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fix(terminal): keep unrelated rows out of wrapped links
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@@ -224,6 +224,8 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
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**File-path links (terminal + chat)**: a path an agent prints is clickable on BOTH surfaces and opens the file-preview overlay. ⚠️ ONE pattern (`FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN` / `absoluteFilePathPattern()` in constants.js) feeds the xterm link provider AND `_linkifyFilePaths()`, a fresh instance per call (`lastIndex`). Both call `findFilePathLinks()`, which adds `~/`, relative and folder paths without overlapping a rooted match or a URL; a relative path resolves against `workingDir` (`resolveLinkedFilePath`), `~/` only server-side on the session's host (attachment route), and `terminalPathLine()` joins a path a program hard-wrapped short of the edge. ⚠️ A folder link opens the **folder grid**: `POST /api/sessions/:id/folders` guards + GRANTS the folder (`folder-listing.ts`, own registry, never the 200-capped attachment registry), files come by bare name via `…/folders/:folderId/files/:name/*` through `resolveServableAttachmentPath` plus the same extension/regular-file gate on the symlink's resolved target, so no browser request carries a path; `~/` is refused in a Docker case (the container's home is not this host's). The chat linkifier walks TEXT NODES with DOM APIs, never rebuilds sanitized markup as a string. ⚠️ An out-of-workspace path goes through the ATTACHMENT routes (`POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` with `notify: false`), never by widening `file-content`/`file-raw` or `file-stream-manager`'s `tail -f` allowlist. ⚠️ `TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS` (never a second list), and widening READ must never widen RUN: `html`/`htm`/`svg` stay download-only, other text is inert `text/plain`+`nosniff`. ⚠️ The ONE place HTML renders is `/html-view/<cap>/...` (`html-view-routes.ts`, `html-view-capabilities.ts`): `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` mints a capability for the file's own directory, every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT `allow-same-origin` (opaque origin even as a top-level tab, so the page can never read Codeman or drive its API) and with NO fetch directive (open network, owner decision 2026-10-13: never restrict it or add `allow-same-origin` without the owner), and only non-dot, asset-allowlisted files under that directory are served (GET/HEAD only; capabilities revoked with the web-tab ones on logout). That tree is served recursively, so minting is refused for a hidden directory or a broad root (`isBroadHtmlViewRoot`); the preview renders by default and the **Page** pill (or a refused mint) falls through to the source view and its Edit button. Never serve HTML same-origin anywhere else. Tests: `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts`. Media extensions are single-sourced in `attachment-registry.ts`. ⚠️ **XLSX previews parse in the BROWSER**, never on the server; the admission limits that keep a hostile workbook from freezing the worker live in `src/web/CLAUDE.md` (Spreadsheet preview). → [architecture-invariants#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer)
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The terminal provider scans `terminalLinkLine()`, which extends `terminalPathLine()` for URL continuations in indented paragraphs and table cells. List markers, bare numbers and version tokens never continue a URL. `terminalCellWrappedPaths()` follows each table cell independently, gated by `pathContinuation()` and the per-cell row-length rule; accepted paths displace other links on their cells. Full-width divider rows stop `terminalLogicalLine()` stitching for both links and touch selection. OSC 8 links confirm the real target URI before the shared opener runs.
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**Filesystem path picker** (Link Existing "Browse" + the mobile keyboard's `📁 Path` key): lazy one-directory browsing via `GET /api/filesystem/browse`, with `GET /api/filesystem/preview` for the tapped file. Inserts the path **without** Enter, so the prompt is never submitted; the sibling `⌫ All` key clears only the unsent prompt and must never send the agent's `/clear`. ⚠️ This is a **second file-serving surface and inherits neither the attachment confinement nor its ownership scoping** — it allowlists Home, `CASES_DIR`, `/mnt/d` and `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS`, blocks sensitive trees, and rejects symlink escapes **after** `realpath`. ⚠️ The optional `sessionId` is an ownership boundary that must be `canAccessOwned`-checked by hand (it does not go through `findSessionOrFail`), and in multi-user mode a non-admin gets only their own `userSpacePath` as a root: per-user spaces live INSIDE `homedir()`, so a `Home` root exposes every other user's workspace. Previews go through the same global conversion limiter, and Markdown/TXT/JSON are served as inert `text/plain`. → [architecture-invariants#filesystem-path-picker](docs/architecture-invariants.md#filesystem-path-picker)
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**File Viewer edit mode** (issue #212): the file-preview overlay edits workspace text files in place — `GET .../file-content?edit=1` + `PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content`, policy in `src/config/file-editing.ts`. This is a **third file surface and the only one that WRITES**: read-path confinement (realpath + workspace + ownership) plus sensitive/blocked/`.git` denies and an extension **allowlist**; writes are `wx`-temp + rename (no `O_CREAT` anywhere = edit-in-place is structural); optimistic concurrency via sha256 `baseHash` → 409. ⚠️ `edit=1` never truncates and the client must never save a plain-preview buffer (the 500-line truncation would silently delete the rest). ⚠️ CRLF/UTF-8 guards: EOL re-applied server-side, non-UTF-8 refused via round-trip compare. → [architecture-invariants#file-viewer-edit-mode](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-viewer-edit-mode), `docs/file-viewer-edit-plan.md`
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@@ -409,6 +409,8 @@ A file path an agent prints is a link on both surfaces it can appear on, and cli
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**Path forms beyond the rooted one.** `findFilePathLinks(text)` (constants.js) is the single entry point both consumers call; it returns the rooted matches first, then `~/` and relative paths (`RELATIVE_FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN`, same extension list, pinned equal by `test/link-provider-regex.test.ts`), then folder paths, each only where it overlaps neither an earlier match nor an `http(s)` URL. A relative match must start at a boundary (line start, whitespace, quote, bracket, `=`, `,`, `>`), so it can never begin inside a word, an absolute path or a URL; brackets, `=` and `,` end it (`(shot.png)`, `OUT=shots/a.png`). `resolveLinkedFilePath()` resolves a relative path against the session's `workingDir` (`.`/`..` collapsed, so `../x.png` lands outside and routes like any external path) and passes absolute and `~/` paths through. ⚠️ `~` is the home of the SESSION'S host, which only the server knows: `~/` paths always take the attachment route, where `registerExternalAttachment` expands them (`homedir()` locally, `$HOME` inside the remote probe script), and the guard runs on the expanded, realpath-resolved path as before. ⚠️ Programs hard-wrap their own output short of the terminal edge (Claude Code breaks tool output at 59-118 columns), so xterm's `isWrapped` never fires. `terminalPathLine()` (link provider only; touch selection keeps `terminalLogicalLine`) joins the next row when the previous row ends in a path token with a `/` and no extension and the join reaches an extension; a row that starts a new path is never joined: rooted or `~/`, `./`/`../`, or a relative one that opens on the same top directory the broken token did (the next entry of `git ls-files`/`find`/`ls -R`: `src/components` + `src/index.ts` are two paths, not `src/componentssrc/index.ts`), while a wrapped path continues INSIDE a name, so `…/captures/2` + `026-10-10/…` still joins; a 3+ row chain is kept only if a later row completes the path, and the broken row must be at least as long as the continuing one (keeps `cd /mnt/foo` + a longer next line apart). Tests: `test/file-path-link-forms.test.ts`.
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The terminal provider scans `terminalLinkLine()`, which extends `terminalPathLine()` for URL continuations in indented paragraphs and table cells. List markers, bare numbers and version tokens never continue a URL. `terminalCellWrappedPaths()` follows each table cell independently, gated by `pathContinuation()` and the per-cell row-length rule; accepted paths displace other links on their cells. Full-width divider rows stop `terminalLogicalLine()` stitching for both links and touch selection. OSC 8 links confirm the real target URI before the shared opener runs.
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**Folder grid: a folder is granted, then served by bare file name.** A folder path (rooted or `~/` whose last segment has no extension, relative only with a trailing `/`; `FOLDER_PATH_LINK_PATTERN` + `folderLinkPath()`) opens `openFolderGrid()` (panels-ui.js), as does the preview's "Show folder" button. `POST /api/sessions/:id/folders {path}` (`src/folder-listing.ts`) resolves the folder (locally a bounded `probePathKind(…, { pastCap: true })` first, then async `fs.realpath`; remotely one ssh round trip via `remoteListFolder`, through `runWithRemoteSshLimit`), runs the attachment guard on it (blocklist, `confineToWorkspace`, and in multi-user mode `folderAllowedForUser`: a non-admin only inside their own `userSpacePath` or the session's `workingDir`, as the filesystem path picker), locally BEFORE reading it, lists non-hidden subfolders and files of a supported attachment type (each file also blocklist-checked, newest first, capped at `MAX_FOLDER_ENTRIES`), and GRANTS it an id. Files are then fetched as `GET …/folders/:folderId/files/:name/(raw|preview|thumbnail)`: `:name` must be a bare file name of a supported type (no `/`, `\`, NUL, no leading `.`, since the listing hides those), the local file is probed bounded (`unknown` → 503, never 404), and the joined path goes through the SAME `resolveServableAttachmentPath` as an attachment by id (symlink re-resolution, remote re-probe, guard), then the same gate registration applies to what a symlink RESOLVES to (a supported extension on the resolved path and a regular file: locally `fs.stat`, remotely the probe kind; else 400, so `shot.png -> ../secret.bin` is not served and a FIFO or device behind a supported name never reaches `open`), then `folderAllowedForUser` once more on the resolved file, before `serveServableRaw` (the attachment raw route's body, shared) streams it. So browser requests still never carry a path. ⚠️ Grants live in their own registry (`folderGrants`, 32 per session, cleared with the session's attachments), NOT the attachment registry: that one is capped at 200 per session, and paging a folder of 300 renders would evict the session's real attachments. ⚠️ A local folder is never touched unbounded (#516 rule): a folder on a network mount that stopped answering answers 503 with `describeUnknownPath()`, not 404 and not a frozen server. ⚠️ The remote listing script tells "missing" (`E|n`, 404) from "is a file" (`E|f`, 400 `Not a folder`), because the client falls back to the file preview on `Not a folder`; a remote extensionless file otherwise answered "Folder not found". ⚠️ `.folder-grid-overlay` sits at `z-index: 5090`, one step BELOW the preview (5100) and above the response viewer (5000): a tile's preview opens on top and closing it lands back on the grid. ⚠️ ←/→/Esc are handled in a document CAPTURE listener with `stopPropagation`, because the terminal keeps keyboard focus under the overlays and an arrow that reached xterm would be typed into the session; inputs other than xterm's helper textarea keep their keys. ⚠️ A route PARAMETER is capped by the router (Fastify's default is 100 characters, answered as 404 "Route not found"), and a file name goes up to 255, percent-encoded: the server sets `routerOptions.maxParamLength` to `MAX_ROUTE_PARAM_LENGTH` (route-helpers.ts), the route test harness uses the same constant, and a wiring guard pins it. ⚠️ `~/` in a Docker case is refused with 400 (attachment POST and `POST …/folders`): the session is local for these routes, but `~` inside the container is the container's own home, and expanding it on the host would open a different file than the one the agent printed. Tests: `test/routes/folder-grid-routes.test.ts` (incl. the listing script on a real `sh`), `test/folder-grid-ui.test.ts`.
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**Text reuses the edit-mode allowlist; markup stays download-only.** `TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS` (`config/file-editing.ts`) rather than a second curated list that would drift from it: if the viewer would open a file for editing inside the workspace, the same file outside it can be read. The justification for widening is that the agent in the session can already `cat` any of these and the picker already previews them, so the suffix was never the confidentiality gate; the path guard is (sensitive-file blocklist, `/root` and `/etc` trees, realpath first). ⚠️ Two consequences had to be handled at the same time: `~/.codeman*/state.json` joined `isSensitivePath` (it persists `SessionState.envOverrides`, and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names like `GEMINI_API_KEY`, so it can hold a live credential), and `html`/`htm` joined `svg` in `serveRawFile`'s **download-only** branch so that widening what can be READ never widens what can RUN on our own origin. Text with no dedicated MIME entry goes out as inert `text/plain; charset=utf-8` + `nosniff`, matching the picker. ⚠️ **The one place HTML renders is `/html-view/<cap>/...`** (`html-view-routes.ts`, `html-view-capabilities.ts`), never these routes: `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` mints a capability for the HTML file's own directory, and every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT `allow-same-origin`, so the page is opaque-origin even as a top-level tab and cannot read Codeman or drive its API. ⚠️ **Network access is open, by the owner's decision (2026-10-13, #547):** `HTML_VIEW_CSP` is the `sandbox` directive alone, which REPLACES Codeman's own CSP, with no fetch directive, so a page loads scripts, styles, fonts, images and media from anywhere and may fetch, XHR, open WebSockets, send beacons and post forms anywhere, like a file opened from disk. It can read its own folder through the capability and nothing else on this server; it cannot use Codeman's origin, cookies or API, or reach other folders. Never add a fetch directive or `allow-same-origin` without the owner; the exact header is pinned in `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts`. The directory is served recursively to the page's scripts (non-dot, asset-allowlisted, realpath-confined, blocklist applied, GET/HEAD only; the dot and extension rules run on the requested name AND on the symlink-resolved target, or a `cfg.json -> .git/config` link would serve the git config), which is why minting is refused for an HTML file in a hidden directory (for a file inside the workspace, a hidden directory below the workspace root, so a workspace that itself lives under one still renders) or directly in a broad root (`/`, home, `/tmp`, `/var/tmp` and `$TMPDIR` (named literally, since macOS sets `TMPDIR` in every terminal), the cases and user-space roots, a drive's mount point such as WSL's `/mnt/d`) or in any directory above one of them (`/home`, `/Users`, macOS's `/private`; `isBroadHtmlViewRoot`). A capability minted for a folder outside the workspace records that, and the serving route refuses it per request once `attachmentConfineToWorkspace` is on, the same re-check the attachment serve path makes. The preview renders it by default; the **Page** pill (`htmlRendered`, per-device like `mdRendered`) and any refused mint fall through to the source view with its Edit button. Tests: `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts`, the html-view block in `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`, `test/webview-capability-revocation.test.ts`. The by-id text preview is bounded like the workspace one: a `Range` request for the first 512KB (a real partial read, not a discarded 50MB download) plus a 500-line cap, with the footer saying so.
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@@ -2568,7 +2568,8 @@ function findTerminalUrls(text) {
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* - the next row is indented no further right than the column the URL
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* started in (a table cell or list item continuation, not unrelated text);
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* - that row's first token looks like URL material (contains one of
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* `% & = / ? . - _` or a digit) and is not itself a new `scheme://`.
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* `% & = / ? . - _`), is not a bare number/version or list marker,
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* and is not itself a new `scheme://`.
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* The last rule is what stops prose such as "…/files/" + "then run it" from
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* being glued into one link.
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*
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@@ -2609,7 +2610,7 @@ function terminalUrlContinuationExtent(buffer, row, cols, maxRows) {
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const nextText = next.translateToString(true) || '';
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const indent = nextText.length - nextText.replace(/^\s+/, '').length;
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const token = nextText.slice(indent).split(/\s/, 1)[0];
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if (!token || indent > urlStartCol) break;
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if (!token || indent > urlStartCol || /^(?:\d+[.)]|[-*•])(?:\s|$)/.test(nextText.slice(indent))) break;
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// When other table columns follow the URL, the next row must align with
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// the start of its cell. A new numbered row must not become URL text.
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if (
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@@ -2621,7 +2622,7 @@ function terminalUrlContinuationExtent(buffer, row, cols, maxRows) {
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)
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break;
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if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(token) || !/^[A-Za-z0-9%_~]/.test(token)) break;
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if (!/[%&=/?.\-_0-9]/.test(token)) break;
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if (!/[%&=/?.\-_]/.test(token) || /^v?\d+(?:\.\d+)*(?:[-+][\w.-]+)?[.,;:!?)]?$/i.test(token)) break;
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const nextLogical = terminalLogicalLine(buffer, endRow + 1, cols, bound);
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if (!nextLogical) break;
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if (trailingColumns) firstRowUrlEnd = last.rawEnd;
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@@ -2716,9 +2717,9 @@ function terminalLinkLine(buffer, row, cols, maxRows) {
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* edge is where its text starts after the previous ≥2-space column gap, and the
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* continuation is the token starting at exactly that column on the next row.
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* A fragment qualifies only when it is the last thing in its cell on that row
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* (row end or a ≥2-space gap follows), and the join is accepted only when the
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* whole joined string matches the path pattern from its first character, which
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* is what keeps unrelated cell text from being glued on.
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* (row end or a ≥2-space gap follows). Every continuation must pass
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* pathContinuation and its cell must be no wider than the preceding cell's
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* text, so independent listing rows and longer prose never displace links.
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*
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* Pure: reads rows only. Cells are taken one per string character (xterm rows
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* with wide glyphs would shift columns; such rows simply fail the alignment).
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@@ -2768,6 +2769,7 @@ function terminalCellWrappedPaths(buffer, row, maxRows) {
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while ((e = edge.exec(upToPath)) !== null) cellCol = e.index + e[0].length;
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let joined = text.slice(start, end);
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let previousCellLength = end - cellCol;
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const segments = [{ row: startRow, startCol: start, endCol: end }];
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for (let r = startRow + 1; r < startRow + bound; r++) {
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const line = buffer.getLine(r);
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@@ -2776,7 +2778,11 @@ function terminalCellWrappedPaths(buffer, row, maxRows) {
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if (!next || !isPathChar(next[cellCol]) || (cellCol > 0 && next[cellCol - 1] !== ' ')) break;
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let tokenEnd = cellCol;
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while (tokenEnd < next.length && isPathChar(next[tokenEnd])) tokenEnd++;
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const candidate = joined + next.slice(cellCol, tokenEnd);
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const token = next.slice(cellCol, tokenEnd);
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// Include prose after the token in this cell, but not another column.
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const cellText = next.slice(cellCol).split(/ {2,}|[│┃║|]/, 1)[0].trimEnd();
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if (cellText.length > previousCellLength || !pathContinuation(joined, token)) break;
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const candidate = joined + token;
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const match = absoluteFilePathPattern().exec(candidate);
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if (match && match.index === 0 && match[0].length > joined.length) {
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segments.push({ row: r, startCol: cellCol, endCol: cellCol + match[0].length - joined.length });
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@@ -2785,6 +2791,7 @@ function terminalCellWrappedPaths(buffer, row, maxRows) {
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}
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if (!endsCell(next, tokenEnd)) break;
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joined = candidate;
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previousCellLength = cellText.length;
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segments.push({ row: r, startCol: cellCol, endCol: tokenEnd });
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}
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}
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@@ -2408,13 +2408,14 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
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/**
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* xterm's handler for OSC 8 hyperlinks (a program's own `ESC ]8;;url` links),
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* which take precedence over the text link provider. Routed through the same
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* opener, and only for web URLs: any other scheme a program sends is ignored.
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* opener after confirming the real target (the label may hide it), and only
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* for web URLs: any other scheme a program sends is ignored.
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*/
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_terminalOsc8LinkHandler() {
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return {
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activate: (_event, text) => {
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if (!/^https?:\/\/[^\s\x00-\x1f]+$/i.test(text)) return;
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this._openTerminalUrl(text);
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if (window.confirm(`Open this link?\n\n${text}`)) this._openTerminalUrl(text);
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},
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};
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},
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@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
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import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
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import { join } from 'path';
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import vm from 'node:vm';
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const publicFile = (name: string) => readFileSync(join(__dirname, '..', 'src', 'web', 'public', name), 'utf-8');
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@@ -99,8 +100,9 @@ describe('terminal link-provider regexes (shipped source)', () => {
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// Excluding `&` truncated every real query string: a WordPress edit link
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// resolved to `?post=1479` and opened the wrong page, and Claude Code's OAuth
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// login URL (many `&` params) was not clickable at all.
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const url = shippedPattern('urlPattern');
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const strip = (u: string) => u.replace(/[.,;:!?)&]+$/, '');
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const context = vm.createContext({ console, window: undefined });
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vm.runInContext(`${CONSTANTS_SOURCE}\nglobalThis.findUrls = findTerminalUrls;`, context);
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const findUrls = context.findUrls as (text: string) => Array<{ url: string }>;
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const cases: Array<[string, string]> = [
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[
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'updated in place: https://bio-hacking.blog/wp-admin/post.php?post=1479&action=edit',
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@@ -115,10 +117,7 @@ describe('terminal link-provider regexes (shipped source)', () => {
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['trailing https://x.com/a?b=1& next', 'https://x.com/a?b=1'],
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];
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for (const [line, want] of cases) {
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url.lastIndex = 0;
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const m = url.exec(line);
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expect(m, line).not.toBeNull();
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expect(strip(m![0]), line).toBe(want);
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expect(findUrls(line).map((match) => match.url), line).toEqual([want]);
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}
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});
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@@ -57,6 +57,14 @@ const TABLE: Row[] = [
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{ text: ROW2 },
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{ text: '' },
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];
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const LISTINGS = [
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['/tmp/x', '/tmp/x/dir', '/tmp/x/dir/a.png'],
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[' ⎿ /home/u/proj/src', ' /home/u/proj/src/a.ts'],
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['4.0K /tmp/foo/bar/', '8.0K /tmp/foo/baz.png'],
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['/home/u/proj/docs:', 'guide.md notes.md'],
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['Created /tmp/out', 'report.md written next to it'],
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];
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const BEFORE = '/tmp/demo-check/docs/review/BLDMESH-243/before-overview.png';
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const AFTER = '/tmp/demo-check/docs/review/BLDMESH-243/after-overview.png';
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@@ -70,6 +78,11 @@ describe('terminalCellWrappedPaths', () => {
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}
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});
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it.each(LISTINGS.map((lines) => [lines]))('does not join independent listing rows: %j', (lines) => {
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const rows = lines.map((text) => ({ text }));
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for (let row = 0; row < rows.length; row++) expect(find(fakeBuffer(rows, COLS), row)).toEqual([]);
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});
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it('places the segments on the path cells only', () => {
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const hits = find(fakeBuffer(TABLE, COLS), 1);
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const before = hits.find((h) => h.path === BEFORE)!;
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@@ -188,6 +201,20 @@ describe('terminal link provider with cell-wrapped paths', () => {
|
||||
return { provide, app };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
it.each(LISTINGS.map((lines) => [lines]))('preserves ordinary listing links: %j', (lines) => {
|
||||
const { provide } = harness(lines.map((text) => ({ text })));
|
||||
const expected = [
|
||||
['/tmp/x', '/tmp/x/dir', '/tmp/x/dir/a.png'],
|
||||
['/home/u/proj/src', '/home/u/proj/src/a.ts'],
|
||||
['/tmp/foo/bar/', '/tmp/foo/baz.png'],
|
||||
['/home/u/proj/docs', 'guide.md'],
|
||||
['/tmp/out', 'report.md'],
|
||||
][LISTINGS.indexOf(lines)];
|
||||
for (let row = 0; row < lines.length; row++) {
|
||||
expect(provide(row + 1).map((link) => link.text)).toContain(expected[row]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('makes both screenshot paths clickable from either row and opens the whole path', () => {
|
||||
const { provide, app } = harness(TABLE);
|
||||
for (const line of [2, 3]) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ describe('terminalLogicalLine', () => {
|
||||
const ROW1 = ' ackage/thing';
|
||||
const HARD = [{ text: ROW0 }, { text: ROW1 }];
|
||||
|
||||
it('keeps full-width dividers out of link and touch-selection text', () => {
|
||||
const rows = buffer([{ text: '─'.repeat(COLS) }, { text: 'https://example.com/docs' }]);
|
||||
expect(terminalLogicalLine(rows, 0, COLS)).toMatchObject({ startRow: 0, endRow: 0, text: '─'.repeat(COLS) });
|
||||
expect(terminalLogicalLine(rows, 1, COLS)).toMatchObject({ startRow: 1, endRow: 1, text: 'https://example.com/docs' });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('stitches a hard wrap and drops the indent the continuation carries', () => {
|
||||
const line = terminalLogicalLine(buffer(HARD), 0, COLS)!;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -168,6 +168,16 @@ describe('terminalUrlContinuationExtent (wrap joining)', () => {
|
||||
expect(terminalUrlContinuationExtent(buffer, 4, COLS, 12)).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it.each([
|
||||
['1. https://example.com/one/', '2. https://example.com/two/'],
|
||||
['Docs: https://docs.example.com/guide/', '1. Install the package'],
|
||||
['Fetching https://registry.example.com/pkg/', 'v1.2.3 is the latest'],
|
||||
['GET http://localhost:3000/api/', '200 OK in 12ms'],
|
||||
])('keeps list, version and status rows separate after %s', (first, next) => {
|
||||
const buffer = fakeBuffer([{ text: first }, { text: next }], 100);
|
||||
for (const row of [0, 1]) expect(terminalUrlContinuationExtent(buffer, row, 100, 12)).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not glue a following prose line onto a URL that ends a line', () => {
|
||||
const buffer = fakeBuffer(
|
||||
[{ text: 'Download from https://example.com/files/' }, { text: 'then run the installer' }],
|
||||
@@ -204,11 +214,12 @@ describe('terminalUrlContinuationExtent (wrap joining)', () => {
|
||||
describe('native OSC 8 terminal URLs', () => {
|
||||
it('opens complete HTTP links through the terminal opener and rejects unsafe schemes', () => {
|
||||
const open = vi.fn();
|
||||
const confirm = vi.fn(() => true);
|
||||
const context = vm.createContext({
|
||||
console,
|
||||
CodemanApp: class CodemanApp {},
|
||||
document: { addEventListener: vi.fn() },
|
||||
window: { addEventListener: vi.fn(), removeEventListener: vi.fn() },
|
||||
window: { addEventListener: vi.fn(), removeEventListener: vi.fn(), confirm },
|
||||
});
|
||||
vm.runInContext(`${CONSTANTS}\n${TERMINAL_UI}\nglobalThis.__proto = CodemanApp.prototype;`, context);
|
||||
const proto = (
|
||||
@@ -220,10 +231,16 @@ describe('native OSC 8 terminal URLs', () => {
|
||||
const url = 'https://docs.example.com/Doc.aspx?file=Q3%20Plan&action=default&mobileredirect=true';
|
||||
handler.activate(null, url);
|
||||
expect(open).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(url);
|
||||
expect(confirm).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(`Open this link?\n\n${url}`);
|
||||
confirm.mockReturnValue(false);
|
||||
handler.activate(null, 'http://localhost:3000/private');
|
||||
expect(confirm).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith('Open this link?\n\nhttp://localhost:3000/private');
|
||||
expect(open).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
for (const unsafe of ['javascript:alert(1)', 'data:text/html,hello', 'file:///etc/passwd']) {
|
||||
handler.activate(null, unsafe);
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(open).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
expect(confirm).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user