chore: version packages

build(docker): ship the Docker CLI in the Compose image, not the whole engine
docker/server.Dockerfile installed Debian's `docker.io` to get a client for the socket mounted by Compose. That package is the full ENGINE: even with --no-install-recommends it pulls 15 packages including containerd, runc, dmsetup and iptables, none of which a container that only talks to a mounted socket can use, and it ships Docker 20.10.24 (2023). Copy the CLI and the buildx plugin from the official docker:29-cli image instead. Measured on the same node:22-bookworm-slim base: 266 MB -> 108 MB, so 158 MB smaller with a current CLI (29.7.2) in place of a two-year-old one. Three things verified rather than assumed, by building the real image and running it: - docker:cli is an ALPINE image, so copying a binary into this Debian one is only safe because the binaries are static Go builds (ldd: "Not a valid dynamic program"). In the built image, `docker --version`, `docker ps` and `docker build` all work against a mounted host socket as the unprivileged runtime user. - buildx is copied on purpose. scripts/build-agent-image.mjs shells out to `docker build` and Codeman auto-builds the agent image on the first Docker case. Without the plugin that still works today — CLI 29 falls back to the classic builder, tested — but that builder is deprecated and will be dropped, so the plugin keeps the path supported. - docker-compose is NOT copied: Codeman never shells out to it. Pinned to the 29 major, matching how the base images here are pinned.
2026-10-20 17:19:33 +02:00 · 2026-09-01 21:55:00 +02:00 · 2026-09-01 21:54:56 +02:00 · 2026-09-01 11:32:50 +02:00 · 2026-09-01 11:32:18 +02:00 · 2026-09-01 11:32:03 +02:00
37 changed files with 1351 additions and 132 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+.git
+.agents
+.claude
+.codex
+# `**/` matters: a .dockerignore pattern is matched against the WHOLE
+# context-relative path, so a bare `.env` excludes ONLY the root file and
+# `COPY . .` would bake docker/.env -- CODEMAN_PASSWORD and any provider API
+# keys -- into the published image at /opt/codeman/docker/.env (verified).
+**/.env
+**/.env.*
+!**/.env.example
+node_modules
+dist
+coverage
+out
+test-results
+tmp
+*.log
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@

 Canonical agent/contributor guidance for this repository lives in [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md) —
 project structure, build/test/lint commands, code style, testing safety rules
-(never run the full suite inside a managed tmux session), security notes, and
+(`npm test` is the CI gate and is safe to run bare; the three excluded suites
+have their own runners), security notes, and
 the deployment workflow are all maintained there. Please read it before making
 changes, and keep it the single source of truth rather than duplicating
 sections here.
@@ -1,5 +1,108 @@
 # aicodeman

+## 1.24.4
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- The Compose deployment image ships the Docker CLI instead of the whole Docker engine.
+
+  `docker/server.Dockerfile` installed Debian's `docker.io` to get a client for the mounted
+  host socket. That package is the full **engine**: even with `--no-install-recommends` it
+  pulls 15 packages including containerd, runc, dmsetup and iptables, none of which a
+  container that only talks to a socket can use. It also ships Docker 20.10.24, from 2023.
+
+  The CLI and the buildx plugin are now copied from the official `docker:29-cli` image
+  instead. Measured on the same `node:22-bookworm-slim` base: **266 MB → 108 MB**, a 158 MB
+  saving, with the current CLI (29.7.2) in place of a two-year-old one.
+
+  Verified by building the real image and running it: the binaries are static Go builds, so
+  they work on this glibc image even though they come from an Alpine one, and `docker
+--version`, `docker ps` and `docker build` all succeed against a mounted host socket as
+  the unprivileged runtime user. buildx is copied deliberately — `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs`
+  shells out to `docker build` and Codeman auto-builds the agent image on the first Docker
+  case, which without the plugin falls back to the classic builder Docker has deprecated.
+  `docker-compose` is not copied; Codeman never shells out to it.
+
+## 1.24.3
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Docker Compose deployment, and the plan-usage chip stops losing its 5-hour window.
+
+  **Run Codeman itself in a container** (#349, @opticon454). `docker/` now carries a
+  local-image Compose deployment: copy `docker/.env.example` to `docker/.env`, set
+  `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`, run `bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh`. Docker cases then start as
+  **sibling** containers through the mounted host socket rather than nested ones, which
+  inverts an assumption the bare-host path takes for granted: the daemon no longer shares
+  Codeman's filesystem, so a bind source that is valid inside Codeman means nothing to it.
+  `CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME` translates sources under HOME into the daemon's namespace and
+  `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` points the cases dir at a host-absolute bind mount, so a workspace
+  resolves to the same absolute path on both sides. `CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=1`
+  drops `--memory-swap` for hosts without swap accounting (`--memory` still applies) and
+  filters only that one kernel warning. Guides: `docs/docker-compose.md`, `docker/README.md`.
+
+  Three things were fixed while landing it:
+  - **`docker/.env` was being baked into the image.** A `.dockerignore` pattern matches the
+    whole context-relative path, so the bare `.env` line excluded only the root file while
+    `COPY . .` picked up `docker/.env` — the file the deployment's own README tells you to
+    fill with `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` and provider API keys — and left it at
+    `/opt/codeman/docker/.env`. Now excluded via `**/.env`, verified in both directions
+    against a real build context with a canary secret.
+  - **`codeman skill install --case <name>` could not find a case under Compose.**
+    `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` moved the server's cases dir but not the CLI's, which still
+    hardcoded `~/codeman-cases`. Both now resolve through one place.
+  - **A Docker case handed its Claude conversation id to every other CLI.** `resumeOnStart`
+    seeded `dockerResumeId` from `lastClaudeSessionId` regardless of mode, and
+    `appendResumeFlag()` maps a resume id onto codex/gemini/pi/grok/deepseek/omp/antigravity.
+    This one is a plain master bug, unrelated to Compose.
+
+  **The plan-usage chip keeps its 5-hour slot.** It silently shrank from `5h 4% · 7d 52%`
+  to a lone `7d 52%`, which reads as half the feature breaking. Nothing was broken: Claude
+  Code ships `rate_limits.five_hour` "only while the API reports it and its resets_at has
+  not passed", so between 5-hour session windows the key simply leaves the statusline
+  payload. The slot now stays with a dimmed em dash and the tooltip says "no active session
+  window". Claude only — a missing Codex bucket means that plan has no such limit, so those
+  stay omitted.
+
+  ### Thanks
+  - @opticon454 for #349, and for a write-up that made an infrastructure PR quick to review
+
+## 1.24.2
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Fix every new claude session dying on Claude Code 2.1.252's rewritten folder-trust dialog.
+
+  That dialog used to offer `❯ 1. Yes, I trust this folder` / `2. No, exit`, so Codeman
+  answered it by pressing Enter on the highlighted default. 2.1.252 dropped the numbers,
+  reversed the options and highlights `No, exit`, so the same Enter now answers _exit_: a
+  session in any directory claude had not seen before died (`Pane is dead (status 1)`)
+  about six seconds after it started, before the agent ever drew a composer.
+  - `trustDialogNextKey()` (`src/session-trust-dialog.ts`) now reads the `❯` marker off
+    the rendered pane and returns ONE keystroke at a time: an arrow while the cursor is on
+    the wrong option, Enter only once the screen shows it on the trust option. A frame it
+    cannot read presses nothing. Both the 2.1.252 and the older numbered layout are
+    handled, and the direction is derived from the frame rather than assumed, so a further
+    reordering costs a repaint instead of a session.
+  - The scan schedules its own follow-up read. It had only ever run from the PTY data
+    handler, which was enough while one Enter answered the dialog; the arrow that moves the
+    cursor is the last output the pane produces, so a two-keystroke answer would otherwise
+    stall with the cursor sitting on the right option forever. The keystroke cap goes from
+    3 to 6 for the same reason.
+  - The bundled `codeman` agent skill gets the same treatment (preamble 1.21.0): its
+    `_accept_trust` fallback reads `terminal?full=1`, steers onto the trust option and
+    confirms only after re-reading, instead of posting a blind `\r`. It sends those
+    keystrokes under its own `clientId`, because input sequence numbers are monotonic per
+    client and spending prompt numbers on dialog keys would make the next send-and-wait
+    look like a stale duplicate and vanish silently.
+  - Readiness recipes in `docs/extending-codeman.md`, `docs/api-reference.md` and the
+    skill's own reference carry the corrected answer and a new symptom-table entry for a
+    worker whose pane is dead seconds after the spawn.
+
+  Also included: a CLAUDE.md audit against the tree, correcting counted drift (route
+  modules, handler counts, frontend module count and app.js size, install.sh size) and
+  documenting several subsystems that had no entry.
+
 ## 1.24.1

 ### Patch Changes
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with co
 >
 > **This file is in `.prettierignore` on purpose.** Prettier's markdown printer escapes underscores inside the glob-heavy paths used throughout (`agent-*.jsonl` became `agent-\_.jsonl`, collapsing backtick spans and corrupting a whole paragraph). Do not remove the ignore entry, and do not run `prettier --write` on it.
 >
-> **Repo root is kept short on purpose** (the README sits below the file listing on GitHub). Config lives in `config/` (`eslint.config.js`, `knip.json`, the vitest configs), Prettier's config is the `"prettier"` key in `package.json`, and `SECURITY.md` is under `.github/`. Root-only files are the ones tools genuinely require there: `CLAUDE.md` + `AGENTS.md` (loaded from the root by Claude Code / Codex), `CHANGELOG.md` (changesets writes it next to `package.json`), `tsconfig.json`, `.editorconfig`, `.nvmrc`/`.npmrc`, `.prettierignore` (resolved relative to cwd), `LICENSE` (GitHub detection) and `install.sh` (its raw URL is the published install one-liner). Don't relocate those.
+> **Repo root is kept short on purpose** (the README sits below the file listing on GitHub). Config lives in `config/` (`eslint.config.js`, `knip.json`, the vitest configs), Prettier's config is the `"prettier"` key in `package.json`, and `SECURITY.md` is under `.github/`. Root-only files are the ones tools genuinely require there: `CLAUDE.md` + `AGENTS.md` (loaded from the root by Claude Code / Codex), `CHANGELOG.md` (changesets writes it next to `package.json`), `tsconfig.json`, `.editorconfig`, `.nvmrc`/`.npmrc`, `.prettierignore` (resolved relative to cwd), `LICENSE` (GitHub detection), `.dockerignore` (the build context is the repo root, so Docker resolves it there and nowhere else) and `install.sh` (its raw URL is the published install one-liner). Don't relocate those.

 ## Quick Reference

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ When user says "COM":

 CI runs `npm run check:lockfile` on every push/PR, so lockfile drift fails the build even if the `version-packages` script is bypassed.

-**Version**: 1.24.1 (must match `package.json`)
+**Version**: 1.24.4 (must match `package.json`)

 ## Project Overview

@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 | Production logs                | `journalctl --user -u codeman-web -f`                                                                                                                                                                          |
 | Detached server                | `codeman web -d` (`--status`, `--stop`; pidfile+log at `dataPath('web.pid'/'web.log')`). ⚠ Refuses to start a 2nd server on one data dir — see Instance isolation                                              |
 | Install/remove the service     | `codeman service install` / `status` / `uninstall` (systemd user unit on Linux, LaunchAgent on macOS; names from `config/service-names.ts`)                                                                     |
+| Dependency doctor              | `codeman doctor` (alias `check-deps`; `--json`, `--category core\|office\|other`). Probes Node/Claude CLI/tmux/LibreOffice/MS Office against `config/dependency-registry.ts`; engine is pure given an injectable `ProbeHost` |
+| Multi-user accounts            | `codeman users add <name>` / `passwd <name>` / `list` / `rm <name>` (writes `~/.codeman/users.json`, mode 0600; see Multi-user mode)                                                                            |

 **CI**: `.github/workflows/ci.yml` (push to master/main + PRs, Node 22) runs two jobs: **(1)** `check:lockfile`, `typecheck`, `lint`, `check:frontend-syntax`, `format:check`, then a **server boot smoke test** (`tsx src/index.ts web --port 3151` must answer `/api/status` within 30s); **(2)** the **unit/integration test suite** via `npm run test:ci` (`config/vitest.ci.config.ts` — excludes the browser-driven `test/mobile/**` suite, `perf-*` benchmarks, and 5 Playwright tests; globs live in `config/test-suites.ts`). `npm test` runs this same config, so local green == CI green. Tests are tmux-safe in CI: `TmuxManager` no-ops all shell commands under `VITEST` (see Testing).

@@ -148,9 +150,9 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 | ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | **Entry**        | `src/index.ts`, `src/cli.ts`, `daemon-control`, `service-installer`, `config/service-names`, `cli-style` | The last three back `web -d` / `service install`; `cli-style` is the shared palette/table/spinner/confirm kit |
 | **TUI**          | `src/tui/`: `tui-app` ★ + `tui-client` (the only IO) over a pure core (`-model`, `-layout`, `-render`, `-keys`, `-ansi`, `-composer`, `-approvals`, `-digest`, `-sse`, `-types`) | `codeman tui`, a CLIENT of the server, never a second brain. Design doc: `docs/tui-plan.md`; user guide `docs/tui.md` |
-| **DeepSeek**     | `src/utils/deepseek-cli-resolver.ts`, `src/deepseek-status-shim.ts` | `dsh` is a PROFILE LAUNCHER, not an agent; read `docs/deepseek-integration.md` first |
-| **Session**      | `src/session.ts` ★, `session-manager`, `session-auto-ops`, `session-cli-builder`, `session-task-cache`, `session-order` (pure), `session-pty-exit-breaker`, `usage-limit-patterns`, `usage-telemetry`; `src/services/unified-session-service.ts` | Pure/unit-tested helpers are split out of `session.ts` on purpose                                 |
-| **Mux**          | `src/mux-interface.ts`, `src/mux-factory.ts`, `src/tmux-manager.ts` ★                                  |                                                                                                  |
+| **DeepSeek**     | `src/utils/deepseek-cli-resolver.ts`, `src/deepseek-status-shim.ts`, `src/deepseek-web-server.ts` (background `dsh web`, not a session) | `dsh` is a PROFILE LAUNCHER, not an agent; read `docs/deepseek-integration.md` first |
+| **Session**      | `src/session.ts` ★, `session-manager`, `session-auto-ops`, `session-cli-builder`, `session-task-cache`, `session-order` (pure), `session-pty-exit-breaker`, `session-trust-dialog` (pure), `usage-limit-patterns`, `usage-telemetry`; `src/services/unified-session-service.ts` | Pure/unit-tested helpers are split out of `session.ts` on purpose                                 |
+| **Mux**          | `src/mux-interface.ts`, `src/mux-factory.ts`, `src/tmux-manager.ts` ★, `src/proc-tree.ts` (pure, bounded descendant walk)                                  |                                                                                                  |
 | **Respawn**      | `src/respawn-controller.ts` ★ + 4 helpers (`-adaptive-timing`, `-health`, `-metrics`, `-patterns`)      | Read `docs/respawn-state-machine.md` first                                                       |
 | **Ralph**        | `src/ralph-tracker.ts` ★, `src/ralph-loop.ts` + 5 helpers (`-config`, `-fix-plan-watcher`, `-plan-tracker`, `-stall-detector`, `-status-parser`) | Read `docs/ralph-wiggum-guide.md` first                                                          |
 | **Orchestrator** | `src/orchestrator-loop.ts`, `-planner`, `-verifier`                                                    | Read `docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md` first                                              |
@@ -158,14 +160,14 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 | **Agents**       | `src/subagent-watcher.ts` ★, `team-watcher`, `bash-tool-parser`, `transcript-watcher`, `workflow-run-watcher` | `workflow-run-watcher` is STANDALONE and never touches `subagent-watcher`                        |
 | **AI**           | `src/ai-checker-base.ts`, `ai-idle-checker.ts`, `ai-plan-checker.ts`                                   |                                                                                                  |
 | **Tasks**        | `src/task.ts`, `task-queue.ts`, `task-tracker.ts`                                                      |                                                                                                  |
-| **State**        | `src/state-store.ts`, `run-summary.ts`, `session-lifecycle-log.ts`, `intent-store.ts`                                     |                                                                                                  |
+| **State**        | `src/state-store.ts`, `run-summary.ts`, `session-lifecycle-log.ts`, `intent-store.ts`, `tab-layout.ts` (pure model) + `-service` (sole mutation boundary) + `-persistence` + `-legacy-order`                                     |                                                                                                  |
 | **Infra**        | `src/hooks-config.ts`, `push-store`, `tunnel-manager`, `image-watcher`, `file-stream-manager`, `remote-hosts` + `remote-reconnect` (pure), `docker-hosts` + `docker-export` | Remote/docker case overlays; see Key Patterns                                                    |
 | **Web tabs**     | `src/webview-store.ts`, `webview-capabilities.ts`, `src/web/webview-proxy.ts` (pure), `src/web/routes/webview-routes.ts` | Dashboard URLs as tabs; NOT a SessionMode                                                        |
 | **Search**       | `src/search-service.ts`                                                                                | Pure in-memory core for `GET /api/search`                                                        |
 | **Attachments**  | `src/attachment-registry.ts`, `attachment-magic`, `generated-artifact-attachments`, `session-attachment-history`, `document-preview-cache`, `document-thumbnailer`, `document-conversion-limiter`, `config/attachment-guard` | See Key Patterns                                                                                 |
 | **Plan**         | `src/plan-orchestrator.ts`, `src/prompts/*.ts`, `src/templates/` (`claude-md.ts` + `case-template.md`) | `templates/` holds the CLAUDE.md scaffold generated into new cases                                |
-| **Web**          | `src/web/server.ts` ★, `sse-events.ts`, `routes/*.ts` (24 modules + barrel; `session-routes.ts` ★), `route-helpers.ts`, `ports/*.ts`, `middleware/auth.ts`, `schemas.ts`, `self-update.ts`, `plan-usage-latest.ts`, `ws-connection-registry.ts`, `heic-jpeg-converter.ts` + `heic-jpeg-worker.ts` |                                                                                                  |
-| **Frontend**     | `src/web/public/app.js` (~5K lines, core) + 30 modules + `sw.js`                                       | See Frontend section for the load order, which is authoritative                                  |
+| **Web**          | `src/web/server.ts` ★, `sse-events.ts`, `routes/*.ts` (25 modules + barrel; `session-routes.ts` ★), `route-helpers.ts`, `ports/*.ts`, `middleware/auth.ts`, `schemas.ts`, `self-update.ts`, `plan-usage-latest.ts`, `ws-connection-registry.ts`, `heic-jpeg-converter.ts` + `heic-jpeg-worker.ts` |                                                                                                  |
+| **Frontend**     | `src/web/public/app.js` (~6.7K lines, core) + 31 modules + `sw.js`                                       | See Frontend section for the load order, which is authoritative                                  |
 | **Types**        | `src/types/index.ts` (barrel) → 22 domain files; also `src/types.ts` root re-export                    | See `@fileoverview` in index.ts                                                                  |

 ★ = Large, central file (>50KB) — read its `@fileoverview` first. All files have `@fileoverview` JSDoc — read that before diving in. Discovery aid: `grep -l '@fileoverview' src/web/routes/*.ts` lists all route modules; same grep works for `src/types/`, `src/web/public/*.js`.
@@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph

 **Config**: `src/config/` — 21 files, no barrel (`index.ts`) exists; import from the specific file.

-**Utilities**: `src/utils/` — re-exported via index. Key: `CleanupManager`, `LRUMap` (⚠ NOT in the barrel — import from `./utils/lru-map.js` directly), `StaleExpirationMap`, `BufferAccumulator`, `stripAnsi`, `Debouncer`, `KeyedDebouncer`. Also: `claude-cli-resolver`/`opencode-cli-resolver`/`codex-cli-resolver`/`gemini-cli-resolver`/`antigravity-cli-resolver`/`pi-cli-resolver`/`grok-cli-resolver` (CLI path resolution; ⚠ `pi-cli-resolver` and `grok-cli-resolver` additionally version-probe the binary, since `pi` is a generic name and `grok` has npm squatters), `string-similarity` (fuzzy matching), `regex-patterns` (ANSI/token/spinner patterns), `assertNever` (exhaustive checks), `token-validation` (auth tokens), `nice-wrapper` (process priority).
+**Utilities**: `src/utils/` — re-exported via index. Key: `CleanupManager`, `LRUMap` (⚠ NOT in the barrel — import from `./utils/lru-map.js` directly), `StaleExpirationMap`, `BufferAccumulator`, `stripAnsi`, `Debouncer`, `KeyedDebouncer`. Also: `claude-cli-resolver`/`opencode-cli-resolver`/`codex-cli-resolver`/`gemini-cli-resolver`/`antigravity-cli-resolver`/`pi-cli-resolver`/`grok-cli-resolver`/`deepseek-cli-resolver`/`omp-cli-resolver` (CLI path resolution, one per `SessionMode`, all nine sharing the lookup chain in `cli-executable-resolver`: server PATH, then that CLI's install dirs, then an interactive login shell LAST, since it is the only step that spawns anything and it is what finds nvm/Homebrew installs under a service manager's minimal PATH; ⚠ `pi-`, `grok-` and `deepseek-cli-resolver` additionally probe the binary's identity, since `pi` is a generic name, `grok` has npm squatters, and Debian ships an unrelated `dsh`), `file-query` (⚠ Files-panel search matcher, glob-by-two-pointer, never RegExp), `string-similarity` (fuzzy matching), `regex-patterns` (ANSI/token/spinner patterns), `assertNever` (exhaustive checks), `token-validation` (auth tokens), `nice-wrapper` (process priority), `shell-resolver` (⚠ resolves a real login shell for `mode: 'shell'`; the literal string `$SHELL` used to be expanded by the SERVER's shell, which is empty in a container), `event-loop-monitor` (a sync `execSync` freezes the port while the process stays alive, leaving no trace), `dependency-checker` + `dependency-report` (the `codeman doctor` probe engine, registry in `config/dependency-registry.ts`).

 ### Data Flow

@@ -193,6 +195,10 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph

 ⚠️ **A `❯` sighting is NOT the end of a turn, and neither is silence.** Claude redraws the composer (`❯`) about once a second all through a turn, so the old "saw a ❯, wait 2s → idle" rule flipped every working session to idle two seconds in (measured: a session mid-tool-call at 17 minutes reporting `status:"idle"`). Its working indicator is `✻ Actualizing… (13m 23s · ↓ 47.5k tokens)`: the glyph animates through `· ✢ ✳ ∗ ✻ ✽`, the gerund is randomized, and the finished line (`✻ Cooked for 2m 49s`) carries the same glyph, so neither `SPINNER_PATTERN` (braille, not what current versions draw) nor a keyword list can see it. Matching the new line in the STREAM does not work either: tmux ships partial repaints, so the whole line reaches the PTY only every few tens of seconds. So: `_confirmIdle()` (session.ts) requires the pane to go quiet, and then asks the SCREEN via `capturePaneText()` + `CLAUDE_WORKING_LINE_PATTERN` before believing it; a sustained run of repaints (`session-activity.ts`, pure + unit tested) is what marks a turn as started, with the same screen probe vetoing keystroke echo. Idle now lands ~3-5s after a turn ends instead of 2s into one. Claude-mode only, since an external CLI has no `❯`, so nothing would ever arm the confirmation and the session would latch busy.

+**Workspace-trust dialog auto-accept** (`session-trust-dialog.ts`, pure + unit tested): Claude Code asks once per directory ("Is this a project you created or one you trust?") before it will read or edit anything, and since Codeman sessions run permission-skipping or classifier-guarded modes the answer is always yes, so a session parked on that dialog is simply stuck. ⚠️ **Match the compacted SCREEN, never the stream.** tmux repaints a row by writing each word and then a cursor-forward (`\x1b[C`) instead of a space, and Ink colours each word separately, so the wire carries `I\x1b[Ctrust\x1b[Cthis\x1b[Cfolder`; stripping the escapes leaves `Itrustthisfolder`, because the spaces are not there to strip, they were never sent. A plain `includes('trust this folder')` therefore never matched a single chunk and the auto-accept was silently DEAD for every session that hit the dialog. `compactScreenText()` removes ALL whitespace instead (plus the `ESC ( B` charset selects that `stripAnsi` does not cover, which would otherwise land inside a phrase as a literal `(B`), which survives both that repaint style and the spaced full-screen redraw. ⚠️ **Never answer it with a blind `\r`.** The layout has changed under us at least twice, and Claude Code 2.1.252 dropped the option numbers, put "No, exit" FIRST and highlights IT by default, so the Enter that answered the old dialog now picks *exit* and the pane dies (`Pane is dead (status 1)`) seconds after the session starts. `trustDialogNextKey()` reads the `❯` marker and returns ONE step at a time (an arrow while the cursor is on the wrong option, Enter only once the screen shows it on the trust option), with the pane re-read between steps, so a dropped arrow costs a repaint instead of the session; a frame that does not say which option is highlighted returns null and waits for the next repaint. ⚠️ The LAST marked option in the text wins, because the direct-PTY fallback reads an append-only buffer where every repaint since launch is still present and an older frame must not out-vote the freshest one. ⚠️ Answering types into a live session, so THREE guards must all hold and none is redundant: a **startup-only window** (`TRUST_DIALOG_WINDOW_MS`, 90s, since the dialog renders before the main UI and leaving it open forever would let an agent transcript that merely QUOTES the dialog trigger an Enter, this file being an example), a **two-marker match** requiring a trust phrase AND one of the dialog's own confirm affordances (`isTrustDialogScreen`), and an **attempt cap** (`TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS`, 6: a keystroke can land while Ink is still mounting the widget and be dropped, which is the other half of why sessions got stuck here, but retrying forever would hammer keys into whatever came next; it was 3 while one Enter answered the dialog, and answering now costs at least two keystrokes). ⚠️ It reads `capturePaneText()` and falls back to a deliberately SHORT tail of the terminal buffer only on a direct-PTY session, which has no pane: that buffer is append-only, so a longer tail would keep re-matching a dialog answered minutes ago. ⚠️ **The scan must schedule its own next read** (`_trustDialogTimer`, cleared in `_clearAllTimers()`): it runs from the PTY `onData` handler, which was enough while one Enter answered the dialog, but the arrow that moves the cursor is the LAST output the pane produces, so a two-keystroke answer waiting on more output parks forever with the cursor sitting on the right option (measured on a live 2.1.252 spawn: cursor moved at 6 s, then nothing).
+
+**Process-tree walks are bounded** (`proc-tree.ts`, pure + unit tested): `collectDescendants(pid, byParent)` is the ONE descendant traversal, fed by a single cached `ps -eo pid=,ppid=` snapshot (`refreshProcSnapshot()` in tmux-manager.ts: in-flight-shared, async because `execSync`'s timeout cannot return at all while spawnSync waits on an unkillable child, and ANY error discards the result rather than caching a truncated `ps`, which would make whole subtrees invisible to the kill path). ⚠️ **The unbounded version took a machine down** (2026-07-30): it ran `pgrep -P <pid>` once per node and recursed with no visited set, no depth limit and no node cap, so across ~28 adopted tmux trees the fan-out exploded while each `pgrep` blocked in the WSL kernel reading `/proc/<pid>/cgroup`, ending at ~13,000 `pgrep` processes in D-state, a load average above 13,000, and a machine recoverable only by restarting WSL, which cost every running session. Three properties make that impossible and each has a test: a cycle terminates (a real tree has none, a stale snapshot can still produce one), depth is capped (`PROC_WALK_MAX_DEPTH`), node count is capped (`PROC_WALK_MAX_NODES`). The fourth is structural: the function takes a snapshot and cannot spawn anything at all. ⚠️ It lives in its own module because as a private method of `tmux-manager.ts` the regression test had to keep its own COPY of the algorithm, which is a test that passes while the shipped code rots. ⚠️ Truncation is reported through `onTruncated` rather than silently, with BOTH caps named: a silent depth cap hides a deep tree exactly as effectively as a silent node cap hides a wide one.
+
 **Auto-resume on usage limit** (opt-in per session, top of the Respawn tab): when Claude halts on a subscription limit, `usage-limit-patterns.ts` (pure, unit-tested) parses the reset time and `SessionAutoOps` arms a timer for reset+2min, then sends Esc + `continue`. ⚠️ Respawn cycles are blocked while paused (`isLimitPaused` guard in `onIdleDetected`), which is what prevents `/clear` from wiping the paused conversation. Claude-mode only. → [architecture-invariants#auto-resume-on-usage-limit](docs/architecture-invariants.md#auto-resume-on-usage-limit)

 **Plan-usage chip** (`showPlanUsageLimits`, per-device: desktop default **ON**, handhelds OFF via the mobile block in `getDefaultSettings()`): resolve it ONLY through `planUsageChipEnabled()` in settings-ui.js, which backs all three call sites (the App Settings checkbox, the chip's visibility, and the Claude `statusLineTelemetry` flag on session create). It renders compact Claude and Codex provider rows. Claude data comes from Codeman's marked `statusLine.command` exporter, which POSTs `rate_limits` to `POST /api/status-telemetry`, never overwrites a user's hand-authored statusLine, and prints the footer through. Main Codex usage comes from a read-only host `account/rateLimits/read` app-server poll at startup and every 5 minutes; exclude model-specific buckets such as Spark, and omit the Codex row when no signed-in limit is available. Distinct from auto-resume, which reacts to Claude's limit *message* rather than showing live %. → [architecture-invariants#plan-usage-chip-statusline-telemetry](docs/architecture-invariants.md#plan-usage-chip-statusline-telemetry), `docs/usage-limits-display-plan.md`
@@ -205,14 +211,20 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph

 **Docker cases**: a case can point at a **container**, with any of the CLI run modes running inside it. Like remote-SSH this is a **LOCATION OVERLAY on cases, never a `SessionMode` of its own**. Exactly one long-lived container **per case**, shared by all its sessions, so killing a session kills only that session's in-container tmux and **never** `docker stop` while siblings remain. The workspace is a real host dir bind-mounted at the **same absolute path**, which is what keeps file-routes/watchers on real host bytes and makes the in-container transcript projHash match the host. Credentials are **seeded** (RO mount, copied into the container once) rather than shared RW, so in-container CLIs never write refreshed tokens back to the host, and bind mounts are excluded from `docker commit` so exports stay secret-free. **NEVER a create-time `-e` for secrets, NEVER `--privileged`, NEVER the docker socket.** Config drift is detected via a label hash and a drifted launch is REFUSED rather than silently launched with stale config. ⚠️ On the loopback-only prod bind a container cannot reach 127.0.0.1, so in-container hooks need `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1`; otherwise idle detection falls back to output-based. → [architecture-invariants#docker-cases](docs/architecture-invariants.md#docker-cases), `docs/docker-cases.md` (user guide), `docs/docker-cases-plan.md` (design)

+**Docker Compose deployment** (`docker/`, contributed): Codeman itself runs in a container and spawns Docker cases as **SIBLING** containers through the mounted host socket (Docker-outside-of-Docker), never nested. That inverts one assumption the bare-host path takes for granted: the daemon no longer shares Codeman's filesystem, so a bind source valid *inside* Codeman means nothing to it. `resolveDockerDaemonMountSource()` translates sources under HOME into the daemon's namespace via `CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME`, and `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` points the cases dir at a host-absolute bind mount so a workspace resolves to the SAME absolute path on both sides (which is what keeps the transcript projHash matching, per Docker cases above). ⚠️ **`CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` must move every consumer or none**: it is resolved once in `config/cases-dir.ts` because `src/cli.ts` resolves case paths too, and when only the server's `CASES_DIR` learned the override, `codeman skill install --case <name>` reported "Case not found" on exactly the deployment the override exists for. ⚠️ **`.dockerignore` patterns match the WHOLE context-relative path**, so a bare `.env` line excludes only the ROOT file: `docker/.env` (which holds `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` and any provider keys) rode `COPY . .` into the image until `**/.env` was added — verified in both directions with a real build context. ⚠️ A Compose LONG-form bind (`type: bind`) **creates a missing host source directory ROOT-OWNED** rather than refusing, so any bind source the runtime user must write to has to be pre-created and chowned. `CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=1` drops `--memory-swap` (and filters only that one kernel warning) for hosts without swap accounting; `--memory` still applies. `docs/docker-compose.md` + `docker/README.md` (user guides)
+
 **External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` gates Claude-specific behavior off (Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token/CLI-info parsing, ❯-prompt readiness); these CLIs render their own TUIs, so readiness is output stabilization instead. All eight **require tmux with no direct PTY fallback**, because secrets are injected via socket-scoped `tmux setenv` and never on the spawn command line. ⚠️ `run*()` in `session-ui.js` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope; reading the raw shape silently breaks the run. ⚠️ **Codex sessions use PREDICTIVE WRITE-THROUGH echo, never the buffer overlay** (`_localEchoPolicy` in `_updateLocalEchoState`, terminal-ui.js): codex's composer reacts per keystroke ("/" pops a live-filtering picker, arrows edit server-side state, the composer grows as it wraps), so buffer-until-Enter starved it into issues #218/#219/#220/#222 and stays disabled (`_localEchoEnabled` remains false for codex). Instead, `PredictiveEchoAddon` (separate `vendor/xterm-predictive-echo.js` bundle) paints each keystroke at the predicted cell while the wire path stays BYTE-IDENTICAL: the onData hook (`_predictHookOnData`) is a plain statement with no `return`, so control always falls through into the untouched send path — pinned by vm and E2E byte-identity tests. Predictions reconcile against the parsed buffer and only while the cursor sits on the measured composer row (`isCodexComposerRow`, `/^› /`). Codex also **drops keystrokes that share a PTY read with a bracketed paste**, so flushed text and the paste sequence must go out as separate delayed writes (mirroring the Enter branch's delayed `\r`). Tests: `test/local-echo-codex-gating.test.ts`, `test/codex-predictive-echo.test.ts` (E2E vs real codex), `packages/xterm-zerolag-input/test/codex-replay.test.ts`. ⚠️ **Pi is the opposite kind of CLI and needs the opposite instincts**: it has NO permission prompts and no sandbox, so there is no bypass flag to send and Codeman must not invent one; its privileged knob is the tri-state `approveProjectTrust` (`--approve`/`--no-approve`), which makes pi EXECUTE repo-local `.pi/extensions` TypeScript, so the multi-user clamp puts pi in the **materialize** branch (an absent config still yields `--no-approve` for a non-granted owner) and `--api-key` is never wired. Pi stays OUT of `isAltScreenStripMode()` (main-screen TUI, and its 0.84.0 fullscreen mode is runtime-switchable via `/settings`, where the alt screen is load-bearing), and lands on the `'buffer'` echo policy via the `_updateLocalEchoState` fallthrough. Pi's own tests: `test/pi-mode.test.ts`, `test/routes/external-cli-bypass-clamp.test.ts`; user guide `docs/pi-integration.md`. ⚠️ **Grok is codex-shaped on permissions but opencode-shaped on rendering**: its bypass switch is `alwaysApprove` (`--always-approve`, grok's `bypassPermissions` mode — the Run button sends it `true` like antigravity's, and the clamp's only-if-sent branch strips it for non-granted owners), while its fullscreen alt-screen TUI keeps it OUT of `isAltScreenStripMode()`; the resolver version-probes `grok --version` like pi's (npm squatters exist for the name — `GET /api/grok/status` surfaces path + version), and grok lands on the `'buffer'` echo policy via the fallthrough (UNMEASURED against a live authenticated session; if its composer turns out per-keystroke-reactive like codex, flip it to the `'off'` branch). Grok's own tests: `test/grok-mode.test.ts`, `test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts`; user guide `docs/grok-integration.md`. ⚠️ **DeepSeek breaks three of this family's assumptions, so do not pattern-match it onto its siblings.** (1) The agent is a **PROFILE, not the binary**: `dsh` is a launcher over `$DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>` and DeepSeek ships only `web`/`headless`/`base`, so the terminal front door is ALWAYS third-party and "installed" ≠ "runnable" — the Run button gates on `isDeepSeekRunnable()` (binary AND a pane-capable profile) while `isDeepSeekAvailable()` gates the "add a profile" affordance; a `web`/`headless` profile is refused at spawn because it cannot drive a pane. (2) The permission switch is the **`DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` env export, not a flag** (`read-only`/`workspace-write`/`danger-full-access`) — the harness has none, and this is the one legitimate exception to the effort-style env-var ban because it is read with `??` as a boot-time default, so it stays soft; absent = `workspace-write`, which asks, hence the only-if-sent clamp branch, clamping to `workspace-write` (never `read-only`, which would break the workspace). ⚠️ **That clamp needs a second half no other CLI needs**, because the switch is an env var and `DSH_*` is an allowlisted `envOverrides` prefix: `applyEnvOverrides()` runs AFTER `_configureDeepSeek()` in tmux-manager, so a non-granted owner sending `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` on the SAME request would land last and hand back exactly the privilege the confLine truncated

+**DeepSeek web UI** (`POST`/`GET`/`DELETE /api/deepseek/web`, `deepseek-web-server.ts`): the Run menu's "DeepSeek web UI..." entry supervises ONE background `dsh web` child process, deliberately **NOT a shell session**. The session version worked and was still wrong in use: it put a terminal tab on screen next to the web tab the user actually asked for, every single time, and nothing about a long-lived HTTP server needs to be a tab. ⚠️ What a session gave for free now has to be paid for explicitly, and every piece is load-bearing: **exactly one** server (a second click REUSES it rather than racing it for a port, which two sessions structurally could not do), **restarted when the browser authority changes** (`--trusted-host` fences dsh's `/api` against the browser authority, and a Codeman reachable at both loopback and a tailnet name has two, so whoever asks last wins: the asker is by definition the origin about to load the page), **killed on shutdown** (`stopDeepSeekWeb()` in the server teardown, because the child is detached so its whole plugin tree can be signalled at once, which also means it would OUTLIVE Codeman and hold its port against the next start), and **failures returned to the caller**, since with no tab there is nowhere for a stack trace to land. ⚠️ The port search starts at dsh's own default 3080 and walks 40, never fixed: that default is precisely the port most likely to be taken already by the user's own `dsh web`, and hardcoding it killed this feature with EADDRINUSE once. Free-port detection BINDS rather than connects (a connect probe cannot tell "free" from "listening but not answering yet"), so it is racy by nature and the caller still waits for the server to really answer before reporting success. ⚠️ Both `POST` and `DELETE` sit at the **same privilege bar as the profile installer** (`canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands`) even though the action reads as "open a page": booting a dsh profile executes the plugin code in it, and the server is a single shared instance, so stopping it in multi-user mode takes it out from under other users' tabs.
+
 **Run launch synchronization**: the Run entrypoint holds an in-flight lock and disables `#runBtn` for the whole launch (≥500ms), so a double click cannot create duplicate sessions with the same `w<n>-<case>` name. `_ensureCreatedSessionVisible()` runs before `selectSession()`, and `_onSessionCreated()` stays an idempotent upsert, so POST-first and SSE-first ordering both produce exactly one rendered tab. ⚠️ **Closing has the mirror-image race and one owner**: `closeSession()` reads `wasActive` BEFORE its `await` and announces the delete via `_closingSessions`, while `_onSessionDeleted` skips the active-session handoff for an id in that set. Both used to read `activeSessionId` after the fact, so the `session_deleted` broadcast for your own delete could null it first and closing the tab you were on landed on the welcome screen instead of the next session, on the same build, depending on timing. The fallback also picks the first order entry that is still in `sessions` (a dead id can linger in `sessionOrder`, same reason Alt+N indexes a live-filtered list). A delete from ANOTHER client still shows the welcome screen, which is the honest answer when what you were looking at was taken away. Tests: `test/session-close-fallback.test.ts`. → [architecture-invariants#run-launch-synchronization](docs/architecture-invariants.md#run-launch-synchronization)

 **Session lineage lines** (tab → tab it spawned, `sessionLineageLines`, per-device, desktop default ON): a create request may name the session that spawned it, as a `parentSessionId` body field on `POST /api/sessions` / `POST /api/quick-start` or the `X-Codeman-Parent-Session` header (the agent skill sets that once on its shared curl invocation, so every spawn recipe carries it). `resolveParentSessionId()` (route-helpers.ts) **resolves rather than trusts** it: exact id, else a UNIQUE ≥8-char prefix (ids reach agents truncated), it must be a live session the caller can see AND carry the same owner, and **anything unresolvable is DROPPED, never a 400** — a cosmetic field must not be able to fail a worker spawn. It rides `toState()` into `session_created`, so there is no new SSE event. ⚠️ Rendering is an ADDITIONAL LAYER on the existing SVG pass (`_appendLineageConnectionLines` called at the tail of `_updateConnectionLinesImmediate()`, exactly like ultracode), sharing one batched read→write reflow and the `tab:<id>` rect cache; geometry is pure in `computeLineagePath()` (constants.js). ⚠️ **ONE shape, and the second one was the bug**: every pair (flat strip or wrapped) gets a U-bridge hanging below the strip, anchored on both tabs' BOTTOM edges. A wrapped strip used to get a parent-bottom → child-TOP bezier with a ~14px row gap to bend in, which drew a flat line hidden in the gap with siblings overprinting. ⚠️ The dip is a **mis-tuned-in-both-directions corridor** (44px cap = straight thread at strip-wide spans, #285; 104px cap + full row offset = ~106px over-bow into the terminal, 2026-08-15): it now hangs from the **STRIP's bottom edge** (fallback: lower tab bottom), capped at 64px, with NO per-row offsets stacked on top — the strip-bottom baseline is also what keeps a row-1 pair's arc from drawing through row 2's tab labels. ⚠️ **Colors are keyed on the SPAWNING tab, not per child**: every arc leaving one tab is the same color however many workers it spawns, so the strip reads as "these five came from w1, those two came from w2" — per-child coloring gave one tab's own children a different color each, which is the distinction the colors exist to make. A child that spawns in turn is a parent in its own right and gets its own color for the arcs below it, so a chain changes color at each generation while each generation's fan-out stays uniform. Assignment cycles `CodemanLineage.COLORS` in first-seen order per parent id (first entry empty = the skin-tuned `--session-blue`, so the first spawning tab keeps it; the rest vivid fixed hexes), memoized rather than derived from draw index (the SVG is wiped and rebuilt constantly, so an index-based color would flicker), and set inline as `--lineage-color` so styles.css keeps owning opacity/glow/dash. `test/session-lineage-lines.test.ts` drives the real `_appendLineageConnectionLines()` and asserts the painted property, since testing the color function alone would pass just as happily with the child id passed back in. ⚠️ **Desktop only**: the overlay is `z-index: 999` and the desktop header is 100 (arcs paint over it, which is what lets them touch tab bottoms), but under 1024px mobile.css makes the header `fixed; z-index: 1200` and would bury them. ⚠️ Paths carry `data-agent-id="lineage:<childId>"` because that is what `_applyLineEntrances()` queries — that one attribute is what gives them the entrance animation and its negative-`animation-delay` resume across `svg.innerHTML=''`. ⚠️ `.session-tabs` is `overflow-x: auto`, so a scrolled-out tab still HAS a rect (over the logo); edges with an endpoint outside the strip are skipped, and a passive `scroll` listener re-anchors the rest.

 **Unified session list**: `GET /api/sessions/unified` merges live sessions, persisted state, lifecycle-log history, and Claude transcript files into one deduped list (pure core in `src/services/unified-session-service.ts`). Transcript rows fold into their owning session via a `claudeSessionId → Codeman id` alias map, so resumed and `/clear`-respawned sessions do not appear twice. No terminal buffers in the response, unlike `/api/sessions`. Backs the Cmd+K Session Manager, plus pinning and cross-device tab order (`PUT /api/session-order`; pure merge helpers in `src/session-order.ts`, pushing device wins and server-only ids are never dropped). → [architecture-invariants#unified-session-list-and-session-manager](docs/architecture-invariants.md#unified-session-list-and-session-manager)

+**Owner tab layouts** (COD-359, `tab-layout*.ts` + `GET`/`PUT /api/tab-layout`): named tab GROUPS over the flat tab strip, scoped per owner (`SINGLE_USER_LAYOUT_OWNER` = `@single` when multi-user is off), persisted under the `tabLayouts` key in state.json. A layout is `{version, groups[], ungrouped[], updatedAt}` whose refs point at either a session or a saved webview (`TabRefKind`), capped at 32 groups / 512 refs. ⚠️ **BACKEND ONLY as of 1.24.1**: nothing in `src/web/public/` calls these routes yet, so a UI built on top is new frontend work, not a rewiring job. ⚠️ **`TabLayoutService` is the single mutation boundary** and every lifecycle caller (session created/removed, webview created/deleted, a legacy order PUT) describes ONE completed server action and gets AT MOST ONE versioned write; writing layout state from a route or a manager directly is what the service exists to prevent. ⚠️ The layout does not replace `PUT /api/session-order`, it PROJECTS onto it: `tab-layout-legacy-order.ts` is the pure translation both ways (`putLegacyOrder()` recomposes a global order from the owner's groups), so changing one side without the other silently desyncs the tab strip from the stored layout. ⚠️ **Reconciliation is gated on a SUCCESSFUL restore** (`markRestorationComplete` / `markRestorationFailed` / `markRestorationSkipped`, plus `assertDeletionReady()`): pruning refs against a session list that failed to load would delete live tabs, so a failed restore must leave the layout untouched. `PUT` takes exactly `{baseVersion, layout}` (any other key shape is a validation error), answers a stale `baseVersion` with the current layout rather than clobbering, and is capped at 128 KiB. Broadcasts `tab:layoutChanged`, owner-routed via `deriveTabLayoutSseHint`.
+
 **Hook events**: Claude Code hooks trigger via `/api/hook-event`. Key events: `permission_prompt`, `elicitation_dialog`, `elicitation_complete`, `elicitation_response`, `idle_prompt`, `stop`, `teammate_idle`, `task_completed`. See `src/hooks-config.ts`; upstream hook semantics mirrored in `docs/claude-code-hooks-reference.md`. ⚠️ **Every claude session INSTALLS the hooks block into its workspace** (`applyWorkspaceHooks` in hooks-config.ts → `ensureCodemanHooks`, an add-only merge that keeps a user's own handlers), from EVERY claude create path — both interactive routes, cron fires, legacy scheduled runs, the plan-orchestrator one-shots — and from `restoreMuxSessions()` for sessions recovered on server start (that boot sweep skips a workspace that no longer exists, so a deleted repo with a surviving tmux session is never resurrected as an empty dir). Before 2026-08-15 hooks were written ONLY when Codeman created the case DIRECTORY, so a linked case / cloned repo — where most sessions actually run — had no hooks at all and every hook-driven surface was silently dead there: an AskUserQuestion dialog blocked the pane while the tab and the phone overview both read a calm `idle`, with no Approvals Inbox item, no push, no definitive `stop`/`idle_prompt` for respawn and no `stop`/`blocked` for the wait endpoints. The escape hatch is the synced `workspaceHooksEnabled` setting (App Settings → Agents & CLIs → Claude, **default ON**); OFF restores the old behavior, where a Codeman block that is already there is still refreshed when stale (COD-91) but one is never added. ⚠️ Route the decision through `applyWorkspaceHooks` rather than calling `ensureCodemanHooks` at a new site, or the setting silently stops applying to that path. ⚠️ Claude Code RE-READS `settings.local.json`, so an already-running session starts firing hooks without a restart (measured 2026-08-15) — and the notification for a blocking dialog is delayed by Claude Code (~30s), so the alert trails the dialog. ⚠️ An AskUserQuestion / plan-selection dialog arrives as **`permission_prompt`**, not `elicitation_dialog` (that one is MCP elicitation), so it renders as the RED "needs you" alert, not the yellow idle one.

 **Approvals Inbox** (cross-session queue of prompts waiting on a human; `approvalsInboxEnabled`, SYNCED, default OFF: every surface is opt-in; only the store and answer endpoints run regardless, so flipping it ON shows anything already pending): `web/approval-inbox.ts` is a `sessionWaits`-style singleton fed by `/api/hook-event`, holding at most ONE item per session (a new prompt supersedes), claude-mode only, in-memory. Cards are answered via `POST /api/approvals/:id/answer`, which sends a digit / Esc / idle-prompt text through `writeViaMux` (menu answers never carry `\r`). ⚠️ `option` digits are accepted ONLY when they match options parsed from the captured pane frame, and the answer path RE-CAPTURES the pane first (a dialog that no longer parses on screen means the keystroke would land in the composer, so refuse with 409). ⚠️ Resolution on the heuristic `working` signal ALONE is restricted to `idle` items; a permission/question item gets the pane-VERIFIED variant on that same signal (`resolveIfDialogGone()` → `verifyStillAnswerable()`), so the heuristic only decides when to LOOK and the screen decides the outcome. That is what clears a dialog answered in the terminal mid-turn; the other definitive signals are `stop`, `elicitation_complete`/`elicitation_response`, exit/delete, answer, supersede and the 12h TTL. ⚠️ **Viewing a session ACKNOWLEDGES its idle item, it does not resolve it** (`POST /api/approvals/session/:sessionId/viewed` → `acknowledgedAt` → `approval:updated`): the item stays pending (still answerable, still Read My Mind context) and only stops arming the yellow tab alert. That flag is what makes the clear durable, since the view-clears-idle rule used to live in one browser's memory and `seedApprovals()` re-armed the alert on the next reload while other devices never heard about it at all; the local half is `markIdleAlertSeen()` (app.js), called from BOTH `selectSession` paths, including the already-active early return, where a click could otherwise never clear the alert. ⚠️ **Only a HUMAN opening a session acknowledges**: `selectSession(id, { auto: true })` marks the three selections the APP makes (boot restore, a solo window opening its target, the fallback after the active session is closed) and skips the acknowledgement, so a page load cannot silently spend an alert the user never saw. The flag defaults to user-initiated, so an untagged call site fails toward acknowledging rather than toward an alert nothing can clear; `test/session-select-ack-gate.test.ts` pins both the gate and the tagged call sites. Idle-only by construction (`acknowledge()` defaults to `['idle']`): looking at a permission/question dialog does not answer it. ⚠️ Same rule on the input path: `_ackDelivery` (app.js) spends the IDLE alert only, via that same `markIdleAlertSeen()`. It used to `clearPendingHooks(sessionId)` with no kind, so one keystroke wiped a RED alert on that device while the dialog was still up, the other devices stayed red, and a reload re-seeded it. ⚠️ Claude Code fires no "permission answered" hook (only `elicitation_complete`/`elicitation_response`, i.e. the question flavor), so an answered-in-the-terminal dialog would otherwise sit pending until `stop`: `GET /api/approvals` therefore runs a **staleness sweep** over the caller's own items via `verifyStillAnswerable()`, which is deliberately the conservative check the answer path uses (only an item whose ORIGINAL frame parsed options can be dropped, so an unreadable capture keeps the alert rather than losing a live one). ⚠️ **`applyCapture()` is therefore ADD-ONLY for `options`**: a re-capture that parses nothing must never erase a parse an earlier one found. Claude Code delays the Notification hook behind the dialog (measured 6s, documented ~30s), so the 600ms re-capture routinely lands on a frame the user has ALREADY answered; clearing the field there made the item permanently unsweepable, because `verifyStillAnswerable()` reads a MISSING `options` as "we never could read this dialog" and keeps such items answerable by design. The red "needs you" then survived every sweep AND every page reload, went away only on `stop` (2026-08-20: a confirmed question left a tab flowing red for ~8 minutes while the turn ran on), and the stale card still accepted an answer, typing a bare `1` into a composer with no dialog under it. Pinned by `test/approval-inbox.test.ts`. ⚠️ A frame that parses no options is CONCLUSIVE in exactly two cases, and the second one closes the late-hook hole: the item once parsed options (they cannot vanish while the dialog is up), or the frame shows Claude actively running a turn. A modal dialog BLOCKS the turn, so the two cannot coexist — measured on v2.1.237, a live-dialog frame carries neither the `… (13s` timer NOR the `esc to interrupt` footer, which the dialog replaces with `Enter to select · ↑/↓ to navigate · Esc to cancel`. Anything else stays answerable, so an unreadable capture Line truncated
@@ -244,6 +256,8 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph

 **File Viewer edit mode** (issue #212): the file-preview overlay edits workspace text files in place — `GET .../file-content?edit=1` + `PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content`, policy in `src/config/file-editing.ts`. This is a **third file surface and the only one that WRITES**: read-path confinement (realpath + workspace + ownership) plus sensitive/blocked/`.git` denies and an extension **allowlist**; writes are `wx`-temp + rename (no `O_CREAT` anywhere = edit-in-place is structural); optimistic concurrency via sha256 `baseHash` → 409. ⚠️ `edit=1` never truncates and the client must never save a plain-preview buffer (the 500-line truncation would silently delete the rest). ⚠️ CRLF/UTF-8 guards: EOL re-applied server-side, non-UTF-8 refused via round-trip compare. → [architecture-invariants#file-viewer-edit-mode](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-viewer-edit-mode), `docs/file-viewer-edit-plan.md`

+**Files panel search** (COD-236, the `q` param on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): `compileFileQuery()` (`utils/file-query.ts`, pure, no IO, so it unit-tests directly) compiles the query into a reusable predicate, which is what lets the server-side walk prune instead of streaming the whole tree. ⚠️ **A query turns that endpoint into a FLAT match list rather than a nested tree**, and the walk deliberately recurses past non-matching directories, since the whole point of searching is to reach a file whose ancestors do not match. An empty or whitespace-only query compiles to `null`, which is what keeps the default tree response byte-identical when no search is requested. ⚠️ **Globs are never compiled into a RegExp**: `*a*a*a…` translated to `^.*a.*a.*a…$` is a classic backtracking blowup evaluated synchronously against every walked path, so one pathological query would freeze the event loop for the whole server (the same reason `search-service.ts` is regex-free). `globMatch()` is a two-pointer wildcard walk instead, O(text · pattern) with both operands short by construction, and an overlong query (`MAX_QUERY_LENGTH`, 256) also compiles to `null` rather than running. A query containing `/` matches the relative path, otherwise the bare entry name; globs match anchored and case-insensitively (`*` spans any run, slashes included, `?` exactly one character), everything else is a plain case-insensitive substring.
+
 **Raw file bodies are streamed and range-aware**: `file-raw` and the attachments `/raw` route always advertise `Accept-Ranges: bytes` and answer a `Range` header with `206` + `Content-Range` (single-range only; parser is pure + unit-tested in `src/web/http-range.ts`, a malformed spec is ignored → 200 while an out-of-bounds one is a 416). ⚠️ A 200-only response is what made the File Viewer's `<video>` unseekable: Chrome then reports `video.seekable` as `[0, 0]`, the scrub bar is inert and `currentTime = x` silently reverts (measured on an 18MB mp4), and Safari refuses to start the media at all. ⚠️ These bodies go out through `reply.hijack()`, which bypasses Fastify's status handling — `sendRawStream` must copy the status onto `reply.raw` by hand or a partial body ships labelled `200` and the browser treats a slice as the whole file. ⚠️ Closing the preview must **pause and unload** the media (`_stopFilePreviewMedia` in panels-ui.js): dropping the overlay's `visible` class is `display:none` and nothing else, and a DETACHED `HTMLMediaElement` keeps playing, which is how the X button used to leave a video audible with no player to pause.

 **Ultracode / workflow-run visualization** (opt-in, default OFF): the Workflow tool writes a completion artifact only at run *end*, so live in-flight runs exist solely as transcript dirs. `workflow-run-watcher.ts` therefore synthesizes ACTIVE runs from transcripts until the completion artifact appears and supersedes them. It is **STANDALONE** and deliberately never imports or touches `subagent-watcher.ts`, despite reading the same tree. Two independent toggles: `showUltracodeAgents` (docked panel) and `ultracodeFloatingWindows` (floating windows); the watcher starts if **either** is on. → [architecture-invariants#ultracode--workflow-run-visualization](docs/architecture-invariants.md#ultracode-and-workflow-run-visualization)
@@ -342,7 +356,7 @@ Frontend JS modules have `@fileoverview` with `@dependency`/`@loadorder` tags. L

 ### API Routes

-~220 handlers across 24 route files in `src/web/routes/`: system (51), sessions (34), cases (29), files (17), orchestrator (10), ralph (9), cron (9), admin (8), plan (8), respawn (7), webviews (6 + the `/webview/:cap/*` proxy), mux (5), push (4), scheduled (4, legacy `ScheduledRun`), approvals (4), readmymind (4), me (2), teams (2), search (1), hooks (1), clipboard (1), status-telemetry (1), voice (1 + the `/ws/voice/stream` relay), ws (1 WebSocket). Each file has `@fileoverview` with endpoint details.
+~227 handlers across 25 route files in `src/web/routes/`: system (56), sessions (34), cases (29), files (17), orchestrator (10), ralph (9), cron (9), admin (8), plan (8), respawn (7), webviews (6 + the `/webview/:cap/*` proxy), mux (5), push (4), scheduled (4, legacy `ScheduledRun`), approvals (4), readmymind (4), me (2), teams (2), tab-layout (2), search (1), hooks (1), clipboard (1), status-telemetry (1), voice (1 + the `/ws/voice/stream` relay), ws (1 WebSocket). Each file has `@fileoverview` with endpoint details.

 **HTTP contract** (stable since 0.9.x, see `docs/versioning-policy.md`; full envelope/status/error-code/SSE spec in `docs/api-reference.md`): responses use the `ApiResponse<T>` envelope — `{ success: true, data? }` or `{ success: false, error, errorCode }` (`src/types/api.ts`). `/api/v1/*` is a versioned alias of `/api/*` (URL rewrite in `server.ts`).

@@ -360,7 +374,7 @@ Frontend JS modules have `@fileoverview` with `@dependency`/`@loadorder` tags. L

 ## State Files

-All in `~/.codeman/`: `state.json` (sessions, settings, respawn, orchestrator, cron jobs/runs), `mux-sessions.json` (tmux recovery), `settings.json` (user prefs), `push-keys.json` + `push-subscriptions.json`, `session-lifecycle.jsonl` (audit log), `update-status.json` (self-updater progress, polled across the service restart), `linked-cases.json`, `webviews.json` (saved web-tab dashboard URLs), `remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json`, `docker-hosts.json` + `docker-cases.json` + `docker-exports/`, `subagent-window-states.json` + `subagent-parents.json` (subagent window layout, GET/PUT `/api/subagent-window-states`/`-parents`), `hook-secret` (per-instance), `users.json` (multi-user, mode 0600) + `admin-audit.jsonl`, `intents.json` (Read My Mind intent profiles, mode 0600), `certs/` (self-signed TLS for `--https`), `.env` (CODEMAN_USERNAME/PASSWORD fallback for the `codeman attach` CLI). Transient: `self-update-runner.sh`. Multi-user case spaces live OUTSIDE the data dir at `~/codeman-users/<username>/cases` (shared across instances like `~/codeman-cases`, override `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR`).
+All in `~/.codeman/`: `state.json` (sessions, settings, respawn, orchestrator, cron jobs/runs, owner tab layouts), `mux-sessions.json` (tmux recovery), `settings.json` (user prefs), `push-keys.json` + `push-subscriptions.json`, `session-lifecycle.jsonl` (audit log), `update-status.json` (self-updater progress, polled across the service restart), `linked-cases.json`, `webviews.json` (saved web-tab dashboard URLs), `remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json`, `docker-hosts.json` + `docker-cases.json` + `docker-exports/`, `subagent-window-states.json` + `subagent-parents.json` (subagent window layout, GET/PUT `/api/subagent-window-states`/`-parents`), `hook-secret` (per-instance), `users.json` (multi-user, mode 0600) + `admin-audit.jsonl`, `intents.json` (Read My Mind intent profiles, mode 0600), `certs/` (self-signed TLS for `--https`), `.env` (CODEMAN_USERNAME/PASSWORD fallback for the `codeman attach` CLI). Transient: `self-update-runner.sh`. Multi-user case spaces live OUTSIDE the data dir at `~/codeman-users/<username>/cases` (shared across instances like `~/codeman-cases`, override `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR`).

 **Generated top-level dirs** (all gitignored — don't edit or commit): `dist/` (esbuild output), `out/`, `coverage/`, `test-results/`, `tmp/`, `screenshots-echo-diag/`. The committed gesture bundle (`src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js`) IS tracked, but its runtime wasm/model assets (`src/web/public/gesture/wasm/`, `*.task`) are fetched and gitignored.

@@ -423,6 +437,6 @@ Two constraints worth knowing before you touch them: the env-derived PTY buffer

 ## Scripts & Tunnel

-**`install.sh`** (repo root, 92KB) is the public entry point: `curl -fsSL <raw url> | bash` installs Node/tmux if missing, clones to `~/.codeman/app`, builds, and offers a systemd/launchd service. The network-access prompt is 3-way: **Tailscale** (loopback bind + guided `tailscale serve --bg <port>` HTTPS setup: install/login/operator/tailnet-HTTPS-toggle, then curl-verified end-to-end), **LAN** (0.0.0.0 + password prompt), or **local-only**; it preserves the existing binding on re-runs via `read_existing_binding()`. Tailscale state is detected dynamically from `tailscale serve status --json` (no marker files); the installer must NEVER `tailscale serve reset` or touch serve mappings other than 443→Codeman's port (users have unrelated serve config). `install.sh update`, `install.sh uninstall`, and `install.sh tailscale` (retrofit Tailscale access onto an existing install) also exist; `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` approves system changes for automation, `CODEMAN_TAILSCALE=1` presets the Tailscale choice (never installs Tailscale non-interactively).
+**`install.sh`** (repo root, 104KB) is the public entry point: `curl -fsSL <raw url> | bash` installs Node/tmux if missing, clones to `~/.codeman/app`, builds, and offers a systemd/launchd service. The network-access prompt is 3-way: **Tailscale** (loopback bind + guided `tailscale serve --bg <port>` HTTPS setup: install/login/operator/tailnet-HTTPS-toggle, then curl-verified end-to-end), **LAN** (0.0.0.0 + password prompt), or **local-only**; it preserves the existing binding on re-runs via `read_existing_binding()`. Tailscale state is detected dynamically from `tailscale serve status --json` (no marker files); the installer must NEVER `tailscale serve reset` or touch serve mappings other than 443→Codeman's port (users have unrelated serve config). `install.sh update`, `install.sh uninstall`, and `install.sh tailscale` (retrofit Tailscale access onto an existing install) also exist; `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` approves system changes for automation, `CODEMAN_TAILSCALE=1` presets the Tailscale choice (never installs Tailscale non-interactively).

 Other key scripts: `scripts/tmux-manager.sh` (safe tmux mgmt), `scripts/tunnel.sh [quick|named] start|stop|status|url` (quick = random trycloudflare URL, default; `named setup|enable` = fixed-hostname tunnel via `scripts/codeman-tunnel-named.service`; bare `start|stop|url` still means quick), `scripts/run-beta.sh` (isolated beta instance), `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (docker base image), `scripts/self-update.sh` (detached updater). Production services: `scripts/codeman-web.service`, `scripts/codeman-tunnel.service`. **Always set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`** before exposing via tunnel.
@@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ codeman users add alice --admin      # create the first admin account
 codeman web --multiuser              # named logins + per-user case spaces
 ```

+**Prefer Docker Compose?** A local-image Compose deployment ships in `docker/`: copy `docker/.env.example` to `docker/.env`, set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`, then run `bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh` on Linux. Codeman runs in a container and spawns Docker cases as sibling containers through the host socket. See the [Docker deployment guide](docker/README.md) for direct Compose commands, storage and networking options.
+
 Details in [Multi-User Mode](#multi-user-mode-opt-in) below.

 <details>
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# Codeman Docker Compose environment template
+# Copy this file to .env and set the values for the Docker host.
+# =============================================================================
+
+TZ=Australia/Perth
+
+# Optional overrides for direct `docker compose` use. The Bash start script
+# detects these values from CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH automatically. Compose uses
+# 1000:1000 when the variables are omitted.
+# PUID=1000
+# PGID=1000
+
+# Name of the account that runs Codeman and all local CLI sessions. Changing
+# this value rebuilds the image with a matching account.
+CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER=opencode
+
+# Required. Persistent Codeman application data, CLI credentials, and session
+# state are stored here on the host and mounted at the runtime account's home
+# directory in the container.
+CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH=/mnt/user/appdata/Coding/codeman
+
+# Required for Docker cases. This must be an absolute path on the Docker host.
+# Codeman and each isolated case use this same path, so it cannot be a
+# container-only path such as /home/opencode/codeman-cases.
+CODEMAN_CASES_PATH=/mnt/user/appdata/Coding/codeman/codeman-cases
+
+# Required. Network bind address, host port, and local image tag.
+CODEMAN_HOST=0.0.0.0
+CODEMAN_PORT=3000
+CODEMAN_IMAGE=codeman:local
+
+# Required for any network-accessible Codeman instance. Use a unique, strong
+# password. This file is safe to commit; copy it to .env and set the value.
+CODEMAN_PASSWORD=changeme
+
+# Required. Username for Codeman HTTP Basic authentication.
+CODEMAN_USERNAME=admin
+
+# Optional: authenticate Gemini CLI without an interactive login.
+GEMINI_API_KEY=
+
+# Linux default. On Docker Desktop, use the socket path supported by your
+# Docker installation when it differs from /var/run/docker.sock.
+DOCKER_SOCKET=/var/run/docker.sock
+
+# Optional override for direct `docker compose` use. The Bash start script
+# detects this from DOCKER_SOCKET automatically. The direct Compose default is
+# 999, but the correct value depends on the Docker host.
+# DOCKER_SOCKET_GID=999
+
+# Set to 1 only when Docker-case hook callbacks are required.
+CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=0
+
+# Set to 1 when `docker info` reports `SwapLimit=false`. The case memory limit
+# remains active; Codeman omits --memory-swap and filters the daemon's exact
+# unsupported-swap warning while preserving all other Docker create errors.
+CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=0
+
+# Required only when applying the macvlan example in README.md.
+CODEMAN_MACVLAN_NETWORK=br0.11
+CODEMAN_IPV4_ADDRESS=10.10.11.236
+CODEMAN_MAC_ADDRESS=02:10:11:00:00:EC
+
+# Required only when creating a new managed macvlan network, rather than using
+# the external-network macvlan example.
+CODEMAN_MACVLAN_PARENT=br0.11
+CODEMAN_MACVLAN_SUBNET=10.10.11.0/24
+CODEMAN_MACVLAN_GATEWAY=10.10.11.1
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Codeman Docker deployment
+
+This folder contains the Compose configuration, server image Dockerfile, and environment template for a locally built Codeman server.
+
+## Start
+
+From the repository root, create the runtime environment file and set the required values, especially `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`.
+
+```sh
+cp docker/.env.example docker/.env
+bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh
+```
+
+On PowerShell, use the following command instead.
+
+```powershell
+Copy-Item docker/.env.example docker/.env
+docker compose --env-file docker/.env -f docker/docker-compose.yaml up --build -d
+```
+
+Every required value is defined and explained in `.env.example`. `GEMINI_API_KEY` is intentionally optional and may remain blank.
+
+On Linux, `Start-Codeman.sh` stops with an error when required paths are missing. It creates the application-data directory when safe, detects its numeric owner as `PUID:PGID`, and detects `DOCKER_SOCKET_GID` from the configured Docker socket. It rejects a root-owned application-data directory because Codeman and its local CLI sessions must remain unprivileged.
+
+Codeman, Claude, OpenCode, and other local sessions run as the unprivileged account named by `CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER`, which defaults to `opencode`. When Compose is run directly, `PUID` and `PGID` default to `1000:1000`; set them in `.env` when the application-data directory has a different owner. The Bash start script determines them automatically instead.
+
+To retain Docker-case support without root when running Compose directly, set `DOCKER_SOCKET_GID` to the numeric group ID of the host socket. On a standard Linux Docker host, obtain it with `stat -c '%g' /var/run/docker.sock`. The Bash start script detects it automatically.
+
+## Application data storage
+
+The default configuration uses a host-folder bind mount:
+
+```yaml
+volumes:
+  - type: bind
+    source: ${CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH}
+    target: /home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}
+```
+
+Set `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH` in `.env` to a directory that the Docker daemon can access. The example value is `/mnt/user/appdata/Coding/codeman`.
+
+`CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` is the separate host directory for managed case workspaces. It is mounted into Codeman at the same absolute path, allowing the host Docker daemon to bind it into an isolated case container. Set it to a child directory of `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH` unless you deliberately store workspaces elsewhere.
+
+Compose also exposes `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH` to Codeman as `CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME`. This lets Docker case seed files, CLI credentials and the hook secret be mounted using paths that exist in the host daemon's filesystem. Direct host installations do not set this variable and retain their existing behaviour.
+
+Set `CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=1` when `docker info` reports `SwapLimit=false`. Codeman continues to apply the configured case memory limit, omits Docker's unsupported `--memory-swap` option, and filters only the daemon's exact swap-capability warning. Every other Docker create error and its exit status remain visible.
+
+For an existing installation created by a root-running image, change ownership of the application-data directory before upgrading so the configured `PUID` and `PGID` can read the saved credentials and state:
+
+```sh
+chown -R 99:100 /mnt/user/appdata/Coding/codeman
+```
+
+Replace `99:100` and the path with the values from your `.env` file.
+
+Do not replace this bind mount with a Docker-managed named volume when Docker cases are enabled. Codeman passes seed, credential, transcript and hook-secret bind sources to the host Docker daemon, so their source files must have stable paths in the daemon's filesystem. A named volume does not provide the required host path mapping.
+
+## Static macvlan networking
+
+The default configuration publishes a host port. It does not use `network_mode: host`. To attach Codeman directly to an existing external macvlan network with a static IP address and MAC address, remove the `ports:` section and add the following to the `codeman` service:
+
+```yaml
+mac_address: ${CODEMAN_MAC_ADDRESS}
+networks:
+  codeman_lan:
+    ipv4_address: ${CODEMAN_IPV4_ADDRESS}
+```
+
+Then add this top-level network declaration:
+
+```yaml
+networks:
+  codeman_lan:
+    external: true
+    name: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_NETWORK}
+```
+
+Set `CODEMAN_MACVLAN_NETWORK`, `CODEMAN_IPV4_ADDRESS`, and `CODEMAN_MAC_ADDRESS` in `.env`. The values in `.env.example` match the supplied Unraid example network and should be changed for other hosts.
+
+### Create a managed macvlan network
+
+If an external macvlan network does not already exist, use this top-level declaration instead. Do not use it together with the external-network declaration.
+
+```yaml
+networks:
+  codeman_lan:
+    driver: macvlan
+    driver_opts:
+      parent: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_PARENT}
+    ipam:
+      config:
+        - subnet: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_SUBNET}
+          gateway: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_GATEWAY}
+```
+
+Macvlan containers are ordinarily not reachable from their Docker host without additional host-network routing. Confirm the selected address, MAC address, parent interface, and subnet are reserved and valid for the target network before starting the stack.
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+script_dir=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)
+env_file="$script_dir/.env"
+compose_file="$script_dir/docker-compose.yaml"
+
+if [[ ! -f "$env_file" ]]; then
+  printf 'Error: Docker environment file is missing: %s\n' "$env_file" >&2
+  printf 'Create it from %s/.env.example before starting Codeman.\n' "$script_dir" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+compose_command=(docker compose --env-file "$env_file" -f "$compose_file")
+appdata_path=$(
+  "${compose_command[@]}" config --environment |
+    awk -F= '$1 == "CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH" { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); print; exit }'
+)
+docker_socket=$(
+  "${compose_command[@]}" config --environment |
+    awk -F= '$1 == "DOCKER_SOCKET" { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); print; exit }'
+)
+
+if [[ -z "$appdata_path" ]]; then
+  printf 'Error: CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH is not set in %s\n' "$env_file" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if [[ ! -d "$appdata_path" ]]; then
+  if [[ "$EUID" == '0' ]]; then
+    printf 'Error: Refusing to create CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH as root: %s\n' "$appdata_path" >&2
+    printf 'Create it as the unprivileged account that should run Codeman, then retry.\n' >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  mkdir -p -- "$appdata_path"
+fi
+
+if owner_ids=$(stat -c '%u:%g' -- "$appdata_path" 2>/dev/null); then
+  :
+elif owner_ids=$(stat -f '%u:%g' "$appdata_path" 2>/dev/null); then
+  :
+else
+  printf 'Error: Cannot determine the owner of CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH: %s\n' "$appdata_path" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+export PUID=${owner_ids%%:*}
+export PGID=${owner_ids##*:}
+
+if [[ "$PUID" == '0' ]]; then
+  printf 'Error: CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH is owned by root: %s\n' "$appdata_path" >&2
+  printf 'Change the directory ownership to the unprivileged account that should run Codeman.\n' >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if [[ -z "$docker_socket" || ! -S "$docker_socket" ]]; then
+  printf 'Error: DOCKER_SOCKET is not a Unix socket: %s\n' "${docker_socket:-<unset>}" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if socket_ids=$(stat -c '%u:%g' -- "$docker_socket" 2>/dev/null); then
+  :
+elif socket_ids=$(stat -f '%u:%g' "$docker_socket" 2>/dev/null); then
+  :
+else
+  printf 'Error: Cannot determine the owner of DOCKER_SOCKET: %s\n' "$docker_socket" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+export DOCKER_SOCKET_GID=${socket_ids##*:}
+
+exec docker compose --env-file "$env_file" -f "$compose_file" up --build -d
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+name: codeman
+
+services:
+  codeman:
+    build:
+      context: ..
+      dockerfile: docker/server.Dockerfile
+      args:
+        CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER: ${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}
+        PGID: ${PGID:-1000}
+        PUID: ${PUID:-1000}
+    image: ${CODEMAN_IMAGE}
+    init: true
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    ports:
+      - "${CODEMAN_PORT}:${CODEMAN_PORT}"
+    environment:
+      CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS: ${CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS}
+      # Host-side equivalent of the runtime user's HOME. Docker case seed,
+      # credential and hook mounts are translated into the daemon namespace.
+      CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME: ${CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH}
+      CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT: ${CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT}
+      CODEMAN_CASES_PATH: ${CODEMAN_CASES_PATH}
+      CODEMAN_HOST: ${CODEMAN_HOST}
+      CODEMAN_PASSWORD: ${CODEMAN_PASSWORD}
+      CODEMAN_PORT: ${CODEMAN_PORT}
+      CODEMAN_USERNAME: ${CODEMAN_USERNAME}
+      GEMINI_API_KEY: ${GEMINI_API_KEY}
+      PGID: ${PGID:-1000}
+      PUID: ${PUID:-1000}
+      TZ: ${TZ}
+    group_add:
+      # Retain access to the host Docker socket without running as root.
+      - ${DOCKER_SOCKET_GID:-999}
+    volumes:
+      # Application data and CLI credentials persist on the configured host
+      # path, rather than in a Docker-managed volume.
+      - type: bind
+        source: ${CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH}
+        target: /home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}
+      # Docker cases are sibling containers on the host daemon. Their workspace
+      # must be visible to Codeman at the same absolute path used by that daemon.
+      - type: bind
+        source: ${CODEMAN_CASES_PATH}
+        target: ${CODEMAN_CASES_PATH}
+      # Codeman uses the host daemon to create isolated Docker cases. This is
+      # Docker-outside-of-Docker, not Docker-in-Docker.
+      - type: bind
+        source: ${DOCKER_SOCKET}
+        target: /var/run/docker.sock
+    extra_hosts:
+      - "host.docker.internal:host-gateway"
+    security_opt:
+      - no-new-privileges:true
+    cap_drop:
+      - ALL
+    healthcheck:
+      test:
+        - CMD-SHELL
+        - >-
+          node -e "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:${CODEMAN_PORT}/api/status').then((response) => process.exit(response.status < 500 ? 0 : 1)).catch(() => process.exit(1))"
+      interval: 30s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3
+      start_period: 30s
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
+
+# Build the application from the checkout supplied as the Docker build context.
+# No published Codeman application image is required.
+FROM node:22-bookworm-slim AS build
+
+RUN apt-get update \
+ && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 make g++ \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+WORKDIR /opt/codeman
+
+COPY . .
+
+RUN npm ci \
+ && npm run build \
+ && npm prune --omit=dev --ignore-scripts \
+ && npm cache clean --force
+
+# The Docker CLI talks to the host daemon through the socket mounted by
+# docker/docker-compose.yaml. It does not run a Docker daemon in this container.
+FROM node:22-bookworm-slim
+
+ARG CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER=opencode
+ARG PUID=1000
+ARG PGID=1000
+
+RUN apt-get update \
+ && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+      ca-certificates \
+      curl \
+      git \
+      openssh-client \
+      procps \
+      ripgrep \
+      tmux \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# The Docker CLI, taken from the official image rather than Debian's `docker.io`.
+# That package is the full ENGINE: with --no-install-recommends it still pulls 15
+# packages including containerd, runc, dmsetup and iptables, none of which a
+# client that only talks to a mounted socket can use. Measured on top of this
+# base image: `docker.io` costs 266 MB and ships Docker 20.10.24 (2023), while
+# these two files cost 108 MB and ship the current CLI (493 MB vs 335 MB total).
+#
+# The binaries are STATIC Go builds, so they run on this glibc image even though
+# the image they come from is Alpine (verified: `docker --version`, `docker ps`
+# and `docker build` all work here against a mounted host socket).
+#
+# buildx is copied on purpose. `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` shells out to
+# `docker build` — Codeman auto-builds the agent image on the first Docker case —
+# and without the plugin that silently falls back to the CLASSIC builder, which
+# Docker has deprecated and will eventually drop. `docker-compose` is NOT copied:
+# Codeman never shells out to it.
+COPY --from=docker:29-cli /usr/local/bin/docker /usr/local/bin/docker
+COPY --from=docker:29-cli \
+     /usr/local/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/docker-buildx \
+     /usr/local/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/docker-buildx
+
+# Keep credentials out of the image. Users authenticate these CLIs at runtime
+# through Codeman sessions, and the configured host bind mount retains state.
+RUN npm install --global \
+      @anthropic-ai/claude-code \
+      @google/gemini-cli \
+      @openai/codex \
+      opencode-ai \
+ && npm cache clean --force
+
+# Keep the web server and every local Codeman session unprivileged. PUID and
+# PGID match the host-owned application-data directory mounted by Compose. The
+# requested GID may not exist in the base image, and a host UID such as 1000 may
+# already belong to the baked `node` account, so handle both cases explicitly.
+RUN set -eux; \
+    case "${PUID}" in ''|*[!0-9]*) echo "PUID must be numeric" >&2; exit 1;; esac; \
+    case "${PGID}" in ''|*[!0-9]*) echo "PGID must be numeric" >&2; exit 1;; esac; \
+    if [ "${PUID}" -eq 0 ]; then \
+      echo "PUID must identify an unprivileged account, not root" >&2; \
+      exit 1; \
+    fi; \
+    if ! getent group "${PGID}" >/dev/null; then \
+      groupadd --gid "${PGID}" codeman-runtime; \
+    fi; \
+    existing_user="$(getent passwd "${PUID}" | cut -d: -f1 || true)"; \
+    if [ -n "${existing_user}" ]; then \
+      usermod \
+        --login "${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}" \
+        --gid "${PGID}" \
+        --home "/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}" \
+        --move-home \
+        --shell /bin/bash \
+        "${existing_user}"; \
+    else \
+      useradd \
+        --uid "${PUID}" \
+        --gid "${PGID}" \
+        --create-home \
+        --home-dir "/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}" \
+        --shell /bin/bash \
+        "${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}"; \
+    fi
+
+WORKDIR /opt/codeman
+
+COPY --from=build /opt/codeman /opt/codeman
+
+ENV CODEMAN_PORT=3000 \
+    HOME=/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER} \
+    NODE_ENV=production
+
+EXPOSE 3000
+
+USER ${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}
+
+CMD ["node", "dist/index.js", "web"]
@@ -204,11 +204,16 @@ turn.
 The reliable sequence is: poll `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id` until `.data.pid` is
 non-null, then `wait-output` for the composer's own marker (`bypass`, the status
 bar of a CLI spawned in bypass mode) with a short timeout, handling the trust
-dialog only as the bounded fallback (`trust` matched → send `\r` → wait for
-`bypass` again). Do not probe `trust` first and Enter blindly: the dialog text
-stays in the terminal buffer for the life of the session, so a `trust` probe with
-`from=buffer` keeps matching on every later run and the Enter lands in a ready
-composer. A worked version is in
+dialog only as the bounded fallback.
+
+⚠️ **The fallback is not a bare `\r`.** Claude Code 2.1.252 unnumbered the dialog's
+options, reversed them and highlights `No, exit`, so an Enter sent blind quits the
+CLI and the pane dies seconds after the spawn. Read the `❯` marker off the current
+frame (`GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/terminal?full=1`), send `ESC [ B` while it is on
+`No, exit`, re-read, and confirm only once it is on `Yes, I trust this folder`.
+Reading the current frame is also what keeps this correct on later runs: the dialog
+text stays in the terminal buffer for the life of the session, so a `trust` probe
+with `from=buffer` keeps matching long after the dialog is gone. A worked version is in
 [`extending-codeman.md`](extending-codeman.md#seam-3-http-api-and-cli).

 ### `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/wait`
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Docker Compose deployment
+
+This configuration builds the Codeman application image locally from this checkout. It does not download or depend on a pre-built Codeman image.
+
+For the Compose configuration, environment settings, storage migration, and macvlan networking examples, see the [Docker deployment guide](../docker/README.md).
+
+The image includes Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, and OpenCode. Authenticate a CLI from its Codeman session; credentials are never baked into the image.
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- Docker Engine or Docker Desktop with Docker Compose v2
+- A reachable Docker daemon
+
+The application container mounts the Docker daemon socket so Codeman can create and manage its isolated Docker cases. Treat anyone who can administer this Compose project as having Docker-host-equivalent access.
+
+## Start
+
+Copy the environment template, set a strong password, and confirm `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH`. The example maps `/mnt/user/appdata/Coding/codeman` on the host to `/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}` in the container, preserving Codeman state and CLI credentials outside Docker-managed volumes.
+
+```sh
+cp docker/.env.example docker/.env
+```
+
+On PowerShell, use the following command instead.
+
+```powershell
+Copy-Item docker/.env.example docker/.env
+```
+
+On Linux, run the stack with the start script. It determines `PUID` and `PGID` from the owner of `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH`, and `DOCKER_SOCKET_GID` from the configured Docker socket, before invoking Compose. A root-owned application-data directory is rejected so the runtime account cannot become UID 0.
+
+```sh
+bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh
+```
+
+On other platforms, run Compose directly. `PUID` and `PGID` default to `1000:1000`; set them in `docker/.env` when the application-data directory has a different owner.
+
+```sh
+docker compose --env-file docker/.env -f docker/docker-compose.yaml up --build -d
+```
+
+Open `http://localhost:3000` and sign in with the username and password from `docker/.env`.
+
+## Operations
+
+The local image is tagged `codeman:local` by default. Change `CODEMAN_IMAGE` in `docker/.env` if a different local tag suits your environment.
+
+```sh
+docker compose --env-file docker/.env -f docker/docker-compose.yaml logs -f codeman
+bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh
+docker compose --env-file docker/.env -f docker/docker-compose.yaml down
+```
+
+`CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH` holds Codeman state and survives container recreation. Remove that host directory only when deliberately resetting the installation.
+
+`CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` must be an absolute path on the Docker host. Compose mounts it at the same path inside Codeman, so the host daemon can bind the managed workspace into isolated Docker cases. Do not set it to `/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}/codeman-cases`.
+
+Compose passes `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH` into Codeman as `CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME`. Codeman uses that value to translate generated Docker seed, credential and hook-secret bind sources from the container's home path into paths visible to the host Docker daemon.
+
+If `docker info` reports `SwapLimit=false`, set `CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=1`. Isolated cases retain their configured memory limit. Codeman omits the unsupported swap-limit option and filters only the daemon's exact swap-capability warning while retaining every other Docker create error.
+
+If that directory was created by an earlier root-running image, change its ownership to the configured `PUID:PGID` before starting this version. This preserves existing CLI credentials and session state while allowing the unprivileged runtime account to use them.
+
+## Docker cases
+
+The default socket path is `/var/run/docker.sock`, which works with a standard Linux Docker Engine. The Bash start script detects its numeric group ID. When running Compose directly, set `DOCKER_SOCKET_GID`, for example using `stat -c '%g' /var/run/docker.sock`, so the unprivileged `CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER` account can create Docker cases. Docker Desktop users should set `DOCKER_SOCKET` in `docker/.env` only when their Docker installation exposes a different compatible socket path.
+
+Codeman Docker cases are sibling containers on the host daemon, not children of the application container. The Compose configuration handles their workspace bind mount through `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH`; the `/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}` application-data mapping is for Codeman state and ordinary in-container sessions, not sibling-case workspaces.
@@ -228,6 +228,14 @@ window: the wait resolves on `idle` in a couple of seconds with `timedOut: false
 indistinguishable from a finished turn. Wait for the pid, then wait for the
 composer, answering the dialog only as the bounded fallback.

+⚠️ **Answering it is not "press Enter".** Claude Code 2.1.252 dropped the options'
+numbers, reversed them, and highlights `No, exit` by default, so a blind `\r` quits
+the CLI and the pane is dead seconds after the spawn. Read the `❯` marker off the
+rendered pane (`GET .../terminal?full=1`), send `ESC [ B` while it sits on `No, exit`,
+re-read, and confirm only once the marker is on `Yes, I trust this folder`. Codeman's
+own auto-accept (`trustDialogNextKey()` in `src/session-trust-dialog.ts`) does exactly
+this, inside a 90 s startup window and a 6-keystroke cap.
+
 A worked orchestration: start a worker, get it ready, prompt it, wait, clean up.

 ```bash
@@ -244,24 +252,36 @@ SID=$("${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/quick-start" \
 [ -n "$SID" ] && [ "$SID" != null ] || { echo "quick-start failed"; exit 1; }

 # 2. READINESS: composer marker first, trust dialog only as the bounded fallback.
-#    Skip this and step 3 reports a turn that never ran. Do NOT probe trust first
-#    and Enter blindly: the dialog text stays in the buffer for the life of the
-#    session, so on every later run that probe matches stale text and the Enter
-#    lands in a ready composer. Match single tokens only: TUI text can arrive
-#    without its spaces. Stage 1 is short on purpose (an already-trusted case
-#    matches in <1 s; a first-run case can never pass it and pays it in full).
+#    Skip this and step 3 reports a turn that never ran. Match single tokens only:
+#    TUI text can arrive without its spaces. Stage 1 is short on purpose (an
+#    already-trusted case matches in <1 s; a first-run case can never pass it and
+#    pays it in full).
+#    ⚠️ NEVER answer the dialog with a bare \r. Its highlighted option is `No, exit`
+#    (claude-cli 2.1.252), so a blind Enter quits the CLI; and the dialog text stays
+#    in the buffer for the life of the session, so a `from=buffer` probe for `trust`
+#    keeps matching long after it is gone. Read the CURRENT pane instead and steer.
 until [ "$("${CURL[@]}" "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID" | jq '.data.pid')" != null ]
 do sleep 1; done
 R=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
      --data-urlencode 'match=bypass' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' \
      --data-urlencode 'timeout=5000')           # composer's status bar = ready
 if ! jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$R" >/dev/null; then
-  T=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
-        --data-urlencode 'match=trust' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' \
-        --data-urlencode 'timeout=2000')
-  jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$T" >/dev/null && \
+  ESC=$(printf '\033')   # \x1b is GNU-sed only; this form also works on macOS
+  for _ in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do
+    # Which option the ❯ marker sits on, read off the CURRENT frame.
+    K=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/terminal" --data-urlencode 'full=1' \
+        | jq -r '.data.terminalBuffer // empty' \
+        | sed -e "s/$ESC\[[0-9;?]*[a-zA-Z]//g" -e "s/$ESC[()][AB0]//g" | tr -d ' \t' \
+        | grep -i '❯[0-9.]*\(yes,itrustthisfolder\|no,exit\)' | tail -1 \
+        | sed -e 's/.*[Yy]es,.*/confirm/' -e 's/.*[Nn]o,.*/move/')
+    [ -n "$K" ] || break                      # no dialog on screen: nothing to answer
+    [ "$K" = confirm ] && IN="\r" || IN="$ESC[B"
    "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/input" \
-      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"input":"\r","useMux":true}' >/dev/null
+      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+      -d "$(jq -nc --arg i "$IN" '{input:$i,useMux:true}')" >/dev/null
+    [ "$K" = confirm ] && break
+    sleep 1                                   # re-read: confirm the arrow landed
+  done
  "${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
    --data-urlencode 'match=bypass' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' \
    --data-urlencode 'timeout=45000' >/dev/null
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
  "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.24.1",
+  "version": "1.24.4",
  "lockfileVersion": 3,
  "requires": true,
  "packages": {
    "": {
      "name": "aicodeman",
-      "version": "1.24.1",
+      "version": "1.24.4",
      "hasInstallScript": true,
      "license": "MIT",
      "workspaces": [
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
  "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.24.1",
+  "version": "1.24.4",
  "description": "Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence",
  "type": "module",
  "main": "dist/index.js",
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ later call opens with, and your first REAL call performs them anyway:

 ```bash
 . "${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-$HOME/.cache}/codeman-agent-$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID.sh" 2>/dev/null
-[ "${CODEMAN_PREAMBLE:-}" = 1.20.0 ] || { echo "preamble missing or stale; run the full §0 block"; exit 1; }
+[ "${CODEMAN_PREAMBLE:-}" = 1.21.0 ] || { echo "preamble missing or stale; run the full §0 block"; exit 1; }
 ```

 ⚠️ **Never spend a Bash call on this check alone.** §1's block opens with this same
@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ PRE="${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-$HOME/.cache}/codeman-agent-$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID.sh"
 mkdir -p "$(dirname "$PRE")"
 # Rewrite unless the file already ends with THIS version's stamp, so a stale or a
 # half-written file self-heals here instead of costing you a round trip to rm it.
-grep -qs '^CODEMAN_PREAMBLE=1.20.0$' "$PRE" || (umask 077; cat > "$PRE" <<'PREAMBLE'
-# ---- Codeman agent preamble 1.20.0 (seeded by Codeman at session spawn; the SKILL.md §0 bootstrap rewrites it when missing or stale) ----
+grep -qs '^CODEMAN_PREAMBLE=1.21.0$' "$PRE" || (umask 077; cat > "$PRE" <<'PREAMBLE'
+# ---- Codeman agent preamble 1.21.0 (seeded by Codeman at session spawn; the SKILL.md §0 bootstrap rewrites it when missing or stale) ----
 API="${CODEMAN_API_URL:?CODEMAN_API_URL not set; refusing to guess}"
 SELF="${CODEMAN_SESSION_ID:?CODEMAN_SESSION_ID not set}"
 # Credentials, cheapest first. Your session has usually INHERITED the server's
@@ -127,6 +127,43 @@ _dsh_up() {        # <sid> <timeoutMs> -> "true"/"false". The DeepSeek Harness T
    --data-urlencode "match=${DSH_READY_MARK:-❯}" --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' \
    --data-urlencode "timeout=$2" | jq -r '.data.wait.matched // false'
 }
+# ---- the workspace-trust dialog: READ the screen, never press Enter blind ----
+# Claude Code 2.1.252 dropped the option numbers, REVERSED them, and highlights
+# "No, exit" by default:
+#     Security guide
+#   ❯ No, exit
+#     Yes, I trust this folder
+#   Enter to confirm . Esc to cancel
+# so the bare \r that answered the old layout now answers *exit* and the pane is
+# dead (`status 1`) seconds after the spawn -- measured on a live 2.1.252 case.
+# These two read the rendered pane and steer onto the trust option instead.
+_trust_key() {     # <sid> -> "confirm" | "move" | "" (nothing safe to press)
+  # full=1 returns the RENDERED pane; a claude pane keeps no tmux history, so that
+  # is the current frame rather than every repaint since launch. tail -1 anyway,
+  # because the freshest marked row is the only one still true.
+  "${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$1/terminal" --data-urlencode 'full=1' \
+    | jq -r '.data.terminalBuffer // empty' \
+    | sed -e "s/$(printf '\033')\[[0-9;?]*[a-zA-Z]//g" -e "s/$(printf '\033')[()][AB0]//g" \
+    | tr -d ' \t' | grep -i '❯[0-9.]*\(yes,itrustthisfolder\|no,exit\)' | tail -1 \
+    | sed -e 's/.*[Yy]es,.*/confirm/' -e 's/.*[Nn]o,.*/move/'
+}
+_accept_trust() {  # <sid> -> 0 once it has answered the dialog, 1 if it could not
+  local sid="$1" k i=1
+  while [ "$i" -le 6 ]; do
+    k=$(_trust_key "$sid")
+    [ -n "$k" ] || return 1   # no dialog on screen, or a layout this cannot read
+    # A SEPARATE clientId for these keys. seq is monotonic per clientId, so
+    # spending prompt numbers here would make the next sendwait -- whose default
+    # seq is the epoch second -- look like a stale duplicate and vanish silently.
+    "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$sid/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+      -d "$(jq -nc --arg k "$([ "$k" = confirm ] && printf '\r' || printf '\033[B')" \
+              --arg c "$CID-trust-$sid" --argjson s "$i" \
+              '{input:$k,useMux:true,clientId:$c,seq:$s}')" >/dev/null
+    [ "$k" = confirm ] && return 0
+    sleep 1; i=$((i+1))   # re-read: the arrow is CONFIRMED before Enter goes out
+  done
+  return 1
+}
 # spawn_worker <caseName> [mode] -> session id on stdout, diagnostics on stderr.
 # quick-start AND readiness in one call, with a strict contract: NON-EMPTY stdout means
 # a READY worker whose end-of-turn signal can be trusted -- a claude worker in a
@@ -177,19 +214,16 @@ spawn_worker() {
  grep -qs '/api/hook-event' "$cp/.claude/settings.local.json" || {
    echo "case '$name' resolved to '$cp', which has no Codeman hooks (workspaceHooksEnabled off, remote, or an older server?): turn the setting on, or work §5.1+§5.5 by hand with markers" >&2
    delete_session "$sid" >/dev/null; return 1; }
-  # Short composer wait FIRST, then the trust-dialog probe: a case still showing the
-  # dialog can never pass the composer wait, so probing early keeps a cold case from
+  # Short composer wait FIRST, then the trust dialog: a case still showing the
+  # dialog can never pass the composer wait, so acting early keeps a cold case from
  # paying the whole long wait before the fallback even runs (§5.2). A warm case
-  # matches in under a second and never reaches the probe.
+  # matches in under a second and never reaches it, and _accept_trust returns in a
+  # blink when there is no dialog, so this costs nothing in the ordinary slow case.
  r=$(_composer_up "$sid" 5000)
  if [ "$r" != true ]; then
-    if "${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$sid/wait-output" \
-         --data-urlencode 'match=trust' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=2000' \
-       | jq -e '.data.wait.matched' >/dev/null; then
-      # Codeman's own auto-accept gives up after 90 s / 3 tries; this is that bounded fallback.
-      "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$sid/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-        -d "$(jq -nc --arg c "$CID-$sid" '{input:"\r",useMux:true,clientId:$c,seq:1}')" >/dev/null
-    fi
+    # Codeman answers this dialog itself and normally wins the race; this is the
+    # bounded fallback for when its 90 s window / 6-keystroke cap has run out.
+    _accept_trust "$sid"
    r=$(_composer_up "$sid" 45000)
  fi
  [ "$r" = true ] || { echo "worker $sid never drew a composer; deleted it. Retry by hand via the §5.2 ladder (its billed stage-4 probe included)" >&2
@@ -288,10 +322,10 @@ last_text() {
 # The stamp is the LAST line on purpose (a truncated write leaves it unset) and is kept
 # bare on purpose: the write condition above anchors on it with $, so an inline comment
 # here would fail that match and rewrite this file on every single bootstrap.
-CODEMAN_PREAMBLE=1.20.0
+CODEMAN_PREAMBLE=1.21.0
 PREAMBLE
 )
-. "$PRE"; [ "${CODEMAN_PREAMBLE:-}" = 1.20.0 ] || { echo "preamble at $PRE is stale or truncated: rm it and re-run this block"; exit 1; }
+. "$PRE"; [ "${CODEMAN_PREAMBLE:-}" = 1.21.0 ] || { echo "preamble at $PRE is stale or truncated: rm it and re-run this block"; exit 1; }
 ```

 Every later Bash call that touches the API starts with the same two loader lines from
@@ -342,7 +376,7 @@ and no per-call body to hand-build.

 ```bash
 . "${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-$HOME/.cache}/codeman-agent-$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID.sh" 2>/dev/null   # §0 loader
-[ "${CODEMAN_PREAMBLE:-}" = 1.20.0 ] || { echo "preamble missing or stale; run the full §0 block"; exit 1; }
+[ "${CODEMAN_PREAMBLE:-}" = 1.21.0 ] || { echo "preamble missing or stale; run the full §0 block"; exit 1; }
 N=(alpha beta)                    # INVENT one fresh case name per worker; never list cases first
                                  # (a name may carry a mode: `beta:deepseek`, see below)
 T=('reply with one line: the absolute path of your working directory'
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# ---- Codeman agent preamble 1.20.0 (seeded by Codeman at session spawn; the SKILL.md §0 bootstrap rewrites it when missing or stale) ----
+# ---- Codeman agent preamble 1.21.0 (seeded by Codeman at session spawn; the SKILL.md §0 bootstrap rewrites it when missing or stale) ----
 API="${CODEMAN_API_URL:?CODEMAN_API_URL not set; refusing to guess}"
 SELF="${CODEMAN_SESSION_ID:?CODEMAN_SESSION_ID not set}"
 # Credentials, cheapest first. Your session has usually INHERITED the server's
@@ -49,6 +49,43 @@ _dsh_up() {        # <sid> <timeoutMs> -> "true"/"false". The DeepSeek Harness T
    --data-urlencode "match=${DSH_READY_MARK:-❯}" --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' \
    --data-urlencode "timeout=$2" | jq -r '.data.wait.matched // false'
 }
+# ---- the workspace-trust dialog: READ the screen, never press Enter blind ----
+# Claude Code 2.1.252 dropped the option numbers, REVERSED them, and highlights
+# "No, exit" by default:
+#     Security guide
+#   ❯ No, exit
+#     Yes, I trust this folder
+#   Enter to confirm . Esc to cancel
+# so the bare \r that answered the old layout now answers *exit* and the pane is
+# dead (`status 1`) seconds after the spawn -- measured on a live 2.1.252 case.
+# These two read the rendered pane and steer onto the trust option instead.
+_trust_key() {     # <sid> -> "confirm" | "move" | "" (nothing safe to press)
+  # full=1 returns the RENDERED pane; a claude pane keeps no tmux history, so that
+  # is the current frame rather than every repaint since launch. tail -1 anyway,
+  # because the freshest marked row is the only one still true.
+  "${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$1/terminal" --data-urlencode 'full=1' \
+    | jq -r '.data.terminalBuffer // empty' \
+    | sed -e "s/$(printf '\033')\[[0-9;?]*[a-zA-Z]//g" -e "s/$(printf '\033')[()][AB0]//g" \
+    | tr -d ' \t' | grep -i '❯[0-9.]*\(yes,itrustthisfolder\|no,exit\)' | tail -1 \
+    | sed -e 's/.*[Yy]es,.*/confirm/' -e 's/.*[Nn]o,.*/move/'
+}
+_accept_trust() {  # <sid> -> 0 once it has answered the dialog, 1 if it could not
+  local sid="$1" k i=1
+  while [ "$i" -le 6 ]; do
+    k=$(_trust_key "$sid")
+    [ -n "$k" ] || return 1   # no dialog on screen, or a layout this cannot read
+    # A SEPARATE clientId for these keys. seq is monotonic per clientId, so
+    # spending prompt numbers here would make the next sendwait -- whose default
+    # seq is the epoch second -- look like a stale duplicate and vanish silently.
+    "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$sid/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+      -d "$(jq -nc --arg k "$([ "$k" = confirm ] && printf '\r' || printf '\033[B')" \
+              --arg c "$CID-trust-$sid" --argjson s "$i" \
+              '{input:$k,useMux:true,clientId:$c,seq:$s}')" >/dev/null
+    [ "$k" = confirm ] && return 0
+    sleep 1; i=$((i+1))   # re-read: the arrow is CONFIRMED before Enter goes out
+  done
+  return 1
+}
 # spawn_worker <caseName> [mode] -> session id on stdout, diagnostics on stderr.
 # quick-start AND readiness in one call, with a strict contract: NON-EMPTY stdout means
 # a READY worker whose end-of-turn signal can be trusted -- a claude worker in a
@@ -99,19 +136,16 @@ spawn_worker() {
  grep -qs '/api/hook-event' "$cp/.claude/settings.local.json" || {
    echo "case '$name' resolved to '$cp', which has no Codeman hooks (workspaceHooksEnabled off, remote, or an older server?): turn the setting on, or work §5.1+§5.5 by hand with markers" >&2
    delete_session "$sid" >/dev/null; return 1; }
-  # Short composer wait FIRST, then the trust-dialog probe: a case still showing the
-  # dialog can never pass the composer wait, so probing early keeps a cold case from
+  # Short composer wait FIRST, then the trust dialog: a case still showing the
+  # dialog can never pass the composer wait, so acting early keeps a cold case from
  # paying the whole long wait before the fallback even runs (§5.2). A warm case
-  # matches in under a second and never reaches the probe.
+  # matches in under a second and never reaches it, and _accept_trust returns in a
+  # blink when there is no dialog, so this costs nothing in the ordinary slow case.
  r=$(_composer_up "$sid" 5000)
  if [ "$r" != true ]; then
-    if "${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$sid/wait-output" \
-         --data-urlencode 'match=trust' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=2000' \
-       | jq -e '.data.wait.matched' >/dev/null; then
-      # Codeman's own auto-accept gives up after 90 s / 3 tries; this is that bounded fallback.
-      "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$sid/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-        -d "$(jq -nc --arg c "$CID-$sid" '{input:"\r",useMux:true,clientId:$c,seq:1}')" >/dev/null
-    fi
+    # Codeman answers this dialog itself and normally wins the race; this is the
+    # bounded fallback for when its 90 s window / 6-keystroke cap has run out.
+    _accept_trust "$sid"
    r=$(_composer_up "$sid" 45000)
  fi
  [ "$r" = true ] || { echo "worker $sid never drew a composer; deleted it. Retry by hand via the §5.2 ladder (its billed stage-4 probe included)" >&2
@@ -210,4 +244,4 @@ last_text() {
 # The stamp is the LAST line on purpose (a truncated write leaves it unset) and is kept
 # bare on purpose: the write condition above anchors on it with $, so an inline comment
 # here would fail that match and rewrite this file on every single bootstrap.
-CODEMAN_PREAMBLE=1.20.0
+CODEMAN_PREAMBLE=1.21.0
@@ -800,7 +800,8 @@ for environment and setup problems.
 | wait routes 404 on a valid session id | read the `.error` text: a `Route ...` prefix means the server predates the wait endpoints (< 1.13.0; a dev build can serve them while reporting an older version, so probe, never version-compare), poll `terminal?tail=` and say so. `Session ... not found` means your id is wrong, not the server |
 | wait on `stop` never resolves | a mode with no hook signals, or hooks not reaching the server (Docker/remote), or a case created by Codeman < 1.13.0 against an `--https` install (its hook curls lacked `-k` and TLS-failed silently; a 1.13.0+ server rewrites them the next time a session starts in that case). Use markers or `idle,exit` |
 | wait on `stop` never resolves, on a **dsh** worker whose pane clearly finished | that profile does not implement the harness's supervisor contract, which Codeman cannot detect at request time (an unrecognized profile is treated as launchable on purpose). The wait is accepted and then times out. Drive that worker with markers, or switch to a profile that reports — `@deepseek-harness-tui/dsh-tui` does |
-| new claude worker ignores its first prompt | it was showing the first-run trust dialog and Codeman's auto-accept did not fire (it is bounded by a 90 s window and an attempt cap); use the readiness recipe in SKILL.md, wait for `shift+tab` first, accept the dialog only as the bounded fallback |
+| new claude worker ignores its first prompt | it was showing the first-run trust dialog and Codeman's auto-accept did not fire (it is bounded by a 90 s window and a keystroke cap); use the readiness recipe in SKILL.md, wait for `shift+tab` first, answer the dialog only as the bounded fallback |
+| a brand-new claude worker's pane is DEAD (`status 1`) seconds after the spawn | something pressed Enter at the first-run trust dialog. Since claude-cli 2.1.252 its options are unnumbered, reversed, and the highlighted default is `No, exit`, so a blind `\r` — an up-front Enter, or a task prompt typed into the dialog — quits the CLI. Answer it by reading the `❯` marker off `terminal?full=1` and arrowing onto `Yes, I trust this folder` first: `_accept_trust` in the §0 preamble |
 | readiness burns its whole budget, then the worker answers fine anyway | you matched `bypass`, which is the statusline of ONE permission mode. Codeman spawns `--dangerously-skip-permissions` by default, but the server's `claudeMode` setting also has `auto` (`auto mode on`), `allowedTools` and `normal` (both `don't ask on`), and the effective per-session value is not exposed on `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id`. Match **`shift+tab`** instead: every mode's status bar ends `(shift+tab to cycle)` (measured per mode against claude-cli 2.1.226). Expect `blocked` signals mid-turn on the non-default modes |
 | ANSI escapes survive the strip pipeline | `sed -e 's/\x1b…'` on macOS: `\x1b` is GNU-only, BSD sed matches nothing and strips nothing. Use the `ESC=$(printf '\033')` form above |
 | `wait-output` times out although the pane shows the text | multi-word match against a TUI screen; the stream has no spaces there, match one token |
@@ -69,9 +69,14 @@ SEQ=1               # $CID is the fixed literal from the preamble; never rebuild
 #    plus a two-marker screen match in session-trust-dialog.ts), not the output stream.
 #    It still misses two ways, and both leave the dialog up until someone answers it:
 #    it only scans in the first 90 s after the pane started (TRUST_DIALOG_WINDOW_MS),
-#    and it gives up after 3 Enter presses (TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS). So: composer
-#    marker first, dialog only as the bounded fallback (a blind Enter up front would
-#    land in an already-ready composer).
+#    and it gives up after 6 keystrokes (TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS). So: composer
+#    marker first, dialog only as the bounded fallback.
+#    ⚠️ The dialog is NOT answered with Enter. Since claude-cli 2.1.252 the options
+#    lost their numbers, swapped places, and the highlighted one is `No, exit`, so a
+#    blind \r quits the CLI and the pane is dead seconds after the spawn (measured).
+#    _accept_trust (§0 preamble) reads the ❯ marker off the rendered pane, arrows onto
+#    `Yes, I trust this folder`, re-reads to confirm the move landed, and only then
+#    presses Enter.
 #    Stage 1 is SHORT on purpose: an already-trusted case matches in <1 s, while a
 #    virgin case can never pass it (the dialog is up) and always pays it in full,
 #    the long budget belongs to stage 3, after the dialog is answered.
@@ -92,13 +97,8 @@ done
 R=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
    --data-urlencode 'match=shift+tab' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=5000')
 if ! jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$R" >/dev/null; then
-  T=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
-      --data-urlencode 'match=trust' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=2000')
-  if jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$T" >/dev/null; then
-    "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-      -d '{"input":"\r","useMux":true,"clientId":"'"$CID"'","seq":'$SEQ'}' >/dev/null
-    SEQ=$((SEQ+1))
-  fi
+  _accept_trust "$SID"   # reads the marker and steers; never a blind \r. Own clientId,
+                         # so it spends none of $SEQ's numbers.
  R=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
      --data-urlencode 'match=shift+tab' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=45000')
 fi
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ if ! jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$R" >/dev/null; then
  # stage 4, mode-agnostic and bounded: answering a trivial prompt IS readiness.
  # COSTS THE WORKER ONE BILLED TURN, so it only runs when the fast marker missed.
  # Split token (the typed line echoes into the stream) and unique per call. Must stay
-  # AFTER the dialog fallback: free text plus \r into a trust dialog still up answers
-  # it blind, the same footgun as an up-front Enter.
+  # AFTER the dialog fallback: the select widget swallows the text and the \r answers
+  # whatever is highlighted, which on a live dialog is `No, exit`.
  TOK="${RANDOM}_$$"
  "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"input":"reply with the word READY immediately followed by _'"$TOK"' and nothing else\r","useMux":true,"clientId":"'"$CID"'","seq":'$SEQ'}' >/dev/null
@@ -527,9 +527,10 @@ done
  circuit breaker, which exists to stop a worker that crashes on every start from being
  restarted in a loop; clearing it unasked re-arms that loop.
 - Then run **Flow 1's readiness stages 1-3** on each SID. A path claude has never been
-  run in shows the trust dialog, and typing your task into a dialog answers it blind and
-  loses the task. Stages 1-3 cost no turn; stage 4, if it fires, costs that worker one
-  billed turn.
+  run in shows the trust dialog, and typing your task into it does not just lose the
+  task: the select widget swallows the text and the trailing `\r` answers the
+  highlighted option, which since claude-cli 2.1.252 is `No, exit`. Stages 1-3 cost no
+  turn; stage 4, if it fires, costs that worker one billed turn.

 ### 4. Hand out the tasks: markers, not send-and-wait

@@ -171,10 +171,27 @@ itself, reliably enough that stage 1 usually just works: `_maybeAcceptTrustDialo
 reads the **rendered pane** via `capturePaneText()` rather than the arriving chunk
 (the per-chunk `includes()` version could never match, because tmux repaints the row
 with cursor-forward escapes in place of spaces, and it is documented in-source as the
-historical bug). The remaining miss modes are structural: the auto-accept only runs
-inside a 90 s window after interactive start and gives up after 3 attempts. So keep
-the dialog handling as a bounded fallback, and never send a blind Enter up front (if
-auto-accept already fired, it lands in the composer).
+historical bug).
+
+⚠️ **The answer is no longer "press Enter".** Claude Code 2.1.252 dropped the option
+numbers, reversed the two options, and highlights the one that quits:
+
+```
+  ❯ No, exit
+    Yes, I trust this folder
+  Enter to confirm · Esc to cancel
+```
+
+so a blind `\r` answers *exit*: the pane is dead (`Pane is dead (status 1)`) about six
+seconds after the spawn, measured on a fresh case. Read the marker off the rendered
+pane (`GET .../terminal?full=1`), send `ESC [ B` while it sits on `No, exit`, re-read,
+and press Enter only once the marker is on the trust option. `_accept_trust` in the
+§0 preamble is exactly that, and `trustDialogNextKey()` is the server-side twin.
+
+The remaining miss modes are structural: the auto-accept only runs inside a 90 s window
+after interactive start and gives up after 6 keystrokes. So keep the dialog handling as
+a bounded fallback, and never send a blind Enter up front — landing in an already-ready
+composer only wastes a turn, landing in this dialog ends the worker.

 Stage 1 is short on purpose: an already-trusted case matches `shift+tab` in under a
 second, while a case still showing the dialog cannot pass stage 1 at all and always
@@ -232,14 +249,11 @@ SEQ=1   # $CID came from the §0 preamble; do NOT rebuild it from $$
 R=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
    --data-urlencode 'match=shift+tab' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=5000')
 if ! jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$R" >/dev/null; then
-  # composer never appeared, so the trust dialog is probably still up; accept it once
-  T=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
-      --data-urlencode 'match=trust' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=2000')
-  if jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$T" >/dev/null; then
-    "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-      -d '{"input":"\r","useMux":true,"clientId":"'"$CID"'","seq":'$SEQ'}' >/dev/null
-    SEQ=$((SEQ+1))
-  fi
+  # Composer never appeared, so the trust dialog is probably still up. NEVER a blind
+  # Enter here: the highlighted option is "No, exit". _accept_trust (§0 preamble) reads
+  # the marker off the pane, arrows onto the trust option, re-reads, then confirms. It
+  # carries its OWN clientId, so it spends none of $SEQ's numbers.
+  _accept_trust "$SID"
  R=$("${CURL[@]}" -G "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/wait-output" \
      --data-urlencode 'match=shift+tab' --data-urlencode 'from=buffer' --data-urlencode 'timeout=45000')
 fi
@@ -248,8 +262,10 @@ if ! jq -e '.data.wait.matched' <<<"$R" >/dev/null; then
  # of a broken worker, and answering is proof that it works. Split the token (your
  # keystrokes echo into the stream) and keep it unique per call. This costs the worker
  # one billed turn, so it runs only after the fast path missed. It must stay AFTER
-  # stage 2, which is the only thing that clears the trust dialog: free text plus \r
-  # into a dialog still up answers it blind, the same footgun as the up-front Enter.
+  # stage 2, which is the only thing that clears the trust dialog: the typed text is
+  # swallowed by the select widget and the \r then answers whatever is highlighted,
+  # which since 2.1.252 is "No, exit" -- the same footgun as the up-front Enter, except
+  # that it kills the worker rather than wasting a turn.
  TOK="${RANDOM}_$$"
  "${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/input" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"input":"reply with the word READY immediately followed by _'"$TOK"' and nothing else\r","useMux":true,"clientId":"'"$CID"'","seq":'$SEQ'}' >/dev/null
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { isAbsolute, join } from 'node:path';
 import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { dataPath } from './config/instance.js';
+import { casePath } from './config/cases-dir.js';
 import { installAgentSkillInto, removeAgentSkillFrom, type AgentSkillApplyResult } from './hooks-config.js';
 import { getSessionManager } from './session-manager.js';
 import { getTaskQueue } from './task-queue.js';
@@ -146,7 +147,9 @@ export function resolveCliCasePath(name: string): string {
  } catch {
    // no registry yet, or unreadable/invalid JSON: fall through to the cases dir
  }
-  return join(homedir(), 'codeman-cases', name);
+  // Same resolver the server uses, so CODEMAN_CASES_PATH (Docker Compose) moves
+  // the CLI's idea of a case with it instead of leaving it on the home default.
+  return casePath(name);
 }

 /**
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Where case (project) folders live.
+ *
+ * Deliberately NOT instance-scoped, unlike `dataPath()`: `~/codeman-cases` is
+ * shared by every Codeman on the machine, the same way `~/codeman-users/<u>`
+ * user spaces are, so a beta instance sees the same projects as prod.
+ *
+ * `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` overrides the location. Docker Compose deployments set
+ * it to a host-absolute bind mount so a Docker case's workspace resolves to the
+ * SAME absolute path inside Codeman and on the host daemon that mounts it.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **One resolver, every caller.** This started life as three hardcoded
+ * `join(homedir(), 'codeman-cases')` copies. When only the web server's copy
+ * learned the override, `codeman skill install --case <name>` still looked in
+ * the home default and reported "Case not found" on exactly the deployment the
+ * override exists for. A new cases-dir consumer imports this; it does not
+ * rebuild the path.
+ *
+ * (`state-store.ts` keeps its own literal on purpose: that one migrates the
+ * historical `~/claudeman-cases` directory to `~/codeman-cases` by name, and is
+ * about the old default location rather than the active one.)
+ *
+ * @module config/cases-dir
+ */
+
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+
+/** Absolute path to the shared cases directory. */
+export function getCasesDir(): string {
+  return process.env.CODEMAN_CASES_PATH || join(homedir(), 'codeman-cases');
+}
+
+/** Absolute path to one case folder inside it. */
+export function casePath(name: string): string {
+  return join(getCasesDir(), name);
+}
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@

 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
-import { join, dirname } from 'node:path';
+import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
@@ -277,6 +277,24 @@ export interface DockerMount {
  readonly?: boolean;
 }

+/**
+ * Resolve a bind source into the Docker daemon's filesystem namespace.
+ *
+ * A bare-host Codeman process and its Docker daemon see the same HOME, so the
+ * source is returned unchanged. In Docker-outside-of-Docker deployments,
+ * `runtimeHome` is the path inside Codeman while `daemonHome` is the host path
+ * bind-mounted there. Sources beneath HOME must therefore be translated before
+ * they are sent through the Docker socket.
+ */
+export function resolveDockerDaemonMountSource(source: string, runtimeHome: string, daemonHome?: string): string {
+  const configuredDaemonHome = daemonHome?.trim();
+  if (!configuredDaemonHome) return source;
+
+  const relativeSource = relative(resolve(runtimeHome), resolve(source));
+  if (relativeSource.startsWith('..') || isAbsolute(relativeSource)) return source;
+  return resolve(configuredDaemonHome, relativeSource);
+}
+
 /**
 * Resolved, IO-free context for buildDockerCreateArgs. The caller (tmux-manager)
 * resolves the environment-dependent bits (host uid, existing cred mounts, the
@@ -300,6 +318,8 @@ export interface DockerCreateContext {
  addHostGateway: boolean;
  /** Engine host-gateway alias (host.docker.internal / host.containers.internal). */
  gatewayAlias: string;
+  /** Omit --memory-swap when the host kernel cannot enforce swap limits. */
+  disableSwapLimit?: boolean;
 }

 /**
@@ -317,12 +337,15 @@ function mountSpec(m: DockerMount): string {
  return `type=bind,src=${m.src},dst=${m.dst}${m.readonly ? ',readonly' : ''}`;
 }

-function resourceFlags(resources?: DockerResourceLimits): string[] {
+function resourceFlags(resources?: DockerResourceLimits, disableSwapLimit = false): string[] {
  if (!resources) return [];
  const flags: string[] = [];
  if (resources.memory) {
-    // memory-swap == memory disables swap, making --memory a REAL OOM cap.
-    flags.push('--memory', resources.memory, '--memory-swap', resources.memory);
+    flags.push('--memory', resources.memory);
+    // memory-swap == memory disables swap where the daemon supports swap
+    // accounting. Some kernels, including the deployed Unraid host, do not;
+    // requesting it there emits a warning and Docker ignores the value.
+    if (!disableSwapLimit) flags.push('--memory-swap', resources.memory);
  }
  if (resources.cpus) flags.push('--cpus', resources.cpus);
  if (resources.pidsLimit) flags.push('--pids-limit', String(resources.pidsLimit));
@@ -387,7 +410,7 @@ export function buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx: DockerCreateContext): string[] {
  if (addHostGateway) args.push('--add-host', `${gatewayAlias}:host-gateway`);

  args.push(
-    ...resourceFlags(docker.resources),
+    ...resourceFlags(docker.resources, ctx.disableSwapLimit),
    // GPU passthrough (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit on the host). No storage
    // cap is set, so the container's writable layer + volumes grow elastically as
    // data flows in (bounded only by host disk).
@@ -1,16 +1,32 @@
 /**
- * @fileoverview Recognizing Claude Code's workspace-trust dialog on screen.
+ * @fileoverview Recognizing Claude Code's workspace-trust dialog on screen, and
+ * working out which keystroke answers it.
 *
- * Claude asks once per directory before it will read or edit anything:
+ * Claude asks once per directory before it will read or edit anything. The
+ * layout has changed under us at least twice; both of these are live shapes:
 *
- *   Quick safety check: Is this a project you created or one you trust? ...
+ *   Quick safety check: Is this a project you created or one you trust? ...     (<= 2.1.220)
 *   ❯ 1. Yes, I trust this folder
 *     2. No, exit
 *   Enter to confirm · Esc to cancel
 *
+ *   Quick safety check: Is this a project you created or one you trust? ...     (2.1.252)
+ *   Security guide
+ *   ❯ No, exit
+ *     Yes, I trust this folder
+ *   Enter to confirm · Esc to cancel
+ *
 * Codeman sessions run permission-skipping or classifier-guarded modes, so the
 * answer is always yes, and a session parked on this dialog is simply stuck.
 *
+ * ⚠️ **Never press Enter without reading the selection.** The options are now
+ * unnumbered, REVERSED, and the highlighted default is "No, exit" — so the blind
+ * `\r` that answered the old layout picks *exit* on the new one and the pane
+ * dies (`Pane is dead (status 1)`) seconds after the session starts, which is
+ * exactly what a fresh case did on Claude Code 2.1.252. `trustDialogNextKey()`
+ * reads the `❯` marker instead and moves the cursor onto the trust option before
+ * it confirms anything.
+ *
 * **Why the text has to be compacted.** tmux repaints a row by writing each word
 * and then a cursor-forward (`\x1b[C`) instead of a space, and Ink colours each
 * word separately, so the wire carries `I\x1b[Ctrust\x1b[Cthis\x1b[Cfolder`.
@@ -39,6 +55,25 @@ const TRUST_PHRASES = [
 /** The dialog's own affordances. Prose that quotes the question will not have these. */
 const CONFIRM_PHRASES = ['entertoconfirm', 'esctocancel', '2.no,exit'];

+/** The option that answers yes, compacted. Identical text in both layouts. */
+const YES_OPTION = 'yes,itrustthisfolder';
+
+/** The option that quits Claude. It is the highlighted DEFAULT since 2.1.252. */
+const NO_OPTION = 'no,exit';
+
+/** Ink's selection marker. The only marked row while the dialog is up. */
+const SELECTION_MARK = '❯';
+
+/** A numbered option's `1.` / `2.` prefix, which the 2.1.220 layout put after the marker. */
+const OPTION_NUMBER_PREFIX = /^\d+\./;
+
+/** Move the selection one row down / up. Literal, so `send-keys -l` carries them. */
+export const TRUST_KEY_DOWN = '\x1b[B';
+export const TRUST_KEY_UP = '\x1b[A';
+
+/** Confirm the highlighted option. */
+export const TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM = '\r';
+
 /**
 * Charset-select sequences (`ESC ( B`), which tmux emits around styled runs and
 * `stripAnsi` does not cover. Left in, they would land inside a phrase as a
@@ -65,6 +100,50 @@ export function isTrustDialogScreen(text: string): boolean {
  return TRUST_PHRASES.some((p) => compact.includes(p)) && CONFIRM_PHRASES.some((p) => compact.includes(p));
 }

+/**
+ * Which option the `❯` marker sits on, or null when this text does not say.
+ *
+ * The LAST marked option wins. A pane capture holds exactly one frame and so
+ * exactly one marker, but the direct-PTY fallback reads an append-only buffer
+ * where every repaint since launch is still present — there the freshest frame
+ * is the one at the end, and an older one must not out-vote it.
+ */
+function selectedTrustOption(compact: string): { at: number; option: 'yes' | 'no' } | null {
+  let selected: { at: number; option: 'yes' | 'no' } | null = null;
+  for (let at = compact.indexOf(SELECTION_MARK); at >= 0; at = compact.indexOf(SELECTION_MARK, at + 1)) {
+    const after = compact.slice(at + SELECTION_MARK.length).replace(OPTION_NUMBER_PREFIX, '');
+    if (after.startsWith(YES_OPTION)) selected = { at, option: 'yes' };
+    else if (after.startsWith(NO_OPTION)) selected = { at, option: 'no' };
+  }
+  return selected;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The single keystroke that moves this dialog one step closer to "yes", or null
+ * when the screen does not show clearly enough to touch.
+ *
+ * One step per call on purpose: the caller re-reads the screen between
+ * keystrokes, so a moved cursor is CONFIRMED before Enter is pressed rather than
+ * assumed. Firing arrow+Enter together would re-create the failure this exists
+ * to prevent whenever the arrow is dropped (Ink drops keystrokes while it is
+ * still mounting a widget) — the Enter would then land on "No, exit".
+ *
+ * Returning null is the safe answer, not a failure: an unreadable frame means
+ * wait for the next repaint, and a layout whose options this cannot name means
+ * leave the dialog to the human. The caller's startup window bounds the waiting.
+ */
+export function trustDialogNextKey(text: string): string | null {
+  const compact = compactScreenText(text);
+  if (!compact.includes(YES_OPTION)) return null; // no trust option to steer onto
+  const selected = selectedTrustOption(compact);
+  if (!selected) return null; // marker missing, or not on an option we recognize
+  if (selected.option === 'yes') return TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM;
+  // On "No, exit". Which way the trust option lies is read from THIS frame — it
+  // sits below in 2.1.252 and above in the numbered layout before it — so the
+  // order flipping again costs a repaint, not a killed session.
+  return compact.includes(YES_OPTION, selected.at) ? TRUST_KEY_DOWN : TRUST_KEY_UP;
+}
+
 /**
 * How long after the pane starts the dialog is still plausible. It renders
 * before the main UI, so this only has to cover a slow first launch; leaving it
@@ -72,16 +151,21 @@ export function isTrustDialogScreen(text: string): boolean {
 */
 export const TRUST_DIALOG_WINDOW_MS = 90_000;

-/** Minimum gap between two Enter presses, and between two screen reads. */
+/** Minimum gap between two keystrokes, and between two screen reads. */
 export const TRUST_DIALOG_RETRY_MS = 1500;

 /**
- * Attempts before giving up and leaving the dialog to the user. A keystroke can
- * land while Ink is still mounting the widget and be dropped, which is the other
- * half of why sessions got stuck here; retrying costs nothing, but retrying
- * forever would hammer Enter into whatever came next.
+ * Keystrokes before giving up and leaving the dialog to the user. A keystroke
+ * can land while Ink is still mounting the widget and be dropped, which is the
+ * other half of why sessions got stuck here; retrying costs nothing, but
+ * retrying forever would hammer Enter into whatever came next.
+ *
+ * Six rather than three because answering is no longer one press: the 2.1.252
+ * layout needs an arrow onto the trust option and then Enter, each confirmed
+ * against a re-read of the screen, so a cap of three left only one dropped
+ * keystroke of slack.
 */
-export const TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3;
+export const TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 6;

 /**
 * How much of the append-only terminal buffer to read on a direct-PTY session,
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ import { RalphTracker } from './ralph-tracker.js';
 import { BashToolParser } from './bash-tool-parser.js';
 import {
  isTrustDialogScreen,
+  trustDialogNextKey,
+  TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM,
  TRUST_DIALOG_WINDOW_MS,
  TRUST_DIALOG_RETRY_MS,
  TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
@@ -455,8 +457,9 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
  private _lastPaneProbeAt = 0; // Throttle for the tmux screen probe
  private _lastPaneProbeWorking: boolean | null = null; // Its last verdict (null = could not read)
  private _trustDialogAccepted: boolean = false; // Stops the trust-dialog scan (answered, or given up)
-  private _trustDialogAttempts = 0; // Enter presses sent at the trust dialog
+  private _trustDialogAttempts = 0; // Keystrokes sent at the trust dialog
  private _lastTrustDialogScanAt = 0; // Throttle for the trust-dialog screen read
+  private _trustDialogTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null; // Re-read after a keystroke (see below)
  private _interactiveStartedAt = 0; // When the interactive pane launched (bounds that scan)
  private _taskTracker: TaskTracker;

@@ -1841,6 +1844,10 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
    this._interactiveStartedAt = Date.now();
    this._trustDialogAttempts = 0;
    this._lastTrustDialogScanAt = 0;
+    if (this._trustDialogTimer) {
+      clearTimeout(this._trustDialogTimer);
+      this._trustDialogTimer = null;
+    }

    // COD-118: if the PTY exit breaker has tripped (repeated non-zero exits in a
    // short window), refuse to respawn. This is the uniform choke point that stops
@@ -2229,6 +2236,15 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
   * makes a retry safe, since the terminal buffer is append-only and keeps the
   * dialog in its tail long after it has been answered.
   *
+   * ⚠️ **The keystroke is read off the screen, never assumed.** Claude Code
+   * 2.1.252 dropped the option numbers, put "No, exit" first, and highlights IT
+   * by default, so the bare `\r` this used to send now answers *exit*: a fresh
+   * case died (`Pane is dead (status 1)`) about six seconds after spawning.
+   * `trustDialogNextKey()` returns one step at a time — an arrow while the
+   * cursor is on the wrong option, Enter only once the screen shows it on the
+   * trust option — and this method re-reads the pane between the two, so a
+   * dropped arrow costs a repaint instead of the session.
+   *
   * Three guards keep an Enter press off a live session: a startup-only window,
   * a two-marker match (isTrustDialogScreen), and an attempt cap.
   */
@@ -2249,17 +2265,39 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
      this._terminalBuffer.value.slice(-TRUST_DIALOG_SCAN_BYTES);
    if (!isTrustDialogScreen(screen)) return;

+    // Null means the frame does not say which option is highlighted. Waiting for
+    // the next repaint is the safe move; pressing Enter blind is the bug.
+    const key = trustDialogNextKey(screen);
+    if (key === null) return;
+
    this._trustDialogAttempts++;
    if (this._trustDialogAttempts > TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
      this._trustDialogAccepted = true; // leave it to the user rather than keep typing
      console.warn(`[Session] Workspace trust dialog did not clear after retries: ${this.id}`);
      return;
    }
+    const step = key === TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM ? 'confirming' : 'moving to the trust option';
    console.log(
-      `[Session] Auto-accepting workspace trust dialog for: ${this.id} (attempt ${this._trustDialogAttempts})`
+      `[Session] Auto-accepting workspace trust dialog for: ${this.id} (attempt ${this._trustDialogAttempts}, ${step})`
    );
-    // Enter confirms the highlighted default, "1. Yes, I trust this folder".
-    this.writeViaMux('\r');
+    this.writeViaMux(key);
+
+    // ⚠️ Schedule the next read; do NOT wait for more PTY output. This scan only
+    // ever ran from `onData`, which was enough while one Enter answered the
+    // dialog. It is not enough now: the arrow that moves the cursor is the LAST
+    // output the pane produces, so a dialog left sitting on the trust option
+    // never gets its Enter and the worker stays parked on it forever (measured
+    // on a live 2.1.252 spawn: cursor moved at 6 s, then nothing). The timer is
+    // one-shot and self-rearming through this same path, and every exit route
+    // goes through _clearAllTimers().
+    // The +100ms puts the re-entry OUTSIDE the scan throttle above; firing at
+    // exactly the throttle boundary would let the scan return early and break
+    // the chain with the dialog still on screen.
+    if (this._trustDialogTimer) clearTimeout(this._trustDialogTimer);
+    this._trustDialogTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+      this._trustDialogTimer = null;
+      this._maybeAcceptTrustDialog();
+    }, TRUST_DIALOG_RETRY_MS + 100);
  }

  /**
@@ -2784,6 +2822,12 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
  }

  private _clearAllTimers(): void {
+    // Clear the workspace-trust follow-up read
+    if (this._trustDialogTimer) {
+      clearTimeout(this._trustDialogTimer);
+      this._trustDialogTimer = null;
+    }
+
    // Clear activity timeout to prevent memory leak
    if (this.activityTimeout) {
      clearTimeout(this.activityTimeout);
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ import {
  hostGatewayAlias,
  resolveDockerClaudeArtifacts,
  resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts,
+  resolveDockerDaemonMountSource,
  type DockerCreateContext,
  type DockerMount,
  type DockerSeedCopy,
@@ -1354,8 +1355,23 @@ export function buildDockerLaunchCommand(opts: DockerLaunchOptions): string {
  const startFailMsg = shellescape(`Codeman: container ${docker.containerName} failed to start (docker daemon down?)`);

  const imageCheck = `${base} image inspect ${image} >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ${imageMissingMsg}; exit 1; }`;
-  // create-if-missing (idempotent): reconnect / boot recovery re-runs this exact chain.
-  const ensure = `${base} inspect ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || ${base} ${createArgs}`;
+  // create-if-missing (idempotent): reconnect / boot recovery re-runs this exact
+  // chain. A daemon without swap accounting warns whenever --memory is present,
+  // even when --memory-swap is omitted. In compatibility mode, retain the memory
+  // cap and filter ONLY that exact warning; all other stdout/stderr and the real
+  // create exit status are preserved so mount/config failures remain visible.
+  // A session-unique file avoids shell variables and command substitution, both
+  // of which would be expanded too early by the nested bash/tmux launch layers.
+  const createOutputPath = shellescape(`/tmp/codeman-create-${sessionId}.log`);
+  const filteredCreateOutput = `sed '/^WARNING: Your kernel does not support swap limit capabilities or the cgroup is not mounted\\. Memory limited without swap\\.$/d' ${createOutputPath}`;
+  const removeCreateOutput = `rm -f ${createOutputPath}`;
+  const createCommand = createContext.disableSwapLimit
+    ? `{ if ${base} ${createArgs} >${createOutputPath} 2>&1; ` +
+      `then ${filteredCreateOutput}; ${removeCreateOutput}; ` +
+      `elif ${base} inspect ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1; then ${removeCreateOutput}; ` +
+      `else ${filteredCreateOutput} >&2; ${removeCreateOutput}; false; fi; }`
+    : `${base} ${createArgs}`;
+  const ensure = `${base} inspect ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || ${createCommand}`;
  const start = `${base} start ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ${startFailMsg}; exit 1; }`;
  // Seed writable credential config from read-only host mounts ONCE per container
  // (guarded by [ -e ] so reconnects never clobber in-container config; `cp -a` for
@@ -1466,11 +1482,18 @@ export function resolveDockerLaunchOptions(
    sessionId,
    instance: CODEMAN_INSTANCE,
    userArgs,
-    credentialMounts,
-    extraMounts,
+    credentialMounts: credentialMounts.map((mount) => ({
+      ...mount,
+      src: resolveDockerDaemonMountSource(mount.src, home, process.env.CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME),
+    })),
+    extraMounts: extraMounts.map((mount) => ({
+      ...mount,
+      src: resolveDockerDaemonMountSource(mount.src, home, process.env.CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME),
+    })),
    envCreate,
    addHostGateway: !isDesktop,
    gatewayAlias,
+    disableSwapLimit: process.env.CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT === '1',
  };

  const execEnv: Record<string, string> = {
@@ -2634,8 +2634,19 @@ class CodemanApp {
    // string field (e.g. modelDisplayName, which the route also broadcasts) is
    // ever shown in this chip, render it via textContent — never interpolate an
    // untrusted string into this template.
-    const seg = (label, p) => {
-      if (p === null) return '';
+    // `idle: true` keeps a missing window's SLOT with a dimmed em dash instead of
+    // dropping it. Claude only: Claude Code documents `five_hour` as "present
+    // only while the API reports it and its resets_at has not passed", so that
+    // key leaves the statusline payload whenever no 5-hour session window is
+    // open, and a chip that silently shrank from two windows to one read as a
+    // broken feature rather than as an idle window (reported 2026-09-01). A
+    // missing CODEX bucket means the opposite — that plan has no such limit —
+    // so those stay omitted rather than showing a dash forever.
+    const seg = (label, p, idle) => {
+      if (p === null) {
+        if (!idle) return '';
+        return `<span class="pu-win pu-win-idle"><span class="pu-label">${label}</span><span class="pu-val">—</span></span>`;
+      }
      const n = Math.round(Number(p));
      if (!Number.isFinite(n)) return '';
      return `<span class="pu-win"><span class="pu-label">${label}</span><span class="pu-val ${colorClass(n)}">${n}%</span></span>`;
@@ -2644,24 +2655,31 @@ class CodemanApp {
    // provider to tell apart: a machine with Claude alone shows bare windows.
    const hasWindows = (usage) => pct(usage?.fiveHour) !== null || pct(usage?.sevenDay) !== null;
    const labelled = hasWindows(data) && hasWindows(data.codex);
-    const row = (provider, usage) => {
-      const windows = [seg('5h', pct(usage?.fiveHour)), seg('7d', pct(usage?.sevenDay))].filter(Boolean);
+    const row = (provider, usage, idle) => {
+      // hasWindows() gates the row, so a placeholder can only ever appear
+      // ALONGSIDE a real reading — a provider reporting nothing still renders
+      // nothing, never a row of em dashes.
+      if (!hasWindows(usage)) return '';
+      const windows = [seg('5h', pct(usage?.fiveHour), idle), seg('7d', pct(usage?.sevenDay), idle)].filter(Boolean);
      if (!windows.length) return '';
      const label = labelled ? `<span class="pu-provider">${provider}</span>` : '';
      return `<span class="pu-row">${label}<span class="pu-windows">${windows.join('<span class="pu-sep">·</span>')}</span></span>`;
    };
-    const rows = [row('Claude', data), row('Codex', data.codex)].filter(Boolean);
+    const rows = [row('Claude', data, true), row('Codex', data.codex, false)].filter(Boolean);
    chip.innerHTML = rows.length ? rows.join('') : '—';
    const resetStr = (w) => (w && w.resetAt ? new Date(w.resetAt).toLocaleString() : '—');
-    const details = (provider, usage) => {
+    const details = (provider, usage, idle) => {
      const lines = [];
      const five = pct(usage?.fiveHour);
      const seven = pct(usage?.sevenDay);
      if (five !== null) lines.push(`5-hour limit: ${five}% used (resets ${resetStr(usage.fiveHour)})`);
+      else if (idle && seven !== null) lines.push('5-hour limit: no active session window');
      if (seven !== null) lines.push(`Weekly limit: ${seven}% used (resets ${resetStr(usage.sevenDay)})`);
      return lines.length ? `${provider} plan usage\n${lines.join('\n')}` : '';
    };
-    chip.title = [details('Claude', data), details('Codex', data.codex)].filter(Boolean).join('\n\n') || 'Plan usage limits';
+    chip.title =
+      [details('Claude', data, true), details('Codex', data.codex, false)].filter(Boolean).join('\n\n') ||
+      'Plan usage limits';
  }

  // Scheduled runs
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 * @globals {function} scheduleBackground - scheduler.postTask wrapper (background priority)
 * @globals {function} getEventCoords - Unified mouse/touch coordinate extractor
 * @globals {function} escapeHtml - XSS-safe HTML escaping
- * @globals {object} SSE_EVENTS - Centralized SSE event type constants (156 event types; must match backend src/web/sse-events.ts)
+ * @globals {object} SSE_EVENTS - Centralized SSE event type constants (157 event types; must match backend src/web/sse-events.ts)
 * @globals {Array} BUILTIN_RESPAWN_PRESETS - Built-in respawn configuration presets
 *
 * @dependency None (first in load order)
@@ -12470,6 +12470,13 @@ kbd {
  color: var(--text-dim);
  opacity: 0.45;
 }
+/* A window Claude is not currently reporting: the slot stays, dimmed, so the
+   chip keeps its shape instead of looking like half of it broke. */
+.header-plan-usage .pu-win-idle .pu-label,
+.header-plan-usage .pu-win-idle .pu-val {
+  color: var(--text-dim);
+  opacity: 0.55;
+}
 /* Green/yellow/red by how much of the window is used up. */
 .header-plan-usage .pu-green {
  color: #3fb950;
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
 import { join, resolve, relative, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
 import { realpathSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
 import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
-import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import type { z } from 'zod';
 import type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
 import { Session } from '../session.js';
@@ -21,12 +20,15 @@ import type { EventPort } from './ports/event-port.js';
 import type { AuthSessionRecord } from './ports/auth-port.js';
 import type { StaleExpirationMap } from '../utils/index.js';
 import { dataPath } from '../config/instance.js';
+import { getCasesDir } from '../config/cases-dir.js';
 import { isMultiUserMode, maxSessionsPerUser, userCasesDir } from '../config/multiuser.js';
 import { SYNTHETIC_ADMIN, findUser } from '../user-store.js';

 // Shared path constants used across route modules. CASES_DIR (project folders)
 // stays shared across instances; SETTINGS_PATH is per-instance runtime state.
-export const CASES_DIR = join(homedir(), 'codeman-cases');
+// The cases dir is resolved in ONE place (config/cases-dir.ts) because the CLI
+// resolves it too, and CODEMAN_CASES_PATH must move both or neither.
+export const CASES_DIR = getCasesDir();
 export const SETTINGS_PATH = dataPath('settings.json');

 /**
@@ -3076,9 +3076,9 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(

      casePath = dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath; // a REAL host dir (bind-mounted into the container)
      docker = sessionDocker;
-      // Seed resume so a relaunch resumes the case's last conversation from the
-      // bind-mounted transcript (decision: resume-on-start default ON).
-      if (sessionDocker.resumeOnStart && dockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId) {
+      // Seed only Claude's resume id. Codex, Gemini, and the other CLIs have
+      // separate conversation stores and must never receive a Claude UUID.
+      if (mode === 'claude' && sessionDocker.resumeOnStart && dockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId) {
        dockerResumeId = dockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId;
      }
    } else {
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { dataPath } from '../src/config/instance.js';
 import { program, resolveCliCasePath, resolveSkillTargetPath } from '../src/cli.js';
+import { getCasesDir } from '../src/config/cases-dir.js';

 const LINKED_CASES_FILE = dataPath('linked-cases.json');
 const CASES_DIR = join(homedir(), 'codeman-cases');
@@ -142,3 +143,36 @@ describe('skill command wiring', () => {
    }
  });
 });
+
+describe('cases dir override (CODEMAN_CASES_PATH)', () => {
+  // The Docker Compose deployment points Codeman at a host-absolute bind mount
+  // so a Docker case resolves to the same path inside the container and on the
+  // host daemon. The override shipped on the server's CASES_DIR only, which left
+  // the CLI looking in the home default: `codeman skill install --case <name>`
+  // then reported "Case not found" on exactly the deployment it exists for.
+  const saved = process.env.CODEMAN_CASES_PATH;
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (saved === undefined) delete process.env.CODEMAN_CASES_PATH;
+    else process.env.CODEMAN_CASES_PATH = saved;
+  });
+
+  it('moves the CLI and the server together', () => {
+    process.env.CODEMAN_CASES_PATH = '/srv/codeman-cases';
+    expect(getCasesDir()).toBe('/srv/codeman-cases');
+    expect(resolveCliCasePath('demo')).toBe(join('/srv/codeman-cases', 'demo'));
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to the home default when unset', () => {
+    delete process.env.CODEMAN_CASES_PATH;
+    expect(getCasesDir()).toBe(CASES_DIR);
+    expect(resolveCliCasePath('demo')).toBe(join(CASES_DIR, 'demo'));
+  });
+
+  it('still lets a linked case win over the override', () => {
+    // The registry lookup runs first, so a case linked in from outside the cases
+    // dir keeps resolving to its real location under Compose too.
+    process.env.CODEMAN_CASES_PATH = '/srv/codeman-cases';
+    writeLinkedCases(JSON.stringify({ linked: join(LINKED_ROOT, 'linked') }));
+    expect(resolveCliCasePath('linked')).toBe(join(LINKED_ROOT, 'linked'));
+  });
+});
@@ -80,6 +80,26 @@ describe('buildDockerLaunchCommand', () => {
    expect(cmd).toContain("docker start 'codeman-case-myproj'");
  });

+  it('avoids eager create expansion, tolerates a concurrent creator, and preserves real failures in compatibility mode', () => {
+    const opts = launchOpts();
+    opts.createContext.disableSwapLimit = true;
+    const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(opts);
+    // No command substitution or shell variables: either could expand eagerly
+    // before the inspect side of || short-circuits in a nested launch shell.
+    expect(cmd).not.toContain('$(');
+    expect(cmd).not.toContain('codeman_create_output');
+    expect(cmd).toContain('if docker create');
+    expect(cmd).toContain("'/tmp/codeman-create-1a2b3c4d5e6f.log'");
+    // If another session created the case between inspect and create, re-inspect
+    // succeeds and the losing creator continues without printing the conflict.
+    expect(cmd).toContain("elif docker inspect 'codeman-case-myproj' >/dev/null 2>&1; then rm -f");
+    expect(cmd).toContain('Your kernel does not support swap limit capabilities');
+    expect(cmd).toContain('else sed');
+    expect(cmd).toContain('>&2; rm -f');
+    expect(cmd).toContain('; false; fi;');
+    expect(cmd).not.toContain('--memory-swap');
+  });
+
  it('execs a TTY into the durable in-container tmux', () => {
    const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts());
    expect(cmd).toContain("exec docker exec -it --workdir '/home/arkon/cases/myproj'");
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import {
  resolveClaudeJsonSeedMount,
  resolveDockerClaudeArtifacts,
  resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts,
+  resolveDockerDaemonMountSource,
  toSessionDocker,
  writeDockerCases,
  writeDockerHosts,
@@ -267,6 +268,32 @@ describe('buildDockerCreateArgs', () => {
    expect(s).not.toContain('--storage-opt');
    expect(buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx()).join(' ')).not.toContain('--gpus');
  });
+
+  it('omits the unsupported swap limit while retaining the memory limit when disabled', () => {
+    const s = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx({ disableSwapLimit: true })).join(' ');
+    expect(s).toContain('--memory 4g');
+    expect(s).not.toContain('--memory-swap');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('resolveDockerDaemonMountSource', () => {
+  const runtimeHome = join(tmpdir(), 'codeman-runtime-home');
+  const daemonHome = join(tmpdir(), 'codeman-daemon-home');
+
+  it('maps paths beneath the runtime HOME into the daemon-visible HOME', () => {
+    const source = join(runtimeHome, '.codeman', 'docker-seeds', 'codeman-case-test1.json');
+    expect(resolveDockerDaemonMountSource(source, runtimeHome, daemonHome)).toBe(
+      join(daemonHome, '.codeman', 'docker-seeds', 'codeman-case-test1.json')
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('preserves direct-host and non-HOME sources', () => {
+    const source = join(runtimeHome, '.claude', 'settings.json');
+    expect(resolveDockerDaemonMountSource(source, runtimeHome)).toBe(source);
+
+    const outsideHome = join(tmpdir(), 'codeman-cases', 'test1');
+    expect(resolveDockerDaemonMountSource(outsideHome, runtimeHome, daemonHome)).toBe(outsideHome);
+  });
 });

 describe('resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts (isolated codex/gemini/gcloud/opencode)', () => {
@@ -80,6 +80,34 @@ describe('header plan usage chip', () => {
    expect(codexRow).toContain('7d');
  });

+  it("keeps Claude's 5h slot as a dash when no session window is open", () => {
+    // Claude Code ships `five_hour` "only while the API reports it and its
+    // resets_at has not passed", so between session windows the key is simply
+    // absent. The chip used to shrink to a lone 7d segment, which reads as a
+    // broken feature rather than an idle window (reported 2026-09-01).
+    const { CodemanApp, chip } = loadCodemanAppClass();
+    const app = Object.create((CodemanApp as { prototype: object }).prototype) as UsageApp;
+
+    app.updatePlanUsageChip({ sevenDay: { usedPercentage: 52, resetAt: 2000 } });
+
+    expect(chip.innerHTML).toContain('pu-win-idle');
+    expect(chip.innerHTML).toContain('5h');
+    expect(chip.innerHTML).toContain('52%');
+    expect(chip.title).toContain('no active session window');
+  });
+
+  it('renders no row at all for a provider reporting nothing', () => {
+    // The placeholder must never stand alone: a row of em dashes would claim a
+    // provider is idle when it is really absent.
+    const { CodemanApp, chip } = loadCodemanAppClass();
+    const app = Object.create((CodemanApp as { prototype: object }).prototype) as UsageApp;
+
+    app.updatePlanUsageChip({ codex: { sevenDay: { usedPercentage: 40, resetAt: 3000 } } });
+
+    expect(chip.innerHTML).not.toContain('pu-win-idle');
+    expect(chip.innerHTML).toContain('40%');
+  });
+
  it('drops the provider label when Claude is the only provider with limits', () => {
    const { CodemanApp, chip } = loadCodemanAppClass();
    const app = Object.create((CodemanApp as { prototype: object }).prototype) as UsageApp;
@@ -19,19 +19,20 @@
 * including the sweep's deleted-workspace guard.
 */

-import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, vi } from 'vitest';
 import Fastify, { type FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
 import fastifyCookie from '@fastify/cookie';
 import { mkdtemp, rm, readFile, mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { createMockRouteContext } from '../mocks/index.js';
+import { createMockRouteContext, type MockRouteContext } from '../mocks/index.js';
 import { installRouteErrorHandler } from '../../src/web/route-error-handler.js';
 import { registerSessionRoutes } from '../../src/web/routes/session-routes.js';
 import { generateHooksConfig, applyWorkspaceHooks } from '../../src/hooks-config.js';
 import { getDataDir } from '../../src/config/instance.js';
 import { CASES_DIR } from '../../src/web/route-helpers.js';
+import { Session } from '../../src/session.js';

 interface HooksFile {
  hooks?: Record<string, Array<{ matcher?: string; hooks?: Array<{ command?: string }> }>>;
@@ -223,6 +224,7 @@ describe('POST /api/sessions workspace hooks', () => {

 describe('POST /api/quick-start workspace hooks', () => {
  let app: FastifyInstance;
+  let ctx: MockRouteContext;

  const quickStart = (payload: Record<string, unknown>) =>
    app.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/api/quick-start', payload });
@@ -230,15 +232,19 @@ describe('POST /api/quick-start workspace hooks', () => {
  const hooksFileIn = (dir: string) => join(dir, '.claude', 'settings.local.json');

  beforeEach(async () => {
+    vi.spyOn(Session.prototype, 'startInteractive').mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    vi.spyOn(Session.prototype, 'startShell').mockResolvedValue(undefined);
    app = Fastify({ logger: false });
    await app.register(fastifyCookie);
-    registerSessionRoutes(app, createMockRouteContext());
+    ctx = createMockRouteContext();
+    registerSessionRoutes(app, ctx);
    installRouteErrorHandler(app);
    await app.ready();
  });

  afterEach(async () => {
    await app.close();
+    vi.restoreAllMocks();
    // Docker fixtures + case dirs must not leak into the next test.
    await rm(join(getDataDir(), 'docker-hosts.json'), { force: true });
    await rm(join(getDataDir(), 'docker-cases.json'), { force: true });
@@ -260,7 +266,7 @@ describe('POST /api/quick-start workspace hooks', () => {
  });

  /** Minimal docker host + case fixtures (docker IO is no-op'd under vitest). */
-  const writeDockerFixtures = async (caseName: string, hostWorkspacePath: string) => {
+  const writeDockerFixtures = async (caseName: string, hostWorkspacePath: string, lastClaudeSessionId?: string) => {
    await mkdir(getDataDir(), { recursive: true });
    await writeFile(
      join(getDataDir(), 'docker-hosts.json'),
@@ -268,7 +274,7 @@ describe('POST /api/quick-start workspace hooks', () => {
    );
    await writeFile(
      join(getDataDir(), 'docker-cases.json'),
-      JSON.stringify([{ name: caseName, type: 'docker', hostId: 'd1', hostWorkspacePath }])
+      JSON.stringify([{ name: caseName, type: 'docker', hostId: 'd1', hostWorkspacePath, lastClaudeSessionId }])
    );
  };

@@ -300,6 +306,35 @@ describe('POST /api/quick-start workspace hooks', () => {
      await rm(ws, { recursive: true, force: true });
    }
  });
+
+  it.each(['codex', 'gemini'] as const)('does not pass a saved Claude conversation id to Docker %s', async (mode) => {
+    const ws = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), `codeman-docker-${mode}-`));
+    try {
+      await writeDockerFixtures('dockexternal', ws, 'e83a9063-3cb4-44d2-a9a0-df153b81721f');
+
+      const res = await quickStart({ caseName: 'dockexternal', mode });
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      const session = ctx.sessions.get(JSON.parse(res.body).sessionId);
+      expect(session?.toState().resumeSessionId).toBeUndefined();
+    } finally {
+      await rm(ws, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('passes a saved Claude conversation id only to Docker Claude', async () => {
+    const ws = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'codeman-docker-resume-'));
+    const resumeId = 'e83a9063-3cb4-44d2-a9a0-df153b81721f';
+    try {
+      await writeDockerFixtures('dockresume', ws, resumeId);
+
+      const res = await quickStart({ caseName: 'dockresume', mode: 'claude' });
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      const session = ctx.sessions.get(JSON.parse(res.body).sessionId);
+      expect(session?.toState().resumeSessionId).toBe(resumeId);
+    } finally {
+      await rm(ws, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
 });

 describe('applyWorkspaceHooks (the shared decision core in hooks-config)', () => {
@@ -8,10 +8,23 @@
 *
 * RAW_DIALOG_CHUNK below is a verbatim slice of the PTY stream from a live
 * session parked on that dialog (Claude Code 2.1.220).
+ *
+ * The second bug this pins: Claude Code 2.1.252 dropped the option numbers, put
+ * "No, exit" first and highlights IT, so the blind Enter that answered the old
+ * layout selects *exit* and the pane dies seconds after the session starts.
+ * RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252 is a verbatim `capture-pane -p` of that screen.
 */
 import { describe, expect, it, vi, afterEach } from 'vitest';
 import { Session } from '../src/session.js';
-import { isTrustDialogScreen, compactScreenText, TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS } from '../src/session-trust-dialog.js';
+import {
+  isTrustDialogScreen,
+  compactScreenText,
+  trustDialogNextKey,
+  TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM,
+  TRUST_KEY_DOWN,
+  TRUST_KEY_UP,
+  TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+} from '../src/session-trust-dialog.js';

 /** Verbatim from the wire: note the `\x1b[C` where every space should be. */
 const RAW_DIALOG_CHUNK =
@@ -29,6 +42,25 @@ const RENDERED_DIALOG = [
  ' Enter to confirm · Esc to cancel',
 ].join('\n');

+/**
+ * Verbatim `capture-pane -p` from Claude Code 2.1.252 on a fresh case: no
+ * numbers, the options reversed, and the cursor parked on the one that quits.
+ */
+const RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252 = [
+  ' Accessing workspace:',
+  ' /home/arkon/codeman-cases/trustprobe1',
+  ' Quick safety check: Is this a project you created or one you trust? (Like your own code, a well-known open source',
+  " project, or work from your team). If not, take a moment to review what's in this folder first.",
+  " Claude Code'll be able to read, edit, and execute files here.",
+  ' Security guide',
+  ' ❯ No, exit',
+  '   Yes, I trust this folder',
+  ' Enter to confirm · Esc to cancel',
+].join('\n');
+
+/** The same screen after one arrow press: the cursor has moved onto "yes". */
+const RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252_ON_YES = RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252.replace(' ❯ No, exit\n   Yes,', '   No, exit\n ❯ Yes,');
+
 /** An ordinary working session: no dialog anywhere. */
 const RENDERED_MAIN_UI = [
  '✻ Actualizing… (13m 23s · ↓ 47.5k tokens)',
@@ -61,12 +93,54 @@ describe('isTrustDialogScreen', () => {
    expect(isTrustDialogScreen('press Enter to confirm the release')).toBe(false);
  });

+  it('sees the 2.1.252 dialog, whose options lost their numbers', () => {
+    // '2.no,exit' is gone from this layout, so the confirm affordance is now the
+    // only thing carrying the match.
+    expect(isTrustDialogScreen(RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
  it('compacts away both real spaces and the escapes tmux sends instead', () => {
    expect(compactScreenText('I\x1b[Ctrust\x1b[Cthis\x1b[Cfolder')).toBe('itrustthisfolder');
    expect(compactScreenText('I trust this folder')).toBe('itrustthisfolder');
  });
 });

+describe('trustDialogNextKey', () => {
+  it('confirms straight away when the trust option is already highlighted', () => {
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey(RENDERED_DIALOG)).toBe(TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM);
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey(RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252_ON_YES)).toBe(TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM);
+  });
+
+  it('moves DOWN instead of confirming when 2.1.252 parks the cursor on "No, exit"', () => {
+    // The regression in one line: Enter here answers *exit* and kills the pane.
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey(RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252)).toBe(TRUST_KEY_DOWN);
+  });
+
+  it('moves UP when the trust option is the one above, as in the numbered layout', () => {
+    const numberedOnNo = RENDERED_DIALOG.replace(' ❯ 1. Yes,', '   1. Yes,').replace(
+      '   2. No, exit',
+      ' ❯ 2. No, exit'
+    );
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey(numberedOnNo)).toBe(TRUST_KEY_UP);
+  });
+
+  it('reads the LAST frame in an append-only buffer, not the first', () => {
+    // The direct-PTY fallback has no pane to capture, so it reads a buffer that
+    // still holds every repaint since launch. The freshest frame is the truth.
+    const buffer = `${RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252}\n${RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252_ON_YES}`;
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey(buffer)).toBe(TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM);
+  });
+
+  it('presses nothing when the screen does not say which option is selected', () => {
+    // A layout this cannot read is a dialog for the human, not a coin flip: the
+    // wrong guess exits Claude.
+    const noMarker = RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252.replace(' ❯ No, exit', '   No, exit');
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey(noMarker)).toBe(null);
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey(RENDERED_MAIN_UI)).toBe(null);
+    expect(trustDialogNextKey('')).toBe(null);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('Session trust-dialog auto-accept', () => {
  afterEach(() => vi.useRealTimers());

@@ -102,6 +176,32 @@ describe('Session trust-dialog auto-accept', () => {
    expect(writes).toEqual(['\r']);
  });

+  it('walks the 2.1.252 dialog onto the trust option before it confirms', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    // The whole point: no Enter goes out while "No, exit" is highlighted.
+    let screen = RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252;
+    const { writes, tick } = sessionShowing(() => screen);
+    tick();
+    expect(writes).toEqual([TRUST_KEY_DOWN]);
+
+    screen = RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252_ON_YES;
+    vi.advanceTimersByTime(2000);
+    tick();
+    expect(writes).toEqual([TRUST_KEY_DOWN, TRUST_KEY_CONFIRM]);
+  });
+
+  it('never presses Enter while the cursor sits on "No, exit"', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    // A dialog that never moves (a dropped arrow, a wedged pane) must run out of
+    // attempts pressing arrows, not answer *exit* on the way.
+    const { writes, tick } = sessionShowing(() => RENDERED_DIALOG_2_1_252);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+      tick();
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(2000);
+    }
+    expect(writes).toEqual(Array(TRUST_DIALOG_MAX_ATTEMPTS).fill(TRUST_KEY_DOWN));
+  });
+
  it('retries a dropped keystroke, then gives up rather than typing forever', () => {
    vi.useFakeTimers();
    // Ink can drop a keystroke while it is still mounting the widget, so one
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Codeman maintainer	71ffbf18e4	chore: version packages	2026-09-01 21:55:00 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	826ddaa9aa	build(docker): ship the Docker CLI in the Compose image, not the whole engine docker/server.Dockerfile installed Debian's `docker.io` to get a client for the socket mounted by Compose. That package is the full ENGINE: even with --no-install-recommends it pulls 15 packages including containerd, runc, dmsetup and iptables, none of which a container that only talks to a mounted socket can use, and it ships Docker 20.10.24 (2023). Copy the CLI and the buildx plugin from the official docker:29-cli image instead. Measured on the same node:22-bookworm-slim base: 266 MB -> 108 MB, so 158 MB smaller with a current CLI (29.7.2) in place of a two-year-old one. Three things verified rather than assumed, by building the real image and running it: - docker:cli is an ALPINE image, so copying a binary into this Debian one is only safe because the binaries are static Go builds (ldd: "Not a valid dynamic program"). In the built image, `docker --version`, `docker ps` and `docker build` all work against a mounted host socket as the unprivileged runtime user. - buildx is copied on purpose. scripts/build-agent-image.mjs shells out to `docker build` and Codeman auto-builds the agent image on the first Docker case. Without the plugin that still works today — CLI 29 falls back to the classic builder, tested — but that builder is deprecated and will be dropped, so the plugin keeps the path supported. - docker-compose is NOT copied: Codeman never shells out to it. Pinned to the 29 major, matching how the base images here are pinned.	2026-09-01 21:54:56 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	e2b72aafd7	chore: version packages	2026-09-01 11:32:50 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	b15cc0eb1a	fix(ui): keep the plan-usage chip's 5h slot when no session window is open The header chip silently shrank from "5h 4% · 7d 52%" to a lone "7d 52%", which reads as half the feature breaking rather than as an idle window. Nothing was broken. Claude Code documents `rate_limits.five_hour` as "present only while the API reports it and its resets_at has not passed", so between 5-hour session windows the key simply leaves the statusline payload. Codeman's snapshot replaces the Claude half wholesale on every sample, so the segment disappeared until usage opened a new window. Confirmed against a live 2.1.252 session by capturing real statusline payloads on an isolated tmux socket: the boot render carries no `rate_limits` at all, and the first post-response render carries both windows. The slot now stays, with a dimmed em dash. Claude only: a missing CODEX bucket means that plan has no such limit rather than an idle window, so those stay omitted (pinned by the existing test). The placeholder can never stand alone either — hasWindows() still gates the row, so a provider reporting nothing renders nothing rather than a row of dashes. The tooltip says "5-hour limit: no active session window" instead of dropping the line. Verified in a real browser against a dev instance: the idle chip renders "5h — · 7d 52%" with the dash at opacity 0.55 in --text-dim while the live value keeps its green, and the chip holds its shape (100px idle vs 107px with both windows).	2026-09-01 11:32:18 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	2a32b5064a	Merge pull request #349 from opticon454/feature/docker-compose Docker Compose deployment: Codeman runs in a container and spawns Docker cases as SIBLING containers through the mounted host socket (Docker-outside-of-Docker). Resolved the README conflict (master had grown to eight CLIs since the branch was cut) and moved the Compose blurb out of the feature bullets into Quick Start, next to the other ways of starting Codeman. Three review findings from the PR discussion are fixed here rather than left for a follow-up, because two of them are shipped-image problems: - `.dockerignore` excluded `.env` only at the ROOT. A pattern is matched against the whole context-relative path, so `docker/.env` — which the deployment's own README tells the user to fill with CODEMAN_PASSWORD and provider API keys — was picked up by `COPY . .` and baked into the image at /opt/codeman/docker/.env. Verified in both directions against a real build context: with a canary secret in docker/.env, the unfixed ignore file lets /ctx/docker/.env through, and `/.env` (plus `/.env.*` and a negation for the checked-in .env.example) leaves only the example behind. - `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` moved the server's CASES_DIR but not the CLI's, which still hardcoded ~/codeman-cases, so `codeman skill install --case <name>` reported "Case not found" on exactly the deployment the override exists for. Both now resolve through config/cases-dir.ts. state-store.ts keeps its own literal on purpose: that one migrates the historical ~/claudeman-cases directory by name and is about the old default, not the active location. - CLAUDE.md gained the Compose paragraph (the sibling-container inversion, the three env vars, the .dockerignore and root-owned-bind traps) and .dockerignore joins the documented list of files that genuinely belong in the repo root. The PR's `mode === 'claude'` guard on dockerResumeId is an unrelated master bug fix riding along: appendResumeFlag() maps a resume id onto codex/gemini/pi/grok/ deepseek/omp/antigravity and RESUME_ID_SAFE accepts a UUID, so a Docker case's lastClaudeSessionId was handed to every non-claude CLI. Full gate green in a merge worktree: 6360 tests, lint, format, frontend syntax, public assets, lockfile.	2026-09-01 11:32:03 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	0da0c8219d	chore: version packages 1.24.2. Also corrects two numbers in the CLAUDE.md trust-dialog paragraph that was written while the fix was still uncommitted: the keystroke cap is 6, not 3, and the scan now schedules its own follow-up read rather than waiting on PTY output that a static dialog never produces.	2026-09-01 02:31:31 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	aaa93d4252	fix(session): answer Claude Code 2.1.252's reversed folder-trust dialog Every claude session in a directory claude had not seen before died about six seconds after it started (`Pane is dead (status 1)`), before the agent drew a composer. Reproduced on a fresh case and measured. Claude Code 2.1.252 rewrote the dialog. It used to be ❯ 1. Yes, I trust this folder 2. No, exit and is now unnumbered, reversed, and highlights the option that quits: ❯ No, exit Yes, I trust this folder Detection still worked (the confirm affordance carries the match once the numbered option text is gone), so the failure was entirely in the answer: the auto-accept pressed Enter on the highlighted default, which is now exit. trustDialogNextKey() reads the ❯ marker off the rendered pane and returns ONE keystroke at a time: an arrow while the cursor is on the wrong option, Enter only once the screen shows it on the trust option, and null for a frame that does not say. Both layouts are handled, and which way the trust option lies is read from the frame rather than assumed, so a further reordering costs a repaint instead of a session. The last marked option wins, because the direct-PTY fallback reads an append-only buffer where an older frame must not out-vote the freshest one. Two things only a live pane showed: - The scan ran solely from the PTY onData handler. The arrow that moves the cursor is the last output the pane produces, so the first fix parked every session with the cursor sitting on the right option and no Enter ever sent. It now schedules its own follow-up read (_trustDialogTimer, cleared in _clearAllTimers()), offset past the scan throttle so the chain cannot break on a boundary. - The keystroke cap goes 3 -> 6, since answering is no longer one press. The bundled codeman skill had the same blind \r as its bounded fallback, so preamble 1.21.0 replaces it with _trust_key/_accept_trust: read terminal?full=1, steer onto the trust option, re-read, then confirm. Those keystrokes go out under their own clientId, because input sequence numbers are monotonic per client and spending prompt numbers on dialog keys would make the next send-and-wait look like a stale duplicate and vanish while reporting success. The readiness recipes in docs/extending-codeman.md, docs/api-reference.md and the skill's own reference carry the corrected answer, plus a symptom-table entry for a worker whose pane is dead seconds after spawn. Verified live on an isolated instance (own data dir and tmux socket): fresh case -> arrow at 5 s -> Enter at 7 s -> composer, with hasTrustDialogAccepted recorded. With the server-side auto-accept disabled in a throwaway copy, the skill's fallback cleared a genuinely parked dialog in 1.1 s and spawn_worker took a brand-new case to a live composer in 7.2 s; spawn_workers + sendwait + last_text then ran end to end.	2026-09-01 02:31:26 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	3518af3a9f	docs: correct CLAUDE.md drift and document four undocumented subsystems Audit of CLAUDE.md against the tree. Verified still accurate: the 31-module frontend load order (matches index.html exactly), SSE registry parity at 157 = 157 (confirmed by running the parity test), config/ 21 files, types/ 22 domain files, 136 mobile device profiles, the version line, and every Quick Reference command. Drift corrected: 24 route modules to 25, ~220 handlers to ~227, system-routes 51 to 56, app.js ~5K lines to ~6.7K and 30 modules to 31, install.sh 92KB to 104KB. Completed the CLI resolver inventory, which was missing deepseek-cli-resolver and omp-cli-resolver even though both modes are documented, and named the shared cli-executable-resolver lookup chain. Filled the gaps found by sweeping every src module against the file: - Owner tab layouts (COD-359) had 6 source modules, 7 test files, 2 routes, an SSE event and a state.json key, with zero mentions anywhere in CLAUDE.md or docs/. The paragraph records the four things a reader would otherwise get wrong: it is backend-only as of 1.24.1 with no frontend consumer, the service is the sole mutation boundary, it projects onto PUT /api/session-order rather than replacing it, and reconciliation is gated on a successful restore. - codeman doctor and codeman users were undocumented top-level CLI commands. - Four subsystems whose invariants lived only in their @fileoverview: the workspace-trust dialog recognizer, proc-tree's bounded walk (the 2026-07-30 incident that took a machine down), deepseek-web-server (one child process, deliberately not a shell session), and the Files panel search matcher (globs are never compiled to a RegExp). Also fixes a stale "156 event types" comment in constants.js (actual: 157) and a contradiction in AGENTS.md, which still carried the retired "never run the full suite inside a managed tmux session" rule against CLAUDE.md's current "npm test is the gate and is safe to run bare". Note: the trust-dialog paragraph documents trustDialogNextKey(), which is part of a sibling session's in-flight fix for the Claude Code 2.1.252 layout change (unnumbered, reversed options with "No, exit" highlighted, so a blind carriage return picks exit and kills the pane). That fix was uncommitted in the shared tree when this landed, so the doc leads the code until it is committed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NMN8UuvdBim3iM87reuQ9Z	2026-09-01 02:10:09 +02:00
Devvyn	e2179bd530	chore(docker): remove local handover references	2026-08-27 19:42:37 +08:00
Devvyn	b85f7659b7	feat(docker): add Compose deployment support	2026-08-27 19:38:38 +08:00