The four review items of #797, applied at merge.
The editor's name rule lowercases, the data dir's .env pattern did not:
.codeman/.ENV passed both, and on a case-insensitive filesystem (the macOS
default) that is ~/.codeman/.env, the login file codeman attach reads. A
session whose workspace is the home folder could open and save it. The
pattern is case-insensitive now, pinned in the blocklist table and on the
three editor routes.
A save writes a new file and renames it over the old one, so the file took
the server's own group: a 0640 .env owned you:www-data came back you:you
and the web server lost read access. The save now puts the old user and
group back where the account may (best effort), and the wiki says mode
and group instead of permissions.
Tests: an .env in an outside worktree is refused on edit=1 and PUT too,
now that the editor's own gate lets dotenv through; the comment on why
.env.example is blocked for downloads and attachments is back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plain preview already serves a workspace dotenv file in full to the same user, so refusing the edit protected nothing. The edit gate now passes allowDotenv to the sensitive-path check, which skips only the two dotenv patterns; every other credential pattern, a dotenv file inside a blocked tree and Codeman's own data-dir login file stay blocked. Downloads and attachments are unchanged.
Closes#212. The file-preview overlay can now edit workspace text files in
place, phone-first: agent writes a file, you review it in the viewer, tweak
two lines, save, tell the agent to continue.
Backend (file-routes.ts, policy in src/config/file-editing.ts):
- GET file-content?edit=1: read-for-edit that never truncates (a truncated
buffer must never become an edit buffer), 512KB cap (413 over it), and
returns the sha256 hash + detected EOL the client echoes back on save.
- PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content: edit-in-place only, with no O_CREAT
anywhere in the handler. Confinement matches the read path (realpath +
workspace boundary + ownership via findSessionOrFail), plus sensitive-path
and attachment-guard blocklists, a .git subtree deny, and an extension
allowlist (svg and env deliberately excluded). Optimistic concurrency via
baseHash: mismatch is a 409 unless force. Writes are wx-temp + fchmod +
fsync + rename, closing the validate-then-write TOCTOU window.
- Corruption guards: NUL sniff + UTF-8 round-trip compare (refuses binary
and latin-1), and server-side EOL re-application so a textarea's LF
normalization cannot rewrite every line of a CRLF file.
- Plain reads gain an additive editable flag the UI keys the button off.
Frontend (panels-ui.js + overlay markup/styles):
- Edit button on editable text previews; textarea editor with Save/Cancel,
dirty indicator, discard-confirm on cancel/close, and a conflict dialog
that offers overwrite (force) when the file changed on disk mid-edit.
- Phone: full-bleed window sized by --app-height so the editor and Save bar
track the OS keyboard; 16px editor font (iOS zoom guard); no autofocus.
- zh-CN strings for the new chrome.
Tests: pure policy unit tests plus a route suite that deliberately does NOT
mock node:fs. It runs against a real temp workspace so symlink escapes,
write-through of in-workspace symlinks, mode preservation, CRLF round-trip,
409/force, and the no-create property are exercised for real. Also verified
end to end on an isolated beta instance: 39-check curl matrix, Playwright
desktop flow (real clicks and typing, bytes asserted on disk, live conflict
with an external rewrite), and a 393px phone profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeman maintainer