleted, and a
+  Playwright pass over the Run menu entry, the `Run JC` button and the rendered transcript.
+
+The fixtures in `test/jcode-mode.test.ts` are verbatim from these captures.

docs/releasing.md

@@ -42,7 +42,10 @@ When user says "COM":
 5. **Commit and deploy**: verify the branch first (`git branch --show-current`), then stage EXPLICIT paths — never `git add -A`, which has swept another session's WIP into a release. `git status --short` and account for every line before committing:
    `git add <paths> && git commit -m "chore: version packages" && git push && npm run build && systemctl --user restart codeman-web`
 6. **Refresh the getcodeman.com version badge**: the landing page's status bar carries the release version (`v<x.y.z> · getcodeman.com · MIT`), so it goes stale on every release if nobody bumps it. The site source and its deploy script are maintained outside this repository, on the maintainer's machine only; follow the local site handbook there, which also covers the numbers strip and `sitemap.xml` refresh that belong in the same pass. Poll production (`curl -s https://getcodeman.com/ | grep v<x.y.z>`) before calling it done, since the edge lags a deploy by up to a minute. Not applicable to contributor clones — skip it and say so.
-7. **Wait for CI**: after `git push`, TWO workflows fire per master push: `CI` and `Release` (the npm publish, the GitHub release and the MCP registry publish). List both runs for the pushed commit with `gh run list --commit $(git rev-parse HEAD) --json databaseId,workflowName` and watch EACH with `gh run watch <id> --exit-status`. Confirm both pass before considering the release done (`gh run list -L 1` returns only one of the two).
+
+   A site change that links the Mac app (`Codeman.dmg`, `/mac`) deploys only after step 7 showed the `macOS app` job green and the [DMG check](#the-mac-app-codemandmg) answered 200: the DMG reaches the release well after the npm publish, and the download link answers 404 until then.
+
+7. **Wait for CI**: after `git push`, TWO workflows fire per master push: `CI` and `Release` (the npm publish, the GitHub release, the MCP registry publish and, when Codeman itself was published, the `macOS app` job that attaches `Codeman.dmg`). List both runs for the pushed commit with `gh run list --commit $(git rev-parse HEAD) --json databaseId,workflowName` and watch EACH with `gh run watch <id> --exit-status`. Confirm both pass before considering the release done (`gh run list -L 1` returns only one of the two).
 
 8. **Check the MCP registry**: `codeman mcp` is listed in the official MCP registry as `io.github.Ark0N/codeman`, and the registry does not follow npm, so every release is published there. The `Release` workflow does this itself in its `MCP registry` job (`.github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml`): it waits until npm serves the version, because the registry checks that the npm package exists and carries `mcpName: io.github.Ark0N/codeman`, signs in with the workflow's GitHub OIDC token (no secret, no browser) and publishes the `config/mcp-registry/server.json` that `npm run version-packages` wrote (`scripts/sync-plugin.mjs`). A version the registry already has is skipped. Confirm with `curl -s 'https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/servers?search=io.github.Ark0N/codeman' | jq -r '.servers[] | "\(.server.version) latest=\(._meta["io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/official"].isLatest)"'`: the new version must be the one with `latest=true`. If the job failed, `gh workflow run publish-mcp.yml` publishes the version on master again. Its publisher is pinned: bump `MCP_PUBLISHER_VERSION` and `MCP_PUBLISHER_SHA256` together, the digest from the release's asset. The local fallback is `cd config/mcp-registry && ~/.local/bin/mcp-publisher login github && ~/.local/bin/mcp-publisher publish`, signed in as the account that owns the `io.github.Ark0N/` namespace, with mcp-publisher 1.8.1 or newer, the release binary from https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases: the Snap Store package is stuck at 1.1.0 and rejects the current `$schema` with a false "deprecated schema detected", so never edit `server.json` for that error. Older publishers also save their login as `.mcpregistry_github_token` and `.mcpregistry_registry_token` (live tokens) in the current directory; move those out of the repo, never commit them.
 
@@ -50,6 +53,36 @@ When user says "COM":
 
 CI runs `npm run check:lockfile` on every push/PR, so lockfile drift fails the build even if the `version-packages` script is bypassed.
 
+## The Mac app (Codeman.dmg)
+
+Every Codeman release carries the native macOS app (`packages/desktop`) as `Codeman.dmg` plus `Codeman.dmg.sha256`. The name never changes, so https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg always serves the newest app, while each release keeps its own copy at `https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/download/codeman@<x.y.z>/Codeman.dmg` (link that one in release notes). The app keeps its own version (`packages/desktop/Cargo.toml`), so the DMG of Codeman 1.50.0 holds app 0.1.0.
+
+**How it gets there.** When npm took a Codeman release (not one that moved only xterm-zerolag-input), the `Release` run's `macOS app` job calls `.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml` with the tag `codeman@<x.y.z>`. It has three jobs, so no job that holds a secret runs code from a crate: `build` runs `cargo test --locked` and `bundle-macos.sh --universal` on the release commit with a read-only token and no secret; `sign` imports the Developer ID certificate into a throwaway keychain and runs `packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh`, which signs the app with the hardened runtime, has Apple notarize it, staples the ticket, builds the DMG around it and signs, notarizes and staples that too; `attach` uploads both files to the release (`--clobber`) and checks that the download links serve those bytes. The release job's `Keep Latest on the Codeman release` step puts the Latest badge back on the newest `codeman@` release after every publish, since the stable link follows that badge.
+
+**The secrets** are repository secrets, passed to the job by name (never `secrets: inherit`, which would hand it `NPM_TOKEN`): `MACOS_CERT_P12` (the Developer ID Application certificate WITH its private key, exported from Keychain Access as a .p12, then `base64 -i <file>.p12`), `MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD` (the export password), `APPLE_ID`, `APPLE_APP_PASSWORD` (an app-specific password for that Apple ID, made at account.apple.com) and `APPLE_TEAM_ID`. A Developer ID certificate lasts five years; its successor replaces the first two secrets and nothing else.
+
+**Check it before anything links to it.** The DMG lands after a universal build and two notary submissions, so well after the npm publish, and until then the stable link answers 404:
+
+```bash
+gh release view codeman@<x.y.z> --json assets -q '.assets[].name'   # Codeman.dmg and Codeman.dmg.sha256
+curl -sIL -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg   # 200
+```
+
+**Dry run.** `gh workflow run desktop-dmg.yml` builds, signs and notarizes master and attaches nothing; `gh workflow run desktop-dmg.yml --ref <branch>` does the same for a branch that carries the workflow (GitHub starts a manual run only for a workflow file that is also on master). The signed DMG is the run's `codeman-dmg` artifact (`gh run download <run-id> -n codeman-dmg`). For a first-launch test, download it on a Mac through the browser from the run page instead, so the copy is quarantined like one from a release.
+
+**Rebuild a release's DMG.** `gh workflow run desktop-dmg.yml -f tag=codeman@<x.y.z>`, started from master (the only ref allowed to attach), builds that tag and replaces its `Codeman.dmg`. It works for any release that carries `packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh`. The tag must be a Codeman release tag (`codeman@x.y.z`, or the `aicodeman@x.y.z` a failed rename leaves) whose commit is on master's history: `build` and `sign` both refuse anything else before they run its scripts, since `sign` runs them with the signing key unlocked. A failed job is also retried in place with `gh run rerun <run-id> --failed`.
+
+**If notarization fails.** The `Sign and notarize` job's log names the submission and prints Apple's log for it (`xcrun notarytool log <id>` with the same login shows it again).
+
+- `HTTP status code: 401` (invalid credentials) or `403` (a required agreement is missing or has expired) at the first submission: a new Apple ID password revokes every app-specific password, so make a new one and update `APPLE_APP_PASSWORD`, or accept the new agreement at developer.apple.com, then `gh run rerun <run-id> --failed`.
+- `0 valid Developer ID Application identities` in the `Signing keychain` step: the .p12 lacks its private key or holds another certificate type. A team mismatch there means `APPLE_TEAM_ID` names another team than the certificate.
+- `In Progress` at the 45-minute limit, or a network error: Apple's service was slow. Rerun the failed job.
+- `Invalid`: Apple's log names the file and the reason (a binary without the hardened runtime or a secure timestamp, an entitlement it refuses). That is a code fix and a new release. Until then keep the stable link on the last app that passed, `gh release edit codeman@<previous> --latest`, and hold any site change that links the new one.
+
+**By hand on a Mac**, only when the workflow cannot be fixed in time: in a clean checkout of the tag, `env -u CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALLER_URL -u CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALL_BRANCH packages/desktop/scripts/bundle-macos.sh --universal`, then `SIGN_IDENTITY="Developer ID Application: ..." NOTARY_PROFILE=<profile> packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh packages/desktop/dist/Codeman.app <out-dir>` (a profile saved with `xcrun notarytool store-credentials`), then `gh release upload codeman@<x.y.z> <out-dir>/Codeman.dmg <out-dir>/Codeman.dmg.sha256 --clobber`. Never upload a build made with either of those two variables set: it installs Codeman from the test branch it names.
+
+**Toolchain and runner.** `desktop-dmg.yml` and the pull-request check `desktop-ci.yml` (`cargo fmt --check`, clippy with `-D warnings` and `cargo test --locked` on macOS, for changes under `packages/desktop`) both pin `RUST_TOOLCHAIN` and run on `macos-26`. Move them together.
+
 ## Security notices
 
 A security notice is a sticky warning card about something outside Codeman that its users should act on (the first: OpenCode's Console breach, October 2026). On a browser that gets the release's update toast it appears inside that toast instead, so nobody sees it twice. Notices live in `src/web/public/security-notices.json`, which is maintained BY HAND; never put one in `whats-new.json`, which `npm run version-packages` rewrites. A notice reaches users only with a release, so add it before the COM that should carry it.

docs/remote-sessions.md

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Types live in `src/types/session.ts`; persistence in `src/remote-hosts.ts`.
 | `RemoteHost` (extends `RemoteSshOptions`) | A saved host: `id`, `label`, `host`, `username`, `port?`, `commands?` (per-mode launch command override). |
 | `RemoteCase` | A working directory on a host: `name`, `type: 'remote'`, `hostId`, `remotePath`. |
 | `SessionRemote` (extends `RemoteSshOptions`) | The resolved bundle stamped onto a live session: host coordinates + `remotePath` + `commands`, plus **`owned?`** and **`remoteSessionName?`** (COD-105 — see [Ownership](#ownership-launched-vs-discovered-and-attached-cod-105)). Built by `toSessionRemote(host, case)` (sets `owned: true`) for the launch path, or `toAttachedSessionRemote(host, name, path)` (sets `owned: false`) for the attach path. Both copy the advanced SSH options through so every connection is identical. |
-| `RemoteCommandMode` | `Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' \| 'claude' \| 'opencode' \| 'codex' \| 'gemini' \| 'antigravity' \| 'pi' \| 'grok' \| 'deepseek' \| 'omp'>` — the modes that can run remotely. |
+| `RemoteCommandMode` | `Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' \| 'claude' \| 'opencode' \| 'codex' \| 'gemini' \| 'antigravity' \| 'pi' \| 'grok' \| 'deepseek' \| 'omp' \| 'jcode'>` — the modes that can run remotely. |
 | `RemoteSessionInfo` (COD-105) | One discovered remote tmux session: `name` (always `codeman-*`), `attached` (a client is connected), `created` (epoch s), `windows`. Returned by `listRemoteCodemanSessions()`. |
 
 Persistence is two flat JSON arrays in the instance data dir:

docs/security-architecture.md

@@ -342,6 +342,25 @@ escapes the session working directory (`..`, absolute paths, and symlinks that
 resolve outside). The realpath‑before‑check ordering closes the validation‑time
 TOCTOU window.
 
+A local session has one more root while its agent works in a git worktree of the
+same repository OUTSIDE its folder (published as `outsideWorktree`). An absolute path inside
+that worktree is confined to it by `validateLocalSessionFilePath()`, and only while the
+worktree folder still `realpath`s to the path recorded for it. The edit route
+(`PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content`) uses the same check, so a file in that worktree can be
+written as well as read. Codeman records such a
+worktree only after the session's own repository vouches for it, and never `/`, the
+home folder or above, a folder holding the working directory, or a folder at, inside or
+around a Docker case workspace (`src/live-worktree.ts`). It also refuses a folder that is
+itself a sensitive folder such as `.ssh`, and `validateLocalSessionFilePath()` never serves a
+file from the worktree that `isSensitivePath()` blocklists. In multi-user mode a regular
+owner's session also needs the owner's folder rule (their own space or the working directory);
+an admin's does not. It follows nothing while attachment workspace confinement is on, and
+nothing at, inside or around a blocked attachment tree. Codeman judges these rules when the pane
+changes directory, and the routes judge confinement and the blocked trees again on every request,
+so turning confinement on or blocking the folder stops serving it at once. The multi-user rule is
+judged only when the pane changes directory. On every request the routes also check that the
+folder still resolves to its recorded path. A relative path is still confined to the working directory alone.
+
 | Route | Cap | Notes |
 |-------|-----|-------|
 | `file-content` | 10 MB | text preview |

docs/wiki/Agent-CLIs.md

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 # Agent CLIs
 
-Codeman drives eleven run modes: ten agent CLIs plus a plain shell. This page covers picking
+Codeman drives twelve run modes: eleven agent CLIs plus a plain shell. This page covers picking
 one, setting it up, and the differences that actually change how you work.
 
-## The eleven modes
+## The twelve modes
 
 | Mode                 | CLI                          | Get it                                                                 |
 | -------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ one, setting it up, and the differences that actually change how you work.
 | **DeepSeek Harness** | `dsh`                        | [github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness) |
 | **OMP**              | `omp`                        | [github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi)     |
 | **GitHub Copilot**   | `copilot`                    | [github.com/github/copilot-cli](https://github.com/github/copilot-cli) |
+| **jcode**            | `jcode`                      | [jcode.sh](https://jcode.sh)                                           |
 | **Terminal / Shell** | your `$SHELL`                | Already installed.                                                     |
 
 Any combination works, including all of them. The run mode is chosen per session from the
@@ -51,10 +52,11 @@ If a CLI is installed but a Run button for it never appears:
    precisely to avoid this; a hand-written plist or unit will not.
 3. Restart the server after installing a new CLI.
 
-`pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot` and `dsh` are additionally identity-probed rather than trusted by name:
+`pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot`, `dsh` and `jcode` are additionally identity-probed rather than trusted by name:
 `pi` and `omp` are generic enough that something else on your PATH may answer to them,
-`grok` has npm squatters, and Debian ships an unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell). Each has a
-status endpoint (`/api/grok/status`, `/api/deepseek/status`, `/api/omp/status`, `/api/copilot/status`) that reports
+`grok` has npm squatters, an unrelated npm package is also called `jcode`, and Debian ships an
+unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell). Each has a status endpoint (`/api/grok/status`,
+`/api/deepseek/status`, `/api/omp/status`, `/api/copilot/status`, `/api/jcode/status`) that reports
 the path and version that actually resolved, so a misresolution is visible rather than
 presenting as "the mode just does not work".
 
@@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ output. The other CLIs expose no equivalent.
 | Respawn cycling and unattended runs               | Yes    | Yes                                                  |
 | Cron jobs                                         | Yes    | Yes                                                  |
 | Docker cases, remote SSH cases                    | Yes    | Yes                                                  |
-| Precise idle detection                            | Yes    | Codex, Pi, OpenCode, OMP, Copilot, Gemini and Antigravity: same screen check, via their own prompt and working line. DeepSeek: reports its end of turn itself. Grok: generic cues only, unreliable |
+| Precise idle detection                            | Yes    | Codex, Pi, OpenCode, OMP, Copilot, Gemini, Antigravity and jcode: same screen check, via their own prompt and working line. DeepSeek: reports its end of turn itself. Grok: generic cues only, unreliable |
 | Auto-resume when a usage limit resets             | Yes    | No                                                   |
 | Plan usage chip                                   | Yes    | Codex (limits) and Copilot (monthly premium requests); the others no |
 | Approvals Inbox                                   | Yes    | DeepSeek and Codex as alerts (answer in the terminal); others no |
@@ -79,7 +81,7 @@ output. The other CLIs expose no equivalent.
 | Subagent and team windows                         | Yes    | No                                                   |
 | Model, effort, advisor, and ultracode controls    | Yes    | No                                                   |
 | `stop` and `blocked` wait signals                 | Yes    | DeepSeek yes; Codex `blocked` only; elsewhere 400 if you ask for them explicitly |
-| The bundled agent skill                           | Yes    | No                                                   |
+| The bundled agent skill                           | Yes    | Every CLI except Pi and Copilot, in `.agents/skills/` |
 
 Everything that makes a session a session works everywhere. What is Claude-only is mostly
 the machinery that needs to know *what* the agent is doing rather than *that* it is doing
@@ -352,6 +354,33 @@ Ralph tracker, as for the other non-Claude CLIs.
 
 Guide: [`docs/copilot-integration.md`](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/docs/copilot-integration.md).
 
+### jcode
+
+A coding agent written in Rust, installed with `curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash`
+into `~/.local/bin`. jcode keeps its own logins and provider choice (`jcode login`, `/login`,
+`~/.jcode/config.toml`); there is no Codeman-side login, key field, or bypass switch, and Run
+sends no jcode config at all, because jcode never asks before running a tool. A session can
+be started on a model (`--model`) or resume a jcode session by its id or short name
+(`--resume`).
+
+Four things worth knowing:
+
+- **Run `jcode` once in a terminal first.** A fresh install opens an onboarding wizard
+  instead of the prompt for its first few launches, and a prompt typed into that wizard is
+  lost. Finish or skip it once (Esc), and Codeman sessions open straight at the prompt.
+- **All jcode sessions share one background daemon**, which jcode starts the first time and
+  keeps running after the tab that started it is closed. jcode's tools run inside that
+  daemon, so they see the daemon's environment, not the tab's. For that reason Codeman does
+  not inject its agent skill into jcode, and accepts no per-session `JCODE_*` environment
+  variables: set those in `~/.jcode/config.toml` or in the server's own environment.
+- **Read a jcode worker from its terminal.** Codeman cannot read jcode's answers back yet,
+  so the Response Viewer and `last-response` stay empty for it; `codeman agent read <id>
+  --tail 3000` (or the terminal tail) shows what it said.
+- **Idle detection is the precise kind**: Codeman reads jcode's spinner row above the
+  prompt, and the wheel or a swipe pages jcode's own transcript.
+
+Guide: [`docs/jcode-integration.md`](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/docs/jcode-integration.md).
+
 ### Terminal / Shell
 
 A plain shell in a tmux session. No agent, no hooks, no idle detection.
@@ -379,6 +408,7 @@ respawns. Which variables are accepted depends on the mode:
 | DeepSeek    | `DSH_*`, `DEEPSEEK_*`             |
 | OMP         | `OMP_*`                           |
 | Copilot     | `COPILOT_*` (a token goes in `COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN`; `GH_TOKEN` and `GITHUB_TOKEN` are not accepted as per-session overrides) |
+| jcode       | none (its tools run in a shared daemon, see [jcode](#jcode)) |
 
 Anything outside the allowlist is rejected at the schema. This is intentional: the allowlist
 is one global list, so widening it for one CLI widens it for all of them. In multi-user mode
@@ -394,7 +424,7 @@ into the case's `.claude/settings.local.json` so that `/model` keeps working.
 
 - **Claude Code** if you want every Codeman feature. Unattended overnight runs, usage-limit
   auto-resume, the Approvals Inbox, and subagent visualization all assume it.
-- **Codex, OpenCode, Gemini, Antigravity, Grok, OMP, GitHub Copilot** when you prefer that agent or that
+- **Codex, OpenCode, Gemini, Antigravity, Grok, OMP, GitHub Copilot, jcode** when you prefer that agent or that
   model. You get the session layer, respawn, cron, Docker, and remote SSH; you do not get the
   hook-driven features (Codex dialogs still raise the red alert and an alert-only inbox card,
   see [Codex](#codex) above).

docs/wiki/Autonomous-Loops.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ The shape of it:
 - The loop ends when the agent signals completion, when the iteration cap is reached, or
   when you stop it.
 
-Start it from **Session Options → Ralph / Todo**, or from the wizard on the welcome screen.
+Start it from **Session Options → Ralph / Todo**.
 
 | Setting                | What it does                                                             |
 | ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |

docs/wiki/Codeman-Skill.md

@@ -43,7 +43,11 @@ DeepSeek Harness worker on a local qwen model and a Claude Code worker power on
 
 ## Install it
 
-Pick one route. The skill only acts inside a Codeman session, so a global install is safe.
+Usually you do not have to: since 1.50.0 Codeman puts the skill into every new session's
+folder by default (the Web UI row below), where that session's CLI looks for skills. The copy
+ignores itself in git, so your repository never lists it as a new file.
+
+Otherwise pick one route. The skill only acts inside a Codeman session, so a global install is safe.
 
 | How                | Command                                                                         | Scope |
 | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- |
@@ -51,10 +55,13 @@ Pick one route. The skill only acts inside a Codeman session, so a global instal
 | Claude Code plugin | `/plugin marketplace add Ark0N/Codeman`, then `/plugin install codeman@codeman` | Global, through Claude Code's plugin manager. `/plugin update codeman` follows releases. |
 | Bundled CLI        | `codeman skill install`                                                         | Global, at `~/.claude/skills/codeman`. |
 | Bundled CLI        | `codeman skill install --case <name> [--mode <mode>]`                           | One case. `--mode codex` (or any other run mode) writes it where that CLI looks for skills. |
-| Web UI             | **App Settings → Agents & CLIs → All agent CLIs → Codeman Agent Skill**         | Injects it into each case when a session is created, where that session's CLI looks: `.claude/skills/` for Claude Code, `.agents/skills/` for Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Antigravity, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP. Off by default. |
+| Web UI             | **App Settings → Agents & CLIs → All agent CLIs → Codeman Agent Skill**         | Injects it into each case when a session is created, where that session's CLI looks: `.claude/skills/` for Claude Code, `.agents/skills/` for Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Antigravity, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP. On by default since 1.50.0. |
 
 Use the plugin **or** `codeman skill install`, not both: a Claude Code with both lists the
-skill twice (`codeman` and `codeman:codeman`).
+skill twice (`codeman` and `codeman:codeman`). The Web UI copy counts too, and it is on by
+default: with the plugin installed, Claude Code sessions in Codeman list the skill twice.
+Both work. Turn **Codeman Agent Skill** off if the duplicate bothers you (other CLIs then
+lose their copy too), or use the Web UI copy instead of the plugin.
 
 The web UI route skips pi, because a project skill makes pi ask to trust the folder at
 startup. A pi or plain shell session uses the [`codeman agent`
@@ -67,9 +74,16 @@ same verbs as shell commands.
 Codeman-managed copy in that case, whichever CLI's directory it sits in). It never touches a
 `skills/codeman` you wrote yourself.
 
-Turning the web UI setting back off **does not remove copies it already injected**, because
+To stop the Web UI copy, turn **App Settings → Agents & CLIs → All agent CLIs → Codeman Agent
+Skill** off. It is on by default since 1.50.0: a settings file without the setting means on,
+and only switching it off turns it off. Existing installs that stored off are switched on
+once at the first 1.50.0 start (every App Settings save on an earlier version stored the old
+default, off, whether or not you touched this switch); turning it off afterwards sticks.
+
+Turning the web UI setting off **does not remove copies it already injected**, because
 a sweep at session start would pull the skill out from under other live sessions sharing
-that directory. Remove them per case with `codeman skill uninstall --case <name>`.
+that directory. Remove them per case with `codeman skill uninstall --case <name>`, which
+also removes the copy's `.gitignore`.
 
 ## Then just ask
 

docs/wiki/Contributing.md

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ Conventions for wiki pages:
 - Images are referenced from the main repository over raw URLs rather than being copied into
   the wiki.
 - Say what the default is, especially when it is off. Most of Codeman is opt-in.
-- Label Claude-only behaviour every time it appears. Ten of the eleven run modes are not
+- Label Claude-only behaviour every time it appears. Eleven of the twelve run modes are not
   Claude.
 
 ## Conduct

docs/wiki/Core-Concepts.md

@@ -92,10 +92,10 @@ A session carries state the case does not:
 ## Run mode
 
 The **run mode** is which CLI the session runs: `claude`, `opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`,
-`antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `deepseek`, `omp`, `copilot`, or `shell`. It is chosen at start and does not change afterwards; to
+`antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `deepseek`, `omp`, `copilot`, `jcode`, or `shell`. It is chosen at start and does not change afterwards; to
 switch, start another session.
 
-Claude is the reference mode. Nine of the ten are not Claude, and a number of Codeman
+Claude is the reference mode. Eleven of the twelve are not Claude, and a number of Codeman
 features are Claude-only for structural reasons rather than missing effort: they depend on
 Claude Code's hook system or on parsing its terminal output. Every such feature is labelled
 Claude-only where it appears, and [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs) lists them in one place.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ Where a case runs is **separate from** which CLI it runs. There are three locati
 | **Docker**     | One long-lived container per case; sessions `docker exec` into it. See [Docker Cases](Docker-Cases).                             |
 | **Remote SSH** | A durable tmux server on the remote host, fronted by a local pane running `ssh`. See [Remote SSH Sessions](Remote-SSH-Sessions). |
 
-This matters because it is a common source of confusion: Docker is **not** an eleventh run
-mode. All eleven run modes work in all three locations. A case is docker-backed or
+This matters because it is a common source of confusion: Docker is **not** a thirteenth run
+mode. All twelve run modes work in all three locations. A case is docker-backed or
 ssh-backed; a session is claude or codex or shell.
 
 **Web tabs** are the other thing that is not a session. A saved dashboard URL renders as a
@@ -213,21 +213,21 @@ See [Hooks And Integrations](Hooks-And-Integrations).
 
 ## Vocabulary
 
-| Term             | Means                                                                                             |
-| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| **Case**         | Named working directory.                                                                          |
-| **Session**      | One CLI in one tmux session.                                                                      |
-| **Run mode**     | Which CLI: claude, opencode, codex, gemini, antigravity, pi, grok, deepseek, omp, copilot, shell. |
-| **Respawn**      | Restarting the CLI on idle to keep an unattended run going.                                       |
-| **Ralph loop**   | An autonomous single-session task loop.                                                           |
-| **Orchestrator** | A phased plan driven across multiple agents.                                                      |
-| **Subagent**     | An agent the CLI spawned itself, shown live in its own window.                                    |
-| **Web tab**      | A saved dashboard URL rendered as a tab. Not a session.                                           |
-| **Instance**     | One Codeman server with its own data directory and tmux socket.                                   |
+| Term             | Means                                                                                                    |
+| ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Case**         | Named working directory.                                                                                 |
+| **Session**      | One CLI in one tmux session.                                                                             |
+| **Run mode**     | Which CLI: claude, opencode, codex, gemini, antigravity, pi, grok, deepseek, omp, copilot, jcode, shell. |
+| **Respawn**      | Restarting the CLI on idle to keep an unattended run going.                                              |
+| **Ralph loop**   | An autonomous single-session task loop.                                                                  |
+| **Orchestrator** | A phased plan driven across multiple agents.                                                             |
+| **Subagent**     | An agent the CLI spawned itself, shown live in its own window.                                           |
+| **Web tab**      | A saved dashboard URL rendered as a tab. Not a session.                                                  |
+| **Instance**     | One Codeman server with its own data directory and tmux socket.                                          |
 
 ## Read next
 
 - [The Dashboard](The-Dashboard) - what the UI is showing you.
-- [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs) - the eleven run modes in detail.
+- [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs) - the twelve run modes in detail.
 - [Keeping Agents Running](Keeping-Agents-Running) - respawn, idle detection, usage limits.
 - [`docs/architecture-invariants.md`](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/docs/architecture-invariants.md) - the mechanisms behind all of this, for contributors.

docs/wiki/Docker-Cases.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Run a case inside its own container instead of directly on your host: for isolat
 reproducible toolchain, and for the ability to pick the whole environment up and move it to
 another machine.
 
-A docker case is a **location overlay**, not a run mode. All eleven run modes work inside a
+A docker case is a **location overlay**, not a run mode. All twelve run modes work inside a
 container. See [Core Concepts](Core-Concepts).
 
 ## One-time setup: the base image
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ A zero exit code proves the layers ran, not that the toolchain works. Verify:
 
 ```bash
 docker run --rm codeman/agent:base bash -lc \
-  'for c in claude codex gemini opencode agy pi grok dsh omp; do printf "%-9s " $c; $c --version 2>&1 | head -1; done'
+  'for c in claude codex gemini opencode agy pi grok dsh omp jcode; do printf "%-9s " $c; $c --version 2>&1 | head -1; done'
 ```
 
 The image is secret-free. Credentials are delivered at runtime, never baked in, so exports
@@ -120,7 +120,9 @@ as whole directories, because those directories also hold sessions, extensions,
 installed packages, which can be gigabytes. So in-container Pi and Grok sessions are
 invisible from the host (`pi -c` and `grok -c` inside a docker case see only that
 container's history). OMP's `sessions/` is the exception and is shared read-write, because
-Codeman reads it host-side for history and resume.
+Codeman reads it host-side for history and resume. jcode's credentials are not seeded at all
+(`~/.jcode` keeps its OAuth tokens beside its builds, sessions and caches): sign in to jcode
+inside the container.
 
 GitHub Copilot CLI is not seeded: on a host without a keyring its sign-in token sits in plain
 text in `~/.copilot/config.json`, and there is no Docker credential row for it. Sign in inside

docs/wiki/Driving-Codeman-From-An-Agent.md

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ A skill in the `SKILL.md` format that Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode,
 and most other agent CLIs read. It teaches the agent the whole API, so you ask in plain
 English instead of pasting endpoint documentation into prompts:
 
+Since 1.50.0 Codeman puts it into every new session's folder by default (App Settings →
+Agents & CLIs → **Codeman Agent Skill**), so an agent inside Codeman usually has it already.
+For pi, or a copy that does not depend on that setting:
+
 ```bash
 codeman skill install    # or: npx skills add Ark0N/Codeman --skill codeman -g
 ```

docs/wiki/FAQ.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ stores, or refreshes your credentials.
 ### Which agent CLIs does it support?
 
 Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok Build, DeepSeek Harness,
-OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI, plus a plain shell, chosen per session. Claude is the reference mode and a few features
+OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI and jcode, plus a plain shell, chosen per session. Claude is the reference mode and a few features
 are Claude-only; [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs) has the table.
 
 ### Does Codeman send my code or prompts anywhere?
@@ -215,7 +215,9 @@ Yes. Codeman ships an agent skill that lets an agent inside a session drive the
 list sessions, spawn workers in any installed CLI, send prompts, and block until a worker's
 turn finishes. Install it once with `codeman skill install` or the Claude Code plugin, then
 ask in plain English, for example *"use codeman to start 5 claude workers, one per TODO
-item"*. The web UI setting that injects it into every new session's case is off by default.
+item"*. Since 1.50.0 Codeman also injects it into every new session's case by default, so an
+agent inside Codeman usually has it already (App Settings → Agents & CLIs → **Codeman Agent
+Skill** turns that off).
 
 See [The Codeman Skill](Codeman-Skill), with recordings of real runs, and
 [Driving Codeman From An Agent](Driving-Codeman-From-An-Agent) for the other routes.

docs/wiki/Git-Worktrees.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ lists mark a session that runs in one with a `⑂ <name>` pill.
 
 The main checkout does not show the worktrees as untracked: Codeman adds `/.claude/worktrees/`
 (and `/.claude/settings.local.json`, the hooks file it writes for every Claude session, plus the
-`codeman` folder it writes when **Codeman Agent Skill** is on) to the repository's local
+`codeman` folder it writes while **Codeman Agent Skill** is on, the default) to the repository's local
 `.git/info/exclude` when git does not ignore them already. Without that, those files would make
 every worktree look modified and git would refuse to remove it. Your tracked `.gitignore` is
 never touched.
@@ -53,11 +53,21 @@ Only the Files panel moves. The **Git** panel stays on the session's folder, so
 folder, so an `.html` file in `.claude/worktrees/<name>` opens as source rather than as a
 rendered page. A session started in the worktree does not have that limit.
 
-A worktree outside the session's folder (`git worktree add ../feature`) is not followed: Codeman
-only serves files inside the session's folder. The same goes for a session started in a subfolder
-of the repository, because Claude Code puts the worktree at the top of the repository, which is
-outside that session's folder. Open such a worktree as a case of its own with Add Case > Link
-Existing.
+A worktree beside the repository (`git worktree add ../feature`, or a setup that makes
+EnterWorktree put worktrees there) is followed too, as long as the session was started at the top
+of the repository or of one of its worktrees. The panel then lists that folder with full paths,
+and you can preview and edit its files there. Codeman follows such a worktree only when the
+session's own repository lists it. Codeman never follows one of these:
+
+- your home folder or above it, or a folder that holds the session's folder;
+- a folder at, inside or around a Docker case's workspace;
+- in multi-user mode, unless the session's owner is an admin, a folder outside the owner's own space and the session's folder;
+- any worktree beside the repository while the server confines attachments to the workspace;
+- a folder at, inside or around a tree the server blocks for attachments, or a folder that is itself a credential folder such as `.ssh`.
+
+A session started in a subfolder of the repository follows no worktree outside that subfolder,
+including the one Claude Code creates at the top of the repository. Open such a worktree as a case
+of its own with Add Case > Link Existing.
 
 ## Removing one
 

docs/wiki/Home.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 Codeman runs your coding agents on your own machine and puts them behind one dashboard you
 can open from any device. It spawns Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Antigravity, Gemini, Pi,
-Grok, DeepSeek Harness, OMP, or GitHub Copilot CLI inside persistent tmux sessions, streams the real terminal to the browser, and keeps
+Grok, DeepSeek Harness, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI, or jcode inside persistent tmux sessions, streams the real terminal to the browser, and keeps
 working while you are away from the keyboard: it re-prompts idle agents, resumes when a
 subscription limit resets, runs jobs on a schedule, and shows every background subagent
 live.
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ codeman web    # then open http://localhost:3000
 
 **Already running it**
 
-- [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs) - the eleven run modes, their setup, and which features are Claude-only.
+- [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs) - the twelve run modes, their setup, and which features are Claude-only.
 - [Mobile Guide](Mobile-Guide) - phone and tablet use, QR login, the touch keyboard bar.
 - [Remote Access](Remote-Access) - Tailscale, Cloudflare tunnel, LAN plus password, QR login.
 - [Keeping Agents Running](Keeping-Agents-Running) - idle detection, respawn cycling, auto-resume on usage limits.
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ codeman web    # then open http://localhost:3000
 | OS           | macOS or Linux. Windows works through WSL2.                                 |
 | Node.js      | 22 or newer.                                                                |
 | tmux         | Required. Sessions live in tmux, which is what makes them survive restarts.  |
-| An agent CLI | At least one of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok Build, DeepSeek Harness, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI. Plain shell sessions need none. |
+| An agent CLI | At least one of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok Build, DeepSeek Harness, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI, jcode. Plain shell sessions need none. |
 | Network      | Binds to `127.0.0.1` by default. Reaching it from another device is a deliberate step: see [Remote Access](Remote-Access). |
 
 Codeman is MIT licensed, self-hosted, and sends no telemetry. Everything runs on your

docs/wiki/Installation.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Getting Codeman onto a machine, verifying it works, updating it, and removing it
 | **macOS or Linux** | Windows works through WSL2. See [Windows](#windows-wsl) below.                                                                        |
 | **Node.js 22+**  | The installer offers to install it if missing.                                                                                          |
 | **tmux**         | Not optional. Sessions live inside tmux, which is what makes them survive a server restart, a dropped connection, or a closed laptop.    |
-| **An agent CLI** | At least one of [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli), [Antigravity](https://antigravity.google), [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli), [Pi](https://pi.dev), [Grok Build](https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build), [DeepSeek Harness](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness), [OMP](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi). Plain shell sessions need none. See [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs). |
+| **An agent CLI** | At least one of [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli), [Antigravity](https://antigravity.google), [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli), [Pi](https://pi.dev), [Grok Build](https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build), [DeepSeek Harness](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness), [OMP](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi), [jcode](https://jcode.sh). Plain shell sessions need none. See [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs). |
 
 Codeman itself sends no telemetry and phones no home. The only network traffic is your
 browser to your server, and whatever the agent CLI you chose does on its own, plus the
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash
 
 This installs Node.js, tmux and a build toolchain if they are missing (node-pty ships no
 Linux prebuild, so it compiles from source), clones Codeman into `~/.codeman/app`, and
-builds it.
+builds it. On a Mac, the [Codeman app](#on-a-mac-the-codeman-app) can run this installer
+for you, with no Terminal.
 
 It starts by printing what it found (git, Node, tmux, build tools, agent CLIs, Tailscale,
 an existing install), then asks everything it needs up front, then does the work
@@ -78,6 +79,8 @@ install.sh uninstall    # remove (offers to undo a rename it performed)
 install.sh tailscale    # retrofit Tailscale access onto an existing install
 install.sh name [<n>]   # rename this machine on your tailnet (default codeman-<hostname>)
 install.sh cloudflared  # install cloudflared for the in-app Cloudflare tunnel
+install.sh preflight    # print what is on this machine as JSON; changes nothing
+install.sh agent <id>   # install one agent CLI and nothing else, also next to a running Codeman
 ```
 
 **Flags** answer the questions from the command line and pipe through `bash -s --`:
@@ -94,10 +97,18 @@ the name, `--service` / `--run` / `--no-start` the last one. `--yes` takes every
 `--port <n>` moves Codeman off 3000; the service file and the serve mapping follow it. On an
 existing install, `--port` and `--password` re-run the setup so the service file picks them up,
 and a re-run with `--lan` or `--tailscale` keeps the password the service already has.
+`--ai-cli <id>` answers the agent menu that appears when no agent CLI is found, with no
+terminal needed (`--ai-cli claude`, `--ai-cli codex`, ...), and `--ai-cli none` skips it.
+To add an agent later, `install.sh agent codex` installs that one and changes nothing else:
+it does not touch Codeman or its service, and an agent that is already there is left alone.
+Codeman Desktop does the same from *Add a coding agent*. A running Codeman notices the new
+agent at once; reload an open page to see it.
 
 **Automation and CI**: with no terminal attached, any step that would change the system
 aborts with instructions instead of running silently. Set `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` to
-approve those steps. `CODEMAN_TAILSCALE=1` preselects the Tailscale answer, and never
+approve those steps. With nothing else said, that also installs the first agent CLI of the
+catalogue when none is found; `--ai-cli` (or `CODEMAN_AI_CLI`) says which one, or none.
+`CODEMAN_TAILSCALE=1` preselects the Tailscale answer, and never
 installs Tailscale itself non-interactively; a non-interactive run never renames the
 machine and never starts a service. Everything the unattended steps print goes to
 `~/.codeman/install.log`, and the last lines of it are shown when a step fails.
@@ -216,6 +227,73 @@ image, the refreshed volumes and the entrypoint arrive together. The full guide,
 Unraid, storage and networking options, is
 [`docker/README.md`](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/docker/README.md).
 
+## On a Mac: the Codeman app
+
+[Download Codeman.dmg](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/releases/latest/download/Codeman.dmg):
+one universal app for Apple Silicon and Intel, macOS 11.3 or later.
+
+A small native app that opens Codeman in its own window. Its first screen has two tabs:
+
+- **This Mac** looks for Codeman here and offers what fits: *Open Codeman* when it runs,
+  *Start Codeman* when it is installed but stopped, *Install Codeman on this Mac* when it is
+  not there. It also lists the Codeman servers of yours that already run on this Mac (one
+  started by hand in a terminal, say) and offers to connect to those; it never starts a
+  second one next to them. Install runs [the installer](#route-a-the-installer-recommended)
+  for you, with no Terminal and no administrator password: it asks which coding agent to
+  install (only when the Mac has none, and *Skip for now* is there) and who may reach
+  Codeman (this Mac only, or the local network with a password), then shows the install as
+  a checklist. *Add a coding agent* on this tab (*Add a Coding Agent to This Mac…* in the app menu) installs one later.
+- **Another machine** connects to Codeman by address, a tailnet name included, and keeps
+  the password in the Keychain. *Codeman is not installed there yet?* opens Terminal and
+  runs the installer on that machine over SSH.
+
+On a MacBook Pro with a PROLED XDR display, whose lid logo lights up,
+**View > Blink Apple Logo** blinks the logo by what your agents are doing, with a style of
+your own for working, for waiting for you and for needing permission. All three are off
+until you choose, and the menu only exists on such a Mac.
+
+### First launch
+
+1. Open `Codeman.dmg` and drag Codeman into Applications.
+2. Open Codeman from Applications. macOS asks once whether to open an app downloaded from
+   the internet: click **Open**.
+3. On macOS 15 and later, the first connection to an address on your local network (a LAN
+   IP, a `.local` name) makes macOS ask whether Codeman may use the local network, and that
+   first attempt can fail while the question is open: connect again after answering. If
+   you denied it, turn Codeman on in **System Settings > Privacy & Security > Local
+   Network**.
+
+What to know about it:
+
+- **Quitting the app does not stop Codeman.** An install from the app runs Codeman as a
+  LaunchAgent that starts at login, so agents keep working with the window closed, and a
+  browser or phone reaches it as before.
+- **Codeman's page needs the WebKit of Safari 16.4.** The app starts on macOS 11.3, but
+  Codeman itself needs macOS 13.3 or later, or macOS 11 or 12 with Safari 16.4 or later
+  installed. On an older WebKit the app says so and does not connect.
+- **The install from the app needs macOS 15, or a tmux that is already there.** tmux comes
+  from the tmux project's own builds, which need macOS 15. On an older Mac without tmux the
+  app offers Terminal instead, where Homebrew installs it (that takes an administrator once).
+- **The install from the app reaches as far as the local network.** Tailscale needs its own
+  login and setup, which the installer does at a terminal: choose *Install in Terminal
+  instead*, or run `install.sh tailscale` afterwards.
+- **Self-signed HTTPS is refused.** A server started with `codeman web --https` uses a
+  self-signed certificate, which macOS's WebKit rejects. Use `http://127.0.0.1:3000` for a
+  server on this Mac. For another machine, serve Codeman through `tailscale serve`
+  (`https://<machine>.<tailnet>.ts.net` has a real certificate) or a reverse proxy with a
+  real certificate.
+- **The Codeman it installs is an ordinary installer install,** made on the
+  [route without administrator rights](#without-administrator-rights), so
+  [Updating](#updating) and [Uninstalling](#uninstalling) below apply to it.
+- **The app does not update itself yet.** Download the new `Codeman.dmg` and drag it over
+  the old copy.
+- **Deleting the app leaves Codeman running.** The app's own settings are in
+  `~/Library/Application Support/Codeman/`, and its saved passwords in the Keychain under
+  *Codeman Desktop*.
+
+Everything else, including how to build it yourself:
+[`packages/desktop/README.md`](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/packages/desktop/README.md).
+
 ## Installing an agent CLI
 
 Codeman drives CLIs, it does not bundle them. Install at least one:
@@ -231,6 +309,7 @@ Codeman drives CLIs, it does not bundle them. Install at least one:
 | **Grok Build**  | `curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh \| bash`                   | xAI. Lands in `~/.grok/bin`; `grok login --device-auth` for headless hosts.  |
 | **DeepSeek Harness** | `npm i -g @deepseek-ai/dsh pnpm`, then a terminal profile      | The npm package is only a launcher. Codeman's Run menu installs the community terminal profile for you. See [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs). |
 | **OMP**         | `curl -fsSL https://omp.sh/install \| sh`                          | Oh My Pi. Run it once by hand to finish its own onboarding.                |
+| **jcode**       | `curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install \| bash`                      | Run it once by hand to finish (or skip) its onboarding wizard.             |
 
 Log each CLI in once, by hand, before pointing Codeman at it. Codeman never collects or
 stores your CLI credentials.

docs/wiki/Quick-Start.md

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ one:
 | **Grok Build**       | xAI's CLI.                                                      |
 | **DeepSeek Harness** | Needs a terminal profile; the menu offers to install one.       |
 | **OMP**              | Oh My Pi, configured entirely through its own `~/.omp`.          |
+| **jcode**            | Configured through its own `~/.jcode`; no permission prompts.    |
 | **Terminal / Shell** | A plain shell, no agent. Also the **Run Shell** button.          |
 
 The dropdown also lists any saved dashboard URLs ([Web Tabs](Web-Tabs)) and your recent

docs/wiki/Remote-SSH-Sessions.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Point a case at another machine and the agent runs **there**, with the same dash
 mobile UI, and autonomy features. Your laptop becomes a window onto a session living on the
 remote host.
 
-Like Docker, this is a **location overlay** on a case, not a run mode. All eleven run modes
+Like Docker, this is a **location overlay** on a case, not a run mode. All twelve run modes
 work remotely. See [Core Concepts](Core-Concepts).
 
 ## Why bother

docs/wiki/Settings-Reference.md

@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ on. Details: [Custom Model Endpoints](Custom-Model-Endpoints#a-model-that-runs-o
 | Ralph / Todo Tracker             | Enables the Ralph loop surfaces.                                                               |
 | Agent Teams                      | Experimental teams. Also needs the CLI's own environment flag.                                 |
 | Pin tab names on the CLI         | Launches every Claude session with `--name` set to its tab name, so Claude Code's prompt label and `/resume` list match your tabs. Claude then stops generating its own titles for those sessions, and a rename in Codeman holds only until the next turn. Synced, off by default; applies from the next session start or respawn. |
-| Codeman Agent Skill              | Under **All agent CLIs**. Injects the agent skill into each new session's case, where that session's CLI looks for skills (every CLI except Pi and a plain shell). Off by default. See [The Codeman Skill](Codeman-Skill). |
+| Codeman Agent Skill              | Under **All agent CLIs**. Injects the agent skill into each new session's case, where that session's CLI looks for skills (every CLI except Pi, GitHub Copilot and a plain shell). On by default since 1.50.0; existing installs that stored off are switched on once at the first 1.50.0 start, and turning it off afterwards sticks. The copy ignores itself in git, so your repository never lists it. Off stops new copies but removes none (`codeman skill uninstall --case <name>` does). See [The Codeman Skill](Codeman-Skill). |
 | Remote auto-reconnect            | Reattaches dropped remote SSH sessions. On by default.                                         |
 | Nice priority / value            | Runs agent processes at a lower CPU priority.                                                  |
 | Default Codex model              | Model for new local Codex sessions; empty uses Codex's own config. Letters, digits, `.` `_` `-` `/` only. |

docs/wiki/Working-With-Files.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ It renders what it can:
 | Kind                     | Behaviour                                                                 |
 | ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | Text and code            | Plain preview with Lines (line numbers) and Wrap toggles in the header. Long files are truncated in plain preview. |
-| Markdown                 | Rendered by default: headings, tables, code blocks with copy buttons, images and links relative to the file (root-relative ones resolve from the workspace root, as on GitHub). Links to another heading of the same file (`[Install](#installation)`) scroll to it, with GitHub's heading names (lower-case, punctuation dropped, repeats numbered `-1`, `-2`), and never leave the page. Opened from an attachment card, where the file's folder is unknown, relative images show their alt text and relative links show as plain text. Persian, Arabic and Hebrew read right to left, each block following its own first letter, while code stays left to right. The MD pill in the header flips to source. |
+| Markdown                 | Rendered by default: headings, tables, code blocks with copy buttons, images and links relative to the file (root-relative ones resolve from the workspace root, as on GitHub; for a file in a worktree beside the workspace that the agent is in, they resolve from the top of that worktree). Links to another heading of the same file (`[Install](#installation)`) scroll to it, with GitHub's heading names (lower-case, punctuation dropped, repeats numbered `-1`, `-2`), and never leave the page. Opened from an attachment card, where the file's folder is unknown, relative images show their alt text and relative links show as plain text. Persian, Arabic and Hebrew read right to left, each block following its own first letter, while code stays left to right. The MD pill in the header flips to source. |
 | Images                   | Inline.                                                                    |
 | Audio and video          | Inline with a working scrub bar, because range requests are supported.     |
 | Spreadsheets (`.xlsx`)   | Read-only grid, parsed in your browser (never on the server), up to 10 MB. `.xls` and `.ods` are download only. |
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ another checkout. Those are served through the attachment routes rather than the
 ones, so the same rules apply as to any other attachment: secret trees are blocked, the
 extension allowlist decides what can be opened, and symlinks are resolved before either check.
 
+One exception: while the agent works in a worktree of the session's repository beside it (see [Git Worktrees](Git-Worktrees)), a file in that worktree opens through the workspace routes like a workspace file, and you can edit it there. Two things differ from a workspace file: a text file there that you click in the terminal opens in the preview, not the live tail viewer, and secret files such as `.env` there are not served.
+
 Outside the workspace the allowlist is images, video, audio, PDF, Office documents, and text
 files, where "text" is the same list the viewer will let you edit: code, config, logs, csv,
 markdown. The reasoning is that a session can already `cat` any of those, so the file suffix

install.sh

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
 #   --no-admin                      Never use sudo or Homebrew: download Node.js and tmux into
 #                                   the home folder instead (chosen by itself when this account
 #                                   has no administrator rights)
+#   --ai-cli <id>|none              Which AI CLI to install when none is found, without the menu
+#                                   (the ids are the keys of the catalogue below)
+#   --progress                      Also print machine-readable progress lines (for the
+#                                   desktop app; see progress_phase)
 #   --help, -h                      Print this text
 #
 # Environment variables:
@@ -49,6 +53,8 @@
 #   CODEMAN_TARBALL_URL       - Source archive (.tar.gz) to install from when no
 #                               working git is available (default: the GitHub
 #                               archive of CODEMAN_REPO_URL at CODEMAN_BRANCH)
+#   CODEMAN_AI_CLI            - Same as --ai-cli
+#   CODEMAN_PROGRESS=1        - Same as --progress
 #
 # Subcommands:
 #   install.sh update       - Update an existing install
@@ -57,6 +63,7 @@
 #   install.sh name [<n>]   - Rename this machine on your tailnet (default: codeman-<hostname>)
 #   install.sh status       - Print the URLs, the QR code and how to manage the service
 #   install.sh cloudflared  - Install cloudflared for the in-app Cloudflare tunnel
+#   install.sh preflight    - Print what is on this machine as JSON; changes nothing
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -165,6 +172,12 @@ ASSUME_YES="0"
 # Set by parse_flags when a flag asks to change how an existing install is
 # reached or run, so a bare re-run takes the full flow instead of a quiet update.
 RECONFIGURE="0"
+# --ai-cli / CODEMAN_AI_CLI: answers the AI CLI menu, with a catalogue id or
+# "none". Empty means ask. Consent comes with the flag, so unlike the
+# CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE default it installs exactly what was named.
+AI_CLI_CHOICE="${CODEMAN_AI_CLI:-}"
+# --progress / CODEMAN_PROGRESS=1: see progress_phase.
+PROGRESS="${CODEMAN_PROGRESS:-0}"
 SUBCOMMAND=""
 SUBCOMMAND_ARG=""
 # Answers to question 3 (choose_launch_mode): LAUNCH_CHOICE 1/2/3 as above,
@@ -211,19 +224,19 @@ export PUPPETEER_SKIP_DOWNLOAD="${PUPPETEER_SKIP_DOWNLOAD:-1}"
 # script will ever execute, and they arrive embedded in this file — same TLS fetch, same
 # commit as the script itself. Nothing fetched at install time is ever executed; there is
 # no network refresh of these arrays. See cli_catalog_select_platform below.
-CLI_IDS=('claude' 'shell' 'opencode' 'codex' 'gemini' 'antigravity' 'pi' 'grok' 'deepseek' 'omp' 'copilot')
-CLI_LABELS=('Claude Code' 'Shell' 'OpenCode' 'Codex' 'Gemini' 'Antigravity' 'Pi' 'Grok' 'DeepSeek' 'OMP' 'GitHub Copilot')
-CLI_ENABLED=(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1)
-CLI_LAUNCHER_ONLY=(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0)
-CLI_DOCS=('https://docs.claude.com/claude-code' '' 'https://opencode.ai/docs' 'https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli' 'https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli' 'https://antigravity.google/cli' 'https://pi.dev' 'https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build' 'https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness' 'https://omp.sh' 'https://github.com/github/copilot-cli')
-CLI_CMD_LINUX=('curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash' '' 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash' 'npm install -g @openai/codex' 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli' 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash' 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent' 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash' '' 'curl -fsSL https://omp.sh/install | sh' 'npm install -g @github/copilot')
-CLI_CMD_DARWIN=('curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash' '' 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash' 'npm install -g @openai/codex' 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli' 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash' 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent' 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash' '' 'brew install can1357/tap/omp' 'npm install -g @github/copilot')
-CLI_ALL_BINS=('claude' 'opencode' 'codex' 'gemini' 'agy' 'pi' 'grok' 'dsh' 'omp' 'copilot')
-CLI_BIN_OFF=(0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9)
-CLI_BIN_LEN=(1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1)
-CLI_ALL_PATHS=("$HOME/.local/bin/claude" "$HOME/.claude/local/claude" "/usr/local/bin/claude" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/claude" "$HOME/bin/claude" "$HOME/.opencode/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.local/bin/opencode" "/usr/local/bin/opencode" "$HOME/go/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.bun/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/opencode" "$HOME/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.codex/bin/codex" "$HOME/.local/bin/codex" "/usr/local/bin/codex" "$HOME/.bun/bin/codex" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/codex" "$HOME/bin/codex" "$HOME/.gemini/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.local/bin/gemini" "/usr/local/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.bun/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/gemini" "$HOME/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.local/bin/agy" "$HOME/.antigravity/bin/agy" "/usr/local/bin/agy" "$HOME/bin/agy" "$HOME/.local/bin/pi" "/usr/local/bin/pi" "$HOME/.bun/bin/pi" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/pi" "$HOME/bin/pi" "$HOME/.grok/bin/grok" "$HOME/.local/bin/grok" "/usr/local/bin/grok" "$HOME/bin/grok" "$HOME/.local/bin/dsh" "/usr/local/bin/dsh" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/dsh" "$HOME/bin/dsh" "$HOME/.local/bin/omp" "$HOME/.omp/bin/omp" "/usr/local/bin/omp" "$HOME/.bun/bin/omp" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/omp" "$HOME/bin/omp" "$HOME/.local/bin/copilot" "/usr/local/bin/copilot" "$HOME/.bun/bin/copilot" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/copilot" "$HOME/bin/copilot")
-CLI_PATH_OFF=(0 5 5 12 18 24 28 33 37 41 47)
-CLI_PATH_LEN=(5 0 7 6 6 4 5 4 4 6 5)
+CLI_IDS=('claude' 'shell' 'opencode' 'codex' 'gemini' 'antigravity' 'pi' 'grok' 'deepseek' 'omp' 'copilot' 'jcode')
+CLI_LABELS=('Claude Code' 'Shell' 'OpenCode' 'Codex' 'Gemini' 'Antigravity' 'Pi' 'Grok' 'DeepSeek' 'OMP' 'GitHub Copilot' 'jcode')
+CLI_ENABLED=(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1)
+CLI_LAUNCHER_ONLY=(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0)
+CLI_DOCS=('https://docs.claude.com/claude-code' '' 'https://opencode.ai/docs' 'https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli' 'https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli' 'https://antigravity.google/cli' 'https://pi.dev' 'https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build' 'https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness' 'https://omp.sh' 'https://github.com/github/copilot-cli' 'https://jcode.sh/docs')
+CLI_CMD_LINUX=('curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash' '' 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash' 'npm install -g @openai/codex' 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli' 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash' 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent' 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash' '' 'curl -fsSL https://omp.sh/install | sh' 'npm install -g @github/copilot' 'curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash')
+CLI_CMD_DARWIN=('curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash' '' 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash' 'npm install -g @openai/codex' 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli' 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash' 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent' 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash' '' 'brew install can1357/tap/omp' 'npm install -g @github/copilot' 'curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash')
+CLI_ALL_BINS=('claude' 'opencode' 'codex' 'gemini' 'agy' 'pi' 'grok' 'dsh' 'omp' 'copilot' 'jcode')
+CLI_BIN_OFF=(0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10)
+CLI_BIN_LEN=(1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1)
+CLI_ALL_PATHS=("$HOME/.local/bin/claude" "$HOME/.claude/local/claude" "/usr/local/bin/claude" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/claude" "$HOME/bin/claude" "$HOME/.opencode/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.local/bin/opencode" "/usr/local/bin/opencode" "$HOME/go/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.bun/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/opencode" "$HOME/bin/opencode" "$HOME/.codex/bin/codex" "$HOME/.local/bin/codex" "/usr/local/bin/codex" "$HOME/.bun/bin/codex" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/codex" "$HOME/bin/codex" "$HOME/.gemini/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.local/bin/gemini" "/usr/local/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.bun/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/gemini" "$HOME/bin/gemini" "$HOME/.local/bin/agy" "$HOME/.antigravity/bin/agy" "/usr/local/bin/agy" "$HOME/bin/agy" "$HOME/.local/bin/pi" "/usr/local/bin/pi" "$HOME/.bun/bin/pi" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/pi" "$HOME/bin/pi" "$HOME/.grok/bin/grok" "$HOME/.local/bin/grok" "/usr/local/bin/grok" "$HOME/bin/grok" "$HOME/.local/bin/dsh" "/usr/local/bin/dsh" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/dsh" "$HOME/bin/dsh" "$HOME/.local/bin/omp" "$HOME/.omp/bin/omp" "/usr/local/bin/omp" "$HOME/.bun/bin/omp" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/omp" "$HOME/bin/omp" "$HOME/.local/bin/copilot" "/usr/local/bin/copilot" "$HOME/.bun/bin/copilot" "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/copilot" "$HOME/bin/copilot" "$HOME/.local/bin/jcode" "/usr/local/bin/jcode" "$HOME/bin/jcode")
+CLI_PATH_OFF=(0 5 5 12 18 24 28 33 37 41 47 52)
+CLI_PATH_LEN=(5 0 7 6 6 4 5 4 4 6 5 3)
 # <<< END GENERATED CLI CATALOGUE
 
 # ============================================================================
@@ -272,6 +285,24 @@ warn() {
 
 error() {
     echo -e "${RED}Error:${NC} $1" >&2
+    if [[ "$PROGRESS" == "1" ]]; then
+        printf '@@codeman error %s\n' "${1//$'\n'/ }" >&2
+    fi
+}
+
+# progress_phase <name>: tell the desktop app which part of the install has
+# begun. The protocol is one line, `@@codeman phase <name>`, for each of
+# runtime, agent, source, packages, build, service and done, always in that
+# order, and `@@codeman error <text>` for each error() above. A phase runs until
+# the next one starts; a run that ends without `done` failed. A phase with
+# nothing to do may be skipped. The app ignores a name it does not know, so a
+# new phase needs no new app, but `done` must stay the last thing main() reports.
+# On stderr, because this can be reached inside a $( ) that captures stdout.
+progress_phase() {
+    if [[ "$PROGRESS" == "1" ]]; then
+        printf '@@codeman phase %s\n' "$1" >&2
+    fi
+    return 0
 }
 
 die() {
@@ -748,6 +779,17 @@ cli_catalog_names() {
     printf '%s' "$out"
 }
 
+# "claude, opencode, codex, ...": the ids --ai-cli takes.
+cli_catalog_ids() {
+    local i out=""
+    for ((i = 0; i < ${#CLI_IDS[@]}; i++)); do
+        [[ "${CLI_ENABLED[$i]}" == "1" ]] || continue
+        [[ "${CLI_BIN_LEN[$i]}" -gt 0 ]] || continue
+        out="${out:+$out, }${CLI_IDS[$i]}"
+    done
+    printf '%s' "$out"
+}
+
 # The "install one yourself" hints: every enabled CLI that is not installed,
 # showing the trusted install command. An entry with no install command gets
 # its docs URL instead of being silently omitted, which is what used to
@@ -785,6 +827,129 @@ cli_catalog_print_install_hints() {
 # the first time a hint is printed.
 cli_catalog_select_platform
 
+# cli_index <id>: print the catalogue index of an enabled CLI that has a binary
+# to look for. Fails for anything else, `shell` included.
+cli_index() {
+    local i
+    for ((i = 0; i < ${#CLI_IDS[@]}; i++)); do
+        if [[ "${CLI_IDS[$i]}" == "$1" ]] && [[ "${CLI_ENABLED[$i]}" == "1" ]] && [[ "${CLI_BIN_LEN[$i]}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+            printf '%s' "$i"
+            return 0
+        fi
+    done
+    return 1
+}
+
+# cli_offerable <index>: can this run install that entry by itself? 0 = yes,
+# 1 = no, 2 = no, only because its command needs curl and this host has wget.
+# One rule for the menu, for --ai-cli and for `preflight`, so what the desktop
+# app lists is exactly what the menu would. detect_all_clis must have run.
+#
+# ⚠️ The registry's install commands are a MIX: some call `curl` directly
+# (vendor one-liners), others are `npm install -g …`, which never needed curl
+# at all. A wget-only host used to lose the WHOLE menu over this, including
+# every npm entry: the two literals this replaced went through
+# download_to_stdout and so honoured `wget`, and CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1
+# silently stopped defaulting to Claude Code as documented. So this is decided
+# per entry: only a command that actually starts with `curl ` is curl-dependent.
+# Rewriting curl to wget inside a string about to be executed is the wrong
+# instinct either way; the ones we can't run, we show as a hint.
+cli_offerable() {
+    local i="$1"
+    [[ "${CLI_ENABLED[$i]}" == "1" ]] || return 1
+    [[ "${CLI_BIN_LEN[$i]}" -gt 0 ]] || return 1
+    [[ -z "${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$i]}" ]] || return 1
+    [[ -n "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$i]}" ]] || return 1
+    if [[ "${DOWNLOADER:-}" != "curl" ]] && [[ "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$i]}" == curl\ * ]]; then
+        return 2
+    fi
+    # Same reasoning for a Homebrew command: it cannot run where there is no
+    # Homebrew, and the no-admin route never installs one.
+    if [[ "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$i]}" == brew\ * ]] && { [[ "$NO_ADMIN" == "1" ]] || ! command -v brew &>/dev/null; }; then
+        return 1
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Tell a running Codeman to look again: it remembers a missing CLI for up to 5
+# minutes (cliResolveRetryDelayMs), and its Run button reads that memory. The name
+# is CLI_INSTALLED_MARKER in src/utils/cli-executable-resolver.ts. With no data
+# folder there is no Codeman to tell, which is why a failure here is not one.
+mark_cli_installed() {
+    touch "$HOME/.codeman/cli-installed" 2>/dev/null || true
+    return 0
+}
+
+# run_offered_cli <index>: run the trusted command of one entry and look again
+# at what is installed. What that means is the caller's to judge.
+run_offered_cli() {
+    local idx="$1"
+    info "Installing ${CLI_LABELS[$idx]}..."
+    # </dev/null: under `curl | bash` a child that reads stdin would
+    # consume the rest of this script.
+    bash -c "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$idx]}" </dev/null || true
+    hash -r 2>/dev/null || true
+    CLI_DETECT_DONE=""
+    detect_all_clis
+    if [[ -n "${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$idx]}" ]]; then
+        success "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} installed at ${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$idx]}"
+        mark_cli_installed
+    else
+        warn "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} installation failed."
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+# install_offered_cli <index>: the same during an install, where a chosen CLI
+# that leaves no CLI at all behind is fatal.
+install_offered_cli() {
+    run_offered_cli "$1"
+    if [[ "$CLI_FOUND_COUNT" -eq 0 ]]; then
+        die "The selected AI CLI failed to install. Install one manually and re-run the installer."
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Install one AI CLI and nothing else (`install.sh agent <id>`): how the desktop
+# app adds an agent once Codeman is here, also over a running server, which this
+# never touches. It judges the run itself, because install_offered_cli cannot: its
+# gate is fatal only when NO CLI is left, and here another one usually is, so a
+# failed install would report success, and its message is about re-running the
+# installer. A CLI that is here already is a success, and installs nothing.
+agent_subcommand() {
+    if [[ -z "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" || "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" == "none" ]]; then
+        die "Name the AI CLI to install: install.sh agent <id> (one of: $(cli_catalog_ids))."
+    fi
+    check_curl_or_wget || die "curl or wget is required but neither is installed. Please install one first."
+    detect_all_clis
+    progress_phase agent
+
+    local idx offerable=0
+    idx=$(cli_index "$AI_CLI_CHOICE")
+    if [[ -n "${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$idx]}" ]]; then
+        success "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} is already installed at ${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$idx]}"
+        mark_cli_installed
+        progress_phase done
+        return 0
+    fi
+    cli_offerable "$idx" || offerable=$?
+    if [[ "$offerable" -ne 0 ]]; then
+        die "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} cannot be installed automatically here. See ${CLI_DOCS[$idx]:-its documentation}."
+    fi
+    # What this run sees is a login shell's PATH at best: a Node.js that only an
+    # interactive profile loads (nvm in .zshrc) is not on it.
+    if [[ "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$idx]}" == npm\ * ]] && ! check_npm; then
+        die "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} installs with npm, and this run cannot find it. Run this in a terminal instead: ${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$idx]}"
+    fi
+
+    run_offered_cli "$idx"
+    if [[ -z "${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$idx]}" ]]; then
+        die "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} did not install. You can run its installer yourself: ${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$idx]}"
+    fi
+    progress_phase done
+    return 0
+}
+
 # Offer to install one AI CLI from the catalogue, or let the user skip.
 #
 # Split out of main() so the bash 3.2 CI step and test/install-sh-invariants.test.ts
@@ -798,7 +963,10 @@ offer_ai_cli_install() {
     local i
     echo ""
     warn "No AI CLI found. Codeman needs at least one: $(cli_catalog_names)."
-    headless_guard "install an AI CLI (curl | bash from its vendor)"
+    # --ai-cli is the consent the guard otherwise looks for at a terminal.
+    if [[ -z "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" ]]; then
+        headless_guard "install an AI CLI (curl | bash from its vendor)"
+    fi
     echo ""
 
     # The menu is built from the catalogue: every enabled CLI that is not
@@ -810,36 +978,38 @@ offer_ai_cli_install() {
     # ⚠️ TRUST BOUNDARY: the command executed comes from CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED,
     # the only array the generated block above writes and the only one the
     # installer ever runs or displays — see cli_catalog_select_platform.
-    #
-    # ⚠️ The registry's install commands are a MIX: some call `curl` directly
-    # (vendor one-liners), others are `npm install -g …`, which never needed
-    # curl at all. A wget-only host used to lose the WHOLE menu over this,
-    # including every npm entry — the two literals this replaced went through
-    # download_to_stdout and so honoured `wget`, and CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1
-    # silently stopped defaulting to Claude Code as documented. Filter per
-    # entry instead: only a command that actually starts with `curl ` is
-    # curl-dependent, so only THOSE are held back on a wget-only host.
-    # Rewriting curl to wget inside a string about to be executed is the
-    # wrong instinct either way — the ones we can't run, we show as a hint.
     local -a offer_idx=()
-    local curl_only_skipped=0
+    local curl_only_skipped=0 offerable
     for ((i = 0; i < ${#CLI_IDS[@]}; i++)); do
-        [[ "${CLI_ENABLED[$i]}" == "1" ]] || continue
-        [[ "${CLI_BIN_LEN[$i]}" -gt 0 ]] || continue
-        [[ -z "${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$i]}" ]] || continue
-        [[ -n "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$i]}" ]] || continue
-        if [[ "${DOWNLOADER:-}" != "curl" ]] && [[ "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$i]}" == curl\ * ]]; then
-            curl_only_skipped=$((curl_only_skipped + 1))
-            continue
-        fi
-        # Same reasoning for a Homebrew command: it cannot run where there is no
-        # Homebrew, and the no-admin route never installs one.
-        if [[ "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$i]}" == brew\ * ]] && { [[ "$NO_ADMIN" == "1" ]] || ! command -v brew &>/dev/null; }; then
-            continue
-        fi
-        offer_idx[${#offer_idx[@]}]=$i
+        offerable=0
+        cli_offerable "$i" || offerable=$?
+        case "$offerable" in
+            0) offer_idx[${#offer_idx[@]}]=$i ;;
+            2) curl_only_skipped=$((curl_only_skipped + 1)) ;;
+        esac
     done
 
+    # The answer was given up front: never the menu, and never a different CLI
+    # than the one named. A name this host cannot install (parse_flags already
+    # refused a typo) warns and carries on, the same as Skip.
+    if [[ -n "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" ]]; then
+        local named="" entry
+        if [[ "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" != "none" ]]; then
+            named=$(cli_index "$AI_CLI_CHOICE") || named=""
+            for entry in ${offer_idx[@]+"${offer_idx[@]}"}; do
+                if [[ "$entry" == "$named" ]]; then
+                    install_offered_cli "$named"
+                    return 0
+                fi
+            done
+            warn "$AI_CLI_CHOICE cannot be installed automatically here. Codeman will run, but sessions need a CLI to drive."
+        else
+            warn "Skipping AI CLI install. Codeman will run, but sessions need a CLI to drive."
+        fi
+        cli_catalog_print_install_hints
+        return 0
+    fi
+
     if [[ "$curl_only_skipped" -gt 0 ]]; then
         warn "curl is not available, so $curl_only_skipped install command(s) that need it were left out of the menu below (still shown as hints if you skip)."
     fi
@@ -888,22 +1058,7 @@ offer_ai_cli_install() {
             warn "Skipping AI CLI install. Codeman will run, but sessions need a CLI to drive."
             cli_catalog_print_install_hints
         else
-            idx="${offer_idx[$((cli_choice - 1))]}"
-            info "Installing ${CLI_LABELS[$idx]}..."
-            # </dev/null: under `curl | bash` a child that reads stdin would
-            # consume the rest of this script.
-            bash -c "${CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED[$idx]}" </dev/null || true
-            hash -r 2>/dev/null || true
-            CLI_DETECT_DONE=""
-            detect_all_clis
-            if [[ -n "${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$idx]}" ]]; then
-                success "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} installed at ${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$idx]}"
-            else
-                warn "${CLI_LABELS[$idx]} installation failed."
-            fi
-            if [[ "$CLI_FOUND_COUNT" -eq 0 ]]; then
-                die "The selected AI CLI failed to install. Install one manually and re-run the installer."
-            fi
+            install_offered_cli "${offer_idx[$((cli_choice - 1))]}"
         fi
     fi
 }
@@ -2033,7 +2188,8 @@ run_step() {
         success "$label ($(fmt_elapsed $((SECONDS - start))))"
         return 0
     fi
-    error "$label failed (exit $rc). Last lines of $LOG_FILE:"
+    error "$label failed (exit $rc)."
+    echo "Last lines of $LOG_FILE:" >&2
     tail -n 25 "$LOG_FILE" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^/    /' >&2
     return "$rc"
 }
@@ -3723,6 +3879,7 @@ main() {
     # ========================================================================
     # Ask everything up front, so the build afterwards can run unattended
     # ========================================================================
+    progress_phase runtime
     ask_dependencies "$os" "$distro"
 
     # AI CLI: needs a human choice AND node (installed just above), so it sits
@@ -3732,6 +3889,7 @@ main() {
     CLI_DETECT_DONE=""
     detect_all_clis
     if [[ "$CLI_FOUND_COUNT" -eq 0 ]]; then
+        progress_phase agent
         offer_ai_cli_install
     fi
 
@@ -3746,8 +3904,11 @@ main() {
     # ========================================================================
     info "Installing Codeman to $INSTALL_DIR (a few minutes; you can leave this running)"
     INSTALL_STARTED="1"
+    progress_phase source
     install_or_update_repo
+    progress_phase packages
     npm_install_deps
+    progress_phase build
     run_step "Building Codeman" npm run build || exit 1
     finish_source_swap
     install_symlink
@@ -3758,6 +3919,7 @@ main() {
     # (symlinks, PATH, launch menu) instead of silently "updating".
     date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "$INSTALL_DIR/.install-complete"
 
+    progress_phase service
     local service_ok="true"
     if [[ "$LAUNCH_CHOICE" == "2" ]]; then
         if [[ "$SERVICE_TYPE" == "launchd" ]]; then
@@ -3782,6 +3944,7 @@ main() {
     # Security notice: last informational block so it stays visible (when not
     # auto-launching below; if we exec, the server prints the same notice anyway).
     print_security_notice
+    progress_phase done
 
     # Run now in foreground (must be last: exec replaces the shell)
     if [[ "$LAUNCH_CHOICE" == "1" ]]; then
@@ -4520,6 +4683,65 @@ uninstall() {
     echo ""
 }
 
+# json_string <text>: <text> as one JSON string. Control characters that JSON
+# has no short form for are dropped; nothing printed here needs them.
+json_string() {
+    local text
+    text=$(printf '%s' "$1" | LC_ALL=C tr -d '\000-\010\013\014\016-\037')
+    text="${text//\\/\\\\}"
+    text="${text//\"/\\\"}"
+    text="${text//$'\t'/\\t}"
+    text="${text//$'\r'/\\r}"
+    text="${text//$'\n'/\\n}"
+    printf '"%s"' "$text"
+}
+
+json_bool() {
+    if [[ "$1" == "1" ]]; then printf 'true'; else printf 'false'; fi
+}
+
+# What is on this machine and what an install would do here, as one JSON object
+# on stdout: the desktop app shows its install choices from this. Prompts for
+# nothing, changes nothing, and never runs sudo beyond resolve_admin_mode's
+# `sudo -n`. With --no-admin, `blocker` is why that route cannot finish here
+# (empty when it can). `clis` lists the same entries as the AI CLI menu, with
+# the same rule for `installable`, plus the ones already installed.
+#
+# `schema` is bumped only when a field changes meaning: the app is released on
+# its own, and refuses a number it does not know.
+preflight_subcommand() {
+    local os arch need_node="0" need_tmux="0" need_git="0" blocker="" i first="1"
+    os=$(detect_os)
+    arch=$(detect_arch)
+    check_curl_or_wget || die "curl or wget is required but neither is installed. Please install one first."
+    check_node || need_node="1"
+    check_tmux || need_tmux="1"
+    check_git || need_git="1"
+    detect_all_clis
+    if [[ "$NO_ADMIN" == "1" ]]; then
+        blocker=$(no_admin_blocker "$os" "$arch" "$need_node" "$need_tmux")
+    fi
+
+    printf '{"schema":1,"os":%s,"arch":%s,"noAdmin":%s,"blocker":%s' \
+        "$(json_string "$os")" "$(json_string "$arch")" "$(json_bool "$NO_ADMIN")" "$(json_string "$blocker")"
+    printf ',"needs":{"node":%s,"tmux":%s,"git":%s},"clis":[' \
+        "$(json_bool "$need_node")" "$(json_bool "$need_tmux")" "$(json_bool "$need_git")"
+    for ((i = 0; i < ${#CLI_IDS[@]}; i++)); do
+        [[ "${CLI_ENABLED[$i]}" == "1" ]] || continue
+        [[ "${CLI_BIN_LEN[$i]}" -gt 0 ]] || continue
+        local installable="0" installed="0"
+        if cli_offerable "$i"; then installable="1"; fi
+        [[ -z "${CLI_FOUND_PATH[$i]}" ]] || installed="1"
+        [[ "$first" == "1" ]] || printf ','
+        first="0"
+        printf '{"id":%s,"label":%s,"installed":%s,"installable":%s,"docs":%s}' \
+            "$(json_string "${CLI_IDS[$i]}")" "$(json_string "${CLI_LABELS[$i]}")" \
+            "$(json_bool "$installed")" "$(json_bool "$installable")" "$(json_string "${CLI_DOCS[$i]}")"
+    done
+    printf ']}\n'
+    return 0
+}
+
 usage() {
     cat << 'EOF'
 Codeman installer
@@ -4536,6 +4758,8 @@ Flags
   --port <n>                      Port Codeman listens on (default 3000)
   --no-admin                      Never use sudo or Homebrew: Node.js and tmux go into the
                                   home folder (chosen by itself without administrator rights)
+  --ai-cli <id>|none              Which AI CLI to install when none is found, without the menu
+  --progress                      Also print machine-readable progress lines
   --help, -h                      This text
 
 Subcommands
@@ -4545,11 +4769,13 @@ Subcommands
   name [<n>]    Rename this machine on your tailnet (default: codeman-<hostname>)
   status        Print the URLs, the QR code and how to manage the service
   cloudflared   Install cloudflared for the in-app Cloudflare tunnel
+  preflight     Print what is on this machine as JSON; changes nothing
+  agent <id>    Install one AI CLI and nothing else, also next to a running Codeman
 
 Environment: CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1, CODEMAN_INSTALL_DIR, CODEMAN_HOST,
 CODEMAN_PASSWORD, CODEMAN_PORT, CODEMAN_TAILSCALE=1, CODEMAN_TAILSCALE_NAME,
 CODEMAN_SKIP_SYSTEMD=1, CODEMAN_NODE_VERSION, CODEMAN_REPO_URL, CODEMAN_BRANCH,
-CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN=1 or 0, CODEMAN_TARBALL_URL.
+CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN=1 or 0, CODEMAN_TARBALL_URL, CODEMAN_AI_CLI, CODEMAN_PROGRESS=1.
 EOF
 }
 
@@ -4577,6 +4803,12 @@ parse_flags() {
             --no-start)    LAUNCH_PRESET="3" ;;
             --yes|-y)      ASSUME_YES="1" ;;
             --no-admin)    NO_ADMIN="1" ;;
+            --ai-cli)
+                shift
+                [[ $# -gt 0 ]] || die "--ai-cli needs a value (a catalogue id, or none)"
+                AI_CLI_CHOICE="$1" ;;
+            --ai-cli=*)    AI_CLI_CHOICE="${1#--ai-cli=}" ;;
+            --progress)    PROGRESS="1" ;;
             --password)
                 shift
                 [[ $# -gt 0 ]] || die "--password needs a value"
@@ -4588,13 +4820,15 @@ parse_flags() {
                 CODEMAN_PORT="$1"; export CODEMAN_PORT; RECONFIGURE="1" ;;
             --port=*)      CODEMAN_PORT="${1#--port=}"; export CODEMAN_PORT; RECONFIGURE="1" ;;
             --help|-h)     usage; exit 0 ;;
-            update|uninstall|tailscale|name|status|cloudflared)
+            update|uninstall|tailscale|name|status|cloudflared|preflight|agent)
                 [[ -z "$SUBCOMMAND" ]] || die "Only one subcommand at a time ($SUBCOMMAND and $1 given)."
                 SUBCOMMAND="$1" ;;
             -*)            die "Unknown option: $1 (see --help)" ;;
             *)
                 if [[ "$SUBCOMMAND" == "name" && -z "$SUBCOMMAND_ARG" ]]; then
                     SUBCOMMAND_ARG="$1"
+                elif [[ "$SUBCOMMAND" == "agent" && -z "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" ]]; then
+                    AI_CLI_CHOICE="$1"
                 else
                     die "Unexpected argument: $1 (see --help)"
                 fi ;;
@@ -4604,6 +4838,9 @@ parse_flags() {
     if [[ -n "${CODEMAN_PORT:-}" ]] && ! [[ "$CODEMAN_PORT" =~ ^[0-9]+$ && "$CODEMAN_PORT" -ge 1 && "$CODEMAN_PORT" -le 65535 ]]; then
         die "Invalid port: $CODEMAN_PORT"
     fi
+    if [[ -n "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" && "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" != "none" ]] && ! cli_index "$AI_CLI_CHOICE" >/dev/null; then
+        die "Unknown AI CLI: $AI_CLI_CHOICE (use none, or one of: $(cli_catalog_ids))"
+    fi
     return 0
 }
 
@@ -4628,6 +4865,8 @@ case "$SUBCOMMAND" in
     name)        setup_name_subcommand ;;
     status)      status_subcommand ;;
     cloudflared) cloudflared_subcommand ;;
+    preflight)   preflight_subcommand ;;
+    agent)       agent_subcommand ;;
     *)
         # Only a COMPLETED install re-runs as a quiet update. A partial one
         # (clone succeeded but build/menu never finished) lacks the marker and

package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.49.0",
+  "version": "1.50.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "aicodeman",
-      "version": "1.49.0",
+      "version": "1.50.0",
       "hasInstallScript": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "workspaces": [

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.49.0",
+  "version": "1.50.0",
   "description": "Self-hosted mission control for AI coding agents: run Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Gemini, DeepSeek, Grok and more 24/7 in tmux, from any device.",
   "mcpName": "io.github.Ark0N/codeman",
   "type": "module",

packages/desktop/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+target/
+dist/

packages/desktop/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+[package]
+name = "codeman-desktop"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+rust-version = "1.90"
+description = "Codeman Desktop: a small native window for a Codeman server"
+license = "MIT"
+publish = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "codeman-desktop"
+path = "src/main.rs"
+
+[dependencies]
+# Window + event loop (tao), the system web view (wry: WKWebView on macOS,
+# WebView2 on Windows, WebKitGTK on Linux) and native menus (muda). Tauri is
+# built on these three; using them directly keeps the app small and gives us
+# `load_url_with_headers`, which Tauri's navigate() does not have (see README).
+tao = "0.37"
+wry = { version = "0.57", features = ["devtools"] }
+muda = "0.21"
+serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
+serde_json = "1"
+url = "2"
+# The versions ureq and wry already pull in, so neither crate is built twice
+# (ureq builds base64 without its default SIMD engines, and so do we).
+base64 = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
+dirs = "7"
+# The reachability probe. platform-verifier = the OS trust store, the same one
+# WKWebView uses, so the probe and the window agree on which certificates pass.
+ureq = { version = "3", features = ["platform-verifier"] }
+
+[target.'cfg(target_os = "macos")'.dependencies]
+security-framework = "3"
+# Ignoring signals in the logo blinker (src/logo.rs). Already in the tree
+# through wry and tao, so no new crate is added.
+libc = "0.2"
+# JavaScript dialogs, HTTP Basic challenges, clearing cookies and the window's
+# content size (src/macos.rs). The versions wry already pulls in, so no new
+# crate is added.
+objc2 = { version = "0.6.5", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
+block2 = { version = "0.6.2", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
+objc2-foundation = { version = "0.3.2", default-features = false, features = [
+    "std",
+    "objc2-core-foundation",
+    "block2",
+    "NSBundle",
+    "NSDate",
+    "NSDictionary",
+    "NSGeometry",
+    "NSObject",
+    "NSOperation",
+    "NSRange",
+    "NSSet",
+    "NSString",
+    "NSURL",
+    "NSURLAuthenticationChallenge",
+    "NSURLCredential",
+    "NSURLProtectionSpace",
+    "NSURLRequest",
+    "NSURLResponse",
+    "NSURLSession",
+    "NSValue",
+] }
+objc2-app-kit = { version = "0.3.2", default-features = false, features = [
+    "std",
+    "objc2-core-foundation",
+    "NSAlert",
+    "NSApplication",
+    "NSButton",
+    "NSControl",
+    "NSResponder",
+    "NSTextField",
+    "NSView",
+    "NSWindow",
+] }
+objc2-web-kit = { version = "0.3.2", default-features = false, features = [
+    "std",
+    "block2",
+    "objc2-app-kit",
+    "WKFrameInfo",
+    "WKNavigationDelegate",
+    "WKSecurityOrigin",
+    "WKUIDelegate",
+    "WKWebView",
+    "WKWebsiteDataRecord",
+    "WKWebsiteDataStore",
+] }
+
+[profile.release]
+opt-level = "s"
+lto = true
+codegen-units = 1
+strip = true
+panic = "abort"

packages/desktop/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+# Codeman Desktop
+
+A small native app that opens Codeman in its own window. Double-click it, and
+it runs Codeman on this Mac (installing it first if it is not there) or
+connects to Codeman on another machine (installing it there over SSH if
+needed), and Codeman fills the window. `⌃⌘F` puts it in full screen.
+
+macOS first: the app runs on 11.3 or later, and Codeman's own page needs the
+WebKit of Safari 16.4 (see Known limits). The same code is meant to build for
+Windows and Linux later.
+
+- **Size:** 5.3 MB for the universal `Codeman.app` (Apple Silicon + Intel), 3.5 MB as a `.dmg` (measured 2026-11-09).
+- **Stack:** Rust with [tao](https://crates.io/crates/tao) (window and event loop),
+  [wry](https://crates.io/crates/wry) (the system web view: WKWebView on macOS) and
+  [muda](https://crates.io/crates/muda) (native menus), plus [objc2](https://crates.io/crates/objc2)
+  for what wry leaves out on macOS (JavaScript dialogs, HTTP Basic login) and for
+  the lid logo. No bundled browser and no Node in the app.
+- **Server:** unchanged. The app is a client of Codeman's web UI, like a browser tab.
+
+## Why it is cheap
+
+Codeman is already a web app, so the desktop app is a native window around the
+operating system's own web view. An Electron build of the same thing would ship
+a whole Chromium (around 150 MB). The native side only adds what a browser tab
+cannot do.
+
+## What it does
+
+| | |
+| --- | --- |
+| **This Mac** | The connect screen's first tab looks for Codeman on this Mac and offers what fits: *Open Codeman* when it runs, *Start Codeman* when it is installed but stopped, *Install Codeman on this Mac* when it is not there. The address comes from Codeman's LaunchAgent (port, sub-path, HTTPS). The tab also finds every Codeman server of yours that already runs on this Mac (with `ps` and `lsof`: a `codeman web --port 4000` in a terminal, a beta instance beside the installed one) and recommends connecting to it. Each one's address is worked out from its listening socket and its command line (`127.0.0.1` for a bind to loopback or to every interface, its own address for a bind to one, `https` with `--https`, the path of `--base-url`), and each is asked once whether Codeman answers there. When nothing answers at the usual address (the LaunchAgent's, or `http://127.0.0.1:3000` without one), *Open Codeman* is for the first found server that does; when none of them can be opened, the tab says *Codeman is already running on this Mac* and lists them. Next to a Codeman that answers, the others are listed under *Also running on this Mac*. A row shows the address, the version, and a *Connect* button, or the reason the app cannot open that one (HTTPS with Codeman's own certificate, no answer). *Connect* is the connect of the Another machine tab with that address filled in: the same check, the login saved for it, the same entry under recent servers. Finding a server connects to nothing by itself. The tab never offers to start a second server, which would take over the first one's sessions, and Start refuses while one runs. A server that runs but listens nowhere yet (the first seconds after login, a restart) shows as *starting*: the tab looks again every second and, when a connect to this Mac had just been refused, opens Codeman once it is up. Start asks launchd to run the LaunchAgent (`kickstart`, or `bootstrap` when it is not loaded), so the server keeps its own settings and supervision; without a LaunchAgent it runs `codeman web -d`. The login comes from where Codeman keeps it: the LaunchAgent's `CODEMAN_USERNAME`/`CODEMAN_PASSWORD`, else `~/.codeman/.env` (what Codeman's command-line clients read), `admin` by default. It goes only to `127.0.0.1` on that Codeman's port, only while one of your own Codeman processes holds that port, is never saved to the Keychain, and never reaches the page. Whether Codeman is installed is looked up in its files and processes, then the login shell; the interactive profile (nvm in `.zshrc`, say) only on *Check again*. Install sets Codeman up from the app itself, with no Terminal and no password (see Decisions). It fetches the installer, asks it what is on this Mac, then asks two things: which coding agent to install, only when this Mac has none (the list comes from the installer, and *Skip for now* is there), and who can reach Codeman (this Mac only, or the local network with a password). A checklist follows the install, the installer's output is one click away, and Cancel stops it; installing again picks up where it stopped. Codeman runs as a LaunchAgent, so it keeps running when the app quits and starts at login. Port 3000 is used unless something else answers there, then the next free one. Closing the app does not stop an install: it runs on its own, and the app picks it up when it opens again. When it is done the app looks every 3 seconds and opens Codeman as soon as it answers; it stops looking after the first answer, after 30 minutes, or 90 seconds after a finished install whose server never answered (then it offers Start). *Install in Terminal instead* runs the installer in a Terminal window, for what the app cannot do (see Known limits): it may ask for the Mac password (Homebrew) and asks its own questions there. The app offers it by itself on a Mac where the graphical install cannot finish. An install still running in Terminal is recognized by its process, so the tab waits for it instead of offering Install twice. *Add a coding agent*, on this tab and in the app menu whenever Codeman is on this Mac, is the same chooser after the install: pick one agent, watch it install, open Codeman. It needs no password, leaves a running Codeman alone, and can be cancelled or left running like an install. After *Skip for now* the app says Codeman has no agent yet and offers this before it opens Codeman. |
+| **Another machine** | The second tab connects to a server by address (below). *Codeman is not installed there yet?* opens Terminal, connects with `ssh -t` and runs Codeman's installer on that machine, which asks its questions there; the app then suggests `http://<host>:3000` and the installer prints the real address at the end. The SSH login is checked to the characters of a user and host name (no option can be slipped in) and may carry a `:port`. The remote command runs under `bash -o pipefail`, so a failed download fails the install instead of reporting success. The same tab shows the one-line install command, with a Copy button, to run on a machine by hand. |
+| **Connect screen** | Server address, recent servers, a login for password-protected servers (password kept in the macOS Keychain), auto-connect at launch. An address typed without `http://` or `https://` gets `http://`, except a tailnet name with no port (`machine.tailnet.ts.net`, which is `tailscale serve`), which gets `https://`. It explains each failure: nothing listening; wrong password; too many failed logins (the password field stays open, since a single-user Codeman accepts the right password even then); unknown host name; an address this Mac cannot reach (with a pointer to the Local Network setting); an `http://` address on a port that only speaks HTTPS; an untrusted certificate; a redirect, with a button for the suggested `https://` address; not a Codeman server. A multi-user account that must change its password connects, and Codeman's own dialog asks for the new one. If the server page has not started showing within 15 seconds, or you press Cancel while it opens, the connect screen comes back with a notice. A login that would cross the network over plain `http://` to another machine says so. Return opens or starts the Codeman on this Mac (or connects to the one found here, when that is the tab's main button) and Esc cancels a connect, as in a Mac dialog (Install always takes a click). On a Mac whose WebKit is too old for Codeman it says so and Connect stays off (see Known limits). |
+| **Start Codeman** | On the This Mac tab, and when `http://127.0.0.1:<port>` or `http://localhost:<port>` answers nothing, one click runs `codeman web -d` (or `~/.codeman/app`) with your login shell's environment, so the server gets your real PATH (Homebrew, nvm) for the agents it spawns. zsh, bash and other POSIX shells run the start themselves; fish, nu, xonsh, tcsh and other shells only report their environment, and the start runs under `/bin/sh` with it. Offered for those two addresses only: `codeman web -d` listens on 127.0.0.1. |
+| **Login** | The app answers the server's HTTP Basic login requests itself, with the login you connected with, so the page keeps working after the server restarts (a restart forgets every session cookie). It answers only for Codeman's own pages under the server's base path: a web tab or a rendered HTML file that asks for a Basic login of its own is left to WebKit and never gets your Codeman password. WebKit keeps no copy of the login, so every request for it gets the current one. Each connect first clears the app's cookies, so connecting to the same server as another user really switches users (local storage, where Codeman keeps its per-device settings, stays; a dashboard in a web tab that keeps its own login in a cookie may ask for it again). A page that still gets a 401 reloads once. If the server refuses the login (the password was changed, say), the app does not keep sending it: it checks it with a single probe, and only if the server refuses that too does the connect screen come back with a notice. That does not take focus from the app you are in: if Codeman is in the background, its Dock icon bounces. |
+| **Dialogs** | Codeman's `confirm()`, `prompt()` and `alert()` (Delete case, Kill all sessions, Update Codeman, discarding unsaved edits, ...) show as native macOS dialogs. wry implements none of them, and without them WKWebView answers Cancel without showing anything. Each dialog's first line names the page it comes from, and says so when that is an embedded frame (a web tab, a rendered HTML preview), so a frame cannot pass its text off as Codeman's. |
+| **Full screen** | `⌃⌘F` or the green button. The last state is restored at launch; *Always Open in Full Screen* forces it. Leaving full screen returns to the saved window size and position. |
+| **Menus** | A real Edit menu (without one, `⌘C`/`⌘V` do nothing in a WKWebView), Reload `⌘R`, Switch Server `⇧⌘O`, Developer Tools `⌥⌘I`. The page sees every key first, so Codeman's own shortcuts keep working. If the main window ends up showing a raw file instead of Codeman, `⌘R` takes it back to Codeman. |
+| **Pop-outs** | Implements Codeman's existing native-wrapper bridge, `window.CodemanHost` (`openInHostWindow` in `src/web/public/app.js`), so popping out a session or a file preview opens a real app window, and the pop-out icon is on by default. Session and rendered-HTML pop-outs come only from Codeman's own pop-out button. A `window.open` from page script opens only Codeman's file and download windows, without taking keyboard focus, at most 3 at once and then 1 per second. Only Codeman's own pop-out pages become app windows (see Decisions); when the app refuses one, Codeman shows a toast. Each pop-out opens a step down and to the right of the window in use, never exactly on top of another one. A web tab's *Open in new tab* opens the dashboard in your default browser, as it would from a browser tab. |
+| **Links** | On Codeman's own pages (the dashboard and session windows), a link to another site opens in your default browser, also on `⌘`-click or a middle click. Pages can send at most 3 links to the browser at once, then 1 per second. Inside a rendered HTML preview or a web tab, a plain link to another site does nothing, while one that asks for a new window (`target="_blank"`, `window.open`) opens in your default browser within the same budget (see Known limits). |
+| **Downloads** | Codeman's Download links, and downloads Codeman opens in a new window, save the file to `~/Downloads` whatever its type, and a toast in Codeman names the file. Files the web view cannot display are saved the same way. |
+| **A page that stops** | When the web content process of a window ends (a WebKit crash, or macOS taking the process back under memory pressure), the window loads its page again instead of staying blank. A second time within 30 seconds, the main window goes back to the connect screen and a pop-out closes, so a page that cannot stay up never becomes a reload loop. |
+| **Apple logo** | On a MacBook Pro with a PROLED XDR display, the lit Apple logo on the lid says what the agents are doing, with a blink style of your own for each state: **View > Blink Apple Logo > While Working**, **Waiting for You (Yellow)** and **Needs Permission (Red)**. Off, Calm, Slow, Wink, Heartbeat, Fast, or Alarm, three sharp flashes for a state that needs you. All three are off until you choose. When several states hold, the most urgent one with a style shows: red, then yellow, then work. A style chosen in an earlier version stays as the one for work, and yellow and red start as Wink and Alarm. The menu only exists on a Mac with that logo. No password is needed. Shell tabs do not count. The app asks the server every two seconds, and a change has to hold for three seconds before the logo follows it, so an agent between two turns does not flicker it. It keeps working while the window is hidden, and with any Codeman server. A logo you switched off yourself stays off, and if the setting changes while a blink runs, the blink ends and leaves it as it found it. While the app is closed nothing blinks, and macOS keeps the logo dark while the display sleeps or the lid is closed, so the blink pauses then and writes nothing. |
+| **Window** | Size, position and full-screen state are remembered. A saved window that hangs off the screen it opens on (it was last on a larger display that is gone, say) is pulled back on and shrunk to fit; one whose title bar is on no screen at all opens at the default size instead. Clicking the Dock icon brings back a minimized window. |
+
+## Build (on a Mac)
+
+Needs Rust 1.90 or newer ([rustup](https://rustup.rs); `rustup update` for an older
+toolchain) and the Xcode Command Line Tools (`xcode-select --install`).
+
+```bash
+cd packages/desktop
+cargo test                                  # unit tests
+./scripts/bundle-macos.sh                   # dist/Codeman.app for this Mac's architecture
+./scripts/bundle-macos.sh --universal --dmg # Apple Silicon + Intel, plus dist/Codeman-<version>.dmg
+open dist/Codeman.app
+```
+
+The connect page has its own test, which needs no Mac: from the repository
+root, `npm run test:browser -- test/desktop-connect-page.browser.test.ts` drives
+`assets/connect.html` in Chromium through every state of both tabs, under the
+Content-Security-Policy the app serves it with. It is part of the nightly
+browser suite, not of `npm test`.
+
+To try a change to `install.sh` before it is merged, build with
+`CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALLER_URL` (where to get the installer) and
+`CODEMAN_DESKTOP_INSTALL_BRANCH` (the branch it installs from) set. Both are
+read at compile time: a shipped app cannot be pointed at another installer.
+
+The script builds with `--locked` against the committed `Cargo.lock`, targets
+the macOS version in `macos/Info.plist` (`LSMinimumSystemVersion`, 11.3), and
+takes the binary from where cargo says it wrote it, so `CARGO_TARGET_DIR` and a
+cargo config's `build.target-dir` work.
+
+Settings live in `~/Library/Application Support/Codeman/desktop.json`; passwords
+in the Keychain under *Codeman Desktop*, one item per username and server. A
+`desktop.json` the app cannot read or parse is moved aside, never overwritten:
+to `desktop.json.corrupt`, or to the first free name of `desktop.json.corrupt.1`
+to `.corrupt.9` when that one is taken, so an earlier copy is kept. If all ten
+names are taken, or the file cannot be moved, the app starts with default
+settings and saves nothing, which leaves the file where it is. When a server's
+username changes (a change of letter case counts), or a server drops off the
+recent list (it keeps 8), the Keychain item of the old username is deleted.
+
+## Decisions, and why
+
+**tao + wry + muda directly, not Tauri.** Tauri is built on the same three crates.
+The deciding detail is login: Codeman's password protection is HTTP Basic, and
+a WKWebView shows no login dialog of its own (wry 0.57 implements no
+authentication-challenge handler). So the app sends the `Authorization` header
+itself on the first load, with wry's `load_url_with_headers` (Tauri 2.12's
+`navigate()` takes only a URL), and from then on answers the HTTP Basic
+challenges of Codeman's own pages with the current login. Codeman keeps its
+session cookies in memory, so after a server restart that answer is what keeps
+the page logged in. Using the crates directly is also smaller.
+
+**What wry leaves out is added at runtime, not patched in.** `src/macos.rs` adds
+the JavaScript dialog methods and the authentication-challenge method to the
+classes of wry's own delegates, so wry stays an unmodified crates.io dependency.
+
+**What a page may ask of the app** (all in `src/policy.rs`, unit-tested):
+
+- Codeman shows content it did not write on its own origin: rendered HTML files
+  (`/html-view/`) and proxied dashboards (`/webview/`). Only Codeman's own app
+  shell (the dashboard and a session pop-out) may use `window.CodemanHost`.
+  That is an allowlist on the raw path, and a path holding any `%` fails it, so
+  an encoded spelling or a route Codeman adds later stays out.
+- An app window opens only for Codeman's own pop-out pages under the server's
+  base path, checked after decoding the path once, and which ones depends on
+  who asks. `window.CodemanHost` (the app shell only) may open sessions,
+  rendered HTML views, the raw, preview, attachment and folder file routes, the
+  path picker's preview and `api/download`. A `window.open` or `target=_blank`
+  link, which WebKit passes on from any frame without saying which, gets only
+  the file routes and
+  `api/download`, the pages Codeman itself opens that way; otherwise a rendered
+  HTML file could open copies of itself as top-level windows that pass for the
+  app's own. Such a window does not take keyboard focus, and these windows
+  have a budget of their own (3 at once, then 1 per second), apart from the
+  one links draw on. Any other page on the server's origin is refused rather
+  than sent to the browser: a top-level `/webview/` load would escape the web
+  tab's iframe sandbox in either place, so it never opens anywhere.
+  `window.open('')` is refused too, since WebKit's blank window carries none of
+  the app's handlers.
+- wry's navigation handler sees every frame and does not say which one. So a
+  navigation to another site is blocked rather than opened in the browser;
+  otherwise a page full of external iframes could open browser tabs. A real
+  link click is sent out by the injected script in the main frame only.
+- Only `http(s)` URLs ever reach the default browser, at most 3 at once and
+  then 1 per second. macOS lets a page call `window.open` without a click, so
+  this keeps a script from opening a browser tab for every call.
+- The `Authorization` header is only sent to URLs under the server's base path.
+  The login answers a Basic challenge only when it is Codeman's own: the
+  server's scheme, host and port (never a proxy's), a URL below the base path,
+  and not a web tab (`webview/`) or a rendered HTML file (`html-view/`), which
+  relay 401s from content Codeman did not write. Only such a challenge can
+  send the user back to the connect screen. WebKit is handed the login without
+  persistence, so it keeps no copy: every challenge gets the current login,
+  and one from before a Switch Server is never replayed.
+- Each connect starts by clearing the app's cookies (never local storage).
+  Codeman checks its session cookie before the `Authorization` header, so an
+  earlier user's cookie would otherwise win over the new login.
+- Microphone and camera requests prompt per page. wry's default without a
+  handler is to grant them to every frame, sandboxed previews included.
+- The bundled connect page keeps working until a server page commits in the
+  main window (it is still the live page while the server loads), and only
+  the main window may talk to it.
+- `codeman web -d` gets the port and base path as separate arguments, never as
+  shell text.
+
+**The app runs the installer itself; Terminal is the fallback.** `install.sh
+--no-admin` puts Node.js and tmux in the home folder, so a This Mac install needs
+no password and therefore no terminal, and the two questions only a person can
+answer arrive as flags (`src/gui_install.rs`). The app downloads the installer
+once to a private folder, asks it what is on this Mac (`install.sh preflight`,
+which prints JSON and changes nothing) and draws its choices from that answer.
+So the app has no list of coding agents of its own: a new one appears without a
+new app, and the list always matches what the installer can really install
+here. The installer runs with the login shell's environment, so it finds what
+this person already has. The page sends only the agent's id, whether other
+devices may reach Codeman, and that password; the password reaches the
+installer through its environment, never its command line, where `ps` shows it.
+
+**The install outlives the app.** Its output goes to a file, never a pipe, and
+it runs in a process group of its own. With a pipe, quitting the app would kill
+the installer at its next write; in the app's group, launchd would kill it with
+the app. The file holds the whole run, so a page that was reloaded, or an app
+that was opened again, finds the process in `ps` and replays the file from the
+first line. That is why the app keeps no state about a run. A run that ends
+without the installer's last `done` line failed, and the first error it reported
+is the one shown: the ones after it are consequences.
+
+**Adding an agent is a run of its own.** `install.sh agent <id>` installs one
+agent and touches neither Codeman nor its service, so it may run next to a live
+server, which an install must refuse: the installer's service step would replace
+that server under its sessions. It has its own temporary folder, so `ps` tells the
+two apart: everything that reads a running install takes it to mean "Codeman is
+being installed", which an agent run does not. One run goes at a time, since both
+can write to the runtime folder. It asks `preflight` for the list like an install
+does, and both pass `--no-admin`: that flag decides which agents count as
+installable, so without it on both the page could offer one the run refuses. The
+menu item is on the connect page because that is where the app may run things:
+from a Codeman page it leaves the page the way *Switch Server* does.
+
+**Terminal stays for what the app cannot do.** The route with Homebrew asks for
+the administrator password on a terminal, the Xcode tools arrive as a system
+dialog, and ssh asks about host keys and passwords on a terminal too. The app
+writes a short script to the per-user temporary folder (mode 0700, created
+fresh, deleted by the script as it starts) and opens it with `open -b
+com.apple.Terminal`, which needs no permission; scripting Terminal with
+osascript would ask for Automation access. The script prints what it runs. A
+This Mac install downloads the installer to a temporary file and runs it from
+there, so the installer's input is the terminal. Everything in the scripts is
+built and unit-tested in `src/setup.rs`; the page sends only which install it
+wants, whether other devices should reach it, and the SSH login, which is
+checked before it is quoted.
+
+**This Mac's own login comes from where Codeman keeps it.** A Codeman
+installed with a password keeps it in its LaunchAgent (`install.sh`) or in
+`~/.codeman/.env` (what `codeman attach`, `codeman tui` and `codeman agent`
+read). The app reads the same places, so a password-protected Codeman on this
+Mac opens without typing the password. The username and password always come
+from the same place, since the server reads its username from its own
+environment. The login goes only to `127.0.0.1` on that Codeman's port, and
+only while `lsof` shows one of your own Codeman processes holding that port:
+with Codeman stopped, whatever else listens there never gets it.
+
+**Never a second server on the same sessions.** Two Codeman servers on one
+data directory and tmux socket attach to each other's live sessions, and
+`codeman web -d` only notices a server it started itself or one at the same
+address. So the app looks for running Codeman servers of this user (`ps`)
+before it offers or runs a start, and offers to connect to the ones it finds
+instead (`found_addresses` in `src/setup.rs`, unit-tested).
+
+**Closing the main window quits the app.** Codeman's sessions keep running on
+the server, so nothing is lost, and reopening takes about a second.
+
+**One reachability probe per user action, and one to check a refused login.**
+Codeman counts a request without valid credentials against its login rate
+limit (10 per IP, 15 minutes; a successful login resets the count), so the app
+never retries in a loop. A look at this Mac asks each Codeman server found
+here once; the app has a login only for the one at the usual address, so the
+others are asked without one. Once the server refuses the login in a challenge,
+the app sends it only once more, in the single probe that checks the refusal.
+If that probe is refused or rate limited, the connect screen comes back; the
+app does not send the refused login again. Keeping no copy of the login in
+WebKit has a cost here: after a server restart, each request that arrives
+without a cookie gets a 401 before the
+login goes out, and those count until one succeeds. Many windows reconnecting
+at once can push a request past 10, and that request then fails with a 429
+instead of being answered. A refusal that lands while you are in another app
+does not bring Codeman forward: the connect screen loads where the window is,
+and the Dock icon bounces.
+
+**The logo blinks from a child process, through CoreBrightness.** Apple documents
+one control for the logo ([support.apple.com/en-us/149248](https://support.apple.com/en-us/149248)):
+`sudo defaults write com.apple.CoreBrightness LEBacklightMode -int 0`. Doing that
+for every blink would need a root helper and an administrator password. The same
+setting is also a property of `BrightnessSystemClient` in the private
+CoreBrightness framework, and a process of the logged-in user can set it there,
+which is what `src/logo.rs` does. Measured on a Mac17,13 with macOS 27.2 from an
+ad-hoc signed binary: `corebrightnessd` logs the logo dark about a millisecond
+after the write, with no fade, and the NVRAM variable `bklb-backlight-enabled`
+keeps its value while the logo is dark.
+
+The setting is system-wide and survives a reboot, so the app must not end with the
+logo dark, and the release profile has `panic = "abort"`, so no cleanup code of the
+app can be relied on. So all of it runs as this same binary with
+`--logo-blink`, for as long as any style is chosen and a server is open, tied to the app
+by nothing but a pipe: when the pipe closes, however the app ended, it puts the logo
+back and exits. Switching it off closes the same pipe, so the path a crash
+takes is the one used every day. A marker file
+(`logo-blink`, next to `desktop.json`) covers what the child cannot survive itself:
+at the next launch the app puts back a logo a blink left dark. The framework is
+loaded at run time and never linked, and `LEBacklightMode` reading nil (a Mac mini
+answers nil) is what hides the option, so a macOS that drops it loses this feature
+and nothing else.
+
+**Red and yellow come from the server's approvals list.** `GET /api/approvals` is what the
+page reads to rebuild its red and yellow tabs after a reload, and it follows the same rules:
+`permission` and `question` items are red, an `idle` item is yellow until someone has looked
+at it (`acknowledgedAt`). So the logo stops when the tab's colour goes. The request is skipped
+when neither alert has a style, and a server from before the list reads as no alerts. Each
+poll with a dialog on screen costs that server one tmux capture, because the list re-checks
+the dialog, which also clears red soon after a dialog is answered in the terminal.
+
+**The agent count is asked for natively, because the page cannot be trusted with it.**
+The first version read the page's own event stream, which needs no second connection
+and no login. On a real Mac it failed in both directions as soon as the window was
+covered, because WebKit stalls the stream of a hidden page: a turn that started while
+it was stalled was never seen and the logo stayed still, and in another run the logo
+kept blinking 39 seconds after the agent finished, until the page's watchdog reopened
+the stream. A hidden window is the normal case for a signal meant to be read from
+across the room, so `src/agents.rs` asks `api/sessions` itself, from the child process,
+every two seconds. That needs care with the login. A request with a good password and
+no session cookie makes Codeman create a login session, it keeps 100 of them, and the
+oldest goes first, so polling with the password alone would log every browser out
+within minutes. The poller therefore sends the cookie of the first answer with every
+request, which Codeman reads first, so one session is created per server start. A
+refused login ends the polling for good, because Codeman counts each refusal against
+the login rate limit. The app and the child share nothing but the pipe the login
+crosses, so the login is never on a command line.
+
+## Known limits
+
+- **A new agent can take a few minutes to show up in an older Codeman.** The server
+  remembers that a CLI is missing, for up to 5 minutes after it last looked
+  (`cliResolveRetryDelayMs`), so that a status poll never spawns a login shell. The
+  installer's `cli-installed` marker ends that at once, but only for a server that
+  knows the marker, so the screen after *Add a coding agent* still mentions it. An
+  open Codeman page always needs a reload, because the list of installed agents is
+  part of the page.
+- **Agents the app can add are the ones `--no-admin` can install.** OMP's macOS
+  install is Homebrew, so it is not offered, also on a Mac that has Homebrew.
+- **Agents that install with npm use whichever Node.js the login shell finds.**
+  With the Node.js the installer downloaded, or Homebrew's, that folder is yours.
+  The nodejs.org installer leaves `/usr/local/lib/node_modules` to root, so those
+  agents would be expected to fail there, with npm's permission error shown, while
+  the ones with their own installer still work. This has not been tried.
+- **Only your own Codeman servers on this Mac are found, by their command
+  line.** A server another macOS user runs, or one in a container or a virtual
+  machine, is not listed: connect to it by address under Another machine. A
+  base path that a server started by hand has only in its environment
+  (`CODEMAN_BASE_URL`) is not visible either, so its row has the address
+  without the path; the LaunchAgent's base path is read from its job.
+- **A found server that is slow to answer shows as not answering.** Next to a
+  Codeman that answers, each other server gets two seconds (five when nothing
+  answers at the usual address). A password-protected one counts the
+  look as a failed login, like any look at a server the app has no login for.
+  *Check again* asks again.
+- **The logo blink rests on a private macOS interface.** Apple documents the
+  setting, not the way the app reaches it, so a macOS update can take it away;
+  the menu then disappears. Every change of the logo writes `LEBacklightMode`,
+  from about once every two seconds (*Slow*, *Wink*) to about three times a
+  second (*Fast*), which `corebrightnessd` keeps in root's preferences. The
+  setting is on or off, so these styles are rhythms of hard changes. After a
+  blink the key stays there rather than being absent as on a fresh Mac. That
+  reads the same to macOS; `sudo defaults delete com.apple.CoreBrightness
+  LEBacklightMode` removes it. After a power cut in a
+  dark phase the logo stays dark until the app next starts. `api/sessions` does
+  not say which turns are Codeman's own, so with prompt-cache keep-warm on, a
+  keep-alive turn blinks too.
+- **Self-signed HTTPS is refused.** A server started with `codeman web --https`
+  uses a self-signed certificate, and WKWebView rejects it (wry has no trust
+  override). Use `http://127.0.0.1:3000` for a server on this Mac. For another
+  machine, serve Codeman through `tailscale serve`
+  (`https://<machine>.<tailnet>.ts.net` has a real certificate) or a reverse
+  proxy with a real certificate. Marking the certificate as trusted in
+  Keychain Access can only help at `https://localhost` or `https://127.0.0.1`,
+  the only names Codeman's certificate carries, and may not work even there.
+  The connect screen says so when it happens.
+- **Keychain prompt after every rebuild of an ad-hoc build.** The Keychain
+  knows the app that saved a password by its code signature, and an ad-hoc
+  signature changes with every build and update. So each new build asks once
+  for access to the saved passwords: choose *Always Allow*. All Keychain work
+  runs on one background thread, so the prompt does not freeze the window
+  while it waits for an answer. To keep one identity across builds, sign with
+  `SIGN_IDENTITY` (a self-made code-signing certificate from Keychain Access
+  is enough). Microphone and camera permissions are asked again for the same
+  reason.
+- **Gatekeeper, for a build of your own.** The `Codeman.dmg` on each GitHub
+  release is signed with a Developer ID and notarized by CI
+  (`.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml`), so it opens like any downloaded app.
+  A build without a Developer ID is signed ad hoc: it opens normally on the Mac
+  that built it, while a copy that arrived by download or AirDrop is
+  quarantined. On macOS 15 and later, try to open it once, then click *Open
+  Anyway* in System Settings > Privacy & Security (it asks for an administrator
+  password). On macOS 14 and earlier, right-click it and choose *Open* once.
+  Either way, `xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine /Applications/Codeman.app` on the
+  copy in Applications works too. To sign and notarize by hand:
+  `SIGN_IDENTITY="Developer ID Application: ..." NOTARY_PROFILE=<profile> ./scripts/bundle-macos.sh --universal --notarize`,
+  where `scripts/sign-macos.sh` lists what it needs.
+- **Local Network permission (macOS 15 and later).** The first connection to an
+  address on the local network (a LAN IP, a `.local` name) makes macOS ask
+  whether Codeman may use the local network, and that first attempt can fail
+  while the question is open: connect again after answering. If it was denied,
+  turn Codeman on in System Settings > Privacy & Security > Local Network. A
+  server started with *Start Codeman on this Mac* counts as part of the app
+  here, so the same answer covers what it reaches on the local network (ssh to
+  LAN hosts, Wake-on-LAN, web tabs pointing at LAN dashboards), also after the
+  app quits.
+- **Subagent transcript windows do not open in the app.** Codeman writes that
+  view into a blank `window.open('')` window, which the app refuses (see
+  Decisions), and shows a toast instead. A Codeman without the null check in
+  `viewSubagentTranscript` (`src/web/public/panels-ui.js`) reports *Failed to
+  load transcript* there. Open the transcript from a browser tab.
+- **Dialogs are app-modal.** While a JavaScript dialog is open, every Codeman
+  window waits for it. A page that calls `alert()` in a loop (a rendered HTML
+  preview or a web tab can) leaves no way out but Force Quit (`⌥⌘⎋`).
+- **Codeman needs the WebKit of Safari 16.4.** The app itself runs on macOS
+  11.3 or later (downloads go through WKDownload, which arrived in 11.3), but
+  Codeman's terminal (xterm.js 6 uses class static blocks) needs the WebKit
+  that came with Safari 16.4: macOS 13.3, or macOS 11 or 12 with Safari 16.4
+  or later installed. On an older WebKit the connect screen says so and does
+  not connect. Session pop-outs also need BroadcastChannel (Safari 15.4),
+  which the same requirement covers.
+- **Plain links in rendered HTML and web tabs do not open.** A link to another
+  site inside a rendered HTML preview or a web tab does nothing, in the
+  preview overlay, and for a rendered HTML file in its pop-out window too: the
+  app blocks navigation to other sites in every frame (see Decisions). A link
+  there that asks for a new window (`target="_blank"`, or a script's
+  `window.open`) does open, in your default browser, within the budget of 3 at
+  once and then 1 per second.
+- **No login dialog for a web tab's own HTTP Basic login.** The app answers
+  only Codeman's own login, and WebKit shows no dialog for any other, so a
+  dashboard in a web tab that asks for HTTP Basic shows its 401 page.
+- **Downloads from previews and web tabs are saved without asking.** Rendered
+  HTML files and web tabs are allowed to start downloads, and the app saves
+  every download to `~/Downloads` without a prompt. Asking first for those
+  frames is not done yet.
+- **No desktop notifications yet.** WKWebView has no Web Notification API.
+  Native notifications are the first item on the list below.
+- **No service worker.** Codeman works without it; it is only an offline cache.
+- **The graphical install needs macOS 15, or a tmux that is already there.**
+  tmux comes from the tmux project's own builds, which need macOS 15. On an
+  older Mac without tmux the app says so and offers Terminal, where Homebrew
+  installs it (that takes an administrator once).
+- **Who can reach it stops at the local network.** Tailscale needs its own
+  login and setup, which the installer does at a terminal. Choose *Install in
+  Terminal instead*, or run `install.sh tailscale` later.
+- **An agent is chosen during the install, or added later.** With Codeman
+  already installed, or after *Skip for now*, *Add a coding agent* on the This
+  Mac tab (*Add a Coding Agent to This Mac…* in the app menu) installs one. The
+  commands are also in [Installing an agent CLI](../../docs/wiki/Installation.md#installing-an-agent-cli).
+- **An agent only your interactive profile finds counts as missing.** The app
+  reads the login shell's environment, without `.zshrc`, so a CLI on an nvm
+  PATH set up there is offered again as if it were not installed. Installing
+  it again is harmless; *Skip for now* leaves it as it is.
+- **Installing from the app is macOS only so far**, and installing on another
+  machine needs ssh access to it and `curl` or `wget` there. The app does not
+  know when a remote install is done or which address it chose: the installer
+  prints the address, and you connect to it under Another machine.
+- **A This Mac install always sets Codeman up as a LaunchAgent** that starts
+  at login. To stop it: `launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist`;
+  to remove Codeman: `curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash -s -- uninstall`.
+- **Windows and Linux** need their menu hookup (`init_for_hwnd`, GTK), a
+  credential store (Credential Manager, Secret Service) and installers. The
+  rest of the code is platform-neutral.
+
+## Ideas for next
+
+- Native notifications and a Dock badge with the number of sessions waiting
+  for you (tao has `set_badge_label`; Codeman already tracks which sessions need input).
+- A global hotkey that brings Codeman to the front from anywhere.
+- A menu bar icon showing session states.
+- Trusting a self-signed server certificate by its fingerprint.
+- Asking before a download that a rendered HTML file or a web tab starts.
+- A way out of a page that keeps opening dialogs (a "block further dialogs" option).
+- Windows and Linux builds, auto-update.

packages/desktop/macos/Info.plist

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
+<plist version="1.0">
+<dict>
+	<key>CFBundleName</key>
+	<string>Codeman</string>
+	<key>CFBundleDisplayName</key>
+	<string>Codeman</string>
+	<key>CFBundleIdentifier</key>
+	<string>com.getcodeman.desktop</string>
+	<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
+	<string>__VERSION__</string>
+	<key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
+	<string>__VERSION__</string>
+	<key>CFBundleExecutable</key>
+	<string>codeman-desktop</string>
+	<key>CFBundleIconFile</key>
+	<string>Codeman</string>
+	<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
+	<string>APPL</string>
+	<key>CFBundleInfoDictionaryVersion</key>
+	<string>6.0</string>
+	<!-- 11.3 is where WKDownload arrived; wry saves files through it. Below
+	     that a Download link replaces the window or saves nothing.
+	     scripts/bundle-macos.sh builds for this version too. -->
+	<key>LSMinimumSystemVersion</key>
+	<string>11.3</string>
+	<key>LSApplicationCategoryType</key>
+	<string>public.app-category.developer-tools</string>
+	<key>NSHighResolutionCapable</key>
+	<true/>
+	<key>NSSupportsAutomaticGraphicsSwitching</key>
+	<true/>
+	<key>NSHumanReadableCopyright</key>
+	<string>MIT License, Codeman Contributors</string>
+	<!-- Voice dictation and gesture control ask for these; without the
+	     strings macOS kills the app the first time a page requests them. -->
+	<key>NSMicrophoneUsageDescription</key>
+	<string>Codeman uses the microphone for voice dictation when you turn it on.</string>
+	<key>NSCameraUsageDescription</key>
+	<string>Codeman uses the camera for hand-gesture control when you turn it on.</string>
+	<!-- macOS 15 asks before an app reaches the local network (a LAN address,
+	     a .local name), and shows this text in that question. A process the
+	     app starts counts as the app (Apple TN3179), so a server started with
+	     "Start Codeman on this Mac" runs under the same answer. -->
+	<key>NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription</key>
+	<string>Codeman connects to Codeman servers on your local network. A Codeman server you start from this app uses the same permission for what it reaches on the network.</string>
+	<!-- App Transport Security would block plain http:// to a host NAME
+	     (my-mac.local, a LAN box). IP literals are exempt, which is why
+	     http://127.0.0.1 works without this. -->
+	<key>NSAppTransportSecurity</key>
+	<dict>
+		<key>NSAllowsLocalNetworking</key>
+		<true/>
+		<key>NSAllowsArbitraryLoadsInWebContent</key>
+		<true/>
+	</dict>
+</dict>
+</plist>

packages/desktop/macos/entitlements.plist

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
+<plist version="1.0">
+<dict>
+	<!-- Only used with a Developer ID (SIGN_IDENTITY=...), which turns on the
+	     hardened runtime; there, microphone and camera need these. -->
+	<key>com.apple.security.device.audio-input</key>
+	<true/>
+	<key>com.apple.security.device.camera</key>
+	<true/>
+</dict>
+</plist>

packages/desktop/rustfmt.toml

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+max_width = 120

packages/desktop/scripts/bundle-macos.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Build Codeman.app (and optionally a .dmg) from packages/desktop, on macOS.
+#
+#   packages/desktop/scripts/bundle-macos.sh            # this Mac's architecture
+#   packages/desktop/scripts/bundle-macos.sh --universal --dmg
+#   SIGN_IDENTITY="Developer ID Application: ..." packages/desktop/scripts/bundle-macos.sh --dmg
+#   SIGN_IDENTITY="Developer ID Application: ..." NOTARY_PROFILE=<profile> \
+#     packages/desktop/scripts/bundle-macos.sh --universal --notarize
+#
+# Without SIGN_IDENTITY the app is signed ad hoc: it runs on the Mac that built
+# it, and a copy downloaded on another Mac is stopped by Gatekeeper. On macOS 15
+# and later, try to open it once, then click Open Anyway in System Settings >
+# Privacy & Security; on macOS 14 and earlier, right-click it and choose Open.
+# Or run `xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine /Applications/Codeman.app` on the copy
+# in /Applications. A Developer ID signature + notarization avoids all of this.
+#
+# --dmg writes dist/Codeman-<version>.dmg, signed with SIGN_IDENTITY when it is
+# set. --notarize hands the built app to scripts/sign-macos.sh, which signs it
+# with SIGN_IDENTITY, has Apple notarize it, staples the ticket to it and does
+# the same for dist/Codeman.dmg, the DMG built around it (so --dmg is implied).
+# sign-macos.sh's header lists what it needs: SIGN_IDENTITY, and NOTARY_PROFILE
+# or APPLE_ID, APPLE_APP_PASSWORD and APPLE_TEAM_ID. The release workflow
+# (.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml) runs this script ad hoc in one job and
+# sign-macos.sh in another, so the job that runs cargo holds no secret.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
+[ "$(uname -s)" = Darwin ] || { echo "bundle-macos.sh runs on macOS only" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+UNIVERSAL=0
+DMG=0
+NOTARIZE=0
+for arg in "$@"; do
+  case "$arg" in
+    --universal) UNIVERSAL=1 ;;
+    --dmg) DMG=1 ;;
+    --notarize) NOTARIZE=1 ;;
+    *) echo "unknown option: $arg" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+if [ "$NOTARIZE" = 1 ]; then
+  # Checked before the build, so a missing secret costs seconds, not a build.
+  ./scripts/sign-macos.sh --check
+fi
+
+VERSION=$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"$/\1/p' Cargo.toml | head -1)
+[ -n "$VERSION" ] || { echo "could not read the version from Cargo.toml" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# The binary targets the same macOS as LSMinimumSystemVersion in Info.plist,
+# so the two cannot disagree.
+MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET=$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Print :LSMinimumSystemVersion' macos/Info.plist)
+[ -n "$MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET" ] || { echo "could not read LSMinimumSystemVersion from macos/Info.plist" >&2; exit 1; }
+export MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET
+
+WORK=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+# Build with cargo and set BUILT to the executable cargo reports for
+# codeman-desktop. Asking cargo, rather than assuming ./target, keeps
+# CARGO_TARGET_DIR, build.target-dir and build.target from a cargo config
+# working, and a stale binary from an older build is never bundled.
+cargo_build() {
+  local json
+  json=$(cargo build --locked --release "$@" --message-format=json-render-diagnostics)
+  BUILT=$(printf '%s\n' "$json" | awk '
+    index($0, "\"reason\":\"compiler-artifact\"") &&
+    index($0, "\"kind\":[\"bin\"]") &&
+    index($0, "\"name\":\"codeman-desktop\"") &&
+    match($0, /"executable":"[^"]*"/) { path = substr($0, RSTART + 14, RLENGTH - 15) }
+    END { print path }')
+  if [ -z "$BUILT" ] || [ ! -x "$BUILT" ]; then
+    echo "cargo did not report a codeman-desktop executable${BUILT:+ (it named $BUILT)}" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+if [ "$UNIVERSAL" = 1 ]; then
+  rustup target add aarch64-apple-darwin x86_64-apple-darwin >/dev/null
+  cargo_build --target aarch64-apple-darwin
+  ARM_BIN=$BUILT
+  cargo_build --target x86_64-apple-darwin
+  INTEL_BIN=$BUILT
+  BIN="$WORK/codeman-desktop-universal"
+  lipo -create -output "$BIN" "$ARM_BIN" "$INTEL_BIN"
+else
+  cargo_build
+  BIN=$BUILT
+fi
+
+APP=dist/Codeman.app
+rm -rf "$APP"
+mkdir -p "$APP/Contents/MacOS" "$APP/Contents/Resources"
+cp "$BIN" "$APP/Contents/MacOS/codeman-desktop"
+sed "s/__VERSION__/$VERSION/g" macos/Info.plist > "$APP/Contents/Info.plist"
+plutil -lint "$APP/Contents/Info.plist" >/dev/null
+printf 'APPL????' > "$APP/Contents/PkgInfo"
+
+# assets/icon.png (1024x1024, already on Apple's icon grid) -> Codeman.icns
+ICONSET="$WORK/Codeman.iconset"
+mkdir -p "$ICONSET"
+for size in 16 32 128 256 512; do
+  sips -z "$size" "$size" assets/icon.png --out "$ICONSET/icon_${size}x${size}.png" >/dev/null
+  double=$((size * 2))
+  sips -z "$double" "$double" assets/icon.png --out "$ICONSET/icon_${size}x${size}@2x.png" >/dev/null
+done
+iconutil -c icns "$ICONSET" -o "$APP/Contents/Resources/Codeman.icns"
+
+if [ -n "${SIGN_IDENTITY:-}" ]; then
+  codesign --force --options runtime --timestamp \
+    --entitlements macos/entitlements.plist --sign "$SIGN_IDENTITY" "$APP"
+else
+  codesign --force --sign - "$APP"
+fi
+codesign --verify --strict "$APP"
+
+echo "Built $(pwd)/$APP ($(du -sh "$APP" | cut -f1), version $VERSION, macOS $MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET or later)"
+
+if [ "$NOTARIZE" = 1 ]; then
+  ./scripts/sign-macos.sh "$APP" dist
+elif [ "$DMG" = 1 ]; then
+  DMG_PATH="dist/Codeman-$VERSION.dmg"
+  ./scripts/make-dmg.sh "$APP" "$DMG_PATH"
+  if [ -n "${SIGN_IDENTITY:-}" ]; then
+    codesign --force --timestamp --sign "$SIGN_IDENTITY" "$DMG_PATH"
+  fi
+  echo "Built $(pwd)/$DMG_PATH ($(du -sh "$DMG_PATH" | cut -f1))"
+fi

packages/desktop/scripts/make-dmg.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Put Codeman.app in a compressed disk image next to a link to /Applications,
+# so opening the image shows the app and the folder to drag it into.
+#
+#   packages/desktop/scripts/make-dmg.sh <Codeman.app> <out.dmg>
+#
+# bundle-macos.sh (--dmg) and sign-macos.sh both call it, so a local test DMG
+# and the release DMG are laid out the same way. It signs nothing.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+[ "$(uname -s)" = Darwin ] || { echo "make-dmg.sh runs on macOS only" >&2; exit 1; }
+[ $# -eq 2 ] || { echo "usage: $0 <Codeman.app> <out.dmg>" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+APP=$1
+DMG=$2
+[ -d "$APP/Contents/MacOS" ] || { echo "$APP is not an app bundle" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+WORK=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+STAGE="$WORK/dmg"
+mkdir -p "$STAGE"
+# ditto keeps what cp -R can lose: extended attributes, and with them a
+# stapled notarization ticket.
+ditto "$APP" "$STAGE/$(basename "$APP")"
+ln -s /Applications "$STAGE/Applications"
+
+# Hosted macOS runners now and then fail hdiutil with "Resource busy"; the
+# same command a few seconds later passes.
+rm -f "$DMG"
+tries=1
+until hdiutil create -quiet -volname Codeman -srcfolder "$STAGE" -ov -format UDZO "$DMG"; do
+  if [ "$tries" -ge 3 ]; then
+    echo "hdiutil create failed $tries times" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  tries=$((tries + 1))
+  echo "hdiutil create failed, trying again in 10 seconds" >&2
+  rm -f "$DMG"
+  sleep 10
+done
+hdiutil verify -quiet "$DMG"

packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Sign Codeman.app with a Developer ID, have Apple notarize it and staple the
+# ticket to it, then build Codeman.dmg around the stapled app and do the same
+# for the DMG. On macOS.
+#
+#   packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh <Codeman.app> <out-dir>
+#   packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh --check   # only check the environment below
+#
+# <Codeman.app> is re-signed and stapled in place. <out-dir> receives
+# Codeman.dmg and Codeman.dmg.sha256, the latter with the bare file name in it,
+# so `shasum -a 256 -c Codeman.dmg.sha256` works next to a downloaded copy. Both
+# appear only once every check passed; a failed run leaves neither, not even an
+# older pair, so nothing half-done can be uploaded by mistake.
+#
+# The environment names who signs:
+#   SIGN_IDENTITY       a "Developer ID Application: ..." identity in a keychain
+#                       on the search list, by name or by the SHA-1 hash that
+#                       `security find-identity -v -p codesigning` prints
+# and how to reach Apple's notary service, either through a profile saved with
+# `xcrun notarytool store-credentials <profile> --apple-id ... --team-id ...`:
+#   NOTARY_PROFILE      the profile's name
+#   NOTARY_KEYCHAIN     optional, the keychain that holds it (default: login)
+# or with the Apple ID itself:
+#   APPLE_ID, APPLE_APP_PASSWORD (an app-specific password), APPLE_TEAM_ID
+#
+# By hand, on a Mac with the certificate in the login keychain:
+#   SIGN_IDENTITY="Developer ID Application: ..." NOTARY_PROFILE=codeman-notary \
+#     packages/desktop/scripts/sign-macos.sh packages/desktop/dist/Codeman.app packages/desktop/dist
+#
+# The release workflow (.github/workflows/desktop-dmg.yml) runs it in a job that
+# builds nothing: the job that runs cargo, and with it the build script of every
+# crate in Cargo.lock, never holds a signing secret.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+[ "$(uname -s)" = Darwin ] || { echo "sign-macos.sh runs on macOS only" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+DESKTOP=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)
+ENTITLEMENTS="$DESKTOP/macos/entitlements.plist"
+
+# Fails with the name of what is missing, before any work, so a missing secret
+# costs seconds rather than a build.
+check_env() {
+  if [ -z "${SIGN_IDENTITY:-}" ]; then
+    echo "sign-macos.sh needs SIGN_IDENTITY" >&2
+    exit 2
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${NOTARY_PROFILE:-}" ]; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+  local name
+  for name in APPLE_ID APPLE_APP_PASSWORD APPLE_TEAM_ID; do
+    if [ -z "$(eval "printf '%s' \"\${$name:-}\"")" ]; then
+      echo "sign-macos.sh needs NOTARY_PROFILE, or APPLE_ID, APPLE_APP_PASSWORD and APPLE_TEAM_ID ($name is empty)" >&2
+      exit 2
+    fi
+  done
+}
+
+if [ "${1:-}" = --check ] && [ $# -eq 1 ]; then
+  check_env
+  exit 0
+fi
+[ $# -eq 2 ] || { echo "usage: $0 <Codeman.app> <out-dir> | --check" >&2; exit 2; }
+check_env
+
+APP=$1
+OUT=$2
+[ -d "$APP/Contents/MacOS" ] || { echo "$APP is not an app bundle" >&2; exit 2; }
+mkdir -p "$OUT"
+OUT=$(cd "$OUT" && pwd)
+rm -f "$OUT/Codeman.dmg" "$OUT/Codeman.dmg.sha256"
+NAME=$(basename "$APP" .app)
+
+if [ -n "${NOTARY_PROFILE:-}" ]; then
+  NOTARY_AUTH=(--keychain-profile "$NOTARY_PROFILE")
+  if [ -n "${NOTARY_KEYCHAIN:-}" ]; then
+    NOTARY_AUTH=("${NOTARY_AUTH[@]}" --keychain "$NOTARY_KEYCHAIN")
+  fi
+else
+  # On notarytool's command line, which the job's log never shows.
+  NOTARY_AUTH=(--apple-id "$APPLE_ID" --password "$APPLE_APP_PASSWORD" --team-id "$APPLE_TEAM_ID")
+fi
+
+WORK=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+# Submit a file to the notary service and wait. Anything but Accepted stops the
+# script with the submission id and Apple's log, which names the file and the
+# reason (an unsigned binary, a missing timestamp, no hardened runtime...).
+notarize() {
+  local file=$1 result="$WORK/notary.plist" rc=0 status id
+  echo "Submitting $(basename "$file") to Apple's notary service"
+  xcrun notarytool submit "$file" "${NOTARY_AUTH[@]}" --wait --timeout 45m \
+    --output-format plist > "$result" || rc=$?
+  status=$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Print :status' "$result" 2>/dev/null || true)
+  id=$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Print :id' "$result" 2>/dev/null || true)
+  if [ "$status" != Accepted ]; then
+    echo "Notarization of $(basename "$file") ended as '${status:-unknown}' (submission ${id:-none}, notarytool exit $rc)" >&2
+    cat "$result" >&2 || true
+    if [ -n "$id" ]; then
+      xcrun notarytool log "$id" "${NOTARY_AUTH[@]}" >&2 || true
+    fi
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  echo "Notarized $(basename "$file") (submission $id)"
+}
+
+# The app: hardened runtime (which notarization requires), a secure timestamp,
+# and the entitlements the hardened runtime needs for microphone and camera.
+codesign --force --options runtime --timestamp --entitlements "$ENTITLEMENTS" \
+  --sign "$SIGN_IDENTITY" "$APP"
+codesign --verify --strict --verbose=2 "$APP"
+DETAILS=$(codesign --display --verbose=2 "$APP" 2>&1)
+printf '%s\n' "$DETAILS" | grep -E '^(Authority|TeamIdentifier|Timestamp)=' || true
+case "$DETAILS" in
+  *"Authority=Developer ID Application: "*) ;;
+  *) echo "$APP is not signed with a Developer ID Application certificate" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+esac
+case "$DETAILS" in
+  *"(runtime)"*) ;;
+  *) echo "$APP is signed without the hardened runtime" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+esac
+
+ditto -c -k --keepParent "$APP" "$WORK/$NAME.zip"
+notarize "$WORK/$NAME.zip"
+xcrun stapler staple "$APP"
+xcrun stapler validate "$APP"
+spctl --assess --type execute --verbose=2 "$APP"
+
+# The DMG around the stapled app, signed and notarized in its own right, so the
+# image opens without a warning and the app inside opens offline.
+DMG="$WORK/Codeman.dmg"
+"$DESKTOP/scripts/make-dmg.sh" "$APP" "$DMG"
+codesign --force --timestamp --sign "$SIGN_IDENTITY" "$DMG"
+codesign --verify --strict --verbose=2 "$DMG"
+notarize "$DMG"
+xcrun stapler staple "$DMG"
+xcrun stapler validate "$DMG"
+spctl --assess --type open --context context:primary-signature --verbose=2 "$DMG"
+
+(cd "$WORK" && shasum -a 256 Codeman.dmg > Codeman.dmg.sha256)
+mv "$DMG" "$WORK/Codeman.dmg.sha256" "$OUT/"
+echo "Signed and notarized $APP"
+echo "Built $OUT/Codeman.dmg ($(du -h "$OUT/Codeman.dmg" | cut -f1)), sha256 $(cut -d' ' -f1 "$OUT/Codeman.dmg.sha256")"

packages/desktop/src/agents.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+//! What the agents on a server are doing, asked from outside the web view: at
+//! work, finished with nobody having looked yet (a yellow tab), or stopped on a
+//! permission or a question (a red tab).
+//!
+//! The page knows this too, but it cannot be relied on for it: WebKit stalls the
+//! event stream of a hidden page. Measured on macOS 27.2 with the page hidden: a
+//! `session:idle` the server sent never reached it, its own watchdog reopened the
+//! stream 39 seconds later, and in another run a whole turn went unseen. A hidden
+//! window is the normal case for this question, so it is asked natively, of
+//! `api/sessions`, a stable route that works with any Codeman, and of
+//! `api/approvals`, the list the page itself builds its red and yellow tabs from
+//! when it loads. A server from before that list has no such route, which reads
+//! as no alerts.
+//!
+//! A login has a price here that a single request does not show. A request with
+//! a good password and no session cookie makes Codeman create a login session,
+//! it keeps 100 of them, and the oldest goes first, so asking every two seconds
+//! with the password alone would log every browser out within minutes. So the
+//! cookie of the first answer goes along from then on, and Codeman reads the
+//! cookie first: the password is only used when the cookie has lapsed (a server
+//! restart), and then it creates the one new session that replaces it. Sending
+//! both also means a stale cookie costs no failed login. A refused login ends
+//! the polling for good, since Codeman counts each one against the login rate
+//! limit (see `probe`).
+
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use url::Url;
+
+/// How long the logo can lag behind the server. The list is cached for a
+/// second on the server's side and is a few kilobytes.
+pub const POLL_EVERY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
+const TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
+const SESSIONS_PATH: &str = "api/sessions";
+const APPROVALS_PATH: &str = "api/approvals";
+const COOKIE_NAME: &str = "codeman_session";
+
+/// What the agents on a server are doing. Any number of these can be true.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
+pub struct Activity {
+    /// At least one agent is at work.
+    pub working: bool,
+    /// An agent finished and nobody has looked at it yet: a yellow tab.
+    pub waiting: bool,
+    /// An agent stopped on a permission or a question: a red tab.
+    pub needs_you: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Poll {
+    Seen(Activity),
+    /// No answer this time. Worth asking again.
+    Failed,
+    /// The server turned the login down. Never ask again.
+    Refused,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct Session {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    status: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    mode: String,
+}
+
+/// Codeman wraps the list in its API envelope, and older servers sent it bare.
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(untagged)]
+enum Sessions {
+    Envelope { data: Vec<Session> },
+    Bare(Vec<Session>),
+}
+
+/// Agents only: a shell tab with a `tail -f` is a run of output, which the
+/// server may call busy, and that is nobody's agent.
+fn count_working(body: &str) -> Option<u32> {
+    let (Sessions::Envelope { data: sessions } | Sessions::Bare(sessions)) = serde_json::from_str(body).ok()?;
+    let working = sessions.iter().filter(|s| s.status == "busy" && s.mode != "shell");
+    u32::try_from(working.count()).ok()
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct Approval {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    kind: String,
+    #[serde(default, rename = "acknowledgedAt")]
+    acknowledged_at: Option<f64>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct Approvals {
+    approvals: Vec<Approval>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct ApprovalsAnswer {
+    data: Approvals,
+}
+
+/// The two alerts, by the page's own rules: `permission_prompt` and a question
+/// make a tab red, an idle prompt makes it yellow until someone has looked at it,
+/// and an acknowledged item stays listed but alerts nobody.
+fn read_alerts(body: &str) -> Option<(bool, bool)> {
+    let answer: ApprovalsAnswer = serde_json::from_str(body).ok()?;
+    let items = &answer.data.approvals;
+    let waiting = items.iter().any(|i| i.kind == "idle" && i.acknowledged_at.is_none());
+    let needs_you = items.iter().any(|i| i.kind == "permission" || i.kind == "question");
+    Some((waiting, needs_you))
+}
+
+/// `name=value` out of a `Set-Cookie` header, for Codeman's session cookie.
+fn session_cookie(header: &str) -> Option<&str> {
+    let pair = header.split(';').next()?.trim();
+    let (name, value) = pair.split_once('=')?;
+    (name == COOKIE_NAME && !value.is_empty()).then_some(pair)
+}
+
+/// A refused login: Codeman counts each against the login rate limit, so the
+/// polling ends.
+fn refused(status: u16) -> bool {
+    matches!(status, 401 | 403 | 429)
+}
+
+/// What a status code says about asking again.
+fn answer(status: u16, body: Option<&str>) -> Poll {
+    match status {
+        200 => body.and_then(count_working).map_or(Poll::Failed, |working| {
+            Poll::Seen(Activity {
+                working: working > 0,
+                ..Activity::default()
+            })
+        }),
+        s if refused(s) => Poll::Refused,
+        _ => Poll::Failed,
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct Poller {
+    agent: ureq::Agent,
+    sessions_url: String,
+    /// None when no alert has a style: that request is then never made.
+    approvals_url: Option<String>,
+    authorization: Option<String>,
+    cookie: Option<String>,
+    /// The last alerts seen, kept through a request that failed.
+    alerts: (bool, bool),
+}
+
+impl Poller {
+    pub fn new(server: &Url, authorization: Option<String>, alerts: bool) -> Option<Self> {
+        let approvals_url = match alerts {
+            true => Some(server.join(APPROVALS_PATH).ok()?.to_string()),
+            false => None,
+        };
+        Some(Poller {
+            agent: crate::probe::agent(TIMEOUT),
+            sessions_url: server.join(SESSIONS_PATH).ok()?.to_string(),
+            approvals_url,
+            authorization,
+            cookie: None,
+            alerts: (false, false),
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// One GET with the login, and the status with the body of a 200.
+    fn ask(&mut self, url: &str) -> Option<(u16, Option<String>)> {
+        let mut request = self.agent.get(url).header("Accept", "application/json");
+        if let Some(authorization) = &self.authorization {
+            request = request.header("Authorization", authorization);
+        }
+        if let Some(cookie) = &self.cookie {
+            request = request.header("Cookie", cookie);
+        }
+        let mut response = request.call().ok()?;
+        let fresh = response
+            .headers()
+            .get_all("set-cookie")
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .find_map(session_cookie)
+            .map(str::to_owned);
+        if fresh.is_some() {
+            self.cookie = fresh;
+        }
+        let status = response.status().as_u16();
+        let body = (status == 200).then(|| {
+            let body = response.body_mut().with_config();
+            body.limit(crate::probe::MAX_BODY).read_to_string().ok()
+        });
+        Some((status, body.flatten()))
+    }
+
+    pub fn poll(&mut self) -> Poll {
+        let url = self.sessions_url.clone();
+        let Some((status, body)) = self.ask(&url) else {
+            return Poll::Failed;
+        };
+        let mut activity = match answer(status, body.as_deref()) {
+            Poll::Seen(activity) => activity,
+            other => return other,
+        };
+        if let Some(url) = self.approvals_url.clone() {
+            match self.ask(&url) {
+                Some((200, body)) => {
+                    if let Some(alerts) = body.as_deref().and_then(read_alerts) {
+                        self.alerts = alerts;
+                    }
+                }
+                Some((s, _)) if refused(s) => return Poll::Refused,
+                // A server from before the list has no alerts to report.
+                Some((404, _)) => self.alerts = (false, false),
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+        (activity.waiting, activity.needs_you) = self.alerts;
+        Poll::Seen(activity)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader, Write};
+    use std::net::TcpListener;
+    use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+
+    /// The start of a real answer of `GET /api/sessions`, captured from a
+    /// server: other fields around the two that matter, in Codeman's envelope.
+    const REAL_ANSWER: &str = r#"{"success":true,"data":[{"id":"0f8d0215-661e-4a1c-bfad-d7f6fd2ed4b5",
+        "pid":61017,"status":"busy","workingDir":"/Users/lee/codeman-cases/testcase",
+        "paneCwd":"/Users/lee/codeman-cases/testcase","currentTaskId":null,"mode":"opencode"}]}"#;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reads_the_answer_a_real_server_gives() {
+        assert_eq!(count_working(REAL_ANSWER), Some(1));
+        assert_eq!(count_working(r#"{"success":true,"data":[]}"#), Some(0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn counts_agents_at_work_and_nothing_else() {
+        let body = r#"{"success":true,"data":[
+            {"id":"a","status":"busy","mode":"claude"},
+            {"id":"b","status":"busy","mode":"codex"},
+            {"id":"c","status":"idle","mode":"claude"},
+            {"id":"d","status":"busy","mode":"shell"},
+            {"id":"e","status":"stopped","mode":"claude"},
+            {"id":"f","status":"error","mode":"opencode"}
+        ]}"#;
+        assert_eq!(count_working(body), Some(2));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reads_the_bare_list_of_an_older_server() {
+        assert_eq!(count_working(r#"[{"status":"busy","mode":"claude"}]"#), Some(1));
+        assert_eq!(count_working("[]"), Some(0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_session_without_a_mode_counts_and_one_without_a_status_does_not() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            count_working(r#"{"data":[{"status":"busy"},{"mode":"claude"}]}"#),
+            Some(1)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_body_that_is_not_the_list_is_no_answer() {
+        assert_eq!(count_working("<html>"), None);
+        assert_eq!(count_working(r#"{"success":false,"error":"nope"}"#), None);
+        assert_eq!(answer(200, Some("<html>")), Poll::Failed);
+        assert_eq!(answer(200, None), Poll::Failed);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn only_a_login_refusal_ends_the_polling() {
+        for status in [401, 403, 429] {
+            assert_eq!(answer(status, None), Poll::Refused, "{status}");
+        }
+        for status in [301, 404, 500, 502, 503] {
+            assert_eq!(answer(status, None), Poll::Failed, "{status}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn finds_codemans_cookie_in_a_set_cookie_header() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            session_cookie("codeman_session=abc123; Max-Age=86400; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax"),
+            Some("codeman_session=abc123")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(session_cookie("codeman_session=abc123"), Some("codeman_session=abc123"));
+        assert_eq!(session_cookie("other=1; Path=/"), None);
+        assert_eq!(session_cookie("codeman_session=; Max-Age=0"), None);
+        assert_eq!(session_cookie(""), None);
+    }
+
+    /// A server that answers each connection with the next canned response
+    /// and records the headers it was sent.
+    fn serve(responses: Vec<String>) -> (u16, Arc<Mutex<Vec<Vec<String>>>>) {
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+        let seen = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+        let log = seen.clone();
+        std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            for response in responses {
+                let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
+                let mut reader = BufReader::new(stream.try_clone().unwrap());
+                let mut headers = Vec::new();
+                let mut line = String::new();
+                while reader.read_line(&mut line).is_ok() && line.trim() != "" {
+                    headers.push(line.trim().to_ascii_lowercase());
+                    line.clear();
+                }
+                log.lock().unwrap().push(headers);
+                stream.write_all(response.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+            }
+        });
+        (port, seen)
+    }
+
+    const EMPTY: &str = r#"{"success":true,"data":[]}"#;
+
+    fn plain(working: bool) -> Poll {
+        Poll::Seen(Activity {
+            working,
+            ..Activity::default()
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// The shape of a real `GET /api/approvals`, with the frame text cut.
+    fn approvals(items: &[&str]) -> String {
+        format!(r#"{{"success":true,"data":{{"approvals":[{}]}}}}"#, items.join(","))
+    }
+    const IDLE: &str = r#"{"id":"s:1","sessionId":"s","sessionName":"w4","kind":"idle","createdAt":1,"context":"x"}"#;
+    const LOOKED_AT: &str = r#"{"id":"s:2","sessionId":"s","kind":"idle","createdAt":1,"acknowledgedAt":2}"#;
+    const PERMISSION: &str = r#"{"id":"s:3","sessionId":"s","kind":"permission","createdAt":1,"toolName":"Bash"}"#;
+    const QUESTION: &str = r#"{"id":"s:4","sessionId":"s","kind":"question","createdAt":1}"#;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_alerts_follow_the_pages_rules() {
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts(&approvals(&[])), Some((false, false)));
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts(&approvals(&[IDLE])), Some((true, false)));
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts(&approvals(&[LOOKED_AT])), Some((false, false)), "seen");
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts(&approvals(&[PERMISSION])), Some((false, true)));
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts(&approvals(&[QUESTION])), Some((false, true)));
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts(&approvals(&[IDLE, PERMISSION])), Some((true, true)));
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts("not json"), None);
+        assert_eq!(read_alerts(EMPTY), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reads_all_three_states_from_one_poll() {
+        let busy = r#"{"success":true,"data":[{"status":"busy","mode":"claude"}]}"#;
+        let (port, seen_requests) = serve(vec![ok("", busy), ok("", &approvals(&[IDLE, PERMISSION]))]);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
+        let mut poller = Poller::new(&server, None, true).unwrap();
+        let everything = Activity {
+            working: true,
+            waiting: true,
+            needs_you: true,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(poller.poll(), Poll::Seen(everything));
+        assert!(seen_requests.lock().unwrap()[1][0].starts_with("get /api/approvals "));
+    }
+
+    fn status(code: u16) -> String {
+        format!("HTTP/1.1 {code} X\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_server_without_the_list_still_shows_work() {
+        let busy = r#"{"data":[{"status":"busy","mode":"claude"}]}"#;
+        let (port, _) = serve(vec![ok("", busy), status(404)]);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Poller::new(&server, None, true).unwrap().poll(), plain(true));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_refused_list_ends_the_polling_and_a_failed_one_keeps_the_last_answer() {
+        let (port, _) = serve(vec![ok("", EMPTY), status(401)]);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Poller::new(&server, None, true).unwrap().poll(), Poll::Refused);
+
+        let (port, _) = serve(vec![
+            ok("", EMPTY),
+            ok("", &approvals(&[PERMISSION])),
+            ok("", EMPTY),
+            status(500),
+        ]);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
+        let mut poller = Poller::new(&server, None, true).unwrap();
+        let red = Poll::Seen(Activity {
+            needs_you: true,
+            ..Activity::default()
+        });
+        assert_eq!(poller.poll(), red);
+        assert_eq!(
+            poller.poll(),
+            Poll::Seen(Activity {
+                needs_you: true,
+                ..Activity::default()
+            })
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_alert_with_a_style_means_no_second_request() {
+        let (port, seen_requests) = serve(vec![ok("", EMPTY)]);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Poller::new(&server, None, false).unwrap().poll(), plain(false));
+        assert_eq!(seen_requests.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    fn ok(extra_headers: &str, body: &str) -> String {
+        format!(
+            "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\n{extra_headers}\r\n{body}",
+            body.len()
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn keeps_one_login_session_across_polls() {
+        let body = r#"{"success":true,"data":[{"status":"busy","mode":"claude"}]}"#;
+        let (port, seen) = serve(vec![
+            ok("Set-Cookie: codeman_session=first; Max-Age=86400; Path=/\r\n", body),
+            ok("Set-Cookie: codeman_session=first; Max-Age=86400; Path=/\r\n", body),
+            ok("Set-Cookie: codeman_session=second; Max-Age=86400; Path=/\r\n", EMPTY),
+            ok("", EMPTY),
+        ]);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
+        let mut poller = Poller::new(&server, Some("Basic abc".into()), false).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(poller.poll(), plain(true));
+        assert_eq!(poller.poll(), plain(true));
+        assert_eq!(poller.poll(), plain(false));
+        assert_eq!(poller.poll(), plain(false));
+
+        let seen = seen.lock().unwrap();
+        let cookie = |n: usize| seen[n].iter().find(|h| h.starts_with("cookie:")).cloned();
+        assert_eq!(cookie(0), None);
+        assert_eq!(cookie(1).as_deref(), Some("cookie: codeman_session=first"));
+        assert_eq!(cookie(2).as_deref(), Some("cookie: codeman_session=first"));
+        // A server restart hands out a new one; a response without one keeps it.
+        assert_eq!(cookie(3).as_deref(), Some("cookie: codeman_session=second"));
+        assert!(seen.iter().all(|h| h.contains(&"authorization: basic abc".to_string())));
+        assert!(seen[0][0].starts_with("get /api/sessions "), "{:?}", seen[0][0]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn asks_under_the_servers_base_path() {
+        let (port, seen) = serve(vec![ok("", EMPTY)]);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/codeman/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Poller::new(&server, None, false).unwrap().poll(), plain(false));
+        let seen = seen.lock().unwrap();
+        assert!(seen[0][0].starts_with("get /codeman/api/sessions "), "{:?}", seen[0][0]);
+        assert!(!seen[0].iter().any(|h| h.starts_with("authorization:")));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_server_that_answers_nothing_is_only_a_failed_poll() {
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+        drop(listener);
+        let server = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Poller::new(&server, None, false).unwrap().poll(), Poll::Failed);
+    }
+}

packages/desktop/src/assets.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+//! Files bundled into the binary: the connect page, its icon, and the script
+//! injected into every Codeman page (`window.CodemanHost`).
+
+use std::borrow::Cow;
+use wry::http::{header::CONTENT_TYPE, Request, Response, StatusCode};
+
+const CONNECT_HTML: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../assets/connect.html");
+const ICON_PNG: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../assets/icon.png");
+
+/// The connect page loads nothing from outside the app.
+const CSP: &str = "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src codemanapp:";
+
+/// Serve `codemanapp://localhost/<path>`.
+pub fn respond(request: Request<Vec<u8>>) -> Response<Cow<'static, [u8]>> {
+    let (body, mime): (&'static [u8], &str) = match request.uri().path() {
+        "/" | "/index.html" => (CONNECT_HTML, "text/html; charset=utf-8"),
+        "/icon.png" => (ICON_PNG, "image/png"),
+        _ => {
+            return Response::builder()
+                .status(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
+                .body(Cow::Borrowed(&b"not found"[..]))
+                .expect("static response");
+        }
+    };
+    Response::builder()
+        .header(CONTENT_TYPE, mime)
+        .header("Content-Security-Policy", CSP)
+        .header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        .body(Cow::Borrowed(body))
+        .expect("static response")
+}
+
+/// Injected at document start into the MAIN frame of every page (wry's
+/// default), where it does nothing unless the page is http(s). It provides the
+/// native-wrapper bridge Codeman's frontend already looks for
+/// (`window.CodemanHost.openWindow/closeWindow/focusWindow`, see
+/// `openInHostWindow` in src/web/public/app.js), so pop-outs become real app
+/// windows. `openWindow` answers false, posting nothing, for a URL the native
+/// side would drop (not http(s), or longer than its 4096-byte cap), so
+/// Codeman shows its own error instead of marking a session detached with no
+/// window behind it. Besides that it:
+///
+/// - turns a click on a same-origin download link (`download=true`, or a path
+///   ending in `/download`) into a real download by giving the link a
+///   `download` attribute. Codeman's file tree and attachment cards link to
+///   `file-raw?download=true` without one, and the server sends a type WebKit
+///   can show (png, pdf, txt), so WebKit would otherwise replace the Codeman
+///   window with the file, with no way back. This runs in the capture phase,
+///   before the file tree's own `stopPropagation`.
+/// - does the same for `window.open` of such a `download=true` URL (the
+///   attachment history), returning null instead of a window.
+/// - sends clicks on links to other sites to the default browser, after
+///   Codeman's own handlers have had their turn (bubble phase, skipped when
+///   one of them called preventDefault). Middle clicks and modifier clicks
+///   count too: a bare WKWebView has no new-tab gesture of its own, so they
+///   would do nothing.
+/// - reports the first same-origin 401 a `fetch` gets (`sessionExpired`),
+///   once per page load: the session cookie is gone, usually because the
+///   server restarted, and nothing in the page asks for the login again.
+/// - defines `__codemanDesktopRefused(id)` (not enumerable) for
+///   [`refused_script`].
+pub const HOST_SHIM: &str = r#"(function () {
+  'use strict';
+  if (!/^https?:$/.test(location.protocol) || window.CodemanHost) return;
+  var MAX_URL = 4096;
+  var post = function (msg) {
+    try { window.ipc.postMessage(JSON.stringify(msg)); return true; } catch (e) { return false; }
+  };
+  // An http(s) URL object, or null. fetch and window.open resolve against
+  // the document base (Codeman sets <base href>), so those pass it.
+  var httpUrl = function (raw, base) {
+    try {
+      var u = new URL(String(raw), base || location.href);
+      return /^https?:$/.test(u.protocol) ? u : null;
+    } catch (e) { return null; }
+  };
+  var sameOrigin = function (u) { return !!u && u.origin === location.origin; };
+  var link = function (ev) {
+    var a = ev.target && ev.target.closest ? ev.target.closest('a[href]') : null;
+    return a && typeof a.href === 'string' && !a.hasAttribute('download') ? a : null;
+  };
+
+  Object.defineProperty(window, 'CodemanHost', {
+    value: Object.freeze({
+      desktop: true,
+      openWindow: function (url) {
+        var u = httpUrl(url);
+        return u && u.href.length <= MAX_URL ? post({ cmd: 'openWindow', url: u.href }) : false;
+      },
+      closeWindow: function () { post({ cmd: 'closeWindow' }); },
+      focusWindow: function () { post({ cmd: 'focusWindow' }); }
+    })
+  });
+
+  // The native side could not open a window: say so. `id` is a string only
+  // when CodemanHost.openWindow asked for that session's pop-out; that session
+  // goes back to the dashboard (a fresh channel object, so this window's own
+  // channel hears it too). Anything else, null included, only shows the toast.
+  Object.defineProperty(window, '__codemanDesktopRefused', {
+    value: function (id) {
+      try {
+        if (window.app && typeof window.app.showToast === 'function') {
+          window.app.showToast('Could not open a new window', 'error');
+        }
+      } catch (e) {}
+      try {
+        if (typeof id === 'string' && id !== '' && typeof BroadcastChannel === 'function') {
+          var ch = new BroadcastChannel('codeman-windows');
+          ch.postMessage({ type: 'redocked', id: id });
+          setTimeout(function () { try { ch.close(); } catch (e) {} }, 2000);
+        }
+      } catch (e) {}
+    }
+  });
+
+  var markDownload = function (ev) {
+    if (ev.button > 1) return;
+    var a = link(ev);
+    var u = a && httpUrl(a.href);
+    if (sameOrigin(u) && (u.searchParams.get('download') === 'true' || /\/download$/.test(u.pathname))) {
+      a.setAttribute('download', '');
+    }
+  };
+  window.addEventListener('click', markDownload, true);
+  window.addEventListener('auxclick', markDownload, true);
+
+  var lastMiddle = null;
+  var openOutside = function (ev) {
+    if (ev.defaultPrevented || ev.button > 1) return;
+    var a = link(ev);
+    var u = a && httpUrl(a.href);
+    if (!u || sameOrigin(u)) return;
+    ev.preventDefault();
+    // Older WebKit sends a middle click as 'click', newer as 'auxclick'; one
+    // that sent both must still open the link once.
+    if (ev.button === 1) {
+      if (lastMiddle && lastMiddle.a === a && ev.timeStamp - lastMiddle.t < 500) return;
+      lastMiddle = { a: a, t: ev.timeStamp };
+    }
+    post({ cmd: 'openExternal', url: u.href });
+  };
+  window.addEventListener('click', openOutside, false);
+  window.addEventListener('auxclick', openOutside, false);
+
+  var nativeOpen = window.open;
+  if (typeof nativeOpen === 'function') {
+    window.open = function open(url) {
+      try {
+        var u = arguments.length && url !== undefined ? httpUrl(url, document.baseURI) : null;
+        if (sameOrigin(u) && u.searchParams.get('download') === 'true') {
+          var a = document.createElement('a');
+          a.href = u.href;
+          a.setAttribute('download', '');
+          a.click();
+          return null;
+        }
+      } catch (e) {}
+      return nativeOpen.apply(this, arguments);
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Returns the promise fetch itself returned, so callers see exactly what
+  // they saw before; the 401 check hangs off a side branch that swallows its
+  // own errors and never reads the body.
+  var expired = false;
+  var nativeFetch = window.fetch;
+  if (typeof nativeFetch === 'function') {
+    var check = function (input, r) {
+      if (expired || !r || r.status !== 401) return;
+      var raw = r.url || (input && typeof input === 'object' && typeof input.url === 'string' ? input.url : input);
+      if (!sameOrigin(httpUrl(raw, document.baseURI))) return;
+      expired = true;
+      post({ cmd: 'sessionExpired' });
+    };
+    window.fetch = function fetch(input) {
+      var p = nativeFetch.apply(this, arguments);
+      try {
+        if (!expired && p && typeof p.then === 'function') {
+          p.then(function (r) { try { check(input, r); } catch (e) {} }, function () {});
+        }
+      } catch (e) {}
+      return p;
+    };
+  }
+})();"#;
+
+/// A toast inside Codeman (its own `showToast`; nothing happens on a page
+/// without it). `kind` is one of Codeman's fixed toast kinds.
+pub fn toast_script(text: &str, kind: &str) -> String {
+    let text = serde_json::to_string(text).unwrap_or_else(|_| "\"\"".into());
+    format!("try {{ window.app && window.app.showToast && window.app.showToast({text}, \"{kind}\"); }} catch (e) {{}}")
+}
+
+/// A toast inside Codeman when a download finished.
+pub fn download_toast_script(file_name: &str, ok: bool) -> String {
+    let text = if ok {
+        format!("Downloaded {file_name} to Downloads")
+    } else {
+        format!("Download of {file_name} failed")
+    };
+    toast_script(&text, if ok { "success" } else { "error" })
+}
+
+/// Runs in the window that asked for a window the native side did not open
+/// (pop-out limit reached, policy refused it, window or web view failed to
+/// build): the page shows an error toast. Does nothing on a page without the
+/// shim.
+///
+/// `session_id` is the decoded id of a session pop-out
+/// (`policy::session_id_of`), and only for a `CodemanHost.openWindow` request,
+/// which comes from a trusted frame: that session then gets its tab back in
+/// the dashboard. Pass `None` for every other refusal, above all the ones a
+/// `window.open` or `target=_blank` from any frame caused, so a page cannot
+/// make the dashboard drop the detached state of a session that is still
+/// popped out.
+pub fn refused_script(session_id: Option<&str>) -> String {
+    let id = serde_json::to_string(&session_id).unwrap_or_else(|_| "null".into());
+    format!(
+        "try {{ if (typeof window.__codemanDesktopRefused === 'function') window.__codemanDesktopRefused({id}); }} catch (e) {{}}"
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn get(path: &str) -> Response<Cow<'static, [u8]>> {
+        respond(
+            Request::builder()
+                .uri(format!("codemanapp://localhost{path}"))
+                .body(Vec::new())
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn serves_page_and_icon_only() {
+        let page = get("/index.html");
+        assert_eq!(page.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        assert!(page.headers()["content-type"]
+            .to_str()
+            .unwrap()
+            .starts_with("text/html"));
+        assert!(page.headers().contains_key("content-security-policy"));
+        assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(page.body()).contains("window.__codemanDesktop"));
+        assert_eq!(get("/icon.png").status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(get("/../etc/passwd").status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
+        assert_eq!(get("/other.js").status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refused_script_escapes_the_session_id() {
+        let js = refused_script(Some("a'\"); alert(1); //\u{2028}\\"));
+        assert!(js.starts_with("try { if (typeof window.__codemanDesktopRefused === 'function') "));
+        assert!(js.contains(r#"window.__codemanDesktopRefused("a'\"); alert(1); //"#));
+        assert!(js.contains("\u{2028}\\\\\"); } catch (e) {}"));
+        assert!(js.ends_with(" } catch (e) {}"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refused_script_without_a_session_passes_null() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            refused_script(None),
+            "try { if (typeof window.__codemanDesktopRefused === 'function') window.__codemanDesktopRefused(null); } catch (e) {}"
+        );
+        assert!(refused_script(Some("")).contains("__codemanDesktopRefused(\"\")"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn shim_keeps_its_contract() {
+        for needle in [
+            "Object.freeze",
+            "openWindow",
+            "closeWindow",
+            "focusWindow",
+            "__codemanDesktopRefused",
+            "sessionExpired",
+            "'auxclick'",
+            "MAX_URL = 4096",
+            "typeof id === 'string' && id !== ''",
+        ] {
+            assert!(HOST_SHIM.contains(needle), "{needle}");
+        }
+        // The refused hook takes the session id the native side resolved; it
+        // never parses or decodes a URL to find one.
+        assert!(!HOST_SHIM.contains("decodeURIComponent"));
+    }
+
+    /// The connect page refuses what the app would drop without an answer, so
+    /// its two limits have to be the app's own.
+    #[test]
+    fn connect_page_keeps_the_message_limits() {
+        let page = String::from_utf8_lossy(CONNECT_HTML);
+        for needle in [
+            format!("var MAX_URL = {};", crate::policy::MAX_URL_LEN),
+            format!("var MAX_FIELD = {};", crate::policy::MAX_FIELD_LEN),
+        ] {
+            assert!(page.contains(&needle), "{needle}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Copy puts setup::INSTALL_ONE_LINER on the clipboard, and the page shows
+    /// the command as text of its own: the two have to be the same command.
+    #[test]
+    fn connect_page_shows_the_command_that_copy_copies() {
+        let page = String::from_utf8_lossy(CONNECT_HTML);
+        let shown = format!("<code id=\"oneliner\">{}</code>", crate::setup::INSTALL_ONE_LINER);
+        assert!(page.contains(&shown), "{shown}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn toast_escapes_file_names() {
+        let js = download_toast_script("a\"); alert(1); (\".txt", true);
+        assert!(js.contains(r#"Downloaded a\"); alert(1); (\".txt to Downloads"#));
+    }
+}

packages/desktop/src/config.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,859 @@
+//! The app's own settings: recent servers, two preferences and the window
+//! frame. Stored as JSON next to other per-app data
+//! (`~/Library/Application Support/Codeman/desktop.json` on macOS). Passwords
+//! never go here; they live in the Keychain (see `credentials`).
+
+use crate::logo::BlinkStyles;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::fs;
+use std::io;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+const MAX_SERVERS: usize = 8;
+/// How many recovery copies of an unreadable config can sit side by side:
+/// `desktop.json.corrupt`, then `desktop.json.corrupt.1` to `.9`.
+const ASIDE_SLOTS: usize = 10;
+pub const MIN_WIDTH: f64 = 480.0;
+pub const MIN_HEIGHT: f64 = 360.0;
+const MAX_EDGE: f64 = 20_000.0;
+
+/// Height of a standard title bar, in points.
+const TITLE_BAR: f64 = 28.0;
+/// How far the outer top of the window lies above `WindowFrame::y`. On macOS
+/// `y` is the content area's top (tao's `with_position` puts the content rect
+/// there and the title bar above it); elsewhere `y` is already the outer top.
+const TITLE_ABOVE_Y: f64 = if cfg!(target_os = "macos") { TITLE_BAR } else { 0.0 };
+/// How much of the title bar must be on a screen to grab it.
+const MIN_GRIP: f64 = 80.0;
+/// Room `fitted_to` leaves when it shrinks a window. Screens are full display
+/// bounds, so the menu bar and the Dock are inside them.
+const FIT_MARGIN_X: f64 = 40.0;
+const FIT_MARGIN_Y: f64 = 80.0;
+/// Room a first-run window leaves above its content (the menu bar, taller on
+/// a display with a notch, and its own title bar) and below it (a Dock of the
+/// default size): `Rect` is the whole display, so neither is taken off yet.
+const FIRST_RUN_ROOM_ABOVE: f64 = 66.0;
+const FIRST_RUN_ROOM_BELOW: f64 = 90.0;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+#[serde(default, rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Config {
+    /// Most recent first.
+    pub servers: Vec<ServerEntry>,
+    /// Connect to the most recent server at launch.
+    pub auto_connect: bool,
+    /// Always open in full screen (otherwise the last state is restored).
+    pub start_fullscreen: bool,
+    /// What the lit Apple logo does for each state of the agents (logo.rs). The
+    /// menu only shows on a Mac that has one. A value this version does not know
+    /// reads as off: a bad style must not make the whole file unreadable.
+    #[serde(deserialize_with = "lenient_blink")]
+    pub logo_blink: BlinkStyles,
+    /// Anything that is not a whole frame reads as None: a bad frame must not
+    /// make the whole file unreadable, which would cost the server list.
+    #[serde(deserialize_with = "lenient_window")]
+    pub window: Option<WindowFrame>,
+}
+
+fn lenient_window<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(d: D) -> Result<Option<WindowFrame>, D::Error> {
+    let value = serde_json::Value::deserialize(d)?;
+    Ok(serde_json::from_value(value).ok())
+}
+
+fn lenient_blink<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(d: D) -> Result<BlinkStyles, D::Error> {
+    Ok(BlinkStyles::read(&serde_json::Value::deserialize(d)?))
+}
+
+impl Default for Config {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Config {
+            servers: Vec::new(),
+            auto_connect: true,
+            start_fullscreen: false,
+            logo_blink: BlinkStyles::default(),
+            window: None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct ServerEntry {
+    pub url: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub username: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub has_saved_password: bool,
+}
+
+/// The main window's position and inner size, in logical (point)
+/// coordinates. `x`/`y` are where tao's `with_position` wants them: on macOS
+/// the top-left of the CONTENT area (the title bar, about 28 pt, sits above
+/// it), elsewhere the window's outer top-left. Saving the outer corner on
+/// macOS and restoring it as the content corner made the window creep up by
+/// a title bar on every launch.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct WindowFrame {
+    pub x: f64,
+    pub y: f64,
+    pub width: f64,
+    pub height: f64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub fullscreen: bool,
+}
+
+/// A display's full bounds in logical coordinates, as tao reports them. This
+/// is the whole display, not the work area: the menu bar and the Dock are
+/// inside it.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct Rect {
+    pub x: f64,
+    pub y: f64,
+    pub width: f64,
+    pub height: f64,
+}
+
+impl WindowFrame {
+    /// The frame of a first-run window on `screen`: `size` or what fits, never
+    /// less than `min`, centred across and in the height between the menu bar
+    /// and the Dock. Centring in the whole display put the bottom of a window
+    /// under the Dock on a 900 pt high one.
+    pub fn first_run(screen: &Rect, size: (f64, f64), min: (f64, f64)) -> WindowFrame {
+        let width = size.0.min(screen.width - FIT_MARGIN_X).max(min.0);
+        let room = screen.height - FIRST_RUN_ROOM_ABOVE - FIRST_RUN_ROOM_BELOW;
+        let height = size.1.min(room).max(min.1);
+        WindowFrame {
+            x: screen.x + (screen.width - width) / 2.0,
+            y: screen.y + FIRST_RUN_ROOM_ABOVE + ((room - height) / 2.0).max(0.0),
+            width,
+            height,
+            fullscreen: false,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The frame clamped to sane sizes, or None when it holds junk.
+    pub fn sanitized(self) -> Option<WindowFrame> {
+        let vals = [self.x, self.y, self.width, self.height];
+        if vals.iter().any(|v| !v.is_finite()) || self.x.abs() > MAX_EDGE || self.y.abs() > MAX_EDGE {
+            return None;
+        }
+        Some(WindowFrame {
+            width: self.width.clamp(MIN_WIDTH, MAX_EDGE),
+            height: self.height.clamp(MIN_HEIGHT, MAX_EDGE),
+            ..self
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// The frame made to fit the screens it will open on, or None when its
+    /// title bar is on none of them (the caller then falls back to a default
+    /// frame). An edge that no screen covers is pulled onto the screen that
+    /// holds the title bar, shrinking the window when it is too big for it:
+    /// a frame saved on an external display that is gone would otherwise
+    /// open with its right edge and resize corner far off screen. An edge
+    /// that lands on some screen stays put, so a window spanning two
+    /// displays keeps its span. `min` is the window's minimum inner size.
+    pub fn fitted_to(&self, screens: &[Rect], min: (f64, f64)) -> Option<WindowFrame> {
+        let home = *self.title_screen(screens)?;
+        let top = self.outer_top();
+        let outer_height = TITLE_BAR + self.height;
+        let (x, width) = fit_axis(
+            self.x,
+            self.width,
+            (
+                covers_x(screens, self.x, top, top + outer_height),
+                covers_x(screens, self.x + self.width, top, top + outer_height),
+            ),
+            (home.x, home.x + home.width),
+            FIT_MARGIN_X,
+            min.0,
+        );
+        let (top, outer_height) = fit_axis(
+            top,
+            outer_height,
+            (
+                covers_y(screens, top, x, x + width),
+                covers_y(screens, top + outer_height, x, x + width),
+            ),
+            (home.y, home.y + home.height),
+            FIT_MARGIN_Y - TITLE_BAR,
+            min.1 + TITLE_BAR,
+        );
+        Some(WindowFrame {
+            x,
+            y: top + TITLE_ABOVE_Y,
+            width,
+            height: outer_height - TITLE_BAR,
+            ..*self
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn outer_top(&self) -> f64 {
+        self.y - TITLE_ABOVE_Y
+    }
+
+    /// The screen the title bar is on, or None when no screen has enough of
+    /// it to grab (a display unplugged since the last run leaves the frame off
+    /// screen). The middle of the title bar must be inside the screen and at
+    /// least `MIN_GRIP` of the bar's width must overlap it; when several
+    /// qualify, the one holding most of the bar wins.
+    fn title_screen<'a>(&self, screens: &'a [Rect]) -> Option<&'a Rect> {
+        let title_y = self.outer_top() + TITLE_BAR / 2.0;
+        screens
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|m| title_y >= m.y && title_y <= m.y + m.height)
+            .map(|m| {
+                let grip = (self.x + self.width).min(m.x + m.width) - self.x.max(m.x);
+                (m, grip)
+            })
+            .filter(|(_, grip)| *grip >= MIN_GRIP)
+            .max_by(|a, b| a.1.total_cmp(&b.1))
+            .map(|(m, _)| m)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether some screen holds part of the vertical edge at `x` that runs from
+/// `top` to `bottom`.
+fn covers_x(screens: &[Rect], x: f64, top: f64, bottom: f64) -> bool {
+    screens
+        .iter()
+        .any(|m| x >= m.x && x <= m.x + m.width && top < m.y + m.height && bottom > m.y)
+}
+
+/// Whether some screen holds part of the horizontal edge at `y` that runs
+/// from `left` to `right`.
+fn covers_y(screens: &[Rect], y: f64, left: f64, right: f64) -> bool {
+    screens
+        .iter()
+        .any(|m| y >= m.y && y <= m.y + m.height && left < m.x + m.width && right > m.x)
+}
+
+/// One axis of `WindowFrame::fitted_to`. The window runs from `start` for
+/// `len`; `covered` says whether some screen holds each end; `home` is the
+/// title bar screen's range on this axis. An uncovered end is pulled onto
+/// `home`, and the window shrinks (leaving `margin`, never below `min`) when
+/// it does not fit; a covered end may stay where it is, on another display.
+fn fit_axis(start: f64, len: f64, covered: (bool, bool), home: (f64, f64), margin: f64, min: f64) -> (f64, f64) {
+    if covered.0 && covered.1 {
+        return (start, len);
+    }
+    let lo = if covered.0 { start.min(home.0) } else { home.0 };
+    let hi = if covered.1 { (start + len).max(home.1) } else { home.1 };
+    let len = len.min(hi - lo - margin).max(min);
+    // `max` last: a window still too big for the screen keeps its start (the
+    // left edge, or the title bar) on screen rather than its end.
+    let start = start.min(hi - len).max(lo);
+    (start, len)
+}
+
+/// The first name an unreadable `desktop.json` can be moved to without
+/// replacing an earlier recovery copy: `desktop.json.corrupt`, then
+/// `desktop.json.corrupt.1` to `.9`, next to it.
+/// A name is free only when nothing at all is there: a file, a directory or
+/// a dangling symlink left at it is taken, and so is a name that cannot be
+/// checked. None when every name is taken.
+fn free_aside_name(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    (0..ASIDE_SLOTS)
+        .map(|n| match n {
+            0 => path.with_extension("json.corrupt"),
+            n => path.with_extension(format!("json.corrupt.{n}")),
+        })
+        .find(|aside| matches!(fs::symlink_metadata(aside), Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound))
+}
+
+impl Config {
+    /// Where the config lives, or None if the OS has no config directory.
+    pub fn default_path() -> Option<PathBuf> {
+        dirs::config_dir().map(|d| d.join("Codeman").join("desktop.json"))
+    }
+
+    /// Read the config, and say whether saving back to `path` is safe this
+    /// run. A missing file is the default. A file that is there but cannot
+    /// be read (not UTF-8, no permission, a directory, an I/O error) or does
+    /// not parse is moved aside for recovery, and the defaults are used; it
+    /// is never silently overwritten with them. It goes to the first free
+    /// name of `desktop.json.corrupt`, `desktop.json.corrupt.1` to `.9`, so
+    /// a second unreadable file never replaces the copy kept from the first.
+    /// If every name is taken or the move fails, the answer is false: the
+    /// original is still at `path`, and the save at exit must not replace it.
+    pub fn load_from(path: &Path) -> (Config, bool) {
+        let text = match fs::read_to_string(path) {
+            Ok(text) => Some(text),
+            Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return (Config::default(), true),
+            Err(_) => None,
+        };
+        if let Some(mut config) = text.and_then(|t| serde_json::from_str::<Config>(&t).ok()) {
+            config.sanitize();
+            return (config, true);
+        }
+        let Some(aside) = free_aside_name(path) else {
+            eprintln!(
+                "codeman-desktop: {} could not be read, and {} to .{} are all taken; settings will not be saved this run",
+                path.display(),
+                path.with_extension("json.corrupt").display(),
+                ASIDE_SLOTS - 1
+            );
+            return (Config::default(), false);
+        };
+        match fs::rename(path, &aside) {
+            Ok(()) => {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "codeman-desktop: {} could not be read; moved it to {} and started with defaults",
+                    path.display(),
+                    aside.display()
+                );
+                (Config::default(), true)
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "codeman-desktop: {} could not be read or moved aside ({e}); settings will not be saved this run",
+                    path.display()
+                );
+                (Config::default(), false)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Write via a temp file and rename, so a crash never leaves half a file.
+    pub fn save_to(&self, path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
+        if let Some(dir) = path.parent() {
+            fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
+        }
+        let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        let text = serde_json::to_string_pretty(self).map_err(io::Error::other)?;
+        fs::write(&tmp, text)?;
+        fs::rename(&tmp, path)
+    }
+
+    fn sanitize(&mut self) {
+        let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        self.servers.retain(|s| !s.url.is_empty() && seen.insert(s.url.clone()));
+        self.servers.truncate(MAX_SERVERS);
+        self.window = self.window.and_then(WindowFrame::sanitized);
+    }
+
+    /// Move (or add) a server to the top of the recent list. Returns the
+    /// Keychain accounts, as (url, username), of the entries with a username
+    /// that fall off the end of the list (it keeps `MAX_SERVERS`), for the
+    /// caller to delete. A different username on `url` itself is not
+    /// reported: the caller deletes that account before it saves the new
+    /// one, comparing the names exactly as the Keychain account string
+    /// does. A delete made after the save could take the new password with
+    /// it on a Keychain that treats two spellings of a name as one item.
+    #[must_use = "the returned Keychain accounts must be deleted"]
+    pub fn remember(&mut self, url: &str, username: Option<&str>, saved: bool) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
+        self.servers.retain(|s| s.url != url);
+        self.servers.insert(
+            0,
+            ServerEntry {
+                url: url.to_string(),
+                username: username.map(str::to_string),
+                has_saved_password: saved,
+            },
+        );
+        let evicted = self.servers.split_off(self.servers.len().min(MAX_SERVERS));
+        evicted.into_iter().filter_map(|s| Some((s.url, s.username?))).collect()
+    }
+
+    pub fn forget(&mut self, url: &str) -> Option<ServerEntry> {
+        let idx = self.servers.iter().position(|s| s.url == url)?;
+        Some(self.servers.remove(idx))
+    }
+
+    pub fn find(&self, url: &str) -> Option<&ServerEntry> {
+        self.servers.iter().find(|s| s.url == url)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn tmp_dir(name: &str) -> PathBuf {
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("codeman-desktop-test-{}-{name}", std::process::id()));
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+        dir
+    }
+
+    fn frame(x: f64, y: f64, width: f64, height: f64) -> WindowFrame {
+        WindowFrame {
+            x,
+            y,
+            width,
+            height,
+            fullscreen: false,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn rect(x: f64, y: f64, width: f64, height: f64) -> Rect {
+        Rect { x, y, width, height }
+    }
+
+    const MIN: (f64, f64) = (MIN_WIDTH, MIN_HEIGHT);
+
+    fn reachable(f: &WindowFrame, screens: &[Rect]) -> bool {
+        f.title_screen(screens).is_some()
+    }
+
+    /// The outer frame (title bar included) as left, top, right, bottom.
+    fn outer(f: &WindowFrame) -> (f64, f64, f64, f64) {
+        let top = f.y - TITLE_ABOVE_Y;
+        (f.x, top, f.x + f.width, top + TITLE_BAR + f.height)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn missing_file_is_default() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("missing");
+        let (c, can_save) = Config::load_from(&dir.join("desktop.json"));
+        assert_eq!(c, Config::default());
+        assert!(c.auto_connect);
+        assert!(can_save);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_logo_blink_styles_round_trip_and_a_bad_one_reads_as_off() {
+        use crate::logo::BlinkStyle;
+        let mut c = Config::default();
+        assert_eq!(c.logo_blink, BlinkStyles::default());
+        c.logo_blink.needs_you = BlinkStyle::Alarm;
+        let text = serde_json::to_string(&c).unwrap();
+        assert!(text.contains(r#""needsYou":"alarm""#), "{text}");
+        assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Config>(&text).unwrap().logo_blink, c.logo_blink);
+        for bad in [
+            r#"{"logoBlink":3}"#,
+            r#"{"logoBlink":null}"#,
+            r#"{"logoBlink":"strobe"}"#,
+        ] {
+            let c: Config = serde_json::from_str(bad).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(c.logo_blink, BlinkStyles::default(), "{bad}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_style_a_mac_saved_before_there_were_states_is_kept() {
+        use crate::logo::BlinkStyle;
+        let c: Config = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"logoBlink":"heartbeat"}"#).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(c.logo_blink.working, BlinkStyle::Heartbeat);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn round_trip_and_atomic_save() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("roundtrip");
+        let path = dir.join("nested").join("desktop.json");
+        let mut c = Config::default();
+        assert!(c.remember("http://127.0.0.1:3000/", None, false).is_empty());
+        assert!(c.remember("https://box.ts.net/", Some("admin"), true).is_empty());
+        c.start_fullscreen = true;
+        c.window = Some(WindowFrame {
+            x: 10.0,
+            y: 20.0,
+            width: 1200.0,
+            height: 800.0,
+            fullscreen: true,
+        });
+        c.save_to(&path).unwrap();
+        assert!(!path.with_extension("json.tmp").exists());
+        let (back, can_save) = Config::load_from(&path);
+        assert!(can_save);
+        assert_eq!(back, c);
+        assert_eq!(back.servers[0].url, "https://box.ts.net/");
+        let text = fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            !text.to_lowercase().contains("password\":\""),
+            "no password values on disk"
+        );
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn corrupt_file_is_moved_aside() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("corrupt");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+        fs::write(&path, "{ not json").unwrap();
+        let (c, can_save) = Config::load_from(&path);
+        assert_eq!(c, Config::default());
+        assert!(can_save);
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        assert!(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt").exists());
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn non_utf8_file_is_moved_aside() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("non-utf8");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+        // Valid JSON apart from a Latin-1 "ü", which is not UTF-8.
+        let bytes = b"{\"servers\":[{\"url\":\"http://a/\",\"username\":\"J\xfcrg\"}]}";
+        fs::write(&path, bytes).unwrap();
+        let (c, can_save) = Config::load_from(&path);
+        assert_eq!(c, Config::default());
+        assert!(can_save);
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        assert_eq!(fs::read(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt")).unwrap(), bytes);
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unreadable_path_is_moved_aside() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("unreadable");
+        let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+        // A directory where the file should be: it exists but cannot be read.
+        fs::create_dir_all(path.join("inside")).unwrap();
+        let (c, can_save) = Config::load_from(&path);
+        assert_eq!(c, Config::default());
+        assert!(can_save);
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        assert!(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt").join("inside").is_dir());
+        c.save_to(&path).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Config::load_from(&path), (Config::default(), true));
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn second_corruption_keeps_the_first_copy() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("corrupt-twice");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+        fs::write(&path, "{ first").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Config::load_from(&path), (Config::default(), true));
+        fs::write(&path, "{ second").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Config::load_from(&path), (Config::default(), true));
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt")).unwrap(), "{ first");
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::read_to_string(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt.1")).unwrap(),
+            "{ second"
+        );
+        // A good file written afterwards loads normally and moves nothing.
+        Config::default().save_to(&path).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Config::load_from(&path), (Config::default(), true));
+        assert!(!dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt.2").exists());
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn taken_aside_names_are_skipped() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("aside-taken");
+        // A directory left at the first name and a file at the second: the
+        // third is the first free one.
+        fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt")).unwrap();
+        fs::write(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt.1"), "kept").unwrap();
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(dir.join("nowhere"), dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt.2")).unwrap();
+        let next = if cfg!(unix) {
+            "desktop.json.corrupt.3"
+        } else {
+            "desktop.json.corrupt.2"
+        };
+        let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+        fs::write(&path, "{ not json").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Config::load_from(&path), (Config::default(), true));
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        assert!(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt").is_dir());
+        assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt.1")).unwrap(), "kept");
+        // The dangling symlink still points nowhere and still counts as taken.
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        assert!(fs::symlink_metadata(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt.2"))
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_symlink());
+        assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(dir.join(next)).unwrap(), "{ not json");
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_free_aside_name_disables_saving() {
+        let dir = tmp_dir("aside-full");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+        let names: Vec<PathBuf> = std::iter::once(dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt"))
+            .chain((1..ASIDE_SLOTS).map(|n| dir.join(format!("desktop.json.corrupt.{n}"))))
+            .collect();
+        assert_eq!(names.len(), 10);
+        for (n, name) in names.iter().enumerate() {
+            fs::write(name, format!("copy {n}")).unwrap();
+        }
+        fs::write(&path, "{ not json").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(Config::load_from(&path), (Config::default(), false));
+        assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap(), "{ not json");
+        for (n, name) in names.iter().enumerate() {
+            assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(name).unwrap(), format!("copy {n}"));
+        }
+        assert!(!dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt.10").exists());
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn failed_move_aside_disables_saving() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let dir = tmp_dir("stuck");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+        fs::write(&path, "{ not json").unwrap();
+        fs::set_permissions(&dir, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o555)).unwrap();
+        // Root ignores the read-only directory, so the rename cannot fail.
+        if fs::write(dir.join("probe"), "").is_ok() {
+            eprintln!("skipped: the directory is still writable (running as root?)");
+            fs::set_permissions(&dir, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+            let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+            return;
+        }
+        let (c, can_save) = Config::load_from(&path);
+        fs::set_permissions(&dir, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(c, Config::default());
+        assert!(!can_save);
+        assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap(), "{ not json");
+        assert!(!dir.join("desktop.json.corrupt").exists());
+        let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn recent_list_is_deduped_and_capped() {
+        let mut c = Config::default();
+        for i in 0..12 {
+            assert!(c.remember(&format!("http://h{i}/"), None, false).is_empty());
+        }
+        assert!(c.remember("http://h5/", Some("me"), false).is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(c.servers.len(), MAX_SERVERS);
+        assert_eq!(c.servers[0].url, "http://h5/");
+        assert_eq!(c.servers.iter().filter(|s| s.url == "http://h5/").count(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(c.forget("http://h5/").unwrap().username.as_deref(), Some("me"));
+        assert!(c.find("http://h5/").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn remember_leaves_a_username_change_to_the_caller() {
+        let url = "https://box.ts.net/";
+        let mut c = Config::default();
+        assert!(c.remember(url, Some("Alice"), true).is_empty());
+        // Every change of the username on the same server, a case-only one,
+        // another user, or none at all, returns nothing: the caller deletes
+        // the old account before it saves the new one.
+        for (user, saved) in [
+            (Some("alice"), true),
+            (Some(" alice "), true),
+            (Some("bob"), true),
+            (None, false),
+            (None, false),
+            (Some("dave"), true),
+        ] {
+            assert!(c.remember(url, user, saved).is_empty(), "{user:?}");
+            let entry = c.find(url).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!((entry.username.as_deref(), entry.has_saved_password), (user, saved));
+            assert_eq!(c.servers.iter().filter(|s| s.url == url).count(), 1);
+        }
+        assert!(c.remember("http://other/", Some("carol"), true).is_empty());
+        assert!(c.remember(url, Some("erin"), true).is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(c.servers.len(), 2);
+        assert_eq!(c.servers[0].url, url);
+        assert_eq!(c.find("http://other/").unwrap().username.as_deref(), Some("carol"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn remember_returns_evicted_accounts() {
+        let mut c = Config::default();
+        for i in 0..MAX_SERVERS {
+            let user = (i % 2 == 0).then(|| format!("u{i}"));
+            assert!(c.remember(&format!("http://h{i}/"), user.as_deref(), true).is_empty());
+        }
+        // Moving a listed server to the top evicts nothing.
+        assert!(c.remember("http://h3/", None, false).is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(c.servers.len(), MAX_SERVERS);
+        // A new server pushes the oldest (h0, with a username) off the end.
+        assert_eq!(
+            c.remember("http://new/", None, false),
+            vec![("http://h0/".to_string(), "u0".to_string())]
+        );
+        // The next oldest is h1, which has no username: nothing to delete.
+        assert!(c.remember("http://newer/", Some("x"), true).is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(c.servers.len(), MAX_SERVERS);
+        assert!(c.find("http://h0/").is_none() && c.find("http://h1/").is_none());
+        // A username change on a listed server returns nothing; the next new
+        // server evicts the oldest entry, and only that account comes back.
+        let mut c = Config::default();
+        for i in 0..MAX_SERVERS {
+            assert!(c.remember(&format!("http://h{i}/"), Some("u"), true).is_empty());
+        }
+        assert!(c.remember("http://h7/", Some("v"), true).is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(
+            c.remember("http://h8/", Some("w"), true),
+            vec![("http://h0/".to_string(), "u".to_string())]
+        );
+        assert_eq!(c.find("http://h7/").unwrap().username.as_deref(), Some("v"));
+        assert_eq!(c.servers.len(), MAX_SERVERS);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unknown_and_missing_fields_tolerated() {
+        let c: Config = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"servers":[{"url":"http://a/"}],"future":1}"#).unwrap();
+        assert!(c.auto_connect);
+        assert_eq!(c.servers[0].username, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_bad_window_frame_keeps_the_servers() {
+        for (name, window) in [
+            ("missing-height", r#"{"x":1,"y":2,"width":3}"#),
+            ("not-a-frame", r#""maximized""#),
+            ("null-number", r#"{"x":null,"y":2,"width":3,"height":4}"#),
+        ] {
+            let dir = tmp_dir(&format!("bad-window-{name}"));
+            fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+            let path = dir.join("desktop.json");
+            fs::write(
+                &path,
+                format!(r#"{{"servers":[{{"url":"http://a/"}}],"autoConnect":false,"window":{window}}}"#),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+            let (c, can_save) = Config::load_from(&path);
+            assert!(can_save, "{name}");
+            assert_eq!(c.servers.len(), 1, "{name}");
+            assert!(!c.auto_connect, "{name}");
+            assert_eq!(c.window, None, "{name}");
+            // The file was read, so it stays where it is.
+            assert!(path.is_file(), "{name}");
+            assert!(!path.with_extension("json.corrupt").exists(), "{name}");
+        }
+        // A whole frame and an absent one read as before.
+        let c: Config =
+            serde_json::from_str(r#"{"window":{"x":1,"y":2,"width":900,"height":600,"fullscreen":true}}"#).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(c.window.map(|f| (f.width, f.fullscreen)), Some((900.0, true)));
+        assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Config>("{}").unwrap().window, None);
+        assert_eq!(
+            serde_json::from_str::<Config>(r#"{"window":null}"#).unwrap().window,
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn first_run_window_sits_between_the_menu_bar_and_the_dock() {
+        let screen = |width: f64, height: f64| Rect {
+            x: 0.0,
+            y: 0.0,
+            width,
+            height,
+        };
+        let size = (1280.0, 820.0);
+        let min = (480.0, 360.0);
+        // A 13 inch MacBook: the window is shortened, and ends above the Dock.
+        let f = WindowFrame::first_run(&screen(1440.0, 900.0), size, min);
+        assert_eq!((f.width, f.height), (1280.0, 744.0));
+        assert_eq!((f.x, f.y), (80.0, 66.0));
+        assert!(f.y + f.height <= 900.0 - 90.0);
+        // A large display: the full size, centred across and in the free height.
+        let f = WindowFrame::first_run(&screen(2560.0, 1440.0), size, min);
+        assert_eq!((f.width, f.height), (1280.0, 820.0));
+        assert_eq!(f.x, 640.0);
+        assert_eq!(f.y - 66.0, 1440.0 - 90.0 - (f.y + f.height));
+        // A second display to the left of the first.
+        let left = Rect {
+            x: -1920.0,
+            y: 120.0,
+            width: 1920.0,
+            height: 1080.0,
+        };
+        let f = WindowFrame::first_run(&left, size, min);
+        assert_eq!(f.x, -1920.0 + 320.0);
+        assert!(f.y >= 120.0 + 66.0 && f.y + f.height <= 120.0 + 1080.0 - 90.0);
+        // Never smaller than the minimum, on a display too small for it too.
+        let f = WindowFrame::first_run(&screen(500.0, 400.0), size, min);
+        assert_eq!((f.width, f.height), min);
+        assert!(!f.fullscreen);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn frame_sanitizing_and_reachability() {
+        assert!(frame(f64::NAN, 0.0, 800.0, 600.0).sanitized().is_none());
+        let small = frame(0.0, 0.0, 10.0, 10.0).sanitized().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((small.width, small.height), (MIN_WIDTH, MIN_HEIGHT));
+        let screen = [rect(0.0, 0.0, 1512.0, 982.0)];
+        let on = frame(100.0, 50.0, 1200.0, 800.0);
+        assert!(reachable(&on, &screen));
+        assert_eq!(on.fitted_to(&screen, MIN), Some(on));
+        let off = frame(3000.0, 50.0, 1200.0, 800.0);
+        assert!(!reachable(&off, &screen));
+        assert_eq!(off.fitted_to(&screen, MIN), None);
+        let above = frame(100.0, -900.0, 1200.0, 800.0);
+        assert!(!reachable(&above, &screen));
+        assert_eq!(above.fitted_to(&screen, MIN), None);
+        // Only a sliver of the title bar on screen is not enough to grab.
+        let sliver = frame(-1150.0, 50.0, 1200.0, 800.0);
+        assert!(!reachable(&sliver, &screen));
+        assert_eq!(sliver.fitted_to(&screen, MIN), None);
+        // No screens at all (none reported): nothing is reachable.
+        assert_eq!(on.fitted_to(&[], MIN), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn title_bar_is_above_y_on_macos() {
+        let screen = [rect(0.0, 0.0, 1512.0, 982.0)];
+        // On macOS the title bar of a content top at y = 10 is at -18..10,
+        // mostly above the screen; elsewhere it is at 10..38.
+        let high = frame(100.0, 10.0, 1200.0, 800.0);
+        assert_eq!(reachable(&high, &screen), !cfg!(target_os = "macos"));
+        // Half the bar above the top edge: still grabbable, and fitting
+        // brings all of it onto the screen.
+        let straddling = frame(100.0, TITLE_ABOVE_Y - 10.0, 1200.0, 800.0);
+        assert!(reachable(&straddling, &screen));
+        let fitted = straddling.fitted_to(&screen, MIN).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(outer(&fitted).1, 0.0);
+        assert_eq!((fitted.x, fitted.width, fitted.height), (100.0, 1200.0, 800.0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn frame_from_an_unplugged_ultrawide_is_fitted() {
+        // Saved on a 3440x1440 display at the origin, restored on a laptop.
+        let laptop = [rect(0.0, 0.0, 1512.0, 982.0)];
+        let wide = frame(0.0, 30.0, 3300.0, 1300.0);
+        let fitted = wide.fitted_to(&laptop, MIN).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            (fitted.x, fitted.y, fitted.width, fitted.height),
+            (0.0, 30.0, 1512.0 - FIT_MARGIN_X, 982.0 - FIT_MARGIN_Y)
+        );
+        let (left, top, right, bottom) = outer(&fitted);
+        assert!(left >= 0.0 && top >= 0.0 && right <= 1512.0 && bottom <= 982.0);
+        // Hanging off the right of the laptop by a bit: shifted, not shrunk.
+        let fitted = frame(500.0, 100.0, 1200.0, 700.0).fitted_to(&laptop, MIN).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            (fitted.x, fitted.y, fitted.width, fitted.height),
+            (312.0, 100.0, 1200.0, 700.0)
+        );
+        // Hanging off the left: shifted right.
+        let fitted = frame(-1000.0, 100.0, 1200.0, 700.0).fitted_to(&laptop, MIN).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((fitted.x, fitted.width), (0.0, 1200.0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn frame_spanning_two_displays_is_left_alone() {
+        let screens = [rect(0.0, 0.0, 1512.0, 982.0), rect(1512.0, -200.0, 2560.0, 1440.0)];
+        let span = frame(1000.0, 100.0, 1500.0, 700.0);
+        assert_eq!(span.fitted_to(&screens, MIN), Some(span));
+        // Only the edge that lands on no display moves: the left edge stays
+        // on the laptop, the right edge comes back onto the external one.
+        let past = frame(1000.0, 100.0, 3500.0, 700.0);
+        let fitted = past.fitted_to(&screens, MIN).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(fitted.x, 1000.0);
+        assert_eq!(fitted.x + fitted.width, 1512.0 + 2560.0 - FIT_MARGIN_X);
+        assert_eq!((fitted.y, fitted.height), (100.0, 700.0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fitted_frame_keeps_the_minimum_size() {
+        let tiny = [rect(0.0, 0.0, 400.0, 300.0)];
+        let fitted = frame(0.0, 40.0, 1200.0, 800.0).fitted_to(&tiny, MIN).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((fitted.width, fitted.height), MIN);
+        // Too big for the screen even at the minimum: the left edge and the
+        // title bar stay on it.
+        let (left, top, _, _) = outer(&fitted);
+        assert_eq!((left, top), (0.0, 0.0));
+        assert!(reachable(&fitted, &tiny));
+        // The fullscreen flag rides along.
+        let full = WindowFrame {
+            fullscreen: true,
+            ..frame(0.0, 40.0, 1200.0, 800.0)
+        };
+        assert!(full.fitted_to(&tiny, MIN).unwrap().fullscreen);
+    }
+}

packages/desktop/src/credentials.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+//! Saved passwords, in the macOS Keychain (service "Codeman Desktop", one item
+//! per username + server). Nothing secret is ever written to the config file.
+//! Windows and Linux get their stores when those builds land.
+//!
+//! Every Keychain call runs on ONE long-lived worker thread, never on the
+//! event loop: any of them can bring up the system's access prompt (an
+//! ad-hoc build's items name the previous build), and the window must keep
+//! running while it is up. One serial worker rather than a thread per call,
+//! because jobs must run in the order they were asked for: a delete from
+//! Forget that ran after a later save of the same account would remove the
+//! password that was just saved.
+
+use std::sync::mpsc::{self, Receiver, Sender};
+use std::thread::{self, JoinHandle};
+
+pub const SERVICE: &str = "Codeman Desktop";
+
+/// What a job reports when the worker thread is gone.
+const WORKER_GONE: &str = "The Keychain could not be reached.";
+
+/// The Keychain account name for a username on a server.
+pub fn account(server_url: &str, username: &str) -> String {
+    format!("{username} @ {server_url}")
+}
+
+/// The password store the worker runs jobs against: the Keychain on macOS,
+/// a stub elsewhere, an in-memory map in the tests.
+trait Backend: Send {
+    fn load(&mut self, account: &str) -> Option<String>;
+    fn save(&mut self, account: &str, password: &str) -> Result<(), String>;
+    fn delete(&mut self, account: &str);
+}
+
+enum Job {
+    Load {
+        account: String,
+        reply: Sender<Option<String>>,
+    },
+    Save {
+        account: String,
+        password: String,
+        reply: Sender<Result<(), String>>,
+    },
+    Delete {
+        account: String,
+    },
+    /// Ends the worker, so the tests can check what callers see after it.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    Stop,
+}
+
+/// A handle on the Keychain worker. Start it once with [`Keychain::spawn`]
+/// and clone the handle: every clone feeds the same queue, which is what
+/// keeps jobs in order. The worker ends when the last handle is dropped.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct Keychain {
+    jobs: Sender<Job>,
+}
+
+impl Keychain {
+    /// Starts the worker. If the thread cannot be started, the handle still
+    /// works and every call fails soft (no password, save refused).
+    pub fn spawn() -> Keychain {
+        start(Box::new(imp::System)).0
+    }
+
+    /// The saved password for an account. Blocks until every job queued
+    /// before it has run and the Keychain has answered, which can mean
+    /// waiting on the access prompt, so call it from a worker thread.
+    /// `None` when nothing is saved, the item is unreadable or the worker
+    /// is gone.
+    pub fn load_blocking(&self, account: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        let (reply, answer) = mpsc::channel();
+        let job = Job::Load {
+            account: account.to_owned(),
+            reply,
+        };
+        self.jobs.send(job).ok()?;
+        answer.recv().ok().flatten()
+    }
+
+    /// Saves a password, replacing any saved before. Blocks like
+    /// [`Keychain::load_blocking`]; the result is the Keychain's own.
+    pub fn save_blocking(&self, account: &str, password: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+        let (reply, answer) = mpsc::channel();
+        let job = Job::Save {
+            account: account.to_owned(),
+            password: password.to_owned(),
+            reply,
+        };
+        self.jobs.send(job).map_err(|_| WORKER_GONE.to_string())?;
+        answer.recv().unwrap_or_else(|_| Err(WORKER_GONE.into()))
+    }
+
+    /// Queues the removal of an account's password and returns at once.
+    /// Jobs queued after it see the account gone. Nothing happens when the
+    /// worker is gone.
+    pub fn delete(&self, account: &str) {
+        let _ = self.jobs.send(Job::Delete {
+            account: account.to_owned(),
+        });
+    }
+}
+
+/// Starts a worker on `backend`. The join handle is for the tests; `None`
+/// when the thread could not be started, in which case the receiver went
+/// down with the closure and every send fails.
+fn start(backend: Box<dyn Backend>) -> (Keychain, Option<JoinHandle<()>>) {
+    let (jobs, queue) = mpsc::channel();
+    let worker = thread::Builder::new()
+        .name("keychain".into())
+        .spawn(move || run(backend, queue))
+        .ok();
+    (Keychain { jobs }, worker)
+}
+
+/// The worker loop: one job at a time, in the order they were sent, until
+/// every handle is gone. A reply nobody waits for any more is dropped.
+fn run(mut backend: Box<dyn Backend>, queue: Receiver<Job>) {
+    for job in queue {
+        match job {
+            Job::Load { account, reply } => {
+                let _ = reply.send(backend.load(&account));
+            }
+            Job::Save {
+                account,
+                password,
+                reply,
+            } => {
+                let _ = reply.send(backend.save(&account, &password));
+            }
+            Job::Delete { account } => backend.delete(&account),
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            Job::Stop => return,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+mod imp {
+    use super::{Backend, SERVICE};
+    use objc2::rc::autoreleasepool;
+    use security_framework::passwords::{delete_generic_password, get_generic_password, set_generic_password};
+
+    /// The login Keychain, through security-framework. The worker lives as
+    /// long as the app and a thread's implicit autorelease pool drains only
+    /// when the thread ends, so each call gets its own pool and whatever
+    /// Security autoreleases is freed with the job.
+    pub struct System;
+
+    impl Backend for System {
+        fn load(&mut self, account: &str) -> Option<String> {
+            autoreleasepool(|_| {
+                get_generic_password(SERVICE, account)
+                    .ok()
+                    .and_then(|b| String::from_utf8(b).ok())
+            })
+        }
+
+        fn save(&mut self, account: &str, password: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+            autoreleasepool(|_| set_generic_password(SERVICE, account, password.as_bytes()).map_err(|e| e.to_string()))
+        }
+
+        fn delete(&mut self, account: &str) {
+            autoreleasepool(|_| {
+                let _ = delete_generic_password(SERVICE, account);
+            })
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
+mod imp {
+    use super::Backend;
+
+    /// No password store yet on this platform.
+    pub struct System;
+
+    impl Backend for System {
+        fn load(&mut self, _account: &str) -> Option<String> {
+            None
+        }
+        fn save(&mut self, _account: &str, _password: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+            Err("Saving passwords is not supported on this platform yet.".into())
+        }
+        fn delete(&mut self, _account: &str) {}
+    }
+}
+
+/// A Keychain on an in-memory store, for these tests and for the tests of the
+/// code that uses a Keychain (main.rs).
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(crate) mod memory {
+    use super::{start, Backend, Keychain};
+    use std::collections::HashMap;
+    use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+    use std::time::Duration;
+
+    /// An in-memory store that logs every job it runs. Its delete is slow on
+    /// purpose: a queue that did not keep order would let the next job
+    /// overtake it, and the tests would see that.
+    #[derive(Clone, Default)]
+    pub(crate) struct Memory {
+        items: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, String>>>,
+        log: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
+    }
+
+    impl Memory {
+        fn note(&self, entry: String) {
+            self.log.lock().unwrap().push(entry);
+        }
+        /// The jobs the store ran, in order.
+        pub(crate) fn log(&self) -> Vec<String> {
+            self.log.lock().unwrap().clone()
+        }
+    }
+
+    impl Backend for Memory {
+        fn load(&mut self, account: &str) -> Option<String> {
+            self.note(format!("load {account}"));
+            self.items.lock().unwrap().get(account).cloned()
+        }
+        fn save(&mut self, account: &str, password: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+            self.note(format!("save {account}"));
+            self.items
+                .lock()
+                .unwrap()
+                .insert(account.to_owned(), password.to_owned());
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        fn delete(&mut self, account: &str) {
+            std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(30));
+            self.note(format!("delete {account}"));
+            self.items.lock().unwrap().remove(account);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A worker on a fresh store, and the store to look into.
+    pub(crate) fn keychain() -> (Keychain, Memory) {
+        let memory = Memory::default();
+        let (keychain, worker) = start(Box::new(memory.clone()));
+        assert!(worker.is_some(), "the worker thread starts");
+        (keychain, memory)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::memory::{keychain, Memory};
+    use super::{start, Backend, Job, Keychain};
+
+    /// A store whose load fails the way a crashed worker would.
+    struct Crashes;
+
+    impl Backend for Crashes {
+        fn load(&mut self, _account: &str) -> Option<String> {
+            panic!("keychain worker crashed");
+        }
+        fn save(&mut self, _account: &str, _password: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        fn delete(&mut self, _account: &str) {}
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn account_names_are_per_user_and_server() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            super::account("http://127.0.0.1:3000/", "admin"),
+            "admin @ http://127.0.0.1:3000/"
+        );
+        assert_ne!(
+            super::account("http://a/", "admin"),
+            super::account("http://b/", "admin")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_load_reads_what_a_save_wrote() {
+        let (keychain, _) = keychain();
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a"), None);
+        assert_eq!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "secret"), Ok(()));
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a").as_deref(), Some("secret"));
+        assert_eq!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "changed"), Ok(()));
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a").as_deref(), Some("changed"));
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("b"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_delete_queued_before_a_save_never_removes_the_saved_password() {
+        let (keychain, memory) = keychain();
+        assert_eq!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "old"), Ok(()));
+        keychain.delete("a");
+        assert_eq!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "new"), Ok(()));
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a").as_deref(), Some("new"));
+        assert_eq!(memory.log(), ["save a", "delete a", "save a", "load a"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_delete_queued_after_a_save_removes_it_before_the_next_job() {
+        let (keychain, memory) = keychain();
+        assert_eq!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "secret"), Ok(()));
+        keychain.delete("a");
+        // No wait between the two: the load is queued behind the delete.
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a"), None);
+        assert_eq!(memory.log(), ["save a", "delete a", "load a"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn jobs_from_clones_on_other_threads_share_one_queue() {
+        let (keychain, memory) = keychain();
+        let other = keychain.clone();
+        std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            other.save_blocking("a", "secret").unwrap();
+            other.delete("a");
+        })
+        .join()
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a"), None);
+        assert_eq!(memory.log(), ["save a", "delete a", "load a"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn every_call_fails_soft_once_the_worker_is_gone() {
+        let memory = Memory::default();
+        let (keychain, worker) = start(Box::new(memory.clone()));
+        assert_eq!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "secret"), Ok(()));
+        keychain.jobs.send(Job::Stop).unwrap();
+        worker.unwrap().join().unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a"), None);
+        assert!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "secret").is_err());
+        keychain.delete("a");
+        keychain.clone().delete("a");
+        assert_eq!(memory.log(), ["save a"]);
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(panic = "unwind")]
+    #[test]
+    fn a_worker_that_dies_mid_job_answers_nothing_and_takes_no_more_jobs() {
+        let (keychain, worker) = start(Box::new(Crashes));
+        assert_eq!(keychain.load_blocking("a"), None);
+        assert!(worker.unwrap().join().is_err(), "the worker panicked");
+        assert!(keychain.save_blocking("a", "secret").is_err());
+        keychain.delete("a");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_handle_is_send_and_sync() {
+        fn send_sync_clone<T: Send + Sync + Clone + 'static>() {}
+        send_sync_clone::<Keychain>();
+    }
+}

packages/desktop/src/local_server.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
+//! "Start Codeman on this Mac": `codeman web -d` through the user's login shell.
+//! The same login-shell machinery answers whether Codeman is installed
+//! (`installed`) and hands its environment to the graphical install
+//! (`login_environment`); `exec_bounded` is the crate's bounded process runner.
+//!
+//! A double-clicked app gets launchd's bare PATH (`/usr/bin:/bin:...`), which
+//! finds neither `codeman` nor `node`, and the server inherits whatever
+//! environment it is started with: every session it spawns looks for
+//! claude/codex/tmux on that PATH and reads provider keys from it. So the
+//! command runs with the login shell's environment, picking up Homebrew and the
+//! user's profile, and falls back to the interactive profile (`-i`) for setups
+//! that only extend PATH there (nvm in `.zshrc`). The URL's port and base path
+//! are passed as separate arguments (`"$@"`), never spliced into the script text.
+//!
+//! How depends on the shell, chosen by its basename as Codeman's own
+//! `src/utils/shell-resolver.ts` does:
+//! - A POSIX shell (zsh, bash, sh, ...) runs `SCRIPT` itself:
+//!   `$SHELL -l [-i] -c SCRIPT codeman-desktop <args>`.
+//! - Any other shell (fish, nu, xonsh, elvish, pwsh, tcsh) cannot parse
+//!   `SCRIPT`: fish has no `then`/`fi` and refuses `$@`. It is only asked to
+//!   print its environment between two markers, and `SCRIPT` then runs under
+//!   `/bin/sh` with exactly that environment.
+//!
+//! `codeman web -d` refuses to start a second server on the same data dir and
+//! returns once the new one answers `/api/status`, so this is safe to call
+//! only after the probe found nothing listening.
+
+use std::io::Read;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
+use std::sync::mpsc;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+use url::Url;
+
+use crate::policy;
+
+/// For the whole start, every shell run and retry included.
+const TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
+
+/// How long the pipes may stay open after the shell exited. Something the
+/// profile started in the background can inherit them and keep them open for
+/// as long as it runs; whatever arrived by then is used.
+const PIPE_GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
+
+/// Found on PATH first, then the `install.sh` clone at `~/.codeman/app`.
+const SCRIPT: &str = r#"if command -v codeman >/dev/null 2>&1; then exec codeman "$@"; fi
+if [ -f "$HOME/.codeman/app/dist/index.js" ] && command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  exec node "$HOME/.codeman/app/dist/index.js" "$@"
+fi
+echo "Could not find the codeman command or ~/.codeman/app. Install Codeman first: https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman#install" >&2
+exit 127"#;
+
+/// Bracket the environment a non-POSIX login shell prints, so whatever its
+/// profile writes to stdout before or after cannot be read as a variable.
+const ENV_BEGIN: &str = "__CODEMAN_DESKTOP_ENV_BEGIN__";
+const ENV_END: &str = "__CODEMAN_DESKTOP_ENV_END__";
+
+/// What a non-POSIX login shell runs to report its environment. The shell
+/// itself only parses a command path and one single-quoted word with no `;`,
+/// `$`, backslash or `!` in it, so fish, nu, xonsh, elvish, pwsh and tcsh have
+/// no syntax of their own to disagree on. The markers and `env` run under
+/// `/bin/sh`, which inherits everything the profile exported.
+fn capture_command() -> String {
+    format!("/bin/sh -c 'echo {ENV_BEGIN}; /usr/bin/env; echo {ENV_END}'")
+}
+
+fn login_shell() -> PathBuf {
+    std::env::var_os("SHELL")
+        .map(PathBuf::from)
+        .filter(|p| p.is_absolute() && p.exists())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("/bin/zsh"))
+}
+
+/// How the login shell takes part in a start.
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum Flavor {
+    /// Runs `SCRIPT` itself.
+    Posix,
+    /// Only reports its environment. One entry per attempt, in order: a later
+    /// one runs when the earlier one printed no environment or its environment
+    /// had no `codeman` (exit 127).
+    Capture(&'static [&'static [&'static str]]),
+}
+
+fn flavor(shell: &Path) -> Flavor {
+    match shell.file_name().and_then(|n| n.to_str()).unwrap_or("") {
+        "sh" | "bash" | "zsh" | "dash" | "ksh" | "ash" | "ksh93" | "mksh" | "pdksh" => Flavor::Posix,
+        // tcsh honors -l only when it is the ONLY flag, so a login shell that
+        // also runs a command is impossible; -i at least reads all of .tcshrc
+        // (csh: .cshrc), including the parts guarded by `$?prompt`.
+        "csh" | "tcsh" => Flavor::Capture(&[&["-ic"]]),
+        _ => Flavor::Capture(&[&["-l", "-c"], &["-l", "-i", "-c"]]),
+    }
+}
+
+/// What one process printed, stdout and stderr kept apart.
+pub struct Output {
+    pub code: Option<i32>,
+    pub stdout: String,
+    pub stderr: String,
+}
+
+/// What `codeman` (or `SCRIPT` failing to find it) said, for the connect page.
+struct Run {
+    code: Option<i32>,
+    output: String,
+}
+
+impl From<Output> for Run {
+    fn from(out: Output) -> Self {
+        let mut output = out.stdout;
+        if !out.stderr.trim().is_empty() {
+            // On a line of its own, also when stdout ended without a newline.
+            if !output.is_empty() && !output.ends_with('\n') {
+                output.push('\n');
+            }
+            output.push_str(&out.stderr);
+        }
+        Run {
+            code: out.code,
+            output: last_lines(&output, 6),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Copy `pipe` into the channel as it arrives, tagged with `stream`, then send
+/// `None` once it closes.
+fn pump<R: Read + Send + 'static>(pipe: Option<R>, stream: usize, tx: mpsc::Sender<(usize, Option<Vec<u8>>)>) {
+    std::thread::spawn(move || {
+        if let Some(mut pipe) = pipe {
+            let mut buf = [0u8; 8192];
+            loop {
+                match pipe.read(&mut buf) {
+                    Ok(0) => break,
+                    Ok(n) => {
+                        if tx.send((stream, Some(buf[..n].to_vec()))).is_err() {
+                            return;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
+                    Err(_) => break,
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        let _ = tx.send((stream, None));
+    });
+}
+
+/// `exec_bounded` with the start's timeout message. The installed check and
+/// `login_environment` run through it too, and drop its error.
+fn exec(cmd: Command, deadline: Instant) -> Result<Output, String> {
+    exec_bounded(
+        cmd,
+        deadline,
+        "Starting Codeman took longer than a minute; it was stopped.",
+    )
+}
+
+/// Run `cmd` to completion with stdin closed, or kill it at `deadline` and
+/// answer `timed_out`.
+pub fn exec_bounded(mut cmd: Command, deadline: Instant, timed_out: &str) -> Result<Output, String> {
+    cmd.stdin(Stdio::null()).stdout(Stdio::piped()).stderr(Stdio::piped());
+    let mut child = cmd
+        .spawn()
+        .map_err(|e| format!("Could not run {}: {e}", Path::new(cmd.get_program()).display()))?;
+
+    // Read both pipes on threads so a chatty profile cannot fill one and stall.
+    let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel();
+    pump(child.stdout.take(), 0, tx.clone());
+    pump(child.stderr.take(), 1, tx);
+
+    // A login shell usually answers within tens of milliseconds: look often
+    // at first, then back off.
+    let mut nap = Duration::from_millis(5);
+    let status = loop {
+        match child.try_wait() {
+            Ok(Some(status)) => break status,
+            Ok(None) if Instant::now() < deadline => {
+                std::thread::sleep(nap);
+                nap = (nap * 2).min(Duration::from_millis(100));
+            }
+            Ok(None) => {
+                let _ = child.kill();
+                let _ = child.wait();
+                return Err(timed_out.to_string());
+            }
+            Err(e) => return Err(e.to_string()),
+        }
+    };
+
+    let mut bufs = [Vec::new(), Vec::new()];
+    let settle = (Instant::now() + PIPE_GRACE).min(deadline);
+    let mut open = 2;
+    while open > 0 {
+        match rx.recv_timeout(settle.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now())) {
+            Ok((stream, Some(bytes))) => bufs[stream].extend_from_slice(&bytes),
+            Ok((_, None)) => open -= 1,
+            Err(_) => {
+                // Still held open past the grace: keep what already arrived.
+                for (stream, bytes) in rx.try_iter() {
+                    if let Some(bytes) = bytes {
+                        bufs[stream].extend_from_slice(&bytes);
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // Lossy rather than strict: one stray non-UTF-8 byte in a profile's output
+    // must not cost the whole environment.
+    let [out, err] = bufs;
+    Ok(Output {
+        code: status.code(),
+        stdout: String::from_utf8_lossy(&out).into_owned(),
+        stderr: String::from_utf8_lossy(&err).into_owned(),
+    })
+}
+
+/// The tail of what the command printed, for the connect page.
+fn last_lines(text: &str, n: usize) -> String {
+    let lines: Vec<&str> = text
+        .lines()
+        .map(str::trim_end)
+        .filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty())
+        .collect();
+    lines[lines.len().saturating_sub(n)..].join("\n")
+}
+
+/// The variables `env` printed between the markers, or None when the output
+/// does not hold both. A line that does not start with a portable variable
+/// name followed by `=` continues the previous value (a value with a newline
+/// in it); one that does starts the next variable.
+fn parse_env(output: &str) -> Option<Vec<(String, String)>> {
+    let mut lines = output.split('\n');
+    // ends_with: a profile line printed without its newline sits in front.
+    lines.by_ref().find(|l| l.trim_end().ends_with(ENV_BEGIN))?;
+    let mut vars: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new();
+    for line in lines {
+        if line.trim() == ENV_END {
+            return Some(vars);
+        }
+        match env_entry(line) {
+            Some((name, value)) => vars.push((name.to_string(), value.to_string())),
+            None => {
+                if let Some((_, value)) = vars.last_mut() {
+                    value.push('\n');
+                    value.push_str(line);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// A portable variable name: a letter or `_`, then letters, digits or `_`.
+pub fn is_env_name(name: &str) -> bool {
+    let mut chars = name.chars();
+    chars.next().is_some_and(|c| c.is_ascii_alphabetic() || c == '_')
+        && chars.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_')
+}
+
+fn env_entry(line: &str) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
+    let (name, value) = line.split_once('=')?;
+    is_env_name(name).then_some((name, value))
+}
+
+/// Ask `shell` for its environment with `flags`. The outer error ends the
+/// start (the shell could not be run, or time is up); the inner one means this
+/// form printed no environment and the next may be tried.
+fn capture_env(
+    shell: &Path,
+    flags: &[&str],
+    deadline: Instant,
+) -> Result<Result<Vec<(String, String)>, String>, String> {
+    let mut cmd = Command::new(shell);
+    cmd.args(flags).arg(capture_command());
+    let out = exec(cmd, deadline)?;
+    Ok(parse_env(&out.stdout).ok_or_else(|| {
+        // stderr only: stdout can hold part of the environment, API keys included.
+        let said = last_lines(&out.stderr, 6);
+        let mut message = format!("Could not read the environment of your login shell {}", shell.display());
+        if said.is_empty() {
+            let code = out
+                .code
+                .map_or_else(|| "a signal".to_string(), |c| format!("exit code {c}"));
+            message.push_str(&format!(" (it ended with {code})."));
+        } else {
+            message.push_str(":\n");
+            message.push_str(&said);
+        }
+        message
+    }))
+}
+
+/// The login shell's environment, for a process the app runs without it (the
+/// graphical install). `None` when the shell reports none.
+pub fn login_environment() -> Option<Vec<(String, String)>> {
+    let shell = login_shell();
+    let flags: &[&str] = match flavor(&shell) {
+        Flavor::Posix => &["-l", "-c"],
+        Flavor::Capture(attempts) => attempts.first().copied().unwrap_or(&["-c"]),
+    };
+    capture_env(&shell, flags, Instant::now() + FIND_TIMEOUT).ok()?.ok()
+}
+
+/// Run `cmd` in the home folder, where a terminal and the LaunchAgent start
+/// Codeman too. The server keeps the directory it was started in and uses it
+/// as the default for a session that names none; an app opened from the Finder
+/// or the Dock runs in `/`.
+fn in_home(cmd: &mut Command) {
+    if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
+        cmd.current_dir(home);
+    }
+}
+
+/// `script` (SCRIPT or FIND_SCRIPT) under `/bin/sh` with exactly the captured
+/// environment, so the server gets the profile's PATH, API keys and CODEMAN_*
+/// settings and nothing of launchd's bare one.
+fn run_with_env(script: &str, env: &[(String, String)], args: &[String], deadline: Instant) -> Result<Run, String> {
+    let mut cmd = Command::new("/bin/sh");
+    cmd.arg("-c").arg(script).arg("codeman-desktop").args(args);
+    cmd.env_clear().envs(env.iter().map(|(k, v)| (k, v)));
+    in_home(&mut cmd);
+    exec(cmd, deadline).map(Run::from)
+}
+
+/// `script` run by the POSIX login shell itself.
+fn run_in_shell(
+    script: &str,
+    shell: &Path,
+    interactive: bool,
+    args: &[String],
+    deadline: Instant,
+) -> Result<Run, String> {
+    let mut cmd = Command::new(shell);
+    cmd.arg("-l");
+    if interactive {
+        cmd.arg("-i");
+    }
+    cmd.arg("-c").arg(script).arg("codeman-desktop").args(args);
+    in_home(&mut cmd);
+    exec(cmd, deadline).map(Run::from)
+}
+
+/// Run `script` the way the login shell allows (see the module docs). Exit
+/// 127 means "no codeman here" and moves on to the next way of asking; the
+/// interactive profile is asked only when `interactive` allows it.
+fn launch(script: &str, shell: &Path, args: &[String], deadline: Instant, interactive: bool) -> Result<Run, String> {
+    let Flavor::Capture(attempts) = flavor(shell) else {
+        let result = run_in_shell(script, shell, false, args, deadline)?;
+        if result.code != Some(127) || !interactive {
+            return Ok(result);
+        }
+        // Not on the login PATH; try the interactive profile too.
+        return run_in_shell(script, shell, true, args, deadline);
+    };
+    let mut last_run = None;
+    let mut capture_error = None;
+    let interactive_flag = |flags: &&&[&str]| {
+        flags
+            .iter()
+            .any(|f| f.starts_with('-') && !f.starts_with("--") && f.contains('i'))
+    };
+    for flags in attempts.iter().filter(|f| interactive || !interactive_flag(f)) {
+        match capture_env(shell, flags, deadline)? {
+            Ok(env) => {
+                let result = run_with_env(script, &env, args, deadline)?;
+                if result.code != Some(127) {
+                    return Ok(result);
+                }
+                last_run = Some(result);
+            }
+            Err(e) => capture_error = Some(e),
+        }
+    }
+    if let Some(result) = last_run {
+        return Ok(result);
+    }
+    // No form printed an environment: a shell that knows neither -l nor -i
+    // may still run a bare -c.
+    match capture_env(shell, &["-c"], deadline)? {
+        Ok(env) => run_with_env(script, &env, args, deadline),
+        Err(e) => Err(capture_error.unwrap_or(e)),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Exit 0 when SCRIPT would find Codeman (the `codeman` command or the
+/// `install.sh` clone), 127 when it would not. Same lookup, nothing started.
+const FIND_SCRIPT: &str = r#"if command -v codeman >/dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; fi
+if [ -f "$HOME/.codeman/app/dist/index.js" ] && command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; fi
+exit 127"#;
+
+/// How long one look at the login shell may take: whether Codeman is
+/// installed (the This Mac tab), or its environment for the graphical install.
+const FIND_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
+
+/// `installed` with the shell given, so tests need not touch `$SHELL`.
+fn installed_with(shell: &Path, interactive: bool) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        launch(FIND_SCRIPT, shell, &[], Instant::now() + FIND_TIMEOUT, interactive),
+        Ok(Run { code: Some(0), .. })
+    )
+}
+
+/// Whether "Start Codeman on this Mac" would find Codeman: the `codeman`
+/// command on the login shell's PATH, or `~/.codeman/app` with `node`. Runs
+/// the login shell, so never on the event loop. `interactive` also asks the
+/// interactive profile (nvm in `.zshrc`, say), whose side effects only a
+/// user's own click should set off.
+pub fn installed(interactive: bool) -> bool {
+    installed_with(&login_shell(), interactive)
+}
+
+/// `start` with the shell given, so tests need not touch `$SHELL`.
+fn start_with(shell: &Path, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
+    let result = launch(SCRIPT, shell, args, Instant::now() + TIMEOUT, true)?;
+    match result.code {
+        Some(0) => Ok(result.output),
+        _ if result.output.is_empty() => Err("codeman web -d failed without saying why.".into()),
+        _ => Err(result.output),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Start a detached server for `url`. Ok carries what `codeman` printed.
+pub fn start(url: &Url) -> Result<String, String> {
+    if !policy::can_start_locally(url) {
+        return Err("Codeman can only be started here for http://127.0.0.1 or http://localhost on this Mac.".into());
+    }
+    start_with(&login_shell(), &policy::start_args(url))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// One spawning test at a time. A test writes a fake executable and then
+    /// runs it; a process forked by a parallel test in between can still hold
+    /// the write descriptor, and the exec then fails with ETXTBSY.
+    fn serial() -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'static, ()> {
+        static LOCK: std::sync::Mutex<()> = std::sync::Mutex::new(());
+        LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tail_of_output() {
+        assert_eq!(last_lines("a\n\nb\nc\n", 2), "b\nc");
+        assert_eq!(last_lines("", 3), "");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn stderr_starts_on_a_line_of_its_own() {
+        let said = |stdout: &str, stderr: &str| {
+            Run::from(Output {
+                code: Some(1),
+                stdout: stdout.into(),
+                stderr: stderr.into(),
+            })
+            .output
+        };
+        // stdout that ends without a newline: stderr still starts a line of its own.
+        assert_eq!(
+            said("Starting Codeman", "Error: port 3000 is in use\n"),
+            "Starting Codeman\nError: port 3000 is in use"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(said("Starting\n", "Error\n"), "Starting\nError");
+        assert_eq!(said("", "Error\n"), "Error");
+        assert_eq!(said("Started\n", "  \n"), "Started");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_non_local_or_https() {
+        assert!(start(&Url::parse("https://127.0.0.1:3000/").unwrap()).is_err());
+        assert!(start(&Url::parse("http://192.168.1.4:3000/").unwrap()).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// The script passes its arguments through untouched and reports a missing
+    /// `codeman` with exit 127 (run with an empty PATH and HOME so nothing is found).
+    #[test]
+    fn script_reports_missing_codeman() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let out = Command::new("/bin/sh")
+            .arg("-c")
+            .arg(SCRIPT)
+            .arg("codeman-desktop")
+            .args(["web", "-d", "--port", "3000"])
+            .env("PATH", "/nonexistent")
+            .env("HOME", "/nonexistent")
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(127));
+        assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("Could not find the codeman command"));
+    }
+
+    /// Arguments are data: a hostile-looking value is passed as one argv entry
+    /// to a fake `codeman`, never run by the shell.
+    #[test]
+    fn arguments_are_not_shell_text() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("codeman-desktop-fake-{}", std::process::id()));
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        let fake = dir.join("codeman");
+        std::fs::write(&fake, "#!/bin/sh\nfor a in \"$@\"; do printf '[%s]' \"$a\"; done\n").unwrap();
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        {
+            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+            std::fs::set_permissions(&fake, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        }
+        let out = Command::new("/bin/sh")
+            .arg("-c")
+            .arg(SCRIPT)
+            .arg("codeman-desktop")
+            .args(["web", "--base-url", "/x; touch /tmp/pwned"])
+            .env("PATH", format!("{}:/usr/bin:/bin", dir.display()))
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout),
+            "[web][--base-url][/x; touch /tmp/pwned]"
+        );
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+
+    fn pairs(vars: &[(&str, &str)]) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
+        vars.iter().map(|(k, v)| (k.to_string(), v.to_string())).collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn env_capture_parser() {
+        let out = format!(
+            "Welcome to fish, the friendly interactive shell\nno newline here{ENV_BEGIN}\n\
+             PATH=/opt/homebrew/bin:/usr/bin:/bin\n\
+             MULTI=line one\nline two\n  three = 3\n\
+             EMPTY=\n\
+             TRAIL=a \n\n\
+             _=/usr/bin/env\n\
+             {ENV_END}  \nbye from the profile\nNOT_CAPTURED=1\n"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_env(&out),
+            Some(pairs(&[
+                ("PATH", "/opt/homebrew/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"),
+                ("MULTI", "line one\nline two\n  three = 3"),
+                ("EMPTY", ""),
+                ("TRAIL", "a \n"),
+                ("_", "/usr/bin/env"),
+            ]))
+        );
+        // A value may itself contain `=`; only the first one splits.
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_env(&format!("{ENV_BEGIN}\nOPTS=a=b\n{ENV_END}\n")),
+            Some(pairs(&[("OPTS", "a=b")]))
+        );
+        assert_eq!(parse_env(&format!("{ENV_BEGIN}\n{ENV_END}\n")), Some(vec![]));
+        assert_eq!(parse_env(&format!("{ENV_BEGIN}\nPATH=/usr/bin\n")), None);
+        assert_eq!(parse_env(&format!("PATH=/usr/bin\n{ENV_END}\n")), None);
+        assert_eq!(parse_env("fish: Unknown command: then\n"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn shell_flavor_by_basename() {
+        for posix in [
+            "/bin/zsh",
+            "/bin/bash",
+            "/bin/sh",
+            "/bin/dash",
+            "/bin/ksh",
+            "/opt/homebrew/bin/bash",
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(flavor(Path::new(posix)), Flavor::Posix, "{posix}");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(flavor(Path::new("/bin/tcsh")), Flavor::Capture(&[&["-ic"]]));
+        assert_eq!(flavor(Path::new("/bin/csh")), Flavor::Capture(&[&["-ic"]]));
+        for other in [
+            "/opt/homebrew/bin/fish",
+            "/usr/local/bin/nu",
+            "/opt/homebrew/bin/xonsh",
+            "/usr/local/bin/pwsh",
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                flavor(Path::new(other)),
+                Flavor::Capture(&[&["-l", "-c"], &["-l", "-i", "-c"]]),
+                "{other}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The login shell's part avoids everything only POSIX shells read.
+    #[test]
+    fn capture_command_is_shell_neutral() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let cmd = capture_command();
+        for bad in ["then", "fi", "$", "\\", "!", "\"", "&&"] {
+            assert!(!cmd.contains(bad), "{bad} in {cmd}");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(cmd.matches('\'').count(), 2);
+        assert!(cmd.starts_with("/bin/sh -c '"));
+        // /bin/sh, as the capture runs it, prints a parsable environment.
+        let out = Command::new("/bin/sh")
+            .arg("-c")
+            .arg(&cmd)
+            .env("CODEMAN_DESKTOP_PARSER_PROBE", "two\nlines")
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let env = parse_env(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)).expect("markers");
+        assert!(env
+            .iter()
+            .any(|(k, v)| k == "CODEMAN_DESKTOP_PARSER_PROBE" && v == "two\nlines"));
+        assert!(env.iter().any(|(k, _)| k == "PATH"));
+    }
+
+    /// A scratch directory with a fake `codeman` in `bin/` that prints its
+    /// arguments, the profile's marker variable and the names of everything in
+    /// its environment.
+    struct Scratch(PathBuf);
+
+    impl Scratch {
+        fn new(name: &str) -> Self {
+            let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("codeman-desktop-{name}-{}", std::process::id()));
+            let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("bin")).unwrap();
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("home")).unwrap();
+            let scratch = Scratch(dir);
+            scratch.exe(
+                "bin/codeman",
+                "#!/bin/sh\nprintf '[%s]' \"$@\"; echo\necho \"profile: $CODEMAN_DESKTOP_TEST\"\n\
+                 printf 'names:'; env | cut -d= -f1 | tr '\\n' ' '; echo\n",
+            );
+            scratch
+        }
+
+        /// Write an executable at `rel`, with `DIR` in `body` replaced by the scratch path.
+        fn exe(&self, rel: &str, body: &str) -> PathBuf {
+            let path = self.0.join(rel);
+            std::fs::write(&path, body.replace("DIR", &self.0.display().to_string())).unwrap();
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            {
+                use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+                std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+            }
+            path
+        }
+
+        fn argv_log(&self) -> String {
+            std::fs::read_to_string(self.0.join("argv.log")).unwrap_or_default()
+        }
+    }
+
+    impl Drop for Scratch {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.0);
+        }
+    }
+
+    const HOSTILE_ARGS: [&str; 3] = ["web", "--base-url", "/x; touch /tmp/pwned"];
+
+    fn hostile_args() -> Vec<String> {
+        HOSTILE_ARGS.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
+    }
+
+    /// A stand-in for fish: it refuses POSIX `then` and `$@` the way fish
+    /// does, logs its flags, prints profile noise around whatever it runs, and
+    /// its "profile" replaces the environment. On its interactive form only
+    /// when `INTERACTIVE_ONLY` is yes, PATH reaches the fake `codeman`.
+    const FAKE_FISH: &str = r#"#!/bin/sh
+args=""
+for a in "$@"; do
+  case "$a" in
+    *then*|*'$@'*) echo "fish: Unknown command: then" >&2; exit 127;;
+    -*) args="$args$a ";;
+  esac
+  cmd="$a"
+done
+echo "$args" >> "DIR/argv.log"
+bin="DIR/bin"
+case "INTERACTIVE_ONLY:$args" in yes:*-i*|no:*) ;; *) bin=/nonexistent;; esac
+echo "Welcome to fish, the friendly interactive shell"
+/usr/bin/env -i PATH="$bin:/usr/bin:/bin" HOME="DIR/home" CODEMAN_DESKTOP_TEST="from the profile" /bin/sh -c "$cmd"
+echo "bye from the profile"
+"#;
+
+    /// SCRIPT never reaches the non-POSIX shell: it runs under /bin/sh with the
+    /// environment the shell printed, and with nothing else.
+    #[test]
+    fn non_posix_shell_only_reports_its_environment() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("fish");
+        let fish = s.exe("fish", &FAKE_FISH.replace("INTERACTIVE_ONLY", "no"));
+        let out = start_with(&fish, &hostile_args()).expect("started");
+        let lines: Vec<&str> = out.lines().collect();
+        assert_eq!(lines[0], "[web][--base-url][/x; touch /tmp/pwned]");
+        assert_eq!(lines[1], "profile: from the profile");
+        assert_eq!(s.argv_log(), "-l -c \n");
+
+        // env_clear: a variable this process has, but the profile did not
+        // export, must not reach codeman.
+        let names: Vec<&str> = lines[2].trim_start_matches("names:").split_whitespace().collect();
+        assert!(names.contains(&"PATH") && names.contains(&"CODEMAN_DESKTOP_TEST"));
+        let captured = ["PATH", "HOME", "CODEMAN_DESKTOP_TEST", "PWD", "OLDPWD", "SHLVL", "_"];
+        let leaked: Vec<String> = std::env::vars_os()
+            .filter_map(|(k, _)| k.into_string().ok())
+            .filter(|k| !captured.contains(&k.as_str()) && !k.starts_with("__CF"))
+            .filter(|k| names.contains(&k.as_str()))
+            .collect();
+        assert!(leaked.is_empty(), "leaked from the app: {leaked:?}");
+    }
+
+    /// No codeman on the login PATH (exit 127): the environment is captured
+    /// again from the interactive profile, and that run finds it.
+    #[test]
+    fn non_posix_shell_retries_with_the_interactive_profile() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("fish-retry");
+        let fish = s.exe("fish", &FAKE_FISH.replace("INTERACTIVE_ONLY", "yes"));
+        let out = start_with(&fish, &hostile_args()).expect("started");
+        assert!(out.starts_with("[web][--base-url][/x; touch /tmp/pwned]\n"), "{out}");
+        assert_eq!(s.argv_log(), "-l -c \n-l -i -c \n");
+    }
+
+    /// tcsh takes -l only as its only flag, so it is asked with -ic alone.
+    #[test]
+    fn tcsh_gets_ic_and_never_l() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("tcsh");
+        let tcsh = s.exe(
+            "tcsh",
+            r#"#!/bin/sh
+echo "$*" >> "DIR/argv.log"
+if [ "$#" != 2 ] || [ "$1" != -ic ]; then echo "tcsh: Unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 1; fi
+/usr/bin/env -i PATH="DIR/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" HOME="DIR/home" CODEMAN_DESKTOP_TEST=tcsh /bin/sh -c "$2"
+"#,
+        );
+        let out = start_with(&tcsh, &hostile_args()).expect("started");
+        assert!(out.contains("profile: tcsh"), "{out}");
+        assert_eq!(s.argv_log().lines().count(), 1);
+        assert!(s.argv_log().starts_with("-ic /bin/sh -c '"));
+    }
+
+    /// A shell that takes neither -l nor -i still gets a bare -c.
+    #[test]
+    fn shell_without_login_flags_falls_back_to_plain_c() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("nolflag");
+        let shell = s.exe(
+            "elvish",
+            r#"#!/bin/sh
+echo "$1" >> "DIR/argv.log"
+case "$1" in -l|-i) echo "flag provided but not defined: $1" >&2; exit 2;; esac
+/usr/bin/env -i PATH="DIR/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" HOME="DIR/home" CODEMAN_DESKTOP_TEST=plain /bin/sh -c "$2"
+"#,
+        );
+        let out = start_with(&shell, &hostile_args()).expect("started");
+        assert!(out.contains("profile: plain"), "{out}");
+        assert_eq!(s.argv_log(), "-l\n-l\n-c\n");
+    }
+
+    /// A shell that never prints its environment is reported by name with what
+    /// it said on stderr, never with stdout (which can carry secrets).
+    #[test]
+    fn capture_failure_names_the_shell() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("broken");
+        let shell = s.exe(
+            "weirdsh",
+            "#!/bin/sh\necho 'API_KEY=sk-secret'\necho 'weirdsh: cannot start' >&2\nexit 3\n",
+        );
+        let err = start_with(&shell, &hostile_args()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.contains("Could not read the environment"), "{err}");
+        assert!(err.contains("weirdsh: cannot start"), "{err}");
+        assert!(!err.contains("sk-secret"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    /// POSIX shells keep running SCRIPT themselves: `-l -c SCRIPT codeman-desktop
+    /// args`, then `-l -i -c` when the login PATH had no codeman.
+    #[test]
+    fn posix_shell_runs_script_itself_and_retries_interactive() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("zsh");
+        let zsh = s.exe(
+            "zsh",
+            r#"#!/bin/sh
+[ "$1" = -l ] || exit 90
+shift
+PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
+if [ "$1" = -i ]; then shift; PATH="DIR/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"; fi
+[ "$1" = -c ] || exit 91
+shift
+echo "$2" >> "DIR/argv.log"
+HOME="DIR/home"
+export PATH HOME
+exec /bin/sh -c "$@"
+"#,
+        );
+        let out = start_with(&zsh, &hostile_args()).expect("started");
+        assert!(out.starts_with("[web][--base-url][/x; touch /tmp/pwned]\n"), "{out}");
+        // $0 of the script, once per run: login, then interactive.
+        assert_eq!(s.argv_log(), "codeman-desktop\ncodeman-desktop\n");
+    }
+
+    /// The installed check asks the same shells the same way and runs nothing:
+    /// found on the interactive PATH here, after the login PATH had none.
+    #[test]
+    fn installed_check_finds_codeman_without_running_it() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("find-zsh");
+        let zsh = s.exe(
+            "zsh",
+            r#"#!/bin/sh
+[ "$1" = -l ] || exit 90
+shift
+PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
+if [ "$1" = -i ]; then shift; PATH="DIR/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"; fi
+[ "$1" = -c ] || exit 91
+shift
+echo "$2" >> "DIR/argv.log"
+HOME="DIR/home"
+export PATH HOME
+exec /bin/sh -c "$@"
+"#,
+        );
+        // A codeman that would leave a mark if it ran.
+        s.exe("bin/codeman", "#!/bin/sh\ntouch DIR/ran\n");
+        // Without the interactive profile: one login-shell look, not found.
+        assert!(!installed_with(&zsh, false));
+        assert_eq!(s.argv_log(), "codeman-desktop\n");
+        assert!(installed_with(&zsh, true));
+        assert_eq!(s.argv_log(), "codeman-desktop\ncodeman-desktop\ncodeman-desktop\n");
+        assert!(!s.0.join("ran").exists(), "the installed check ran codeman");
+    }
+
+    /// Nothing on any PATH and no ~/.codeman/app: not installed. Through a
+    /// non-POSIX shell too, which only reports its environment.
+    #[test]
+    fn installed_check_reports_missing_codeman() {
+        let _serial = serial();
+        let s = Scratch::new("find-fish");
+        std::fs::remove_file(s.0.join("bin/codeman")).unwrap();
+        let fish = s.exe("fish", &FAKE_FISH.replace("INTERACTIVE_ONLY", "no"));
+        assert!(!installed_with(&fish, true));
+        // The login-only look asks fish once, with -l and never -i.
+        let before = s.argv_log();
+        assert!(!installed_with(&fish, false));
+        assert_eq!(&s.argv_log()[before.len()..], "-l -c \n");
+
+        // The install.sh clone counts once node is there.
+        let app = s.0.join("home/.codeman/app/dist");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&app).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(app.join("index.js"), "").unwrap();
+        s.exe("bin/node", "#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n");
+        assert!(installed_with(&fish, true));
+        assert!(installed_with(&fish, false));
+    }
+}

packages/desktop/src/login.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+//! The login a connect goes out with, and what the Keychain keeps once the
+//! server has answered it.
+
+use crate::credentials::{self, Keychain};
+use crate::probe::ProbeOutcome;
+
+/// The login a connect goes out with, and where its password came from. A
+/// typed password wins, then the one the Keychain holds for this user. Last
+/// comes the login of the Codeman on this Mac, which keeps it where its own
+/// clients find it (setup::local_login: its launchd job, then
+/// ~/.codeman/.env) and only answers it at its own loopback address. That one
+/// is used only when the config expected no password in the Keychain
+/// (`expect_saved`: one that should be there and is not is reported, not
+/// papered over), only for the username in use when there is one, and it is
+/// never saved anywhere. `local` is asked only then: it runs processes.
+pub fn choose_login(
+    user: Option<String>,
+    typed_password: Option<String>,
+    saved: Option<String>,
+    expect_saved: bool,
+    local: impl FnOnce() -> Option<(String, String)>,
+) -> (Option<String>, Option<String>, PasswordSource) {
+    if let Some(password) = typed_password {
+        return (user, Some(password), PasswordSource::Typed);
+    }
+    if let Some(password) = saved {
+        return (user, Some(password), PasswordSource::Keychain);
+    }
+    if !expect_saved {
+        if let Some((local_user, password)) = local() {
+            if user.as_deref().is_none_or(|current| current == local_user) {
+                return (Some(local_user), Some(password), PasswordSource::LocalServer);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    (user, None, PasswordSource::Absent)
+}
+
+/// A login the probe just tried, and what the user asked for it.
+pub struct ProbedLogin<'a> {
+    /// The server, as the config and the Keychain accounts key it.
+    pub server: &'a str,
+    /// The username the config named for this server before the connect.
+    pub previous_user: Option<&'a str>,
+    pub username: Option<&'a str>,
+    pub password: Option<&'a str>,
+    /// Where the password came from.
+    pub source: PasswordSource,
+    pub remember: bool,
+}
+
+/// Where a connect's password came from, which decides what the Keychain
+/// does with it (update_keychain).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum PasswordSource {
+    /// Typed on the connect page this time: saved if Remember is on.
+    Typed,
+    /// From the Keychain: there already.
+    Keychain,
+    /// The local Codeman's own login (setup::local_login): it stays where it
+    /// is, and the Keychain never gets a copy.
+    LocalServer,
+    /// No password.
+    Absent,
+}
+
+/// What update_keychain did: whether the Keychain now holds the login's
+/// password, and whose items it deleted.
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct KeychainUpdate {
+    pub saved: bool,
+    pub deleted: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+/// Bring the Keychain in line with a probe the server answered, on the probe
+/// worker. Only an accepted login changes anything (Ok, or a password the
+/// server wants changed), since only then does the config get the new entry.
+///
+/// When that entry names another user than the config did (compared exactly,
+/// as the account string is), the old user's item is deleted FIRST, before any
+/// save: the Keychain worker runs jobs in order, so a Keychain that treats two
+/// spellings of a name as one item cannot lose the new password to that
+/// delete. Then the typed password is saved when Remember is on and deleted
+/// when it is off, and a password the server wants changed is never kept.
+pub fn update_keychain(keychain: &Keychain, outcome: &ProbeOutcome, login: &ProbedLogin<'_>) -> KeychainUpdate {
+    let mut update = KeychainUpdate::default();
+    if !matches!(outcome, ProbeOutcome::Ok { .. } | ProbeOutcome::PasswordChangeRequired) {
+        return update;
+    }
+    let mut delete = |user: &str| {
+        keychain.delete(&credentials::account(login.server, user));
+        update.deleted.push(user.to_string());
+    };
+    if let Some(old) = login.previous_user.filter(|old| login.username != Some(*old)) {
+        delete(old);
+    }
+    let saved = match (outcome, login.username, login.password) {
+        (ProbeOutcome::Ok { .. }, Some(user), Some(password)) if login.source == PasswordSource::Typed => {
+            if login.remember {
+                keychain
+                    .save_blocking(&credentials::account(login.server, user), password)
+                    .is_ok()
+            } else {
+                delete(user);
+                false
+            }
+        }
+        // A password that came from the Keychain is saved there already.
+        (ProbeOutcome::Ok { .. }, Some(_), Some(_)) => login.source == PasswordSource::Keychain,
+        (ProbeOutcome::PasswordChangeRequired, Some(user), _) => {
+            delete(user);
+            false
+        }
+        _ => false,
+    };
+    update.saved = saved;
+    update
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::credentials::memory;
+
+    fn none() -> Option<(String, String)> {
+        panic!("the local login must not be looked up here");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_login_a_connect_uses() {
+        let s = |v: &str| Some(v.to_string());
+        let local = || Some(("admin".to_string(), "from-this-mac".to_string()));
+
+        // A typed password wins over everything, and nothing else is asked.
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(s("kay"), s("typed"), s("kept"), true, none),
+            (s("kay"), s("typed"), PasswordSource::Typed)
+        );
+        // Then the Keychain's.
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(s("kay"), None, s("kept"), true, none),
+            (s("kay"), s("kept"), PasswordSource::Keychain)
+        );
+        // The Keychain should hold one and does not: reported as absent, the
+        // local login is not tried in its place.
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(s("kay"), None, None, true, none),
+            (s("kay"), None, PasswordSource::Absent)
+        );
+        // Nothing typed, nothing expected: the Codeman on this Mac's own
+        // login, for no username or the same one.
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(None, None, None, false, local),
+            (s("admin"), s("from-this-mac"), PasswordSource::LocalServer)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(s("admin"), None, None, false, local),
+            (s("admin"), s("from-this-mac"), PasswordSource::LocalServer)
+        );
+        // Never for another user: the names are compared exactly.
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(s("kay"), None, None, false, local),
+            (s("kay"), None, PasswordSource::Absent)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(s("Admin"), None, None, false, local),
+            (s("Admin"), None, PasswordSource::Absent)
+        );
+        // No local login either.
+        assert_eq!(
+            choose_login(None, None, None, false, || None),
+            (None, None, PasswordSource::Absent)
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// update_keychain for one probe answer; the log is what the Keychain did,
+    /// in order (the last load only waits for the queue to drain).
+    fn keychain_after(outcome: ProbeOutcome, login: ProbedLogin<'_>) -> (KeychainUpdate, Vec<String>) {
+        let (keychain, store) = memory::keychain();
+        let update = update_keychain(&keychain, &outcome, &login);
+        keychain.load_blocking("done");
+        let mut log = store.log();
+        assert_eq!(log.pop().as_deref(), Some("load done"));
+        (update, log)
+    }
+
+    fn login<'a>(
+        previous_user: Option<&'a str>,
+        username: Option<&'a str>,
+        source: PasswordSource,
+        remember: bool,
+    ) -> ProbedLogin<'a> {
+        ProbedLogin {
+            server: "http://a/",
+            previous_user,
+            username,
+            password: (source != PasswordSource::Absent).then_some("secret"),
+            source,
+            remember,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn what_the_keychain_keeps_after_a_connect() {
+        let ok = || ProbeOutcome::Ok {
+            version: "1.48.0".into(),
+        };
+        let item = |user: &str| credentials::account("http://a/", user);
+
+        // A typed password is saved when Remember is on, deleted when it is off.
+        let (update, log) = keychain_after(ok(), login(Some("kay"), Some("kay"), PasswordSource::Typed, true));
+        assert!(update.saved && update.deleted.is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(log, [format!("save {}", item("kay"))]);
+        let (update, log) = keychain_after(ok(), login(Some("kay"), Some("kay"), PasswordSource::Typed, false));
+        assert!(!update.saved);
+        assert_eq!(update.deleted, ["kay"]);
+        assert_eq!(log, [format!("delete {}", item("kay"))]);
+
+        // One that came from the Keychain is there already: nothing is written.
+        let (update, log) = keychain_after(ok(), login(Some("kay"), Some("kay"), PasswordSource::Keychain, true));
+        assert!(update.saved && log.is_empty());
+
+        // The local Codeman's own login never gets a copy, Remember or not.
+        let (update, log) = keychain_after(ok(), login(None, Some("admin"), PasswordSource::LocalServer, true));
+        assert!(!update.saved && update.deleted.is_empty() && log.is_empty());
+
+        // Another user than before: the old user's item goes FIRST, then the save.
+        let (update, log) = keychain_after(ok(), login(Some("old"), Some("new"), PasswordSource::Typed, true));
+        assert!(update.saved);
+        assert_eq!(update.deleted, ["old"]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            log,
+            [format!("delete {}", item("old")), format!("save {}", item("new"))]
+        );
+
+        // A password the server wants changed is never kept.
+        let (update, log) = keychain_after(
+            ProbeOutcome::PasswordChangeRequired,
+            login(Some("kay"), Some("kay"), PasswordSource::Typed, true),
+        );
+        assert!(!update.saved);
+        assert_eq!(update.deleted, ["kay"]);
+        assert_eq!(log, [format!("delete {}", item("kay"))]);
+
+        // A login the server did not accept changes nothing.
+        for refused in [
+            ProbeOutcome::BadCredentials,
+            ProbeOutcome::NeedsLogin,
+            ProbeOutcome::Refused,
+            ProbeOutcome::Timeout,
+        ] {
+            let (update, log) = keychain_after(refused, login(Some("old"), Some("new"), PasswordSource::Typed, true));
+            assert!(!update.saved && update.deleted.is_empty() && log.is_empty());
+        }
+    }
+}

packages/desktop/src/menu.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+//! The menu bar.
+
+use muda::accelerator::{Accelerator, Code, Modifiers};
+use muda::{AboutMetadata, CheckMenuItem, Menu, MenuItem, PredefinedMenuItem, Submenu};
+
+use crate::config::Config;
+use crate::logo::{self, BlinkStyle, Signal};
+use crate::{APP_NAME, VERSION};
+
+/// Codeman's repository and its documentation (the Help menu, About).
+pub const REPO_URL: &str = "https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman";
+pub const DOCS_URL: &str = "https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/wiki";
+
+pub mod menu_id {
+    pub const SWITCH: &str = "switch-server";
+    pub const ADD_AGENT: &str = "add-agent";
+    pub const RELOAD: &str = "reload";
+    pub const START_FULLSCREEN: &str = "start-fullscreen";
+    pub const DEVTOOLS: &str = "devtools";
+    pub const HELP_DOCS: &str = "help-docs";
+    pub const HELP_GITHUB: &str = "help-github";
+}
+
+pub struct AppMenu {
+    pub bar: Menu,
+    pub window_menu: Submenu,
+    pub help_menu: Submenu,
+    pub start_fullscreen: CheckMenuItem,
+    /// One item per state and style. Empty on a Mac without a lit logo, which has no
+    /// such menu.
+    pub logo_styles: Vec<(Signal, BlinkStyle, CheckMenuItem)>,
+}
+
+pub fn build_menu(config: &Config) -> muda::Result<AppMenu> {
+    let bar = Menu::new();
+    let about = PredefinedMenuItem::about(
+        Some("About Codeman"),
+        Some(AboutMetadata {
+            name: Some(APP_NAME.into()),
+            version: Some(VERSION.into()),
+            comments: Some("A native window for your Codeman server.".into()),
+            website: Some(REPO_URL.into()),
+            ..Default::default()
+        }),
+    );
+    let switch = MenuItem::with_id(
+        menu_id::SWITCH,
+        "Switch Server\u{2026}",
+        true,
+        Some(Accelerator::new(Modifiers::META | Modifiers::SHIFT, Code::KeyO)),
+    );
+    let app_menu = Submenu::with_items(
+        APP_NAME,
+        true,
+        &[
+            &about,
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &switch,
+            &MenuItem::with_id(menu_id::ADD_AGENT, "Add a Coding Agent to This Mac\u{2026}", true, None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::services(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::hide(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::hide_others(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::show_all(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::quit(None),
+        ],
+    )?;
+    // Without these items Cmd+C / Cmd+V do nothing inside a WKWebView.
+    let edit = Submenu::with_items(
+        "Edit",
+        true,
+        &[
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::undo(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::redo(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::cut(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::copy(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::paste(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::select_all(None),
+        ],
+    )?;
+    let start_fullscreen = CheckMenuItem::with_id(
+        menu_id::START_FULLSCREEN,
+        "Always Open in Full Screen",
+        true,
+        config.start_fullscreen,
+        None,
+    );
+    let view = Submenu::with_items(
+        "View",
+        true,
+        &[
+            &MenuItem::with_id(
+                menu_id::RELOAD,
+                "Reload",
+                true,
+                Some(Accelerator::new(Modifiers::META, Code::KeyR)),
+            ),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::fullscreen(None),
+            &start_fullscreen,
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &MenuItem::with_id(
+                menu_id::DEVTOOLS,
+                "Developer Tools",
+                true,
+                Some(Accelerator::new(Modifiers::META | Modifiers::ALT, Code::KeyI)),
+            ),
+        ],
+    )?;
+    // Only a Mac with a lit Apple logo has this menu at all.
+    let mut logo_styles = Vec::new();
+    if logo::available() {
+        let submenu = Submenu::new("Blink Apple Logo", true);
+        for signal in Signal::ALL {
+            let group = Submenu::new(signal.label(), true);
+            for style in BlinkStyle::ALL {
+                let chosen = style == config.logo_blink.get(signal);
+                let item = CheckMenuItem::with_id(style.menu_id(signal), style.label(), true, chosen, None);
+                group.append(&item)?;
+                if style == BlinkStyle::Off {
+                    group.append(&PredefinedMenuItem::separator())?;
+                }
+                logo_styles.push((signal, style, item));
+            }
+            submenu.append(&group)?;
+        }
+        // Right under "Always Open in Full Screen", before the separator.
+        view.insert(&submenu, 4)?;
+    }
+    let window_menu = Submenu::with_items(
+        "Window",
+        true,
+        &[
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::minimize(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::maximize(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::close_window(None),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::separator(),
+            &PredefinedMenuItem::bring_all_to_front(None),
+        ],
+    )?;
+    let help_menu = Submenu::with_items(
+        "Help",
+        true,
+        &[
+            &MenuItem::with_id(menu_id::HELP_DOCS, "Codeman Documentation", true, None),
+            &MenuItem::with_id(menu_id::HELP_GITHUB, "Codeman on GitHub", true, None),
+        ],
+    )?;
+    bar.append_items(&[&app_menu, &edit, &view, &window_menu, &help_menu])?;
+    Ok(AppMenu {
+        bar,
+        window_menu,
+        help_menu,
+        start_fullscreen,
+        logo_styles,
+    })
+}

packages/desktop/src/probe.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,787 @@
+//! "Is a Codeman server answering at this address, and does it want a login?"
+//!
+//! One `GET <server>/api/status`, five seconds at most, run off the UI thread.
+//! The answer is classified into something the connect page can explain. It is
+//! asked on a user action, or by one of the This Mac tab's waits (for an
+//! install to bring Codeman up, for a server that is starting), which end at
+//! the first answer, never as a standing poll: Codeman counts a request without
+//! valid credentials against the login rate limit (10 per IP).
+
+use serde::Serialize;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use url::Url;
+
+pub const TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
+pub const MAX_BODY: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// The path the probe asks for, relative to the server's base URL.
+const STATUS_PATH: &str = "api/status";
+
+/// rustls' text for `Error::InvalidCertificate`, which is what a handshake
+/// with a certificate the OS does not trust fails with. ureq hands it over as
+/// an `io::Error` of kind `InvalidData`, so the text is all there is to match
+/// without a direct rustls dependency.
+const CERT_REJECTED_PREFIX: &str = "invalid peer certificate";
+
+/// std's text for a failed `getaddrinfo`. Its kind is `Uncategorized`, which
+/// cannot be matched on stable Rust, so the prefix is the only handle. The
+/// prefix is the same on macOS and Linux; only the resolver's reason differs.
+const LOOKUP_FAILED_PREFIX: &str = "failed to lookup address information";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub enum ProbeOutcome {
+    Ok {
+        version: String,
+    },
+    /// 401 and we sent no credentials.
+    NeedsLogin,
+    /// 401 although we sent credentials.
+    BadCredentials,
+    /// 429: too many failed logins from this address. A single-user Codeman
+    /// still accepts the right password, so the page needs to know whether
+    /// this probe carried one. `retry_after_secs` is the server's
+    /// `Retry-After`, when it gave one in seconds.
+    #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+    RateLimited {
+        sent_credentials: bool,
+        #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+        retry_after_secs: Option<u64>,
+    },
+    /// 403 `PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED`: the credentials are valid, but a
+    /// multi-user Codeman wants this account's password changed first. Page
+    /// loads are exempt, so the web UI can show its change-password dialog.
+    PasswordChangeRequired,
+    /// 403 from Codeman's Host guard (a name it does not know, e.g. a custom domain).
+    HostNotAllowed,
+    /// 3xx. `location` is the target resolved against the probed URL.
+    /// `suggested` is a server address to use instead, set only when the
+    /// redirect stays on the same host, only moves to https or another port,
+    /// and still points at the status API. Never followed: a second request
+    /// would carry the credentials to an address the user did not type.
+    Redirect {
+        location: String,
+        suggested: Option<String>,
+    },
+    /// Something answered, but not Codeman's status API.
+    NotCodeman {
+        status: u16,
+    },
+    Refused,
+    /// No route to the address: the machine is off or on another network,
+    /// or macOS's Local Network privacy setting blocked the app.
+    Unreachable,
+    /// An http:// probe whose connection was closed without an answer. A
+    /// Codeman started with `--https` does exactly that to plain HTTP.
+    MaybeHttps,
+    Timeout,
+    TlsUntrusted {
+        detail: String,
+    },
+    Unresolvable,
+    Failed {
+        detail: String,
+    },
+}
+
+impl ProbeOutcome {
+    /// The server's version, when it answered as Codeman.
+    pub fn version(&self) -> Option<String> {
+        match self {
+            ProbeOutcome::Ok { version } => Some(version.clone()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Classify an HTTP answer to `<server>/api/status`. `request` is the URL that
+/// was asked, `location` and `retry_after` are those response headers.
+pub fn classify_response(
+    request: &Url,
+    status: u16,
+    location: Option<&str>,
+    retry_after: Option<&str>,
+    sent_credentials: bool,
+    body: &str,
+) -> ProbeOutcome {
+    match status {
+        200 => {
+            let version = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(body)
+                .ok()
+                .filter(|v| v["success"] == true)
+                .and_then(|v| v["data"]["version"].as_str().map(str::to_string));
+            match version {
+                Some(version) => ProbeOutcome::Ok { version },
+                None => ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status },
+            }
+        }
+        300..=399 => {
+            // A 3xx without a usable Location (304, a garbled header) is not a
+            // redirect anyone can act on.
+            match location.and_then(|l| request.join(l.trim()).ok()) {
+                Some(target) => ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                    suggested: suggested_server(request, &target),
+                    location: target.into(),
+                },
+                None => ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status },
+            }
+        }
+        401 if sent_credentials => ProbeOutcome::BadCredentials,
+        401 => ProbeOutcome::NeedsLogin,
+        403 if body.contains("host not allowed") => ProbeOutcome::HostNotAllowed,
+        // Codeman only says this after the Basic credentials verified (the
+        // probe sends no cookie), so without credentials it is not Codeman's
+        // answer to us, and loading the page without them would not help.
+        403 if sent_credentials && error_code(body).as_deref() == Some("PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED") => {
+            ProbeOutcome::PasswordChangeRequired
+        }
+        429 => ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+            sent_credentials,
+            retry_after_secs: retry_after.and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<u64>().ok()),
+        },
+        other => ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: other },
+    }
+}
+
+/// `errorCode` of a Codeman `ApiResponse` error body.
+fn error_code(body: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(body).ok()?;
+    Some(parsed.get("errorCode")?.as_str()?.to_string())
+}
+
+/// The server base URL a redirect points to, when it is the same server
+/// moved to https or another port (a reverse proxy upgrading plain HTTP, the
+/// usual case). Anything else, such as another host (a login gateway the
+/// window could not pass anyway) or a downgrade to http, gets no suggestion.
+fn suggested_server(request: &Url, target: &Url) -> Option<String> {
+    let upgrade = request.scheme() == "http" && target.scheme() == "https";
+    let port_change =
+        request.scheme() == target.scheme() && request.port_or_known_default() != target.port_or_known_default();
+    if !(upgrade || port_change) || target.host() != request.host() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if !target.username().is_empty() || target.password().is_some() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // The redirect must keep pointing at the status API (a proxy may add a
+    // base path in front of it); the base is what comes before it.
+    if !target.path().ends_with(request.path()) || !request.path().ends_with(STATUS_PATH) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let base_path = &target.path()[..target.path().len() - STATUS_PATH.len()];
+    let mut base = target.clone();
+    base.set_path(base_path);
+    base.set_query(None);
+    base.set_fragment(None);
+    Some(base.into())
+}
+
+/// Transport failures, reduced to what the connect page explains differently.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum TransportError {
+    Refused,
+    Unreachable,
+    ClosedWithoutAnswer,
+    Timeout,
+    Tls(String),
+    Dns,
+    Other(String),
+}
+
+pub fn classify_transport(err: TransportError) -> ProbeOutcome {
+    match err {
+        TransportError::Refused => ProbeOutcome::Refused,
+        TransportError::Unreachable => ProbeOutcome::Unreachable,
+        TransportError::ClosedWithoutAnswer => ProbeOutcome::MaybeHttps,
+        TransportError::Timeout => ProbeOutcome::Timeout,
+        TransportError::Tls(detail) => ProbeOutcome::TlsUntrusted { detail },
+        TransportError::Dns => ProbeOutcome::Unresolvable,
+        TransportError::Other(detail) => ProbeOutcome::Failed { detail },
+    }
+}
+
+/// `plain_http`: the probe went to an http:// URL. Only there does a closed
+/// connection hint at an https-only server; over https the same close is a
+/// failed handshake with nothing more to say about it.
+fn transport_error(err: &ureq::Error, plain_http: bool) -> TransportError {
+    use std::io::ErrorKind;
+    match err {
+        ureq::Error::Timeout(_) => TransportError::Timeout,
+        ureq::Error::HostNotFound => TransportError::Dns,
+        ureq::Error::ConnectionFailed => TransportError::Refused,
+        // ureq passes both a rejected certificate (rustls wraps it as
+        // InvalidData during the handshake) and a failed name lookup (std's
+        // own error) through as plain io errors, so they are told apart here
+        // before the kinds below swallow them.
+        ureq::Error::Io(e) if e.kind() == ErrorKind::InvalidData && e.to_string().starts_with(CERT_REJECTED_PREFIX) => {
+            TransportError::Tls(e.to_string())
+        }
+        ureq::Error::Io(e) if e.raw_os_error().is_none() && e.to_string().starts_with(LOOKUP_FAILED_PREFIX) => {
+            TransportError::Dns
+        }
+        ureq::Error::Io(e) => match e.kind() {
+            ErrorKind::ConnectionRefused | ErrorKind::ConnectionReset | ErrorKind::AddrNotAvailable => {
+                TransportError::Refused
+            }
+            ErrorKind::HostUnreachable | ErrorKind::NetworkUnreachable => TransportError::Unreachable,
+            ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof if plain_http => TransportError::ClosedWithoutAnswer,
+            ErrorKind::TimedOut | ErrorKind::WouldBlock => TransportError::Timeout,
+            _ => TransportError::Other(e.to_string()),
+        },
+        // ureq's own rustls errors come from setting up the TLS client (the
+        // handshake's arrive as Io above); only a certificate rejection is
+        // "untrusted", anything else is reported as it is.
+        ureq::Error::Rustls(e) if e.to_string().starts_with(CERT_REJECTED_PREFIX) => TransportError::Tls(e.to_string()),
+        other => TransportError::Other(other.to_string()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Ask the server. Blocking: call it from a worker thread.
+pub fn probe(server: &Url, authorization: Option<&str>) -> ProbeOutcome {
+    probe_within(server, authorization, TIMEOUT)
+}
+
+/// The app's one way of asking a server something: the OS's certificate trust,
+/// a bound on the whole exchange, and status codes as answers.
+pub fn agent(timeout: Duration) -> ureq::Agent {
+    let tls = ureq::tls::TlsConfig::builder()
+        .root_certs(ureq::tls::RootCerts::PlatformVerifier)
+        .build();
+    ureq::Agent::config_builder()
+        .timeout_global(Some(timeout))
+        .http_status_as_error(false)
+        // Never follow: a 3xx comes back as an answer and is explained.
+        .max_redirects(0)
+        .tls_config(tls)
+        .user_agent(concat!("CodemanDesktop/", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")))
+        .build()
+        .into()
+}
+
+/// `probe` with the time the whole exchange may take.
+pub fn probe_within(server: &Url, authorization: Option<&str>, timeout: Duration) -> ProbeOutcome {
+    let status_url = match server.join(STATUS_PATH) {
+        Ok(u) => u,
+        Err(e) => return ProbeOutcome::Failed { detail: e.to_string() },
+    };
+    let mut req = agent(timeout)
+        .get(status_url.as_str())
+        .header("Accept", "application/json");
+    if let Some(auth) = authorization {
+        req = req.header("Authorization", auth);
+    }
+    match req.call() {
+        Ok(mut resp) => {
+            let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+            let header = |name: &str| {
+                resp.headers()
+                    .get(name)
+                    .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+                    .map(str::to_string)
+            };
+            let location = header("location");
+            let retry_after = header("retry-after");
+            let body = match resp.body_mut().with_config().limit(MAX_BODY).read_to_string() {
+                Ok(body) => body,
+                // The answer began but did not finish in time. Where the body
+                // decides what answered (200, 403), that is a timeout, not
+                // "something else answers here".
+                Err(e) if matches!(status, 200 | 403) && transport_error(&e, false) == TransportError::Timeout => {
+                    return ProbeOutcome::Timeout;
+                }
+                Err(_) => String::new(),
+            };
+            classify_response(
+                &status_url,
+                status,
+                location.as_deref(),
+                retry_after.as_deref(),
+                authorization.is_some(),
+                &body,
+            )
+        }
+        Err(e) => classify_transport(transport_error(&e, status_url.scheme() == "http")),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::io;
+
+    fn status_url() -> Url {
+        Url::parse("http://studio.lan:3000/api/status").unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// `classify_response` for the cases that need no headers.
+    fn classify(status: u16, sent_credentials: bool, body: &str) -> ProbeOutcome {
+        classify_response(&status_url(), status, None, None, sent_credentials, body)
+    }
+
+    fn redirect(request: &str, location: &str) -> ProbeOutcome {
+        classify_response(&Url::parse(request).unwrap(), 301, Some(location), None, false, "")
+    }
+
+    fn io_outcome(kind: io::ErrorKind, message: &str, plain_http: bool) -> ProbeOutcome {
+        let err = ureq::Error::Io(io::Error::new(kind, message.to_string()));
+        classify_transport(transport_error(&err, plain_http))
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ok_needs_success_and_version() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(
+                200,
+                false,
+                r#"{"success":true,"data":{"version":"1.47.0","sessions":[]}}"#
+            ),
+            ProbeOutcome::Ok {
+                version: "1.47.0".into()
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(200, false, "<html>hello</html>"),
+            ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 200 }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(200, false, r#"{"success":false,"data":{"version":"1"}}"#),
+            ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 200 }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(200, false, r#"{"success":true}"#),
+            ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 200 }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn auth_and_guards() {
+        assert_eq!(classify(401, false, "Unauthorized"), ProbeOutcome::NeedsLogin);
+        assert_eq!(classify(401, true, "Unauthorized"), ProbeOutcome::BadCredentials);
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(403, false, "Forbidden: host not allowed"),
+            ProbeOutcome::HostNotAllowed
+        );
+        // The Host guard runs before authentication, so it wins even with credentials.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(403, true, "Forbidden: host not allowed"),
+            ProbeOutcome::HostNotAllowed
+        );
+        assert_eq!(classify(403, false, "nope"), ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 403 });
+        assert_eq!(classify(502, false, ""), ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 502 });
+    }
+
+    /// The exact body auth.ts sends: `createErrorResponse(PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED)`.
+    #[test]
+    fn password_change_required_only_after_sent_credentials() {
+        let body = r#"{"success":false,"error":"You must change your password before continuing","errorCode":"PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED"}"#;
+        assert_eq!(classify(403, true, body), ProbeOutcome::PasswordChangeRequired);
+        assert_eq!(classify(403, false, body), ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 403 });
+        // Another Codeman error code, or the text without the JSON field, is not it.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(403, true, r#"{"success":false,"errorCode":"FORBIDDEN"}"#),
+            ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 403 }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(403, true, "PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED"),
+            ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 403 }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rate_limited_says_whether_credentials_went_along() {
+        let body = "Too Many Requests, try again later";
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(429, false, body),
+            ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+                sent_credentials: false,
+                retry_after_secs: None
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify(429, true, body),
+            ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+                sent_credentials: true,
+                retry_after_secs: None
+            }
+        );
+        // auth.ts sends Retry-After in whole seconds; an HTTP date is not parsed.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_response(&status_url(), 429, None, Some(" 742 "), true, body),
+            ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+                sent_credentials: true,
+                retry_after_secs: Some(742)
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_response(
+                &status_url(),
+                429,
+                None,
+                Some("Wed, 21 Oct 2026 07:28:00 GMT"),
+                false,
+                body
+            ),
+            ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+                sent_credentials: false,
+                retry_after_secs: None
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn redirect_to_https_on_the_same_host_is_suggested() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect("http://studio.lan/api/status", "https://studio.lan/api/status"),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "https://studio.lan/api/status".into(),
+                suggested: Some("https://studio.lan/".into())
+            }
+        );
+        // A base path the proxy adds stays part of the suggestion; a query does not.
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect(
+                "http://studio.lan:3000/api/status",
+                "https://studio.lan/codeman/api/status?from=http"
+            ),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "https://studio.lan/codeman/api/status?from=http".into(),
+                suggested: Some("https://studio.lan/codeman/".into())
+            }
+        );
+        // A relative Location resolves against the probed URL; another port is fine.
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect(
+                "http://studio.lan:3000/base/api/status",
+                "//studio.lan:3001/base/api/status"
+            ),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "http://studio.lan:3001/base/api/status".into(),
+                suggested: Some("http://studio.lan:3001/base/".into())
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn other_redirects_are_reported_without_a_suggestion() {
+        // Another host (a login gateway, say).
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect("http://studio.lan/api/status", "https://sso.example.com/login?next=x"),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "https://sso.example.com/login?next=x".into(),
+                suggested: None
+            }
+        );
+        // Same host, but no longer the status API.
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect("http://studio.lan/api/status", "/login"),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "http://studio.lan/login".into(),
+                suggested: None
+            }
+        );
+        // A downgrade to plain http.
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect("https://studio.lan/api/status", "http://studio.lan/api/status"),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "http://studio.lan/api/status".into(),
+                suggested: None
+            }
+        );
+        // Same scheme and port, only the path moved.
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect("http://studio.lan/api/status", "/x/api/status"),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "http://studio.lan/x/api/status".into(),
+                suggested: None
+            }
+        );
+        // Credentials in the target are never suggested.
+        assert_eq!(
+            redirect("http://studio.lan/api/status", "https://u:p@studio.lan/api/status"),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "https://u:p@studio.lan/api/status".into(),
+                suggested: None
+            }
+        );
+        // No Location (304), or one that does not parse: nothing to act on.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_response(&status_url(), 304, None, None, false, ""),
+            ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 304 }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_response(&status_url(), 302, Some("http://[::1"), None, false, ""),
+            ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 302 }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn transport_classes() {
+        assert_eq!(classify_transport(TransportError::Refused), ProbeOutcome::Refused);
+        assert_eq!(classify_transport(TransportError::Timeout), ProbeOutcome::Timeout);
+        assert_eq!(classify_transport(TransportError::Dns), ProbeOutcome::Unresolvable);
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_transport(TransportError::Tls("bad cert".into())),
+            ProbeOutcome::TlsUntrusted {
+                detail: "bad cert".into()
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The io errors exactly as ureq hands them over (`Error::Io`).
+    #[test]
+    fn io_errors_are_told_apart() {
+        use io::ErrorKind;
+        // rustls' certificate rejection from the handshake.
+        let cert = "invalid peer certificate: UnknownIssuer";
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(ErrorKind::InvalidData, cert, false),
+            ProbeOutcome::TlsUntrusted { detail: cert.into() }
+        );
+        // Any other InvalidData (a port that does not speak TLS, say) is not a certificate problem.
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(
+                ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+                "received corrupt message of type InvalidContentType",
+                false
+            ),
+            ProbeOutcome::Failed {
+                detail: "received corrupt message of type InvalidContentType".into()
+            }
+        );
+        // std's getaddrinfo failure (its real kind, Uncategorized, cannot be built on stable).
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(
+                ErrorKind::Other,
+                "failed to lookup address information: nodename nor servname provided, or not known",
+                true
+            ),
+            ProbeOutcome::Unresolvable
+        );
+        // The same text from the OS (an errno) is not a lookup failure.
+        let os = ureq::Error::Io(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(1));
+        assert!(!matches!(
+            classify_transport(transport_error(&os, true)),
+            ProbeOutcome::Unresolvable
+        ));
+        // ureq's "Peer disconnected": over http a hint at https, over https just a failure.
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof, "Peer disconnected", true),
+            ProbeOutcome::MaybeHttps
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof, "Peer disconnected", false),
+            ProbeOutcome::Failed {
+                detail: "Peer disconnected".into()
+            }
+        );
+        // No route: Local Network privacy, or a machine that is off.
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(ErrorKind::HostUnreachable, "No route to host", true),
+            ProbeOutcome::Unreachable
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(ErrorKind::NetworkUnreachable, "Network is unreachable", false),
+            ProbeOutcome::Unreachable
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            io_outcome(ErrorKind::ConnectionRefused, "Connection refused", true),
+            ProbeOutcome::Refused
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_transport(transport_error(&ureq::Error::HostNotFound, true)),
+            ProbeOutcome::Unresolvable
+        );
+        // A ureq TLS setup message is not an untrusted certificate.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_transport(transport_error(
+                &ureq::Error::Tls("Rustls invalid dns name error"),
+                false
+            )),
+            ProbeOutcome::Failed {
+                detail: "Rustls invalid dns name error".into()
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn outcome_serializes_for_the_page() {
+        let json = |o: ProbeOutcome| serde_json::to_value(o).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 404 }),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"notCodeman","status":404})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(json(ProbeOutcome::NeedsLogin), serde_json::json!({"kind":"needsLogin"}));
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+                sent_credentials: true,
+                retry_after_secs: None
+            }),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"rateLimited","sentCredentials":true})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+                sent_credentials: false,
+                retry_after_secs: Some(60)
+            }),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"rateLimited","sentCredentials":false,"retryAfterSecs":60})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::PasswordChangeRequired),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"passwordChangeRequired"})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "https://studio.lan/api/status".into(),
+                suggested: Some("https://studio.lan/".into())
+            }),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"redirect","location":"https://studio.lan/api/status","suggested":"https://studio.lan/"})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: "https://sso.example.com/".into(),
+                suggested: None
+            }),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"redirect","location":"https://sso.example.com/","suggested":null})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::Unreachable),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"unreachable"})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(json(ProbeOutcome::MaybeHttps), serde_json::json!({"kind":"maybeHttps"}));
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::TlsUntrusted { detail: "x".into() }),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"tlsUntrusted","detail":"x"})
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            json(ProbeOutcome::Unresolvable),
+            serde_json::json!({"kind":"unresolvable"})
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Against real sockets: a closed port is `Refused`, a listener that
+    /// speaks HTTP but not Codeman is `NotCodeman`, a fake Codeman is `Ok`,
+    /// a 401 is `NeedsLogin`, a redirect is reported without being followed,
+    /// and a listener that hangs up without answering is `MaybeHttps`.
+    #[test]
+    fn probe_against_local_sockets() {
+        use std::io::{Read, Write};
+        use std::net::TcpListener;
+
+        let closed = {
+            let l = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+            l.local_addr().unwrap().port()
+        };
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{closed}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(probe(&url, None), ProbeOutcome::Refused);
+
+        /// Accept one connection, read the request and send `response`
+        /// (nothing, then close, for an empty one).
+        fn serve_raw(response: String) -> u16 {
+            let l = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+            let port = l.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+            std::thread::spawn(move || {
+                if let Ok((mut s, _)) = l.accept() {
+                    // Read the whole request head (a GET has no body) so that
+                    // closing sends a FIN, not a reset for unread bytes.
+                    let mut head = Vec::new();
+                    let mut buf = [0u8; 4096];
+                    while !head.windows(4).any(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n") {
+                        match s.read(&mut buf) {
+                            Ok(0) | Err(_) => break,
+                            Ok(n) => head.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]),
+                        }
+                    }
+                    let _ = s.write_all(response.as_bytes());
+                }
+            });
+            port
+        }
+        fn serve_once(status_line: &str, extra_headers: &str, body: &str) -> u16 {
+            serve_raw(format!(
+                "HTTP/1.1 {status_line}\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\n{extra_headers}Connection: close\r\n\r\n{body}",
+                body.len()
+            ))
+        }
+
+        let p = serve_once("200 OK", "", r#"{"success":true,"data":{"version":"9.9.9"}}"#);
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{p}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            probe(&url, None),
+            ProbeOutcome::Ok {
+                version: "9.9.9".into()
+            }
+        );
+
+        let p = serve_once("404 Not Found", "", "nope");
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{p}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(probe(&url, None), ProbeOutcome::NotCodeman { status: 404 });
+
+        let p = serve_once("401 Unauthorized", "", "Unauthorized");
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{p}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(probe(&url, None), ProbeOutcome::NeedsLogin);
+
+        let p = serve_once("429 Too Many Requests", "Retry-After: 30\r\n", "Too Many Requests");
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{p}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            probe(&url, Some("Basic YWRtaW46eA==")),
+            ProbeOutcome::RateLimited {
+                sent_credentials: true,
+                retry_after_secs: Some(30)
+            }
+        );
+
+        // Nothing listens on the redirect target: had it been followed, the
+        // answer would be Refused instead.
+        let p = serve_once(
+            "301 Moved Permanently",
+            &format!("Location: https://127.0.0.1:{closed}/api/status\r\n"),
+            "",
+        );
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{p}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            probe(&url, None),
+            ProbeOutcome::Redirect {
+                location: format!("https://127.0.0.1:{closed}/api/status"),
+                suggested: Some(format!("https://127.0.0.1:{closed}/"))
+            }
+        );
+
+        let p = serve_raw(String::new());
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{p}/")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(probe(&url, None), ProbeOutcome::MaybeHttps);
+    }
+
+    /// A Codeman that sends its status headers and then stalls (a blocked
+    /// event loop, a lossy link) did not answer in time: a Timeout, not
+    /// NotCodeman ("something else on this port").
+    #[test]
+    fn a_body_that_stalls_is_a_timeout() {
+        use std::io::{Read, Write};
+        use std::net::TcpListener;
+
+        /// Send `head` and the start of a body, then hold the connection open.
+        fn serve_stalling(status_line: &'static str) -> u16 {
+            let l = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+            let port = l.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+            std::thread::spawn(move || {
+                if let Ok((mut s, _)) = l.accept() {
+                    let mut buf = [0u8; 4096];
+                    let _ = s.read(&mut buf);
+                    let _ = s.write_all(
+                        format!("HTTP/1.1 {status_line}\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: 4096\r\n\r\n{{\"success\":true,").as_bytes(),
+                    );
+                    std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_secs(3));
+                }
+            });
+            port
+        }
+        let short = Duration::from_millis(400);
+
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", serve_stalling("200 OK"))).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(probe_within(&url, None, short), ProbeOutcome::Timeout);
+
+        // A 401 has said all it needs to with its status line.
+        let url = Url::parse(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", serve_stalling("401 Unauthorized"))).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(probe_within(&url, None, short), ProbeOutcome::NeedsLogin);
+    }
+}

packages/desktop/src/terminal_install.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,547 @@
+//! The installs that run in Terminal: on this Mac, and on another machine over
+//! SSH.
+//!
+//! The Terminal route is for what the in-app install (`gui_install.rs`) cannot
+//! do. `install.sh` asks for the administrator password on a terminal
+//! (Homebrew, its sudo keep-alive), the Xcode tools arrive as a system dialog,
+//! and ssh asks about host keys and passwords on a terminal too. So the app
+//! writes a small script that deletes itself and hands it to Terminal
+//! (`open -b com.apple.Terminal`), which needs no permission, unlike scripting
+//! Terminal through osascript (an Automation prompt). Everything the scripts
+//! contain is built here and unit-tested; the only text from the user is the
+//! SSH login, which `SshTarget::parse` limits to the characters of a user and
+//! host name before it is quoted.
+
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
+
+use crate::setup::{DEFAULT_PORT, INSTALLER_URL};
+
+/// The Terminal scripts' file names (`<name>-<pid>-<n>.command`). The local
+/// one is also how `inspect` recognizes an install that is still running.
+pub const LOCAL_SCRIPT_NAME: &str = "install-codeman-local";
+pub const REMOTE_SCRIPT_NAME: &str = "install-codeman-remote";
+
+/// `s` as one bash word.
+pub fn sh_quote(s: &str) -> String {
+    format!("'{}'", s.replace('\'', r"'\''"))
+}
+
+/// What the This Mac install asks `install.sh` for.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct LocalInstall {
+    pub port: u16,
+    /// Let the installer ask how other devices reach Codeman (Tailscale, the
+    /// local network with a password). Off: this Mac only (`--local`).
+    pub network: bool,
+}
+
+/// `install.sh`'s flags for a This Mac install. Always `--service`: a
+/// LaunchAgent runs Codeman, so it keeps running when the app quits and starts
+/// again at login, and the app finds it there (read_service). No `--yes`: the
+/// user answers the installer's questions (Homebrew, AI coding tools).
+pub fn local_install_args(opts: LocalInstall) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut args = Vec::new();
+    if !opts.network {
+        args.push("--local".to_string());
+    }
+    args.push("--service".to_string());
+    args.push("--port".to_string());
+    args.push(opts.port.to_string());
+    args
+}
+
+/// The Terminal script for a This Mac install. It downloads the installer to a
+/// temporary file and runs it from there, so the installer's input is the
+/// terminal itself.
+pub fn local_install_script(opts: LocalInstall) -> String {
+    let args = local_install_args(opts);
+    let shown = format!("bash install.sh {}", args.join(" "));
+    let quoted: Vec<String> = args.iter().map(|a| sh_quote(a)).collect();
+    format!(
+        r#"#!/bin/bash
+rm -f -- "$0"
+printf '\033]0;%s\007' 'Install Codeman'
+cat <<'CODEMAN_MSG'
+Installing Codeman on this Mac.
+
+The installer may ask for your Mac password (it installs Homebrew, Node.js and
+tmux when they are missing) and which AI coding tools to set up. Codeman then
+runs in the background and starts when you log in, so your sessions keep
+running when the app is closed. The Codeman app opens it by itself when the
+install is done.
+
+CODEMAN_MSG
+tmp=$(mktemp "${{TMPDIR:-/tmp}}/codeman-install.XXXXXX") || exit 1
+trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT
+echo {from}
+if ! curl -fsSL {url} -o "$tmp"; then
+  echo
+  echo 'Could not download the installer. Check the internet connection, then try again from the Codeman app.'
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo {shown}
+echo
+bash "$tmp" {args}
+status=$?
+echo
+if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo 'Done. You can close this window.'
+else
+  echo "The installer stopped (exit $status). Its log is ~/.codeman/install.log"
+fi
+exit "$status"
+"#,
+        from = sh_quote(&format!("Downloading the installer from {INSTALLER_URL}")),
+        url = sh_quote(INSTALLER_URL),
+        shown = sh_quote(&format!("$ {shown}")),
+        args = quoted.join(" "),
+    )
+}
+
+/// A machine to install Codeman on, as ssh takes it: `[user@]host`, plus a
+/// `:port` the app passes as `-p`. The host may be a name from `~/.ssh/config`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct SshTarget {
+    pub user: Option<String>,
+    pub host: String,
+    pub port: Option<u16>,
+}
+
+const SSH_FORMAT: &str =
+    "Enter the machine the way ssh takes it: user@host (for example kay@build-box), or a name from your ssh config.";
+
+impl SshTarget {
+    /// Only the characters of a user and host name, never a leading `-` (ssh
+    /// would read it as an option) and never an IPv6 literal (ambiguous with
+    /// the port; a host name or an IPv4 address works).
+    pub fn parse(input: &str) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        let s = input.trim();
+        if s.is_empty() || s.len() > 300 {
+            return Err(SSH_FORMAT.into());
+        }
+        let (user, rest) = match s.split_once('@') {
+            Some((u, r)) => (Some(u), r),
+            None => (None, s),
+        };
+        let (host, port) = match rest.split_once(':') {
+            Some((h, p)) => {
+                let port = p.parse::<u16>().ok().filter(|p| *p > 0).ok_or_else(|| {
+                    "The part after the colon must be the SSH port, for example kay@build-box:2222.".to_string()
+                })?;
+                (h, Some(port))
+            }
+            None => (rest, None),
+        };
+        let name_ok = |v: &str, max: usize| {
+            !v.is_empty()
+                && v.len() <= max
+                && !v.starts_with(['-', '.'])
+                && v.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || "._-".contains(c))
+        };
+        if let Some(u) = user {
+            if !name_ok(u, 64) {
+                return Err(SSH_FORMAT.into());
+            }
+        }
+        if !name_ok(host, 253) {
+            return Err(SSH_FORMAT.into());
+        }
+        Ok(SshTarget {
+            user: user.map(str::to_string),
+            host: host.to_string(),
+            port,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// `user@host`, or `host`.
+    pub fn destination(&self) -> String {
+        match &self.user {
+            Some(u) => format!("{u}@{}", self.host),
+            None => self.host.clone(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The address the connect screen suggests once the install is done: the
+    /// installer's default port on that host. Tailscale and a sub-path give
+    /// another address, which the installer prints at the end.
+    pub fn suggested_url(&self) -> String {
+        format!("http://{}:{DEFAULT_PORT}", self.host)
+    }
+}
+
+/// What the remote login shell runs. It may be fish or tcsh, so the work is
+/// one single-quoted `bash -c` word with nothing in it those shells treat
+/// specially (no `!`, `$`, backslash or single quote). `curl | bash` is the
+/// documented install and the installer asks its questions on ssh's terminal
+/// (`-t`); `pipefail` makes a failed download fail the whole command, where a
+/// plain pipe would report bash's success on an empty script. The installer
+/// needs bash anyway.
+pub fn remote_command() -> String {
+    format!(
+        "bash -o pipefail -c 'if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then curl -fsSL {u} | bash; \
+         elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then wget -qO- {u} | bash; \
+         else echo \"Codeman needs curl or wget on this machine.\" >&2; exit 1; fi'",
+        u = INSTALLER_URL
+    )
+}
+
+/// `ssh`'s arguments for an install on `target`: a terminal (`-t`) for the
+/// installer's questions, the port, and `--` before the destination.
+pub fn ssh_args(target: &SshTarget) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut args = vec!["-t".to_string()];
+    if let Some(port) = target.port {
+        args.push("-p".into());
+        args.push(port.to_string());
+    }
+    args.push("--".into());
+    args.push(target.destination());
+    args.push(remote_command());
+    args
+}
+
+/// The Terminal script for an install on another machine over SSH.
+pub fn remote_install_script(target: &SshTarget) -> String {
+    let args: Vec<String> = ssh_args(target).iter().map(|a| sh_quote(a)).collect();
+    let dest = target.destination();
+    format!(
+        r#"#!/bin/bash
+rm -f -- "$0"
+printf '\033]0;%s\007' {title}
+echo {what}
+cat <<'CODEMAN_MSG'
+
+ssh may ask you to confirm the machine and for its password. Then the installer
+asks how Codeman should be reached (Tailscale, the local network with a password,
+or that machine only) and whether to run it in the background. At the end it
+prints the address of Codeman there: connect to it in the Codeman app, under
+Another machine.
+
+CODEMAN_MSG
+ssh {args}
+status=$?
+echo
+if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo 'Done. You can close this window.'
+else
+  echo "ssh or the installer stopped (exit $status)."
+fi
+exit "$status"
+"#,
+        title = sh_quote(&format!("Install Codeman on {}", target.host)),
+        what = sh_quote(&format!("Installing Codeman on {dest} over SSH.")),
+        args = args.join(" "),
+    )
+}
+
+static SCRIPT_COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
+
+/// Run `script` in a new Terminal window. The script file is private to this
+/// user (the per-user temporary folder, mode 0700, created fresh) and deletes
+/// itself as it starts.
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+pub fn open_in_terminal(name: &str, script: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
+
+    let n = SCRIPT_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+    let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("{name}-{}-{n}.command", std::process::id()));
+    let written = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .create_new(true)
+        .mode(0o700)
+        .open(&path)
+        .and_then(|mut f| f.write_all(script.as_bytes()));
+    if let Err(e) = written {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
+        return Err(format!("Could not write the install script: {e}"));
+    }
+    let out = Command::new("/usr/bin/open")
+        .args(["-b", "com.apple.Terminal"])
+        .arg(&path)
+        .stdin(Stdio::null())
+        .stdout(Stdio::null())
+        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
+        .output();
+    match out {
+        Ok(o) if o.status.success() => Ok(()),
+        Ok(o) => {
+            let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
+            let said = String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stderr).trim().to_string();
+            Err(if said.is_empty() {
+                "Could not open Terminal.".into()
+            } else {
+                format!("Could not open Terminal: {said}")
+            })
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
+            Err(format!("Could not open Terminal: {e}"))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
+pub fn open_in_terminal(_name: &str, _script: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let _ = &SCRIPT_COUNTER;
+    Err("Installing from the app is only available on macOS so far.".into())
+}
+
+/// Put `text` on the clipboard (`pbcopy`). The connect page is not a secure
+/// context, so it cannot use the web clipboard API itself.
+pub fn copy_to_clipboard(text: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let mut child = Command::new("/usr/bin/pbcopy")
+        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
+        .stdout(Stdio::null())
+        .stderr(Stdio::null())
+        .spawn()
+        .map_err(|e| format!("Could not copy: {e}"))?;
+    if let Some(mut stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
+        stdin
+            .write_all(text.as_bytes())
+            .map_err(|e| format!("Could not copy: {e}"))?;
+    }
+    match child.wait() {
+        Ok(s) if s.success() => Ok(()),
+        _ => Err("Could not copy the command.".into()),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn quoting() {
+        assert_eq!(sh_quote("plain"), "'plain'");
+        assert_eq!(sh_quote("it's"), r"'it'\''s'");
+        assert_eq!(sh_quote(""), "''");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_install_flags() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            local_install_args(LocalInstall {
+                port: 3000,
+                network: false
+            }),
+            ["--local", "--service", "--port", "3000"]
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            local_install_args(LocalInstall {
+                port: 3007,
+                network: true
+            }),
+            ["--service", "--port", "3007"]
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Run a script under bash with `curl` and `bash`... replaced, and report
+    /// what it did. The real installer never runs in a test.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn run_script(script: &str, fakes: &[(&str, &str)]) -> (String, i32, bool) {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let n = SCRIPT_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("codeman-setup-test-{}-{n}", std::process::id()));
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("bin")).unwrap();
+        for (name, body) in fakes {
+            let p = dir.join("bin").join(name);
+            std::fs::write(&p, body.replace("DIR", &dir.display().to_string())).unwrap();
+            std::fs::set_permissions(&p, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        }
+        let file = dir.join("run.command");
+        std::fs::write(&file, script).unwrap();
+        let out = Command::new("/bin/bash")
+            .arg(&file)
+            .env("PATH", format!("{}:/usr/bin:/bin", dir.join("bin").display()))
+            .env("TMPDIR", &dir)
+            .stdin(Stdio::null())
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let log = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("log")).unwrap_or_default();
+        let self_deleted = !file.exists();
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+        (log, out.status.code().unwrap_or(-1), self_deleted)
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn local_script_downloads_then_runs_the_installer_with_its_flags() {
+        let script = local_install_script(LocalInstall {
+            port: 3001,
+            network: false,
+        });
+        let (log, code, self_deleted) = run_script(
+            &script,
+            &[(
+                "curl",
+                r#"#!/bin/sh
+echo "curl $*" >> DIR/log
+out=""
+while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do [ "$1" = -o ] && out="$2"; shift; done
+cat > "$out" <<'INSTALLER'
+for a in "$@"; do printf '[%s]' "$a" >> DIR/log; done
+echo >> DIR/log
+exit 7
+INSTALLER
+"#,
+            )],
+        );
+        assert!(self_deleted, "the script must delete itself");
+        assert!(
+            log.starts_with("curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install -o "),
+            "{log}"
+        );
+        assert!(log.contains("\n[--local][--service][--port][3001]\n"), "{log}");
+        assert_eq!(code, 7, "the installer's exit status is the script's");
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn local_script_stops_when_the_download_fails() {
+        let script = local_install_script(LocalInstall {
+            port: 3000,
+            network: true,
+        });
+        let (log, code, _) = run_script(&script, &[("curl", "#!/bin/sh\necho curl >> DIR/log\nexit 22\n")]);
+        assert_eq!(log, "curl\n");
+        assert_eq!(code, 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssh_targets() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            SshTarget::parse(" kay@build-box ").unwrap(),
+            SshTarget {
+                user: Some("kay".into()),
+                host: "build-box".into(),
+                port: None
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            SshTarget::parse("pi@192.168.1.20:2222").unwrap(),
+            SshTarget {
+                user: Some("pi".into()),
+                host: "192.168.1.20".into(),
+                port: Some(2222)
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(SshTarget::parse("macmini").unwrap().destination(), "macmini");
+        assert_eq!(
+            SshTarget::parse("a.b@tnode.tailnet.ts.net").unwrap().destination(),
+            "a.b@tnode.tailnet.ts.net"
+        );
+        for bad in [
+            "",
+            "-oProxyCommand=touch /tmp/x",
+            "kay@-oProxyCommand=x",
+            "-l@host",
+            "kay@host name",
+            "kay@host;rm",
+            "kay@host$(x)",
+            "k'y@host",
+            "kay@",
+            "@host",
+            "kay@host:",
+            "kay@host:0",
+            "kay@host:x",
+            "kay@fe80::1",
+            "kay@[::1]",
+            "a@b@c",
+            ".hidden",
+        ] {
+            assert!(SshTarget::parse(bad).is_err(), "accepted {bad:?}");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(SshTarget::parse("kay@box").unwrap().suggested_url(), "http://box:3000");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssh_arguments() {
+        let t = SshTarget::parse("kay@box:2222").unwrap();
+        let args = ssh_args(&t);
+        assert_eq!(&args[..5], ["-t", "-p", "2222", "--", "kay@box"]);
+        assert_eq!(args.len(), 6);
+        let remote = &args[5];
+        let head = "bash -o pipefail -c '";
+        assert!(remote.starts_with(head) && remote.ends_with('\''));
+        // One word for fish and tcsh: no quote inside, nothing they expand.
+        let inner = &remote[head.len()..remote.len() - 1];
+        assert!(!inner.contains(['\'', '!', '$', '\\', '`']), "{inner}");
+        assert!(inner.contains("curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash"));
+        assert_eq!(ssh_args(&SshTarget::parse("box").unwrap())[..3], ["-t", "--", "box"]);
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_script_runs_ssh_with_exactly_those_arguments() {
+        let t = SshTarget::parse("kay@box:2222").unwrap();
+        let (log, code, self_deleted) = run_script(
+            &remote_install_script(&t),
+            &[(
+                "ssh",
+                "#!/bin/sh\nfor a in \"$@\"; do printf '[%s]' \"$a\" >> DIR/log; done\necho >> DIR/log\nexit 3\n",
+            )],
+        );
+        assert!(self_deleted);
+        let expected: String = ssh_args(&t).iter().map(|a| format!("[{a}]")).collect();
+        assert_eq!(log, format!("{expected}\n"));
+        assert_eq!(code, 3);
+    }
+
+    /// The remote command does what it says under a POSIX shell: curl first,
+    /// wget without curl, and a clear error with neither.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_command_picks_a_downloader() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let n = SCRIPT_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("codeman-remote-cmd-{}-{n}", std::process::id()));
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("bin")).unwrap();
+        let exe = |name: &str, body: &str| {
+            let p = dir.join("bin").join(name);
+            std::fs::write(&p, body).unwrap();
+            std::fs::set_permissions(&p, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        };
+        // The outer `bash -o pipefail` is the real one; the `bash` the
+        // download is piped into only reports what it was fed.
+        exe(
+            "bash",
+            "#!/bin/sh\nif [ \"$1\" = -o ]; then exec /bin/bash \"$@\"; fi\nprintf 'bash got: '; /bin/cat\n",
+        );
+        exe("wget", "#!/bin/sh\necho \"wget $*\"\n");
+        let run = || {
+            let out = Command::new("/bin/sh")
+                .arg("-c")
+                .arg(remote_command())
+                .env("PATH", dir.join("bin"))
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            (
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned(),
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).into_owned(),
+                out.status.code(),
+            )
+        };
+        let (out, _, _) = run();
+        assert_eq!(out, "bash got: wget -qO- https://getcodeman.com/install\n");
+        exe("curl", "#!/bin/sh\necho \"curl $*\"\n");
+        let (out, _, _) = run();
+        assert_eq!(out, "bash got: curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install\n");
+        // A failed download fails the command (pipefail), not "Done".
+        exe(
+            "curl",
+            "#!/bin/sh\necho 'curl: (6) Could not resolve host' >&2\nexit 6\n",
+        );
+        let (_, _, code) = run();
+        assert_ne!(code, Some(0));
+        std::fs::remove_file(dir.join("bin/curl")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::remove_file(dir.join("bin/wget")).unwrap();
+        let (out, err, code) = run();
+        assert_eq!(out, "");
+        assert!(err.contains("needs curl or wget"), "{err}");
+        assert_eq!(code, Some(1));
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+}

plugins/codeman/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "codeman",
   "description": "Drive Codeman, the self-hosted session manager for AI coding agents, from inside a Claude Code session: spawn worker sessions, prompt them, wait for them, read their answers, clean up. Acts inside a Codeman-managed session; outside one it only reads saved Codex conversations offline.",
-  "version": "1.49.0",
+  "version": "1.50.0",
   "author": {
     "name": "Ark0N",
     "url": "https://github.com/Ark0N"

plugins/codeman/README.md

@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ The agent skill for [Codeman](https://getcodeman.com), the self-hosted mission c
 
 The skill acts inside a Codeman-managed session (`CODEMAN_MUX=1`). Outside one it only reads saved Codex conversations offline (`codeman history read`) and refuses everything else, so installing it globally costs nothing for unrelated sessions.
 
-Pick one install route. Codeman can inject the skill into each case itself (App Settings, Agent Skill), and `codeman skill install` writes a user-level copy; a Claude Code that has one of those AND this plugin lists the skill twice, as `codeman` and `codeman:codeman`. Both work, the second is just noise.
+Pick one install route. Codeman injects the skill into each new session's folder itself, on by default since 1.50.0 (App Settings, Agents & CLIs, Codeman Agent Skill), and `codeman skill install` writes a user-level copy; a Claude Code that has one of those AND this plugin lists the skill twice, as `codeman` and `codeman:codeman`. Both work, the second is just noise: turn that setting off, or skip the plugin, if it bothers you.
 
 This directory is a mirror of [`skills/codeman`](../../skills/codeman) in the main repository, kept byte-identical by `scripts/sync-plugin.mjs` and pinned by a test. Edit the source there, never here. `npm run check:plugin` (repo root, needs the `claude` CLI) checks the mirror and validates both manifests. Source, issues and the rest of Codeman: https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman

plugins/codeman/skills/codeman/SKILL.md

@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ Harness TUI reports `idle`/`working`/`blocked` to Codeman over the supervisor co
 implements, so dsh is the one external CLI with definitive `stop`/`blocked` signals
 instead of guessed-from-silence ones — and it writes a structured transcript, which is
 what `last-response` reads for it. `shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`,
-`grok`, `omp` and `copilot` have neither, and `codex` has a transcript and a screen-read `blocked` but
+`grok`, `omp`, `copilot` and `jcode` have neither, and `codex` has a transcript and a screen-read `blocked` but
 no `stop`, so all of them still need markers ([§5.5](reference/verbs.md#55-markers-for-hook-less-workers)).
 
 Three things to know before you spawn one:

plugins/codeman/skills/codeman/reference/endpoints.md

@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ minutes, never retry the credential.
 flushed slightly *after* the `stop` hook fires, so a read taken the instant the wait
 returns is too early (verified live: empty on the first call, full prose seconds later).
 It is also `""` before the worker's first completed turn, and permanently `""` for
-`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp` and `copilot`, which write no transcript at
+`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot` and `jcode`, which write no transcript at
 all. `deepseek` is NOT one of those — it is read from `$DSH_HOME/sessions/**` and lags
 for the same reason claude does (the harness finalizes the assistant message just after
 it reports `idle`), so poll it the same way.
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ ESC=$(printf '\033')
 
 `POST /api/v1/quick-start` body (all optional):
 `{"caseName":"worker-1","mode":"claude","sessionName":"auth-worker","effort":"high"}`
-,  `mode` ∈ `claude|shell|opencode|codex|gemini|antigravity|pi|grok|deepseek|omp|copilot`; response is
+,  `mode` ∈ `claude|shell|opencode|codex|gemini|antigravity|pi|grok|deepseek|omp|copilot|jcode`; response is
 `.data.{sessionId, caseName, casePath}`. Creates the case directory (a real directory
 on the user's disk) if missing, do not retry it in a loop, and remember the name.
 
@@ -361,9 +361,10 @@ a soft default the worker can change with `/advisor`. Remote and docker cases re
 `OPERATION_FAILED`; it never falls back to claude. Probe first whenever you did not pick
 the mode yourself: `GET /api/v1/claude/status`, `GET /api/v1/opencode/status`,
 `GET /api/v1/codex/status`, `GET /api/v1/gemini/status`, `GET /api/v1/antigravity/status`, `GET /api/v1/grok/status`, `GET /api/v1/deepseek/status`,
-`GET /api/v1/pi/status`, `GET /api/v1/omp/status` and `GET /api/v1/copilot/status` each return `.data.{available, path}` (no session needed).
-Pi's, grok's, OMP's and Copilot's also carry `.data.version`, because `pi` is a short generic name,
-`grok` is a name with npm squatters, and `omp` is a similarly short name, and `copilot` is a generic one, so an unrelated
+`GET /api/v1/pi/status`, `GET /api/v1/omp/status`, `GET /api/v1/copilot/status` and `GET /api/v1/jcode/status` each return `.data.{available, path}` (no session needed).
+Pi's, grok's, OMP's, Copilot's and jcode's also carry `.data.version`, because `pi` is a short generic name,
+`grok` is a name with npm squatters, `omp` is a similarly short name, `copilot` is a generic one, and an
+unrelated npm package is also called `jcode`, so an unrelated
 binary on `$PATH` can shadow any of them: the resolver rejects one whose `--version` is
 not version-shaped, so `available:false` there can mean "a different program of the same
 name is in front" rather than "nothing is installed". `shell` has no CLI to probe.
@@ -492,8 +493,8 @@ Quirks that will bite you:
 - ⚠️ **`active-tools` proves presence, never absence.** It is fed by the BashToolParser,
   which reads Claude's rendered `● Bash(…)` lines, and `_processExpensiveParsers`
   returns early for every external CLI mode (`session.ts:~2225`), so it is permanently
-  `[]` on `opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`. ⚠️ **`shell` is NOT one of those**
-  (`isExternalCliMode`, `session.ts:176-187`, lists only those seven), so the parser does
+  `[]` on `opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`. ⚠️ **`shell` is NOT one of those**
+  (`isExternalCliMode` covers only those external CLIs), so the parser does
   run on a shell worker, and `TEXT_COMMAND_PATTERN` (`bash-tool-parser.ts:89`) matches
   bare `tail|cat|head|less|grep|watch|multitail <path>` lines with no `● Bash(` wrapper:
   a shell worker running `cat build.log` really does populate this. In practice it stays

plugins/codeman/skills/codeman/reference/messaging.md

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ own head: the worker enforcing the cap is the one who has to be told about it.
 | synchronize on end of turn | HTTP `wait until=stop` (fires for message-initiated turns too, verified live) |
 | liveness / death check | HTTP `wait?until=exit` |
 | interrupt a running turn (break-glass) | HTTP input, a bare `\x1b` with no `\r` |
-| non-claude modes (`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`) | HTTP only (no other CLI has messaging) |
+| non-claude modes (`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`) | HTTP only (no other CLI has messaging) |
 | delete | HTTP, via SKILL.md's `delete_session` guard |
 
 ## Availability: probe, never assume
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ Without a break-glass, a pair with a bad brief is a token bonfire with no off sw
 
 ### Mixed fleets: the pairing matrix
 
-Non-claude workers (`shell`, `opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `deepseek`, `omp`, `copilot`) cannot be peers
+Non-claude workers (`shell`, `opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `deepseek`, `omp`, `copilot`, `jcode`) cannot be peers
 at all; no other CLI has this feature. Their tasks route over HTTP, and you never mention
 messaging in their briefs. The claude half of the fleet can use messaging among itself,
 subject to the namespace rule: **messaging works between two sessions that share one

plugins/codeman/skills/codeman/reference/recipes.md

@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
 done
 printf '%s\n' "$TXT"
 #    (.data is {text,timestamp}; text is also "" before the first completed turn and
-#     always "" for shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot, which have no transcript, use
+#     always "" for shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot/jcode, which have no transcript, use
 #     the terminal tail there, and here only to diagnose an unsubmitted prompt.)
 
 # 6. clean up: exact id, own list only, through the fail-closed preamble helper

plugins/codeman/skills/codeman/reference/verbs.md

@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ recovered by submitting it with `{"input":"\r"}`.
 only when the workspace actually has them, see [§5.1](#51-where-to-spawn)) **and for
 `deepseek`** — the one external CLI that reports its own lifecycle, so its `stop` is a
 real end-of-turn signal rather than a guess. On
-`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`omp`/`copilot`, requesting them explicitly is a
+`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`, requesting them explicitly is a
 400 (except `blocked` on `codex`, which Codeman reads off its screen when an approval,
 question or trust dialog is up; a wait for it answers at once if one already is), and
 lifecycle transitions there are coarse (a short shell command may emit **no**
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ from the transcript file, which is flushed slightly *after* the `stop` hook fire
 single read taken the instant send-and-wait returns comes back `""` even though the
 turn finished (verified live: empty on the first call, full text seconds later). `text`
 is also `""` before the worker's first completed turn, and always `""` for modes with
-no transcript (`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot`; the first four
+no transcript (`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot`, `jcode`; the first four
 verified live, pi from the same source path), which is
 why the loop above is bounded rather than open-ended. A dsh worker lags too, for its own
 reason: the harness finalizes the assistant message just after it reports `idle`. Fall back to the terminal buffer
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ turn), and both better than diffing terminal samples:
 ```
 
 ⚠️ `active-tools` is parsed out of Claude's own output format, so it is **empty for
-`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`** (those parsers are skipped wholesale) and
+`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`** (those parsers are skipped wholesale) and
 in practice empty for `shell`. Source-verified, not measured live.
 
 Only if neither helps: sample `terminal?tail=` twice a few seconds apart. A changing

skills/codeman/SKILL.md

@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ Harness TUI reports `idle`/`working`/`blocked` to Codeman over the supervisor co
 implements, so dsh is the one external CLI with definitive `stop`/`blocked` signals
 instead of guessed-from-silence ones — and it writes a structured transcript, which is
 what `last-response` reads for it. `shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`,
-`grok`, `omp` and `copilot` have neither, and `codex` has a transcript and a screen-read `blocked` but
+`grok`, `omp`, `copilot` and `jcode` have neither, and `codex` has a transcript and a screen-read `blocked` but
 no `stop`, so all of them still need markers ([§5.5](reference/verbs.md#55-markers-for-hook-less-workers)).
 
 Three things to know before you spawn one:

skills/codeman/reference/endpoints.md

@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ minutes, never retry the credential.
 flushed slightly *after* the `stop` hook fires, so a read taken the instant the wait
 returns is too early (verified live: empty on the first call, full prose seconds later).
 It is also `""` before the worker's first completed turn, and permanently `""` for
-`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp` and `copilot`, which write no transcript at
+`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot` and `jcode`, which write no transcript at
 all. `deepseek` is NOT one of those — it is read from `$DSH_HOME/sessions/**` and lags
 for the same reason claude does (the harness finalizes the assistant message just after
 it reports `idle`), so poll it the same way.
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ ESC=$(printf '\033')
 
 `POST /api/v1/quick-start` body (all optional):
 `{"caseName":"worker-1","mode":"claude","sessionName":"auth-worker","effort":"high"}`
-,  `mode` ∈ `claude|shell|opencode|codex|gemini|antigravity|pi|grok|deepseek|omp|copilot`; response is
+,  `mode` ∈ `claude|shell|opencode|codex|gemini|antigravity|pi|grok|deepseek|omp|copilot|jcode`; response is
 `.data.{sessionId, caseName, casePath}`. Creates the case directory (a real directory
 on the user's disk) if missing, do not retry it in a loop, and remember the name.
 
@@ -361,9 +361,10 @@ a soft default the worker can change with `/advisor`. Remote and docker cases re
 `OPERATION_FAILED`; it never falls back to claude. Probe first whenever you did not pick
 the mode yourself: `GET /api/v1/claude/status`, `GET /api/v1/opencode/status`,
 `GET /api/v1/codex/status`, `GET /api/v1/gemini/status`, `GET /api/v1/antigravity/status`, `GET /api/v1/grok/status`, `GET /api/v1/deepseek/status`,
-`GET /api/v1/pi/status`, `GET /api/v1/omp/status` and `GET /api/v1/copilot/status` each return `.data.{available, path}` (no session needed).
-Pi's, grok's, OMP's and Copilot's also carry `.data.version`, because `pi` is a short generic name,
-`grok` is a name with npm squatters, and `omp` is a similarly short name, and `copilot` is a generic one, so an unrelated
+`GET /api/v1/pi/status`, `GET /api/v1/omp/status`, `GET /api/v1/copilot/status` and `GET /api/v1/jcode/status` each return `.data.{available, path}` (no session needed).
+Pi's, grok's, OMP's, Copilot's and jcode's also carry `.data.version`, because `pi` is a short generic name,
+`grok` is a name with npm squatters, `omp` is a similarly short name, `copilot` is a generic one, and an
+unrelated npm package is also called `jcode`, so an unrelated
 binary on `$PATH` can shadow any of them: the resolver rejects one whose `--version` is
 not version-shaped, so `available:false` there can mean "a different program of the same
 name is in front" rather than "nothing is installed". `shell` has no CLI to probe.
@@ -492,8 +493,8 @@ Quirks that will bite you:
 - ⚠️ **`active-tools` proves presence, never absence.** It is fed by the BashToolParser,
   which reads Claude's rendered `● Bash(…)` lines, and `_processExpensiveParsers`
   returns early for every external CLI mode (`session.ts:~2225`), so it is permanently
-  `[]` on `opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`. ⚠️ **`shell` is NOT one of those**
-  (`isExternalCliMode`, `session.ts:176-187`, lists only those seven), so the parser does
+  `[]` on `opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`. ⚠️ **`shell` is NOT one of those**
+  (`isExternalCliMode` covers only those external CLIs), so the parser does
   run on a shell worker, and `TEXT_COMMAND_PATTERN` (`bash-tool-parser.ts:89`) matches
   bare `tail|cat|head|less|grep|watch|multitail <path>` lines with no `● Bash(` wrapper:
   a shell worker running `cat build.log` really does populate this. In practice it stays

skills/codeman/reference/messaging.md

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ own head: the worker enforcing the cap is the one who has to be told about it.
 | synchronize on end of turn | HTTP `wait until=stop` (fires for message-initiated turns too, verified live) |
 | liveness / death check | HTTP `wait?until=exit` |
 | interrupt a running turn (break-glass) | HTTP input, a bare `\x1b` with no `\r` |
-| non-claude modes (`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`) | HTTP only (no other CLI has messaging) |
+| non-claude modes (`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`) | HTTP only (no other CLI has messaging) |
 | delete | HTTP, via SKILL.md's `delete_session` guard |
 
 ## Availability: probe, never assume
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ Without a break-glass, a pair with a bad brief is a token bonfire with no off sw
 
 ### Mixed fleets: the pairing matrix
 
-Non-claude workers (`shell`, `opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `deepseek`, `omp`, `copilot`) cannot be peers
+Non-claude workers (`shell`, `opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `deepseek`, `omp`, `copilot`, `jcode`) cannot be peers
 at all; no other CLI has this feature. Their tasks route over HTTP, and you never mention
 messaging in their briefs. The claude half of the fleet can use messaging among itself,
 subject to the namespace rule: **messaging works between two sessions that share one

skills/codeman/reference/recipes.md

@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
 done
 printf '%s\n' "$TXT"
 #    (.data is {text,timestamp}; text is also "" before the first completed turn and
-#     always "" for shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot, which have no transcript, use
+#     always "" for shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi/grok/omp/copilot/jcode, which have no transcript, use
 #     the terminal tail there, and here only to diagnose an unsubmitted prompt.)
 
 # 6. clean up: exact id, own list only, through the fail-closed preamble helper

skills/codeman/reference/verbs.md

@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ recovered by submitting it with `{"input":"\r"}`.
 only when the workspace actually has them, see [§5.1](#51-where-to-spawn)) **and for
 `deepseek`** — the one external CLI that reports its own lifecycle, so its `stop` is a
 real end-of-turn signal rather than a guess. On
-`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`omp`/`copilot`, requesting them explicitly is a
+`shell`/`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`, requesting them explicitly is a
 400 (except `blocked` on `codex`, which Codeman reads off its screen when an approval,
 question or trust dialog is up; a wait for it answers at once if one already is), and
 lifecycle transitions there are coarse (a short shell command may emit **no**
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ from the transcript file, which is flushed slightly *after* the `stop` hook fire
 single read taken the instant send-and-wait returns comes back `""` even though the
 turn finished (verified live: empty on the first call, full text seconds later). `text`
 is also `""` before the worker's first completed turn, and always `""` for modes with
-no transcript (`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot`; the first four
+no transcript (`shell`, `opencode`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`, `grok`, `omp`, `copilot`, `jcode`; the first four
 verified live, pi from the same source path), which is
 why the loop above is bounded rather than open-ended. A dsh worker lags too, for its own
 reason: the harness finalizes the assistant message just after it reports `idle`. Fall back to the terminal buffer
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ turn), and both better than diffing terminal samples:
 ```
 
 ⚠️ `active-tools` is parsed out of Claude's own output format, so it is **empty for
-`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`** (those parsers are skipped wholesale) and
+`opencode`/`codex`/`gemini`/`antigravity`/`pi`/`grok`/`deepseek`/`omp`/`copilot`/`jcode`** (those parsers are skipped wholesale) and
 in practice empty for `shell`. Source-verified, not measured live.
 
 Only if neither helps: sample `terminal?tail=` twice a few seconds apart. A changing

src/cli.ts

@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ function describeSkillResult(result: AgentSkillApplyResult, target: string): { o
     },
     symlink: {
       ok: false,
-      text: `${target} (or its parent) is a symlink, refusing to write through it.`,
+      text: `${target}, its parent or its reference folder is a symlink, refusing to write through it.`,
     },
   };
   return messages[result];
@@ -320,7 +320,11 @@ skillCmd
         if (result === 'symlink') {
           // A shared-skills layout (`.agents/skills -> ../.claude/skills`) is deliberate:
           // skip it rather than fail the whole sweep.
-          console.log(palette.warn(`- Skipped ${target}: it (or its parent) is a symlink, so it was not touched`));
+          console.log(
+            palette.warn(
+              `- Skipped ${target}: it, its parent or its reference folder is a symlink, so it was not touched`
+            )
+          );
           continue;
         }
         removedAny = true;

src/config/attachment-guard.ts

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
  * @module config/attachment-guard
  */
 
-import { sep } from 'node:path';
+import { join, sep } from 'node:path';
 import { isSensitivePath } from '../web/sensitive-path.js';
 import { readJsonConfig, SETTINGS_PATH } from '../web/route-helpers.js';
 
@@ -131,3 +131,25 @@ export function isBlockedAttachmentPath(absPath: string, blockedTrees: readonly
   if (isSensitivePath(absPath)) return true;
   return blockedTrees.some((tree) => isUnderTree(absPath, tree));
 }
+
+/**
+ * Like `isBlockedAttachmentPath`, for a directory. The sensitive patterns describe file locations
+ * such as ~/.ssh/<key>, so a child probe is what refuses a folder like ~/.ssh itself.
+ */
+export function isBlockedAttachmentDirectory(dir: string, blockedTrees: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  return (
+    isBlockedAttachmentPath(dir, blockedTrees) ||
+    isBlockedAttachmentPath(join(dir, '__codeman_blocked_dir_probe__'), blockedTrees)
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * True when the attachment guard refuses `root` as the root of a worktree outside the session
+ * folder: workspace confinement is on, the folder is blocked or sensitive, or it surrounds a
+ * blocked tree. `root` must be absolute and symlink-resolved.
+ */
+export function isOutsideWorktreeRootRefused(root: string, guard: AttachmentGuardConfig): boolean {
+  if (guard.confineToWorkspace) return true;
+  if (isBlockedAttachmentDirectory(root, guard.blockedTrees)) return true;
+  return guard.blockedTrees.some((tree) => isUnderTree(tree, root));
+}

src/config/cli-registry/schema.ts

@@ -314,6 +314,8 @@ const capabilitiesSchema = z
     // Keep the PTY's rows while a phone keyboard is up (inline renderers only).
     // Optional: absent means the keyboard resizes, the safe default.
     keyboardHold: z.literal('inline').optional(),
+    // Spare the CLI's own detached daemon (another process group) when a pane is killed.
+    sharedDaemon: z.boolean().optional(),
     keyboardAccessory: z.enum(['agent', 'shell']),
     privilegedCommandGate: z.boolean(),
     startMode: z.enum(['interactive', 'shell']),

src/config/cli-registry/stock.ts

@@ -2023,6 +2023,142 @@ const COPILOT: CliEntry = {
   },
 };
 
+// jcode (1jehuang/jcode, a Rust coding-agent TUI). Measured on a live v0.98.1 pane inside tmux
+// (capture-pane every 200 ms through real turns, a recorded tmux client stream, PageUp/PageDown
+// and SGR wheel reports, a bracketed-paste prompt; 2026-10-16). Three things about it shape
+// this entry and are worth knowing before changing it:
+//
+//   1. Every jcode TUI is a CLIENT of one shared per-user daemon (`jcode serve`, started by the
+//      first client in its own session, so it outlives the pane that started it). The agent and
+//      its tools run in the DAEMON, with the daemon's environment: a second client's env never
+//      reaches its bash tool (measured, `probe=[]`). A session's `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` and
+//      `CODEMAN_API_URL` are therefore whatever the session that started the daemon had, or
+//      nothing. That is why the agent skill is not injected (below) and why `JCODE_*` is not an
+//      `envOverrides` prefix: most of that namespace is read by the daemon, so a per-session
+//      value would do nothing, and where it did act (the session that starts the daemon) it
+//      would reach every jcode session, hook and command-path variables included.
+//   2. It has no approval prompts and no bypass flag: bash runs ungated apart from jcode's own
+//      model-side reflection gate and a catastrophic-path deny. Nothing to clamp, nothing to
+//      read as blocked, same shape as pi.
+//   3. A fresh install opens an onboarding wizard instead of the composer until its launch
+//      counter passes 5 (or 10 sessions exist). A prompt typed into it is lost, so a new user
+//      should run `jcode` once in a terminal (or press Esc in the pane) before driving it.
+const JCODE: CliEntry = {
+  id: 'jcode' as CliEntry['id'],
+  label: 'jcode',
+  shortBadge: 'JC',
+  // No brand colour to borrow (the mark is a monochrome halftone donut, and its TUI's own blue
+  // is gemini's #8ab4f8), so an amber no other entry uses.
+  accent: '#f59e0b',
+  enabled: true,
+  stock: true,
+  order: 110,
+  kind: 'agent',
+  discovery: {
+    binaries: ['jcode'],
+    // The official installer links `~/.local/bin/jcode` (its `JCODE_INSTALL_DIR` default) to a
+    // launcher script under `~/.jcode/builds/`; the agent image puts it in `/usr/local/bin`.
+    searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
+    // `jcode --version` prints `jcode v0.98.1 (1c7426eb1)`. npm carries an unrelated `jcode`
+    // package, so the probe is anchored on the `jcode v` prefix and a mismatch counts as absent.
+    version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(?:^|\\s)jcode v(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', requireVersionMatch: true },
+    install: {
+      command: {
+        linux: 'curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash',
+        darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://jcode.sh/install | bash',
+      },
+      docsUrl: 'https://jcode.sh/docs',
+      agentImageLayer: {
+        kind: 'dedicated',
+        reason:
+          'Not on npm: jcode ships a standalone Rust binary through jcode.sh/install, whose launcher is a script that execs the binary beside it.',
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  launch: {
+    params: {
+      model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
+      // jcode ids look like `session_fox_1792160401272_f5b47ce47d631006` and `--resume` also
+      // takes the short name (`fox`). Its value is OPTIONAL (bare `--resume` opens the session
+      // picker), so the token must not be able to start with `-`, or it would be read as a
+      // flag of its own: `path-segment` requires a leading alphanumeric.
+      resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'path-segment' },
+    },
+    variants: [
+      {
+        id: 'default',
+        args: [
+          { lit: 'jcode' },
+          { flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
+          { flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
+        ],
+      },
+    ],
+    legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
+    legacyConfigField: 'jcodeConfig',
+    resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
+  },
+  env: {
+    exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
+    unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
+    // Provider logins live in jcode's own files (`~/.jcode/auth.json`, `~/.config/jcode/*.env`)
+    // and are read by the daemon, so there is nothing for the server to forward into the pane.
+    tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
+    dockerExecEnvNames: [],
+    // Deliberately none: see note 1 above the entry.
+    allowedPrefixes: [],
+    allowedKeys: [],
+  },
+  capabilities: {
+    ...agentDefaults(),
+    // A full-screen alternate-screen TUI that turns mouse tracking on itself (tmux
+    // `alternate_on=1`, `mouse_any_flag=1`, `mouse_sgr_flag=1`), the opencode shape: kept, a
+    // drag would be reported to jcode instead of selecting text, so Auto Copy and copy-on-select
+    // would silently do nothing.
+    altScreen: 'strip-mux-and-mouse',
+    // Pages its own transcript on PageUp/PageDown (measured: PageUp brought the welcome header
+    // back, PageDown returned to the composer). Over the hollow alt-screen buffer the wheel and a
+    // swipe become those keys instead of doing nothing.
+    transcriptPageKeys: true,
+    // Closing a jcode tab must not take the shared daemon (note 1) down with it: it is a
+    // descendant of whichever pane started it, in a process group of its own (setsid).
+    // Measured before this flag: deleting that tab left the next tab's client looping on
+    // `Connection lost - retrying` with its prompt queued.
+    sharedDaemon: true,
+    echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
+    // At rest the composer row is `<n>> ` (the prompt number, then `>`); while a turn runs the
+    // same row reads `<n>…` and a status row appears directly above it, a braille spinner (the
+    // gemini/omp frame set, ~12 fps) then the phase and the elapsed time:
+    // `⠋ sending… 0s`, `⠦ thinking… 2s · https`, `⠼ waiting for response… 3s · https`,
+    // `⠸ running bash · <detail> · 12s · Alt+B bg`, or, while streaming, the time first
+    // (`⠼ 12s · 45.1 tps · ↑16k ↓20`). Past a minute the time reads `1m 3s`, past an hour
+    // `1h 2m`. A dropped connection swaps the spinner for `↻ network disconnected, waiting to
+    // retry · … · 5s`, still mid-turn. At rest that row is empty or a dim tip, never a spinner.
+    // The spinner repaints the pane at least every 100 ms for the whole turn (recorded tmux
+    // client stream), so the pane is never quiet mid-turn, and at rest it sends nothing at all
+    // (12 s recorded: zero bytes), so the idle check settles.
+    // The glyph is the bare `>`: the turn-ending repaint redraws only the cells that changed,
+    // which on that row is the `…` turning into `>` (recorded: `\x1b[43;2H...> `), never the
+    // prompt number. It only ARMS the idle check. It also leaves the submit verifier inert,
+    // which is what jcode wants (no early-Enter defect): every composer row starts with its
+    // number, so no screen row starts with `>` the way the verifier requires.
+    workDetect: {
+      promptGlyph: '>',
+      workingLine: String.raw`(?:^|\n) *(?:[⠋⠙⠹⠸⠼⠴⠦⠧⠇⠏] [^\n]*\d[smh]\b|↻ network disconnected)`,
+    },
+    // jcode reads `./.agents/skills` (and `./.jcode/skills`, `./.claude/skills`), but its tools
+    // run in the shared daemon, whose CODEMAN_* identity belongs to whichever session started
+    // it (note 1). An injected skill would act as THAT session, so it is not injected.
+    agentSkillInjection: false,
+    customModelInjection: { kind: 'unsupported' },
+  },
+  overlays: {
+    // No credStore: Docker seeding is CRED_STORES in docker-hosts.ts, which has no `.jcode` row.
+    // `~/.jcode` holds the OAuth tokens beside 160 MB of builds, sessions and SQLite caches, and
+    // API keys live in `~/.config/jcode`; sign in inside the container instead.
+  },
+};
+
 /** The full stock catalog, in the order the run menu shows by default. */
 export const STOCK_CLIS: CliEntry[] = [
   CLAUDE,
@@ -2036,4 +2172,5 @@ export const STOCK_CLIS: CliEntry[] = [
   DEEPSEEK,
   OMP,
   COPILOT,
+  JCODE,
 ];

src/config/cli-registry/types.ts

@@ -622,6 +622,19 @@ export interface CliCapabilities {
    * losing lines, so it resizes as before), and for remote and docker sessions.
    */
   keyboardHold?: 'inline';
+  /**
+   * The CLI's TUI is a CLIENT of a per-user daemon that its first client starts and every
+   * later session of the CLI shares (jcode). The daemon detaches into its own session and
+   * process group, but stays a descendant of that first pane by parent pid, so a session
+   * kill signals only the descendants still in the pane's process group
+   * (`descendantsInPaneGroup()`, proc-tree.ts). Without it, closing the tab that happened
+   * to start the daemon took it down and cut every other session of the CLI off.
+   *
+   * The flip side is that processes the agent started through that daemon (its tools run
+   * there, not in the pane) outlive the tab; stopping them is the CLI's own business
+   * (`jcode server stop`). Absent = every descendant is killed, as for every other CLI.
+   */
+  sharedDaemon?: boolean;
   keyboardAccessory: 'agent' | 'shell';
   /** Multi-user: this CLI is a raw shell, so its commands need the privileged gate. */
   privilegedCommandGate: boolean;

src/git-clone.ts

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ import { lstat, readdir, rename, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { basename, dirname, join } from 'node:path';
 import { EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS } from './config/exec-timeout.js';
 import { probePathKind } from './utils/bounded-path-probe.js';
+import { gitMissingError, gitSpawnAllowed } from './utils/git-availability.js';
 
 // ─── Tunables ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -728,6 +729,17 @@ interface GitRun {
  * signal is used rather than `child.kill()`.
  */
 async function runGit(args: string[], timeoutMs: number, maxStdoutBytes: number): Promise<GitRun> {
+  // Never Apple's placeholder git on a Mac without developer tools: answered as a missing git.
+  if (!gitSpawnAllowed()) {
+    return {
+      stdout: '',
+      stderr: '',
+      code: null,
+      timedOut: false,
+      started: false,
+      spawnError: String(gitMissingError()),
+    };
+  }
   // The queue wait spends the SAME deadline as the operation: `timeoutMs` is a
   // promise about the whole call, not about git's runtime after some unbounded
   // wait. A full queue is refused outright rather than queued.
@@ -814,10 +826,17 @@ async function runGit(args: string[], timeoutMs: number, maxStdoutBytes: number)
   }
 }
 
-/** Is a usable `git` on this machine? Memoized: the answer cannot change without a restart. */
+/**
+ * Is a usable `git` on this machine? Memoized: the answer cannot change without a restart. The one
+ * exception is a Mac whose only git is Apple's placeholder with no developer tools behind it: running
+ * that, even as `git --version`, opens macOS's "install the developer tools" window, so it is never
+ * run, and that refusal is not memoized here (the gate keeps its own short memory), so the page finds
+ * git once the tools are installed.
+ */
 let gitAvailable: boolean | null = null;
 export function isGitAvailable(): boolean {
   if (gitAvailable !== null) return gitAvailable;
+  if (!gitSpawnAllowed()) return false;
   try {
     execFileSync('git', ['--version'], {
       encoding: 'utf-8',

src/git-fetch.ts

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ import {
   resolveWorkspaceRepos,
   type GitRunner,
 } from './git-workspace-status.js';
+import { gitMissingError, gitSpawnAllowed } from './utils/git-availability.js';
 
 const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 
@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ export function fetchEnvFor(base: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, repoSshCommand: string | nu
  * add a fifth git process or push a fetch past the user's timeout: it spends part of it.
  */
 export async function readRepoSshCommand(cwd: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise<string | null> {
+  if (!gitSpawnAllowed()) return null;
   try {
     const { stdout } = await execFileAsync('git', ['config', '--get', 'core.sshCommand'], {
       cwd,
@@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ export async function readRepoSshCommand(cwd: string, timeoutMs: number): Promis
  * as a timeout without starting the fetch.
  */
 export const runFetch: GitRunner = async (cwd, args, opts) => {
+  // Never Apple's placeholder git on a Mac without developer tools: answered as GIT_MISSING.
+  if (!gitSpawnAllowed()) throw gitMissingError();
   const timeoutMs = opts?.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_GIT_TIMEOUT_MS;
   const startedAt = Date.now();
   const env = fetchEnvFor(process.env, await readRepoSshCommand(cwd, timeoutMs));

src/git-workspace-status.ts

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { basename, join, relative, sep } from 'node:path';
 import { promisify } from 'node:util';
 import { gitNonInteractiveEnv, redactGitCredentials } from './git-clone.js';
+import { gitMissingError, gitSpawnAllowed } from './utils/git-availability.js';
 
 const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 
@@ -265,6 +266,8 @@ export function parseCommitLog(text: string): GitCommitEntry[] {
 export type GitRunner = (cwd: string, args: string[], opts?: { timeoutMs?: number }) => Promise<string>;
 
 export const runGit: GitRunner = async (cwd, args, opts) => {
+  // Never Apple's placeholder git on a Mac without developer tools (utils/git-availability.ts).
+  if (!gitSpawnAllowed()) throw gitMissingError();
   const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(
     'git',
     // --no-optional-locks: never touch the index just to look. core.fsmonitor=false: do not start or

src/git-worktrees.ts

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { join, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
 import { gitNonInteractiveEnv, isSafeGitRef, sanitizeGitOutput } from './git-clone.js';
 import { isInsideAny, isUnrelatedAncestor } from './git-workspace-status.js';
+import { gitMissingError, gitSpawnAllowed } from './utils/git-availability.js';
 
 // ─── Limits ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -371,6 +372,11 @@ const READ_ONLY_GIT_OPTIONS = ['--no-optional-locks', '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=fals
  */
 export const runWorktreeGit: WorktreeGitRunner = (cwd, args, opts) =>
   new Promise<WorktreeGitResult>((resolveRun) => {
+    // Never Apple's placeholder git on a Mac without developer tools: answered as "git is not installed".
+    if (!gitSpawnAllowed()) {
+      resolveRun({ code: null, stdout: '', stderr: '', timedOut: false, spawnError: String(gitMissingError()) });
+      return;
+    }
     let child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>;
     try {
       child = spawn('git', args, {

src/hooks-config.ts

@@ -1358,6 +1358,87 @@ async function isSymlink(path: string): Promise<boolean> {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Whether a folder INSIDE the copy that holds skill files (today only `reference/`) is a
+ * symlink. The checks on the copy and its parent stop at the copy itself, and a write or
+ * unlink of `reference/<name>.md` follows a linked `reference/` wherever it points:
+ * measured, `reference -> <elsewhere>` made install overwrite a `history.md` there and
+ * uninstall delete it. A cloned repository can commit that link, and a Docker case's
+ * container can plant it in the bind-mounted workspace that the host injects into, so
+ * both are refused like a linked copy. Checked once before the first write or unlink; a
+ * link swapped in after the check (a race against the container) is not covered.
+ */
+async function agentSkillSubdirIsSymlink(skillDir: string, files: AgentSkillFile[]): Promise<boolean> {
+  const subdirs = new Set<string>(['reference']);
+  for (const file of files) {
+    // Every folder on the way to the file, outermost first: `a/b/x.md` checks `a`, then `a/b`.
+    const parts = dirname(file.relPath)
+      .split(/[\\/]/)
+      .filter((part) => part !== '' && part !== '.');
+    for (let i = 1; i <= parts.length; i++) subdirs.add(join(...parts.slice(0, i)));
+  }
+  for (const subdir of subdirs) {
+    if (await isSymlink(join(skillDir, subdir))) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The ignore file every Codeman-managed skill copy carries, and what it holds: `*`
+ * matches everything in the copy's own folder (the ignore file included), so a user's
+ * repository never lists `.claude/skills/codeman/` (or `.agents/skills/codeman/`) as
+ * untracked, without Codeman touching the repository's own `.gitignore` or
+ * `info/exclude`. Same idea as the prompt-uploads folder (`ensureUploadDir`).
+ *
+ * Deliberately NOT part of `readAgentSkillSource()`: it is written once with O_EXCL and
+ * never compared or rewritten, so a file the user put there (or edited) is theirs.
+ *
+ * Measured against Claude Code 2.1.319, whose skill discovery runs `git check-ignore`
+ * only on directories at or above `.claude/skills` (the nested-skills walk), never on a
+ * skill folder or its SKILL.md: a `*` inside `codeman/` ignores the folder's CONTENTS,
+ * not the folder, so the skill still loads. Codex 0.162 does no gitignore check on skills.
+ */
+const AGENT_SKILL_GITIGNORE = '.gitignore';
+const AGENT_SKILL_GITIGNORE_CONTENT = '*\n';
+
+/**
+ * Write the copy's `.gitignore` if none is there. Returns whether it wrote one.
+ * 'wx' (O_CREAT|O_EXCL) never replaces an existing file and refuses a symlink at the
+ * name. A create that succeeded before the write failed (ENOSPC) would leave an empty
+ * file that reads as the user's next time, so it is taken back; that cleanup's own
+ * failure must not replace the cause.
+ */
+async function ensureAgentSkillGitignore(skillDir: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const ignoreFile = join(skillDir, AGENT_SKILL_GITIGNORE);
+  try {
+    await writeFile(ignoreFile, AGENT_SKILL_GITIGNORE_CONTENT, { flag: 'wx' });
+    return true;
+  } catch (err) {
+    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EEXIST') return false;
+    await unlink(ignoreFile).catch(() => {});
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove the copy's `.gitignore` only when it is the LAST thing in the folder and holds
+ * exactly what Codeman writes. Anything else in the folder (a user's own notes) keeps
+ * the ignore file, so those files stay out of `git status` as they were, and a
+ * `.gitignore` with other content is the user's.
+ */
+async function removeAgentSkillGitignoreIfLast(skillDir: string): Promise<void> {
+  const ignoreFile = join(skillDir, AGENT_SKILL_GITIGNORE);
+  try {
+    const entries = await readdir(skillDir);
+    if (entries.length !== 1 || entries[0] !== AGENT_SKILL_GITIGNORE) return;
+    if (!(await lstat(ignoreFile)).isFile()) return;
+    if ((await readFile(ignoreFile, 'utf-8')) !== AGENT_SKILL_GITIGNORE_CONTENT) return;
+    await unlink(ignoreFile);
+  } catch {
+    // best-effort: a folder that stays behind holds only an ignore file
+  }
+}
+
 /** What an install/remove actually did, so callers (CLI, logs) can say so. */
 export type AgentSkillApplyResult =
   | 'installed' // fresh copy written
@@ -1366,23 +1447,31 @@ export type AgentSkillApplyResult =
   | 'removed' // our copy deleted
   | 'absent' // nothing there to remove
   | 'foreign' // a copy exists but is not ours; left untouched
-  | 'symlink'; // the skill dir (or its parent) is a symlink; left untouched
+  | 'symlink'; // the skill dir, its parent or a folder inside it is a symlink; left untouched
 
 /**
  * Install or refresh the Codeman agent skill into `skillDir` (a `.../codeman`
  * directory, e.g. `<case>/.claude/skills/codeman`, `~/.claude/skills/codeman` or
  * `<case>/.agents/skills/codeman`).
  *
- * Refuses two shapes rather than writing through them:
+ * Refuses these shapes rather than writing through them:
  * - a SYMLINK at the skill dir or its `skills/` parent: this repo's own dogfooding
  *   layout (`.claude/skills/codeman -> ../../skills/codeman`) would otherwise have
  *   the injector overwrite the repo source through the link;
+ * - a SYMLINK at a folder inside the copy (`reference/`), which would carry the skill's
+ *   files to wherever it points (`agentSkillSubdirIsSymlink`);
  * - a FOREIGN copy (SKILL.md present without our marker): that is the user's own
  *   skill, and per the statusLine rule we never clobber what we did not write.
  *
  * Idempotent and cheap: unchanged files are not rewritten, so calling on every
  * session create causes no mtime churn.
  *
+ * The copy ignores itself in git: a `.gitignore` of `*` is written FIRST, before any
+ * skill file, so a `git status` that runs mid-install never lists the folder either
+ * (`ensureAgentSkillGitignore`). It is written once and never rewritten; a copy made
+ * before this existed gains it on its next install or refresh, which then reports
+ * 'refreshed'.
+ *
  * Serialized on the skill dir through the same lock the settings writers use: two
  * sessions created at once in one repo both inject this skill, and interleaving their
  * ownership read with the other's write reports a bogus result (an 'unchanged' for a
@@ -1402,7 +1491,9 @@ export async function installAgentSkillInto(skillDir: string): Promise<AgentSkil
     if (existing !== null && !existing.includes(AGENT_SKILL_MARKER_PREFIX)) return 'foreign';
 
     const files = await readAgentSkillSource();
-    let changed = false;
+    if (await agentSkillSubdirIsSymlink(skillDir, files)) return 'symlink';
+    await mkdir(skillDir, { recursive: true });
+    let changed = await ensureAgentSkillGitignore(skillDir);
     for (const file of files) {
       const target = join(skillDir, file.relPath);
       let current: string | null = null;
@@ -1544,7 +1635,8 @@ export async function refreshUserAgentSkill(): Promise<AgentSkillApplyResult | '
  * Remove a Codeman-managed skill copy from `skillDir`. Same ownership and symlink
  * refusals as the install path. Deletes only files the packaged source would have
  * written (never `rm -rf`, so a user's extra files in the directory survive), then
- * prunes the directories bottom-up if they emptied.
+ * the copy's own `.gitignore` when nothing else is left beside it, then prunes the
+ * directories bottom-up if they emptied.
  *
  * Shares the install path's per-dir lock so an uninstall can't run between an install's
  * ownership read and its writes, which would leave half the skill back on disk.
@@ -1564,10 +1656,13 @@ export async function removeAgentSkillFrom(skillDir: string): Promise<AgentSkill
     // Manifest-based, with SKILL.md as the fallback when the packaged source is
     // unreadable: removal must still work on an install whose skills/ dir went missing.
     const files = await readAgentSkillSource().catch((): AgentSkillFile[] => [{ relPath: 'SKILL.md', content: '' }]);
+    // An unlink through a linked `reference/` deletes files wherever it points.
+    if (await agentSkillSubdirIsSymlink(skillDir, files)) return 'symlink';
     for (const file of files) {
       await unlink(join(skillDir, file.relPath)).catch(() => {});
     }
     await rmdir(join(skillDir, 'reference')).catch(() => {}); // fails when non-empty, fine
+    await removeAgentSkillGitignoreIfLast(skillDir);
     await rmdir(skillDir).catch(() => {});
     await rmdir(dirname(skillDir)).catch(() => {}); // prune `.claude/skills` (or the CLI's own dir) if now empty
     return 'removed';
@@ -1601,7 +1696,10 @@ export function agentSkillDirFor(casePath: string, dir: AgentSkillDir): string {
  * Add or remove the Codeman agent skill in `<case>/<dir>/codeman`, where `dir` is the
  * skills directory the session's CLI scans (default: Claude Code's `.claude/skills`;
  * callers resolve it with `agentSkillDir()`), mirroring `applyStatusLineConfig`'s
- * shape. Gated by the synced `agentSkillEnabled` app setting (default OFF).
+ * shape. Gated by the synced `agentSkillEnabled` app setting: default ON since 1.50.0
+ * (an absent key is on, only an explicit false is off; `getAgentSkillEnabled()` in
+ * server.ts), which is safe for a user's repository because the copy ignores itself
+ * in git (`ensureAgentSkillGitignore`).
  *
  * Call-site policy is ADD-ONLY on session create (callers pass `enabled: true` or
  * skip the call), for the statusLine reason: sessions in a repo share one workspace,

src/live-worktree.ts

@@ -13,17 +13,30 @@
  * than by running `git worktree list`: this runs from the pane watcher whenever a directory
  * changes, and a file read starts no process, no repository config and no filter.
  *
- * Only a folder strictly below `workingDir` is ever an answer: the file routes already serve
+ * A folder strictly below `workingDir` is the plain answer: the file routes already serve
  * everything under it, so following a pane there widens nothing, and a planted `.git` file can
- * only move where the listing STARTS inside that same folder. A worktree outside it
- * (`git worktree add ../feature`) stays unfollowed, since listing it would need a second
- * confinement root.
+ * only move where the listing STARTS inside that same folder.
  *
- * That answer is lexical and only as fresh as the last time the pane moved: a symlink can take the
- * folder's place afterwards without moving the pane. So nothing here is a confinement decision.
- * `GET /api/sessions/:id/files` resolves the folder on every request and walks it only while it
- * really lies inside `workingDir` (`canWalkLiveWorktree()` in file-routes.ts), and the routes keep
- * judging every path against `workingDir`.
+ * A worktree OUTSIDE `workingDir` (`git worktree add ../feature`, or an EnterWorktree that a
+ * `WorktreeCreate` hook places beside the repository) is a second confinement root, so it is
+ * answered only when the caller passes {@link OutsideWorktreeOptions}, and only when the session's
+ * own repository vouches for it ({@link findOutsideWorktree}). The answer then carries
+ * `outside: true`, and the file routes serve absolute paths inside it.
+ *
+ * For a worktree inside `workingDir` the answer is lexical and only as fresh as the last time the
+ * pane moved: a symlink can take the folder's place afterwards without moving the pane. So
+ * nothing there is a confinement decision. `GET /api/sessions/:id/files` resolves the folder on
+ * every request and walks it only while it really lies inside `workingDir`
+ * (`canWalkLiveWorktree()` in file-routes.ts), and the routes keep judging every path against
+ * `workingDir`.
+ *
+ * For an outside worktree {@link findOutsideWorktree} IS the confinement decision for the second
+ * root. Its vouching, home and Docker rules, and the multi-user half of `allowRoot`, run only when
+ * the pane moves. The routes re-check two things on each request: that the folder still realpaths
+ * to the recorded path (`outsideWorktreeRootFor()`, `canWalkOutsideWorktree()`), and the attachment
+ * guard half of `allowRoot` (workspace confinement, blocked and sensitive trees:
+ * `isOutsideWorktreeRootRefused()` through `withGuardedOutsideWorktree()` in file-routes.ts), so a
+ * guard setting changed later applies at once.
  *
  * Probes are bounded (#516). The folder can sit on a mount that stopped answering, and an
  * `unknown` answer stops the walk rather than being read as "no `.git` here".
@@ -32,15 +45,44 @@
  */
 
 import { constants, promises as fs } from 'node:fs';
-import { basename, dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { basename, dirname, join, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
 import { probePathKind } from './utils/bounded-path-probe.js';
 
 /** A linked worktree a session's pane is in. */
 export interface LiveWorktree {
   /** The worktree folder's name, for display. */
   name: string;
-  /** Absolute path, spelled like the session's `workingDir`. */
+  /**
+   * Absolute path. Spelled like the session's `workingDir` for a worktree inside it; the real
+   * path (no symlink in any component) for one outside it.
+   */
   path: string;
+  /**
+   * The worktree lies outside `workingDir`, so it is a second root the file routes serve
+   * ABSOLUTE paths from. Absent for a worktree inside `workingDir`.
+   */
+  outside?: true;
+}
+
+/** What {@link findLiveWorktree} needs to answer a worktree outside `workingDir`. */
+export interface OutsideWorktreeOptions {
+  /** Overrides `os.homedir()` (tests). */
+  home?: string;
+  /** Host paths of every Docker case workspace: a container can write there, so none is followed. */
+  dockerWorkspaces?: () => Promise<string[]>;
+  /**
+   * The caller's last word on which worktree may be followed. The server passes its attachment
+   * guard rules (workspace confinement, blocked trees, sensitive folders) in every mode, plus the
+   * owner's folder rule (`folderAllowedForUser`) in multi-user mode, so a regular user's session
+   * cannot list another user's checkout. A rejection counts as a refusal.
+   */
+  allowRoot?: (root: string) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+}
+
+/** The text after `gitdir:` in a `.git` file, as written (possibly relative). */
+function rawGitDir(text: string): string | undefined {
+  return /^gitdir:[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*$/m.exec(text)?.[1];
 }
 
 /** More than any real `.git` file. It is read only to recognise the first line. */
@@ -52,12 +94,33 @@ const MAX_DOT_GIT_FILE_BYTES = 4096;
  * The path may be relative: `git worktree add --relative-paths` writes it that way.
  */
 export function isLinkedWorktreeGitFile(text: string): boolean {
-  const gitDir = /^gitdir:[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*$/m.exec(text)?.[1];
+  const gitDir = rawGitDir(text);
   if (!gitDir) return false;
   const segments = gitDir.split('/').filter(Boolean);
   return segments.length >= 2 && segments[segments.length - 2] === 'worktrees';
 }
 
+/**
+ * The text of a small file, opened so that nothing blocks or escapes. The probe a caller ran
+ * follows symlinks and the file can change after it, so the open itself refuses: O_NOFOLLOW a
+ * symlink, and O_NONBLOCK a FIFO, which would otherwise wait for a writer and hold a threadpool
+ * worker for good. Whatever it did open is then judged on the handle. Null for anything but a
+ * regular file it could read.
+ */
+async function readOpenedSmallFile(path: string): Promise<string | null> {
+  let handle: fs.FileHandle | undefined;
+  try {
+    handle = await fs.open(path, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
+    if (!(await handle.stat()).isFile()) return null;
+    const { buffer, bytesRead } = await handle.read(Buffer.alloc(MAX_DOT_GIT_FILE_BYTES), 0, MAX_DOT_GIT_FILE_BYTES, 0);
+    return buffer.toString('utf8', 0, bytesRead);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  } finally {
+    await handle?.close().catch(() => {});
+  }
+}
+
 /** What `<dir>/.git` says: a linked worktree's root, a boundary the walk must stop at, or nothing. */
 async function classifyDotGit(dir: string): Promise<'worktree' | 'stop' | 'none'> {
   const dotGit = join(dir, '.git');
@@ -65,32 +128,28 @@ async function classifyDotGit(dir: string): Promise<'worktree' | 'stop' | 'none'
   if (kind === 'absent') return 'none';
   // A `.git` directory is a repository of its own, and `unknown` is never read as absent.
   if (kind !== 'file') return 'stop';
-  let handle: fs.FileHandle | undefined;
-  try {
-    // The probe follows symlinks and the file can change after it, so the open itself refuses:
-    // O_NOFOLLOW a symlink, and O_NONBLOCK a FIFO, which would otherwise wait for a writer and
-    // hold a threadpool worker for good. Whatever it did open is then judged on the handle.
-    handle = await fs.open(dotGit, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
-    if (!(await handle.stat()).isFile()) return 'stop';
-    const { buffer, bytesRead } = await handle.read(Buffer.alloc(MAX_DOT_GIT_FILE_BYTES), 0, MAX_DOT_GIT_FILE_BYTES, 0);
-    return isLinkedWorktreeGitFile(buffer.toString('utf8', 0, bytesRead)) ? 'worktree' : 'stop';
-  } catch {
-    return 'stop';
-  } finally {
-    await handle?.close().catch(() => {});
-  }
+  // `null` is a symlink, a FIFO, a non-regular file or an unreadable one: all stop the walk.
+  const text = await readOpenedSmallFile(dotGit);
+  return text !== null && isLinkedWorktreeGitFile(text) ? 'worktree' : 'stop';
 }
 
 /**
- * The linked worktree strictly below `workingDir` that holds `cwd`, if any. Walks up from `cwd`
- * and stops at `workingDir`, at a repository or submodule of its own, or at anything it cannot
- * read. `workingDir` itself is never an answer: a session started in a worktree is already
- * listing it. Never throws.
+ * The linked worktree that holds `cwd`, if any. Walks up from `cwd` and stops at `workingDir`,
+ * at a repository or submodule of its own, or at anything it cannot read. `workingDir` itself is
+ * never an answer: a session started in a worktree is already listing it. When `cwd` lies outside
+ * `workingDir` and `outside` is given, {@link findOutsideWorktree} answers instead. Never throws.
  */
-export async function findLiveWorktree(workingDir: string, cwd: string | undefined): Promise<LiveWorktree | undefined> {
+export async function findLiveWorktree(
+  workingDir: string,
+  cwd: string | undefined,
+  outside?: OutsideWorktreeOptions
+): Promise<LiveWorktree | undefined> {
   if (!cwd?.startsWith('/')) return undefined;
   const root = workingDir.length > 1 ? workingDir.replace(/\/+$/, '') : workingDir;
   const under = root === '/' ? '/' : `${root}/`;
+  if (cwd !== root && !cwd.startsWith(under)) {
+    return outside ? findOutsideWorktree(root, cwd, outside).catch(() => undefined) : undefined;
+  }
   for (let dir = cwd; dir !== root && dir.startsWith(under); dir = dirname(dir)) {
     const found = await classifyDotGit(dir);
     if (found === 'worktree') return { name: basename(dir), path: dir };
@@ -98,3 +157,136 @@ export async function findLiveWorktree(workingDir: string, cwd: string | undefin
   }
   return undefined;
 }
+
+/** True when `child` is `parent` or lies below it. Both must already be real paths. */
+const isSameOrUnder = (child: string, parent: string): boolean =>
+  child === parent || child.startsWith(parent === sep ? parent : parent + sep);
+
+/** The real path of `p` once a bounded probe has answered for it, else null. */
+async function realPathBounded(p: string): Promise<string | null> {
+  const kind = await probePathKind(p);
+  if (kind !== 'directory' && kind !== 'file') return null;
+  try {
+    return await fs.realpath(p);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** The text of a small regular file that a bounded probe found, via {@link readOpenedSmallFile}. */
+async function readSmallFile(path: string): Promise<string | null> {
+  return (await probePathKind(path)) === 'file' ? readOpenedSmallFile(path) : null;
+}
+
+/** The `gitdir:` value of a `.git` file's text, resolved against the folder that holds it. */
+function gitDirOf(text: string, dir: string): string | null {
+  const raw = rawGitDir(text);
+  return raw ? resolve(dir, raw) : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The real path of the git common dir of the repository whose top level is `workingDir`: its
+ * `.git` folder, or, for a linked worktree, the folder its `commondir` file names. Null when
+ * `workingDir` is not the top level of a repository or worktree: a session in a subfolder
+ * follows no worktree outside it.
+ */
+async function sessionCommonDir(workingDir: string): Promise<string | null> {
+  const dotGit = join(workingDir, '.git');
+  const kind = await probePathKind(dotGit);
+  if (kind === 'directory') return realPathBounded(dotGit);
+  if (kind !== 'file') return null;
+  const text = await readSmallFile(dotGit);
+  const gitDir = text ? gitDirOf(text, workingDir) : null;
+  if (!gitDir) return null;
+  // A linked worktree's git dir names the common dir in `commondir`; a submodule's git dir
+  // has none and is its own common dir.
+  const commonDir = await readSmallFile(join(gitDir, 'commondir'));
+  return realPathBounded(commonDir ? resolve(gitDir, commonDir.trim()) : gitDir);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The worktree outside `workingDir` that holds `cwd`, when the session's own repository vouches
+ * for it. `cwd` comes from the pane, which a prompt-injected agent controls, so every rule below
+ * keeps it from widening what the file routes serve beyond a worktree of the session's repository:
+ *
+ *   - The walk up from `cwd` stops at the first `.git`. That folder is a candidate only when its
+ *     `.git` FILE names `<common dir>/worktrees/<id>` of the session's repository AND that
+ *     entry's own `gitdir` file names the candidate back. A `.git` FOLDER is a candidate only when
+ *     it IS the session's common dir (the main worktree, for a session started in a linked one).
+ *     These are the files `git worktree list` reads, read here without starting git: this runs
+ *     from the pane watcher on every directory change.
+ *   - `/`, the home folder and anything above it, and any folder holding `workingDir` are
+ *     refused, as is a folder at, inside or around a Docker case workspace.
+ *   - `allowRoot`, when given, has the last word (the server's attachment-guard and multi-user rules).
+ *
+ * Never rejects: an `allowRoot` that rejects refuses the worktree.
+ *
+ * Every path is compared as a real path, and the answer is the real path. The file routes check
+ * on each request that the folder still resolves to itself, so a symlink swapped in later is
+ * refused there. A forged registry entry needs write access to the session's own `.git`, which
+ * an agent running as this user already has, along with read access to everything it could list.
+ */
+export async function findOutsideWorktree(
+  workingDir: string,
+  cwd: string,
+  opts: OutsideWorktreeOptions
+): Promise<LiveWorktree | undefined> {
+  // The nearest folder at or above `cwd` that holds a `.git`, and what that `.git` is.
+  let dir = cwd;
+  let kind: 'directory' | 'file';
+  for (;;) {
+    const probed = await probePathKind(join(dir, '.git'));
+    if (probed === 'unknown') return undefined;
+    if (probed === 'directory' || probed === 'file') {
+      kind = probed;
+      break;
+    }
+    const parent = dirname(dir);
+    if (parent === dir) return undefined;
+    dir = parent;
+  }
+
+  const commonDir = await sessionCommonDir(workingDir);
+  if (!commonDir) return undefined;
+  const real = await realPathBounded(dir);
+  if (!real) return undefined;
+
+  if (kind === 'directory') {
+    // The main worktree: its `.git` folder is the session's common dir itself. The folder must
+    // really hold it: a `.git` symlink resolves elsewhere, so it fails this comparison.
+    if (join(real, '.git') !== commonDir) return undefined;
+  } else {
+    const text = await readSmallFile(join(dir, '.git'));
+    const gitDir = text && isLinkedWorktreeGitFile(text) ? gitDirOf(text, dir) : null;
+    const realGitDir = gitDir ? await realPathBounded(gitDir) : null;
+    if (!realGitDir || dirname(realGitDir) !== join(commonDir, 'worktrees')) return undefined;
+    // The registry entry must name this folder back, as `git worktree list` would report it.
+    const back = await readSmallFile(join(realGitDir, 'gitdir'));
+    const backDir = back ? await realPathBounded(dirname(resolve(realGitDir, back.trim()))) : null;
+    if (backDir !== real) return undefined;
+  }
+
+  const realWorkingDir = await realPathBounded(workingDir);
+  if (!realWorkingDir || isSameOrUnder(realWorkingDir, real) || isSameOrUnder(real, realWorkingDir)) return undefined;
+  const home = (await realPathBounded(opts.home ?? homedir())) ?? resolve(opts.home ?? homedir());
+  if (real === sep || isSameOrUnder(home, real)) return undefined;
+  if (opts.dockerWorkspaces) {
+    const workspaces = await opts.dockerWorkspaces().catch(() => null);
+    // An unreadable list could hide a container's workspace, so it fails closed.
+    if (!workspaces) return undefined;
+    for (const workspace of workspaces) {
+      const realWorkspace = (await realPathBounded(workspace)) ?? resolve(workspace);
+      if (isSameOrUnder(real, realWorkspace) || isSameOrUnder(realWorkspace, real)) return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+  if (opts.allowRoot) {
+    let allowed = false;
+    try {
+      allowed = await opts.allowRoot(real);
+    } catch {
+      // A callback that throws or rejects refuses the worktree.
+    }
+    if (!allowed) return undefined;
+  }
+  return { name: basename(real), path: real, outside: true };
+}

src/mux-interface.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import type {
   PiConfig,
   GrokConfig,
   CopilotConfig,
+  JcodeConfig,
   DeepSeekConfig,
   OmpConfig,
   SessionRemote,
@@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ export interface CreateSessionOptions {
   piConfig?: PiConfig;
   grokConfig?: GrokConfig;
   copilotConfig?: CopilotConfig;
+  jcodeConfig?: JcodeConfig;
   deepSeekConfig?: DeepSeekConfig;
   ompConfig?: OmpConfig;
   /** When restoring after reboot, resume a previous Claude conversation by its session ID */
@@ -179,6 +181,7 @@ export interface RespawnPaneOptions {
   piConfig?: PiConfig;
   grokConfig?: GrokConfig;
   copilotConfig?: CopilotConfig;
+  jcodeConfig?: JcodeConfig;
   deepSeekConfig?: DeepSeekConfig;
   ompConfig?: OmpConfig;
   /** Resume a previous Claude conversation when respawning */

src/proc-tree.ts

@@ -85,3 +85,36 @@ export function collectDescendants(
   }
   return out;
 }
+
+/**
+ * The descendants a session kill may signal when the pane's CLI runs a SHARED daemon
+ * (`capabilities.sharedDaemon`): only those still in the pane's own process group.
+ *
+ * Such a CLI's first client starts a per-user daemon that every other session of that
+ * CLI talks to, and the daemon detaches itself into its own session (setsid), which also
+ * makes it the leader of a new process group. It stays a descendant of that first pane
+ * by parent pid, though, so the plain descendant kill took it down with the pane and cut
+ * every other session off (measured with jcode: deleting the tab that happened to start
+ * the daemon left the next tab's client reconnecting forever). A process that left the
+ * pane's group did so on purpose, and its whole subtree inherits the new group, so the
+ * group is what draws the line.
+ *
+ * A pid whose group could not be read is KEPT in the kill list: it most likely exited
+ * between the walk and the lookup, and the kill path already checks liveness before it
+ * signals. Callers that could not read the groups at all keep the full list, which is
+ * the behaviour before this existed.
+ *
+ * @param descendants the walk's result for the pane pid
+ * @param groupOf pgid per pid, as read once by the caller
+ * @param paneGroup the pane process's own pgid
+ */
+export function descendantsInPaneGroup(
+  descendants: readonly number[],
+  groupOf: ReadonlyMap<number, number>,
+  paneGroup: number
+): number[] {
+  return descendants.filter((pid) => {
+    const group = groupOf.get(pid);
+    return group === undefined || group === paneGroup;
+  });
+}

src/readmymind-collectors.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { open, readdir, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { promisify } from 'node:util';
 import type { PredictionToolCall, WorkspaceSignals } from './readmymind-context.js';
+import { gitMissingError, gitSpawnAllowed } from './utils/git-availability.js';
 
 const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 
@@ -150,6 +151,8 @@ const MAX_STATUS_LINES = 30;
  */
 export async function collectWorkspaceSignals(workingDir: string): Promise<WorkspaceSignals | null> {
   const git = async (args: string[]): Promise<string> => {
+    // Never Apple's placeholder git on a Mac without developer tools (utils/git-availability.ts).
+    if (!gitSpawnAllowed()) throw gitMissingError();
     const { stdout } = await execFileAsync('git', args, {
       cwd: workingDir,
       timeout: GIT_TIMEOUT_MS,

src/session-cli-registry-bridge.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import type {
   GeminiConfig,
   GrokConfig,
   CopilotConfig,
+  JcodeConfig,
   OmpConfig,
   OpenCodeConfig,
   PiConfig,
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ export interface SpawnBridgeOptions {
   piConfig?: PiConfig;
   grokConfig?: GrokConfig;
   copilotConfig?: CopilotConfig;
+  jcodeConfig?: JcodeConfig;
   deepSeekConfig?: DeepSeekConfig;
   ompConfig?: OmpConfig;
   resumeSessionId?: string;

src/session.ts

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ import {
   type PiConfig,
   type GrokConfig,
   type CopilotConfig,
+  type JcodeConfig,
   type DeepSeekConfig,
   type OmpConfig,
   type SessionRemote,
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
   private _grokConfig: GrokConfig | undefined;
   // GitHub Copilot configuration (only for mode === 'copilot')
   private _copilotConfig: CopilotConfig | undefined;
+  // jcode configuration (only for mode === 'jcode')
+  private _jcodeConfig: JcodeConfig | undefined;
 
   // DeepSeek Harness configuration (only for mode === 'deepseek')
   private _deepSeekConfig: DeepSeekConfig | undefined;
@@ -1003,6 +1006,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       /** Grok configuration (only for mode === 'grok') */
       grokConfig?: GrokConfig;
       copilotConfig?: CopilotConfig;
+      /** jcode configuration (only for mode === 'jcode') */
+      jcodeConfig?: JcodeConfig;
       /** DeepSeek Harness configuration (only for mode === 'deepseek') */
       deepSeekConfig?: DeepSeekConfig;
       /** OMP configuration (only for mode === 'omp') */
@@ -1197,6 +1202,11 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       this._copilotConfig = config.copilotConfig;
     }
 
+    // Apply jcode configuration
+    if (config.jcodeConfig) {
+      this._jcodeConfig = config.jcodeConfig;
+    }
+
     // Apply env overrides (exported at spawn, not persisted to disk).
     // Legacy migration: pre-0.7.2 carried effort as the CLAUDE_CODE_EFFORT_LEVEL env var,
     // which hard-locks /effort switching. Extract it into _effort (--settings soft default)
@@ -1657,10 +1667,13 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
   }
 
   /**
-   * The linked git worktree inside `workingDir` that {@link paneCwd} is in, when there is one
-   * (`live-worktree.ts`). The Files panel lists it instead of the main checkout. Runtime-only and
-   * never a confinement root, like `paneCwd`: it is judged lexically when the pane moves, and the
-   * listing route re-checks the real folder on every request.
+   * The git worktree that {@link paneCwd} is in, when there is one (`live-worktree.ts`): a linked
+   * worktree inside `workingDir`, or, for an outside answer, a linked worktree or the repository's
+   * main worktree (from a session started in a linked one).
+   * The Files panel lists it instead of the main checkout. Runtime-only, like `paneCwd`. One inside
+   * `workingDir` is never a confinement root: it is judged lexically when the pane moves, and the
+   * listing route re-checks the real folder on every request. One outside it (`outside: true`) is
+   * a second root for the file routes, re-checked on every request the same way.
    */
   get liveWorktree(): LiveWorktree | undefined {
     return this._liveWorktree;
@@ -2452,7 +2465,9 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       status: this._status,
       workingDir: this.workingDir,
       paneCwd: this._paneCwd,
-      liveWorktree: this._liveWorktree,
+      // The wire keeps `liveWorktree` inside `workingDir` only; an outside answer rides its own field.
+      liveWorktree: this._liveWorktree?.outside ? undefined : this._liveWorktree,
+      outsideWorktree: this._liveWorktree?.outside ? this._liveWorktree : undefined,
       remote: this._remote,
       docker: this._docker,
       adopt: this._adopt,
@@ -2507,6 +2522,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       piConfig: this._piConfig,
       grokConfig: this._grokConfig,
       copilotConfig: this._copilotConfig,
+      jcodeConfig: this._jcodeConfig,
       deepSeekConfig: this._deepSeekConfig,
       ompConfig: this._ompConfig,
       resumeSessionId: this._resumeSessionId,
@@ -2888,6 +2904,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       piConfig: this._piConfig,
       grokConfig: this._grokConfig,
       copilotConfig: this._copilotConfig,
+      jcodeConfig: this._jcodeConfig,
       deepSeekConfig: this._deepSeekConfig,
       // OMP resolution/pinning does NOT happen here. This object is built
       // EAGERLY — including on every boot-recovery reattach, before anyone
@@ -3406,6 +3423,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
             piConfig: this._piConfig,
             grokConfig: this._grokConfig,
             copilotConfig: this._copilotConfig,
+            jcodeConfig: this._jcodeConfig,
             deepSeekConfig: this._deepSeekConfig,
             ompConfig: this._ompConfig,
             resumeSessionId: this._resumeSessionId,
@@ -3989,6 +4007,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       piConfig: this._piConfig,
       grokConfig: this._grokConfig,
       copilotConfig: this._copilotConfig,
+      jcodeConfig: this._jcodeConfig,
       deepSeekConfig: this._deepSeekConfig,
       ompConfig: this._ompConfig,
     };

src/tmux-manager.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  */
 
 import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';
-import { collectDescendants } from './proc-tree.js';
+import { collectDescendants, descendantsInPaneGroup } from './proc-tree.js';
 import {
   foreignViewSessionName,
   buildForeignDockerViewKillCommand,
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ import {
   type PiConfig,
   type GrokConfig,
   type CopilotConfig,
+  type JcodeConfig,
   type DeepSeekConfig,
   type OmpConfig,
   type SessionRemote,
@@ -1213,6 +1214,7 @@ export function buildSpawnCommand(options: {
   piConfig?: PiConfig;
   grokConfig?: GrokConfig;
   copilotConfig?: CopilotConfig;
+  jcodeConfig?: JcodeConfig;
   deepSeekConfig?: DeepSeekConfig;
   ompConfig?: OmpConfig;
   resumeSessionId?: string;
@@ -2563,6 +2565,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       piConfig,
       grokConfig,
       copilotConfig,
+      jcodeConfig,
       deepSeekConfig,
       ompConfig,
       resumeSessionId,
@@ -2662,6 +2665,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       piConfig,
       grokConfig,
       copilotConfig,
+      jcodeConfig,
       deepSeekConfig,
       ompConfig,
       resumeSessionId,
@@ -2931,6 +2935,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       piConfig,
       grokConfig,
       copilotConfig,
+      jcodeConfig,
       deepSeekConfig,
       ompConfig,
       resumeSessionId,
@@ -2982,6 +2987,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       piConfig,
       grokConfig,
       copilotConfig,
+      jcodeConfig,
       deepSeekConfig,
       ompConfig,
       resumeSessionId,
@@ -3160,6 +3166,45 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
     });
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Narrow a pane's descendants to the ones a kill may signal, for a CLI that runs a
+   * shared daemon (`capabilities.sharedDaemon`): those still in the pane's process group
+   * (see `descendantsInPaneGroup()`). One bounded `ps` for the pane and its descendants,
+   * as an argv (no shell). Any other CLI, or a lookup that failed, gets the list back
+   * unchanged, which is the kill as it always was.
+   */
+  private async killableDescendants(mode: SessionMode, panePid: number, descendants: number[]): Promise<number[]> {
+    if (descendants.length === 0 || !getCli(mode)?.capabilities.sharedDaemon) return descendants;
+    try {
+      const { stdout } = await new Promise<{ stdout: string }>((resolve, reject) => {
+        execFile(
+          'ps',
+          ['-o', 'pid=,pgid=', '-p', [panePid, ...descendants].join(',')],
+          { timeout: EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS },
+          // `ps -p` exits non-zero when some pid is already gone; what it printed still counts.
+          (err, out) => (out ? resolve({ stdout: out }) : reject(err ?? new Error('ps printed nothing')))
+        );
+      });
+      const groupOf = new Map<number, number>();
+      for (const line of stdout.split('\n')) {
+        const [pid, pgid] = line.trim().split(/\s+/).map(Number);
+        if (Number.isInteger(pid) && Number.isInteger(pgid)) groupOf.set(pid, pgid);
+      }
+      const paneGroup = groupOf.get(panePid);
+      if (paneGroup === undefined) return descendants;
+      const killable = descendantsInPaneGroup(descendants, groupOf, paneGroup);
+      if (killable.length < descendants.length) {
+        console.log(
+          `[TmuxManager] Sparing ${descendants.length - killable.length} process(es) outside pane ${panePid}'s group (the CLI's shared daemon)`
+        );
+      }
+      return killable;
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.warn(`[TmuxManager] Could not read process groups for pane ${panePid}; killing every descendant:`, err);
+      return descendants;
+    }
+  }
+
   // Check if a process is still alive. Signal decisions only: an unreaped zombie
   // counts here, so its process group still gets the SIGKILL below. The WAITS use
   // waitForProcessesExit(), which counts a zombie as exited.
@@ -3308,8 +3353,9 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
 
     const allPids: number[] = [currentPid];
 
-    // Strategy 1: Kill all child processes recursively
-    let childPids = await this.getChildPidsFresh(currentPid);
+    // Strategy 1: Kill all child processes recursively (but never a shared daemon the
+    // pane's CLI started for every session of that CLI: see killableDescendants)
+    let childPids = await this.killableDescendants(session.mode, currentPid, await this.getChildPidsFresh(currentPid));
     if (childPids.length > 0) {
       console.log(`[TmuxManager] Found ${childPids.length} child processes to kill`);
       allPids.push(...childPids);
@@ -3328,7 +3374,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       // catch anything spawned since the first one.
       await waitForProcessesExit(childPids, { timeoutMs: TMUX_KILL_WAIT_MS });
 
-      childPids = await this.getChildPidsFresh(currentPid);
+      childPids = await this.killableDescendants(session.mode, currentPid, await this.getChildPidsFresh(currentPid));
       for (const childPid of childPids) {
         if (this.isProcessAlive(childPid)) {
           try {

src/tui/tui-app.ts

@@ -1062,6 +1062,7 @@ const MODE_ITEMS: ReadonlyArray<{ id: TuiRunMode; label: string; detail: string
   { id: 'pi', label: 'pi', detail: 'pi.dev' },
   { id: 'grok', label: 'grok', detail: 'xAI Grok Build' },
   { id: 'deepseek', label: 'deepseek', detail: 'DeepSeek Harness (dsh)' },
+  { id: 'jcode', label: 'jcode', detail: 'jcode' },
 ];
 
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

src/tui/tui-client.ts

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export type TuiAnswerResult =
 
 export interface TuiQuickStartOptions {
   caseName: string;
-  mode?: 'claude' | 'shell' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini' | 'antigravity' | 'pi' | 'grok' | 'deepseek';
+  mode?: 'claude' | 'shell' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini' | 'antigravity' | 'pi' | 'grok' | 'deepseek' | 'jcode';
   sessionName?: string;
   /** The tab this spawn came from, for the lineage lines (cosmetic, dropped if unresolvable). */
   parentSessionId?: string;