Conflicts resolved as on test/desktop-macbook: config/test-suites.ts keeps both browser tests (desktop-connect-page and local-model-ui), and the CLAUDE.md state-files line keeps #778's cli-installed entry with the local model's local-model.json and local-model/ entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The runner header says what each caller passes (the job: the compiled stock
command; the route: the merged entry, behind cliManagementEnabled).
docs/cli-registry.md names both executors in its trust boundary. The
security architecture gains a section on the pinned runtime and its hash,
the loopback port without a login and the digest check, and the install
path without cliManagementEnabled; SECURITY.md lists the port as a known
limitation. The guides and the rules name exactly the paths the launch
guard covers, the session that keeps calling a stopped runtime's port, the
claim before the connect writes, and the outcome kept in memory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keep the 1.49.0 API meaning: liveWorktree and root=live stay inside the
session folder, and an outside worktree is published as outsideWorktree
and walked only with root=live-any.
Refuse a symlinked .git folder as the main worktree, sensitive files
inside a followed worktree, and any outside worktree while attachment
confinement is on or around a blocked tree. The file routes re-check
the guard settings on every request, and a throwing rule check refuses.
The panel keeps its Back to worktree button while pinned to the session
folder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#772 made the Files panel follow an agent into a worktree inside the
session's folder. A worktree beside the repository (git worktree add
../feature, or an EnterWorktree into one that already exists there)
stayed unfollowed, since serving it needs a second confinement root.
findOutsideWorktree() answers that case without running git. The
nearest .git above the pane must name <common dir>/worktrees/<id> of the
session's own repository, and that registry entry must name the
candidate back (or the .git folder must be the common dir itself). It
refuses /, the home folder and above, any folder holding workingDir and
Docker case workspaces, and multi-user mode applies the owner's
folderAllowedForUser rule. The answer is liveWorktree with outside: true
and the folder's real path.
The file routes serve an absolute path inside that worktree, and only
while the folder still resolves to the recorded path. A relative path
still resolves against workingDir alone. The browser routes such paths
to the editable preview, and root-relative markdown refs resolve from
the top of the worktree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Name the real trigger and CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN=0 in the READMEs and the
Installation page, add the install without git to the update tables and the
updater notes, record the installer's downloads in the supply chain section,
and say that the data directory question also removes a kept runtime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The setting told users the sandbox and approvals stay on. With it on, a
command in Codex's sandbox can call Codeman's API, which can start a session
outside the sandbox with no approval prompt. Measured on codex 0.162.0 with
`codex sandbox`: a touch the sandbox refused landed through POST /api/sessions,
and from inside a Codeman pane it landed with a password set too, because a
pane inherits CODEMAN_PASSWORD. Without that password the same call gets 401.
The settings row, the wiki, the skill and the changeset now say so, the wiki
Security page and security-architecture name it, and the docs scope the claims
to what the code does: app-wide, local launches only, not cron jobs, and
--no-daemon is a local launch's flag. Agent-CLIs gains the --no-daemon
trade-off. A test pins that no surface sells the sandbox as still in charge.
Text only: the switch, the clamp and the launch are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The release note and the security doc read as if no file view could return it. The
attachment, folder and download routes refuse it; file-raw serves a session's own
workspace without the blocklist, so a session rooted at the home directory can
still read it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Discord bot token was readable through the attachment routes, because
discord.json was not on the sensitive list, and so were webhook.json,
custom-model-hosts.json and the generated custom-model configs. Config backups
were the wider gap: a dated copy of users.json or settings.json matched none of
the name-anchored patterns. All are blocked now.
`codeman notify --file` relied on folder confinement alone, which holds nothing
back when a tab's folder is the home directory, and it would also post a
workspace .env. It now applies the attachment blocklist to the real path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner decision. Typing the note into a brand-new non-Claude tab spent a model
turn per tab and, for a spawned worker or a scheduled run, landed with the first
real prompt. Claude keeps its hint through the system prompt, and every other CLI
is told nothing. The setting goes with the path it gated: sessionIdle, the fresh
set, isHintableSession and the session:idle wiring. sendInput loses `fromUser`,
which was only ever false for the hint, and the deps test pins that a reply is a
person's own input.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- a lone digit reply is typed without Enter while the tab has a pending permission or question
- the gateway starts after restoreMuxSessions (hold and release), so a reply during restore is not told the tab is gone
- discord-notify resolves an id prefix only among sessions the caller may see
- restore docs/architecture-invariants.md from base and add only the Discord section
- docs: self-ignoring folder, no logging, Notifications group, Send test, local-tab-only Claude hint, typedHint wording
Builds the alert tail only for a post that goes out; separates deduped from disabled and never dedupes a deliberate notify; types the startup hint with fromUser false and skips resumed, remote and Docker tabs; clears per-tab maps and closes the bridge on stop; acts only on a real delete, not a detach; serialises thread-map writes; reloads the bridge after a discord.json restore; probes and self-ignores .codeman-discord; validates the message id; reacts when a reply is rate limited; documents what leaves the machine.
Moves the notify command into src/cli-notify.ts with tests, lets discord-notify take the 8-character id a Docker case exports, adds the wiki page and index entries, rewrites the stale changeset and security notes, and pins the WebServer wiring.
Alerts for permission prompts, questions, idle and errors post into a per-tab thread; a reply from an allowlisted user is typed into that tab. Thread creation, thread cleanup on tab delete and pinging are configurable. POST /api/sessions/:id/discord-notify lets a CLI ask for the user. Setup is in docs/discord-bridge.md.
The network acknowledgement that install.sh writes for every passwordless LAN install also satisfied the tunnel guard, so one click on the welcome screen's tunnel link published full terminal control to a public URL with no login and no confirm. The tunnel now needs CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL or --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel (carried by web -d and service install), and with no login the browser asks before every enable, reading a new loginConfigured field from GET /api/tunnel/status.
The guard is now decided once per request and required again where the tunnel starts, so a save that found the tunnel running can no longer restart it unguarded after a concurrent stop.
Closes#706
Reserving a slot per request refused a correct password with the slots it had
filled itself: after a restart the browser replays its cached Basic header on many
parallel requests. Identical credentials from one IP now join the verify already in
flight for them (keyed on a SHA-256 digest), skipping the gates and its scrypt cost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
In multi-user mode the per-IP and (username, IP) gates read their counts before
the verify and wrote them after it, so a concurrent burst from one IP passed both
on one stale read (29 wrong guesses plus the right password logged in). A request
that passes both gates now takes its slot before the await; a success clears it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Multi-user: add a (username, IP) failure bucket checked before verifyPassword, capped at AUTH_FAILURE_MAX, with the same decay as the other buckets; the per-IP pre-gate stays at AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX and the per-username bucket stays after the verify
A correct password now also clears that account's (username, IP) bucket, beside the IP and per-username buckets
The new bucket is disposed on server stop like the others; the comments above the gate and the constants' JSDoc describe the three buckets
Tests: 10 wrong then the correct password from one IP is a 429, the same account logs in from another IP, another account behind that IP is unaffected, and a correct password clears the pair bucket
test/multiuser-auth.test.ts: the spray test loops to AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX instead of a literal 50
Reworded the rate-limit lines in auth-config.ts, security-architecture.md, README.md, README.zh-CN.md, wiki/Security.md, endpoints.md (plus the plugin mirror), CLAUDE.md and architecture-invariants.md
docs/wiki/Remote-Access.md: add the multi-user note to the tunnel page
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single-user mode has no per-username bucket, so its per-IP bucket is the
only limit on guesses against the one password, and behind a tunnel every
client shares 127.0.0.1. Put it back on AUTH_FAILURE_MAX (10).
AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX (50) now gates only the multi-user per-IP pre-gate,
which runs before the scrypt verify and so refuses even a correct password;
the per-username bucket still caps each account at 10.
Move the headroom test out of the single-user suite and add a multi-user
test that sprays wrong passwords across usernames (9 each) and expects 401
for the first 50, then 429 for the 51st and for a correct password.
Update the docs that still described 10 per IP for every mode, and resync
the plugin mirror of the codeman skill.
One AUTH_FAILURE_MAX (10 per 15 min) gated the single-user per-IP
bucket, the multi-user per-IP pre-gate, the per-username lockout and the
hook-secret bucket. Clients sharing one egress IP (NAT, a tunnel, an
automated client retrying) were throttled after 10 failures in total.
Add AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX = 50 and use it for the two per-IP login buckets
only. The per-username lockout and the hook-secret bucket keep
AUTH_FAILURE_MAX = 10, so guessing against any one account, or against
the hook secret, is no easier than before.
Conflicts resolved against #604, #606 and #601:
- constants.js: the rooted link pattern takes html-md's `markdown` and
`html?` with #606's m4v/ogv; #604's relative pattern gets the same list
(link-provider-regex pins the two equal); #604's findFilePathLinks /
folder helpers and html-md's rendersAsPage() are both kept, and
window.CodemanFilePaths exports all of them.
- terminal-ui.js: #604's resolved `target` (relative, ~/ and folder links)
now also goes through rendersAsPage(), so every link kind routes .html to
the page preview; .md routes there through FILE_PREVIEW_EXTENSIONS.
- CLAUDE.md, api-reference, architecture-invariants: both sides' text kept.
- test/folder-grid-ui.test.ts (#604) stubs rendersAsPage() like the other
panels-ui harnesses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner decision 2026-10-13 (#547): a rendered .html page behaves like a
file opened from disk in a browser. It may load scripts, styles, fonts,
images and media from any host and make fetch, XHR, WebSocket, beacon
and form requests to any host.
The /html-view Content-Security-Policy is therefore the `sandbox`
directive alone (HTML_VIEW_CSP, now exported and documented): the same
sandbox flags as before, never `allow-same-origin`, and no fetch
directive. It replaces Codeman's own `default-src 'self'` policy on these
responses. Everything that confines a page stays: the opaque origin (no
Codeman cookies or document, API writes with `Origin: null` refused, API
reads not readable cross-origin), and the capability serving only the
page's own folder under every path, symlink, dot, extension and
confinement rule.
A new test builds the route behind registerSecurityHeaders, as in
production, and pins the exact header: one `sandbox` directive with the
current flags, no `allow-same-origin`, no `-src` directive. The security
architecture, architecture invariants, API reference, CLAUDE.md and the
Working With Files wiki page now say what a page can do (reach the
network, read its own folder) and cannot do (Codeman's origin, cookies,
API, other folders), and that this is the owner's decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A sandboxed page is opaque-origin, so a fetch() of its own data file with
a non-safelisted header preflights with `Origin: null`. The auth hook
refused the OPTIONS (the html-view exemption admitted GET and HEAD only)
and, without a password, the security-headers hook answered a bare 204
with no Access-Control-Allow-Origin, so the fetch failed either way.
The exemption now admits OPTIONS for a live capability, and
registerSecurityHeaders answers it itself with Allow-Origin `*`,
Allow-Methods `GET, HEAD` and Allow-Headers `*` (no credentials are
involved). An unknown or revoked capability still gets the 401, and
writes on the capability path are still refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The serving route checked hidden segments and the asset allowlist on the
requested name only; after realpath it checked containment and the
blocklist. A symlink `cfg.json -> .git/config` inside the page's folder
was therefore served as 200 application/json. The dot rule now also runs
on the segments of relative(rootDir, resolvedPath), and the extension
allowlist on the resolved file name, which also types the response.
Both realpath calls on the request path (the mint of an out-of-workspace
file and the serving route) are now `await fs.realpath` instead of
realpathSync, so a slow mount stalls one request, not the event loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
os.tmpdir() returns $TMPDIR when it is set, and macOS sets it in every
terminal session, so with TMPDIR set /tmp, /private/tmp and /var/tmp were
never treated as broad and /tmp/report.html got a capability over all of
/tmp. The broad-root list now names /tmp and /var/tmp literally (through
canonical(), so macOS gets /private/tmp), refuses any directory that is an
ancestor of a broad root (/home, /Users, /private), and treats a drive's
mount point (/mnt/d on WSL, /media/x, /Volumes/x) as broad as well.
The new test sets TMPDIR elsewhere and still gets /tmp refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicts resolved:
- CLAUDE.md: kept master's Prompt uploads paragraph and its longer
File-path links paragraph (XLSX admission limits), and inserted the
PR's html-view sentence after the download-only rule.
- src/web/public/terminal-ui.js: kept master's tile-aware
getSessionId() in the shared file-path link provider and added the
PR's .html routing to the file preview on top of it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Docker case is a local session for the file routes, but `~` inside the
container is the container's own seeded home. Expanding `~/x.png` on the host
opened a different file than the one the agent printed. The attachment POST
and POST …/folders now answer 400 for `~/` when the session has `docker` set
(absolute paths are unaffected: the workspace is a bind mount).
Docs: the resolved-target gate, the route-parameter limit, the listing join
rule and the Docker `~/` refusal in architecture-invariants.md,
security-architecture.md and CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Multi-user: a non-admin's folder must resolve inside their own userSpacePath
or the session's workingDir (folderAllowedForUser, the path picker's rule),
checked on the resolved folder before it is read and again on each served
file after symlink resolution; 403 otherwise.
- listFolder probes the local folder with probePathKind({ pastCap: true })
first (unknown -> 503 via describeUnknownPath, never 404), then async
fs.realpath; resolveFolderFile uses probePathKind instead of fs.stat.
- The guard runs on the realpath before readdir.
- FOLDER_PATH_LINK_PATTERN ends a folder at ':' (quadratic `://` rescan on
colon runs; PATH=/a:/b linked as one folder).
- Load counters drop stale preview / folder-grid responses; closing the grid
invalidates a listing still in flight.
- validFolderFileName refuses a leading dot; the remote listing matches
extensions in any case.
- Docs: folder grid in the z-index lists; multi-user rule and bounded probe in
the invariants and security docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CLAUDE.md key pattern and architecture-invariants (File-path links) get
the new path forms (`findFilePathLinks`, `~/` expanded server-side,
`terminalPathLine` join rules) and the folder grid (grant + bare-name
routes, own registry, z-order, captured keys); remote-sessions lists the
folder routes for a remote case; security-architecture states the trust
level of a folder grant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Skip zero-size spreadsheet cells in renderTile. On sheets past the
8,000,000 px scroll cap, a cell clipped to nothing at the spacer's edge
(or a visible row or column the worker clamped to 0 px) was still created,
and the cell padding and border drew it as a 5 px box below the spacer
that grew the scroll area. The size is now computed before the element is
created and such cells are skipped, the same way the heading loops already
skip 0 px rows and columns. spreadsheet-preview.js is not an input of
SPREADSHEET_ASSET_VERSION, so the asset token stays valid.
Add zh-CN entries for the static spreadsheet preview strings (loading,
too large, no visible worksheets, empty worksheet, the warnings label,
timeout, failure, the four parser start and message failures, and the
unavailable message from panels-ui). The file-preview body is not a
skipped surface, so the exact-match entries apply with no code change.
The worker's admission refusal messages and the dynamic status message
stay English for a follow-up.
docs/security-architecture.md described the attachment gate as a
6-extension allowlist; it now names SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS in
src/attachment-registry.ts and what it covers, including the xlsx this
PR adds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Refuse to mint for an HTML file in a hidden directory or directly in a
broad root (/, home, tmpdir, cases and user-space roots): the capability
serves the directory tree recursively to the page's own scripts.
- Keep HTML's source view and editor: a Page pill (per-device htmlRendered,
like MD) toggles to the file-content text path, and a refused mint (remote
case, broad root, hidden dir) falls through to it automatically.
- Tests: html-view auth exemption edges, revocation on logout / admin logout /
user deletion, out-of-workspace mint (blocked tree, confinement), hidden
and broad roots.
- Docs: Working-With-Files, architecture-invariants, security-architecture,
the file-routes comment and CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge-time fixes for the webhook notification channel (ntfy, Slack, Discord, generic JSON).
Minor 1, App Settings Save silently dropped webhook edits: the modal's main Save now
persists the webhook group beside the settings PUT, the same way it already saves the
model config (saveModelConfigFromSettings), but only when the group differs from what
loadWebhook() put on screen (_webhookPending), so an untouched group never re-PUTs. A
refusal (bad URL, enabled with no URL) shows a warning toast, keeps the modal open and
scrolls to the group with the pasted URL still in the box, instead of a success toast.
Send test now saves pending edits first, so it never tests the old URL while the box
shows a new one. The row says so in one line.
Minor 2, no test for the server.ts glue: new test/webhook-push-glue.test.ts drives the
private sendPushNotifications on a real (never started) WebServer with an EMPTY push
store and webhook.json in the instance data dir, delivering through the real
egress-guarded fetch to a local receiver: a permission prompt arrives with the
host-prefixed ntfy Title and body while Web Push is never called, an immediate repeat is
deduped, "response complete" is skipped under scope attention and sent under all, and a
disabled config or a non-push event sends nothing. Verified it fails when the webhook
call is moved below the "no subscriptions" return.
Minor 3, docs: webhook.json added to CLAUDE.md State Files; a Webhooks section in
docs/wiki/Notifications-And-Approvals.md (setup, what is sent, the secret URL, public
ntfy topics, local targets allowed, dedupe, instance-wide reach in multi-user mode) plus
a table row, and a line in Settings-Reference; new section 10c in
docs/security-architecture.md for the second outbound channel through the web-tab
egress guard.
Nits:
- Orphaned JSDoc: the webhook schema moved below the push schemas, so
PushSubscribeSchema has its comment back.
- Duplicated enums: WebhookUpdateSchema uses z.enum(WEBHOOK_KINDS/WEBHOOK_SCOPES), so
the schema cannot accept a kind the store would coerce away.
- describeError classifies egress refusals with isEgressBlockedError (the
CODEMAN_EGRESS_BLOCKED code anywhere in the cause chain) instead of a message regex;
tests pin a deep cause chain and that matching words alone are not a refusal.
- Markup: the URL input uses set-input, the whitespace-only line is gone, and the switch
row hints to pick a long random topic on public ntfy.sh.
- Remove a saved URL: a "Remove URL" button (shown only while a URL is saved, with a
confirm) sends { url: "", enabled: false }.
- Types placement: WEBHOOK_KINDS/SCOPES and WebhookKind/Scope/Urgency/Config/Result/Status
moved to src/types/push.ts (the IO-side WebhookMessage/Request/Fetch stay in the module).
Browser test extended: main Save persists a pending edit, a refused URL keeps the modal
open with the URL, Send test saves a newly pasted URL first, Remove URL clears it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clone Repo clears the credential helpers for a non-admin, but a non-admin's
Docker case with credential seeding on still receives a copy of the server
account's gh/az sign-in when the agent-image switches are on, the same as
the Claude and Codex credentials. Say so in the multi-user notes so the docs
do not read as a stronger guarantee than they are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the review on #472.
- CRED_STORES: `.config/gh` and `.azure` now carry `enabledByEnv`
(CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH / _AZ), and resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts
skips a store unless that variable is exactly `1`, read at container
create. A host that merely has ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml or a plaintext MSAL
cache no longer copies them into every case container. Tests: the default
environment seeds neither even with the files present, and each store
follows only its own switch.
- Multi-user mode: a non-admin's Clone Repo clone and preflight run with
`git -c credential.helper=` (GIT_NO_CREDENTIAL_HELPERS, placed before the
subcommand), so the server account's helpers are never lent to them.
Verified against a real private repo that it also clears the URL-scoped
credential.<url>.helper entries, and that public clones still work.
Tests: the argv in test/git-clone.test.ts, and the route decision
(non-admin cleared; admin and single-user kept) in
test/routes/case-clone-credential-helpers.test.ts.
- Docs: recreate the case container to pick up seeds (docker/README.md,
Docker-Cases wiki, docker-cases.md); the multi-user behaviour in
docker/README.md and security-architecture.md; "functionally unchanged"
instead of "unchanged" for an image built with both switches off
(server.Dockerfile comment, README, changeset).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0167CiuzLrmjYWxwKp3rMWjw
Add Case -> Clone Repo could only reach public repositories in the Docker
deployment. This lets a deployment opt in to the GitHub CLI and the Azure
CLI (+ azure-devops extension) as git credential helpers. Codeman itself
still collects no credentials.
- server.Dockerfile / agent.Dockerfile: CODEMAN_INSTALL_GH /
CODEMAN_INSTALL_AZ build args (0 or 1, default 0; anything else stops the
build). Off leaves no apt repository, package, extension, helper script
or credential entry, so a default build is unchanged. On installs from
the vendors' apt repositories and configures system gitconfig helpers:
github.com / gist.github.com -> `gh auth git-credential`, dev.azure.com /
*.visualstudio.com -> new docker/git-credential-azure-cli (an Entra ID
token from `az account get-access-token`, or AZURE_DEVOPS_EXT_PAT).
A helper whose CLI is not signed in prints nothing, so a private clone
still fails fast.
- The extension lives in AZURE_EXTENSION_DIR outside HOME
(/opt/codeman-az-extensions, runtime-owned; /opt/az-extensions, gid-0
group-writable in the agent image).
- Hosts turn them on in docker-compose.override.yml: `build: args:` for the
server image, `environment:` CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH / _AZ for the
agent image. build-agent-image.mjs and the in-app auto-build share one
env -> ARG table (pinned by the parity test) and pass nothing when unset.
docker-compose.yaml is untouched; .env.example only gains a comment, so
the self-updater's environment gate sees no new keys.
- Docker cases seed the gh sign-in (~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, config.yml) and
the az sign-in files from ~/.azure per file, read-only, like pi/grok.
- The Clone Repo AUTH_REQUIRED message says how to sign the server's git
in instead of claiming private repositories cannot be cloned.
- Docs: docker/README.md "Private repositories", docker-compose.md,
docker-cases.md, the Quick-Start / Core-Concepts / Docker-Cases wiki
pages, security-architecture.md, architecture-invariants.md, changeset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0167CiuzLrmjYWxwKp3rMWjw
README, the Installation / Remote-Access / Running-As-A-Service wiki pages,
docs/security-architecture.md and CLAUDE.md describe the three-question flow,
the flags, the subcommands, the sub-path answer for an occupied :443 and why
the rename is opt-in. docs/installer-v2-plan.md is the design and the
verification record (what was measured, what still needs a fresh machine);
docs/tailscale-installer-plan.md points at it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The lost-frame recovery page is answered ahead of the credential checks in both
auth hooks, which makes it the third unauthenticated 200 beside the two hook
routes, and the only one decided by request headers alone. CLAUDE.md's security
table listed exactly two, and docs/web-tabs.md is not where anyone auditing that
looks, so it now has a row in the table and a fourth property in
docs/security-architecture.md section 10b, including the `/` carve-out and its
credential-free condition. Both state the property that comes with it: a
non-browser client can set those headers, so an unauthenticated caller can tell a
registered route (401) from a non-route (200) and enumerate the route table,
accepted because the routes are public in docs/api-reference.md.
docs/web-tabs.md gains the landing-page case in layer 6 and a Known limits entry:
masking trades away the Referer safety net, only HTML is rewritten server-side,
and a root-absolute url() inside an inline <style> block has the masked document
as its Referer, so it 404s where the Referer fallback used to rescue it. External
stylesheets are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 50MB cap on file-raw, the attachment /raw route and /api/download was
memory protection for a `readFile()` that no longer exists: file-raw and
/raw were rewritten to stream through `sendFileBody()` and answer Range
requests, so size costs a read stream rather than RSS (measured: a 600MB
download moved peak RSS by ~37MB). All the cap still did was refuse
legitimate downloads of build artifacts, videos and archives.
It is now MAX_FILE_DOWNLOAD_BYTES in config/buffer-limits.ts, default 2GB,
env CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES, 0 = unlimited. `parseByteLimitEnv()` is
separate from the `parseInt(...) || default` idiom used elsewhere in that
file precisely because that idiom reads 0 as falsy and would silently
restore the default for the one value that means "no limit".
/api/download was the last route that really did buffer the whole file. It
now shares sendFileBody() with the other two, so it streams, advertises
Accept-Ranges, and is resumable. Its Content-Disposition also goes through
buildContentDisposition() rather than raw interpolation.
Refusals move from 400 to 413 across all three, which is the correct status
for the case; with the cap at 2GB it is a path almost nothing reaches now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeman can now be mounted under a sub-path behind a reverse proxy that
forwards the prefix unchanged (e.g. https://host/codeman/). Default is `/`
(root), which is byte-identical to the historical behavior.
Design — few choke points, mirrored ingress/egress:
- src/config/base-path.ts: pure single-source normalize/validate/join/strip.
- Server ingress: stripBasePath() inside Fastify rewriteUrl, so routes stay
declared prefix-agnostic; un-prefixed requests (hooks, health, docker bridge
hitting the raw port) pass through unchanged.
- Server egress: one onSend hook prepends the base to root-absolute Location
headers (covers all redirects).
- HTML: renderIndexHtml points <base href> at the mount and injects
window.__CODEMAN_BASE__ — ONLY when a base is set (inert at root).
- Frontend runtime URLs: CodemanBase.url() route builder in constants.js,
applied transparently by a fetch wrapper and explicitly at the
EventSource/WebSocket/window.open/<img|iframe|a>-src sites.
- sw.js derives its base from self.location; manifest uses relative start_url/scope.
- Web-tab proxy: proxyPrefixFor(cap, basePath) is the single base-aware root that
cascades to the injected <base>, HTML/attr rewrites, runtimeUrlShim, Set-Cookie
Path and Location; capabilityFromReferer strips the base off the browser Referer,
while the ingress parsers stay base-agnostic (rewriteUrl already stripped it).
--base-url rides the daemon relaunch (buildWebArgs) and the service unit
(resolveServicePlan). constants.js is guarded against a missing `window` for
isolated unit-test contexts.
Tests: test/base-path.test.ts (pure helpers), base-path coverage in
webview-proxy/render-index-html/daemon-control; CodemanBase stubbed in the
vm-isolated panels-ui test contexts. Docs: Remote-Access.md (sub-path section +
nginx example), security-architecture.md env table, CLAUDE.md pattern.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XUkPBxbumnct6qSrx4JDju
SessionMode gains 'grok', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity and Pi: its own PTY, tmux
session, charcoal tab identity ('gk' badge), welcome button, run-mode
entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and
clone-repo Brain option. Flag surface verified live against grok 1.0.5.
Grok mixes two existing shapes and the wiring follows from that:
- Codex-shaped on permissions: the bypass switch is GrokConfig.alwaysApprove
(--always-approve, grok's bypassPermissions mode; config-level deny rules
still apply on top). The Run button sends it true, like runAntigravity(),
and clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() puts grok in the only-if-sent branch:
a bare grok spawn is grok's own ask-mode default, which is already safe,
so only a sent config needs the flag forced off. Cron needs nothing for
the same reason.
- OpenCode-shaped on rendering: grok is a fullscreen alternate-screen TUI
with mouse support, so it stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode() and lands
on the narrow tmux-attach strip and the 'buffer' local-echo fallthrough
(unmeasured against an authenticated composer; documented fallback is the
'off' branch).
- Pi-shaped on resolution: 'grok' has npm squatters (@vibe-kit/grok-cli
also installs a grok bin), so grok-cli-resolver.ts version-probes every
candidate (grok --version, killSignal SIGKILL, VITEST-gated) and
GET /api/grok/status surfaces path AND version; GROK_VERSION_REGEX is
shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode cannot drift.
Env allowlist gains GROK_* plus the XAI_* vendor namespace (XAI_API_KEY is
grok's documented headless auth var), the same narrow-vendor reasoning as
GOOGLE_* for gemini. Resume is id-regexed on purpose: grok's own --resume
also matches session titles, which are arbitrary user strings that must
never reach the bash -c spawn line.
Docker: grok is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in its own step
(xAI's installer has no --dir override; the binary is copied to
/usr/local/bin and root's ~/.grok dropped in the same layer), and
credentials are seeded per-file (auth.json, config.toml, pager.toml; the
dir also holds sessions/, memory/ and the ~160MB binary). Remote SSH routes
through the login-shell wrapper like the other agent CLIs.
Verified end to end on an isolated CODEMAN_INSTANCE with grok 1.0.5
installed: /api/grok/status resolves and reports the probed version,
quick-start spawns a pane whose command line ends in 'grok
--always-approve', the real TUI renders (OAuth device screen on an
unauthenticated box), and grokConfig round-trips through state.json.
Docs: docs/grok-integration.md (user guide) + docs/grok-integration-plan.md
(decisions, verification record, follow-ups).
Tests: test/grok-mode.test.ts, test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts, plus
extended clamp/system-routes/render-index-html/run-mode-ui/mobile-overview/
local-echo-gating coverage. npm test (the CI gate) green: 5910 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs in the File Viewer's media player, both reproduced in a real
browser against an 18MB mp4 before and after the fix.
1. Closing the preview left the video playing. closeFilePreview() only
dropped the overlay's `visible` class, which is display:none and
nothing else, so the audio kept going with no visible player to pause.
Detaching the element is not a fix either: a detached HTMLMediaElement
plays on until it is garbage collected. _stopFilePreviewMedia() now
pauses, drops src and load()s every media element (also on re-open,
where overwriting innerHTML had the same effect), which additionally
aborts the in-flight download.
2. The scrub bar was inert. file-raw read the whole file and answered
200 with no Accept-Ranges, so Chrome reported video.seekable as
[0, 0] and silently reverted `currentTime = x`; Safari refuses to
start such media at all. Raw bodies are now streamed and range-aware:
Accept-Ranges: bytes on every response, 206 + Content-Range for a
Range request, 416 for one past EOF, and a malformed spec ignored
(200) per RFC 9110. Parsing is pure in src/web/http-range.ts.
Measured on tmp/codeman-crt-v5-66s.mp4 (18MB, 66.6s):
before seekable [0, 0] seek to 56.6s reverted to 3.9s close: still playing
after seekable [0, 66.56] seek to 56.6s landed at 60.2s close: paused, NETWORK_EMPTY
Range slices are byte-identical to `dd`, the full-file path is
byte-identical to the file, and the SVG octet-stream/attachment
hardening and the 50MB cap are unchanged (the cap is still checked
before the range).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SessionMode gains 'pi', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
OpenCode, Codex, Gemini and Antigravity: its own PTY, tmux session, rose
tab identity, welcome button, run-mode entry, cron agentType, Docker and
remote-SSH command defaults, and clone-repo Brain option.
Pi is a different shape of CLI from the other four, and three decisions
follow from that:
- It has NO permission prompts and no sandbox, so there is no
--dangerously-skip-permissions analog and none was invented. The
privilege-shaped knob is the tri-state approveProjectTrust, which makes
pi load and EXECUTE repo-local .pi/extensions TypeScript and install
missing project packages. clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() therefore
puts pi in the MATERIALIZE branch: a non-granted multi-user owner gets
--no-approve even when no config was sent, because pi's own default is
a prompt the session user could answer themselves. That helper had zero
test coverage; it now has coverage for all four CLIs.
- Only the PI_ prefix joins the env allowlist. Pi's ~34 provider key vars
share no prefix and ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES is one global list with no mode
context, so admitting them would widen the allowlist for every mode at
once. Auth goes through pi's /login or the server's own environment.
--api-key is deliberately never wired: it would put a provider secret on
the spawn command line.
- pi stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode(). Its default TUI renders into the
main screen with terminal-owned scrollback, and its 0.84.0 fullscreen
mode is runtime-switchable via /settings; that flip was measured to put
the pane into the alt screen, which the strip would have corrupted.
pi-cli-resolver.ts additionally sanity-probes `pi --version` and requires
semver-shaped output, because `pi` is a short generic name a stray binary
can shadow; GET /api/pi/status surfaces path and version so a
misresolution is diagnosable rather than presenting as a broken mode.
Docker installs pi in its own --ignore-scripts step so that flag cannot
affect the other four CLIs, and seeds its credentials per-file rather than
whole-dir (~/.pi/agent also holds sessions, extensions and package trees).
Verified end to end against pi 0.84.1 on an isolated instance: resolver
search-dir fallback, flag construction, piConfig persistence across a full
server restart, the trust prompt and its --no-approve suppression, the
rose Run button on the default daylight-blue skin (the nested skin block
eats per-mode gradients unless the rule lives inside it), and the buffer
local-echo policy, which pi tolerates where codex did not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Antigravity (agy) was wired into the session layer but never propagated to
the surfaces around it, while Gemini CLI stayed documented as a consumer
product despite being enterprise-only since Google's cutover. Gemini keeps
full support; Antigravity now sits beside it everywhere.
Functional fixes:
- docker/agent.Dockerfile never installed agy, so a docker case with
mode 'antigravity' died on command-not-found. agy is not on npm, so it
gets its own installer step. --dir /usr/local/bin is load-bearing: the
default $HOME/.local/bin resolves to root's home at build time and is
unreachable by the `agent` user the container runs as. Verified inside
codeman/agent:base (v1.1.10, reachable as `agent`). Note the binary is
~190MB, the largest layer in the image.
- Welcome screen gained a Run Antigravity action, gated on agy being
present like the other CLI buttons, with a cyan identity matching the
toolbar run button and run-mode dot.
- install.sh now detects agy (search paths mirroring the resolver), counts
it as a satisfying AI CLI, and recommends it over Gemini in the install
hints. Detection only, no new auto-install path.
Docs corrected where they were factually wrong:
- architecture-invariants documented isExternalCliMode() as
opencode/codex/gemini when the code has included antigravity for a
while, said "all three modes", and omitted ANTIGRAVITY_ from the env
prefix allowlist row.
- cron-guide's agentType enum, cron-discovery's SessionMode, and
remote-sessions' RemoteCommandMode were all stale.
Also: README + README.zh-CN (five CLIs, Gemini marked enterprise-only),
package.json keyword, and comment drift in 8 places.
test/run-mode-ui.test.ts now covers the new welcome button; verified it
fails without the settings-ui wiring.
Antigravity nests its whole state under ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/, not
~/.antigravity, so the existing .gemini docker credential seed already
covers it. Recorded as a comment so nobody adds dead config later.
isAltScreenStripMode() deliberately still excludes antigravity: whether
its TUI needs the alt-screen strip is a behavioural question that needs a
real agy session, not a guess.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release 1.9.8 (aicodeman) and 0.1.8 (xterm-zerolag-input).
Fixes macOS session start (`posix_spawnp failed.`, issues #6 and #204):
node-pty ships its macOS spawn-helper as mode 0644 and macOS launches every
PTY through it. `scripts/fix-node-pty.mjs` (npm run fix:node-pty) chmods every
helper, prebuilds/ included, then verifies by really opening a PTY; the blind
Node-22+ rebuild is gone. `spawnPtyWithHelperRepair()` self-heals an already
broken install on the first failed spawn.
Adds the phone home screen (session overview under 430px, per-device
`mobileOverviewEnabled`, default ON) and a guided Tailscale path in
install.sh, plus `install.sh tailscale` to retrofit it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a "Web / URL" section to the Run dropdown. A saved URL renders as a tab in
the same strip as Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions, with the same Alt+1..9 numbering,
so Codeman is one mission control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.
A webview is NOT a sixth SessionMode: no PTY, no tmux, no respawn, no idle
detection. It is a separate resource sharing only the tab strip and the main
content area, the same call that keeps Docker and remote-SSH as case overlays.
Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, because a direct iframe
fails three ways at once in the shipped deployment: prod serves HTTPS behind
tailscale serve, so http:// targets are hard-blocked as mixed content (with no
override at all on iOS Safari); Grafana/Portainer-class dashboards send
X-Frame-Options: DENY; and our own default-src 'self' CSP blocks cross-origin
frames. Proxying dissolves all three and leaves the production CSP byte-for-byte
unchanged, since /webview/... is already covered by 'self'. A useful side effect:
the fetch happens server-side, so a tailnet-only dashboard is reachable from a
phone that is not on the tailnet.
The proxy is not an API surface. It authenticates on a 192-bit capability in the
path (memory-only, rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, revoked on edit or
delete) and is correspondingly exempt from the cookie and Origin checks, because
a sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin: it sends no SameSite=lax cookie and its
writes arrive with Origin: null. The Host allowlist is never bypassed. A second
Referer-keyed form of the exemption exists for root-absolute assets and is fenced
to safe methods on non-/api, non-/ws, non-/q paths.
Iframes omit allow-same-origin unless a URL is explicitly marked trusted, since a
proxied page is served from Codeman's own origin and could otherwise read this
document and drive the agent-spawning API. Authorization and codeman_session are
stripped upstream in BOTH modes, so CODEMAN_PASSWORD cannot leak into a dashboard.
Two things only a real browser reveals, both presenting as the dashboard's own
"Failed to fetch" while the page itself renders fine:
- Runtime-built root-absolute URLs (fetch('/api/data')) escape <base href> and
land on Codeman's root. Widening the Referer fallback into /api would trade
security for it, so an injected shim patches fetch/XHR/WebSocket/EventSource
inside the frame instead, removing the class rather than the guard.
- An opaque-origin document CORS-checks every request, including to the host it
was served from. Script/css/img loads are not CORS-checked, which is why the
page renders while its API calls die. The proxy now emits CORS headers and
answers preflights itself. registerSecurityHeaders answered every OPTIONS with
a bare 204 before routing, carrying no ACAO for Origin: null, so that
short-circuit now exempts a valid capability.
Neither is reproducible with curl, which does not enforce CORS.
Also fixes a pre-existing bug found on the way: .toolbar has backdrop-filter,
making it a stacking context that trapped .run-mode-menu's z-index:1000, so
.welcome-overlay painted over the whole Run menu. With no session open, every
item in it (Claude Code included) was unclickable.
Verified end to end against a real tailnet dashboard: live data, WebSocket push,
no failed requests, and switching tabs does not reload the frame. 98 new tests
cover the pure rewrite helpers, the CORS helper, the shim's rewrite logic, route
CRUD, and every edge of the auth exemption.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stamp the plan doc with shipped-by-phase status; add the multi-user Key Patterns
entry + State Files + case-spaces note to CLAUDE.md; add a multi-user section to
the security architecture (threat model: workspace separation, not a security
boundary) and a README opt-in section; add a minor changeset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- CLAUDE.md: rewrite the Docker cases Key Pattern to the shipped 1.4.0 state
(removes the stale "not on master / Phases remaining" framing); add
docker-quickcreate/templates/GPU/elastic-disk/export-import, the
CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS listener, docker state files, env vars, route +
SSE counts, and the build-agent-image command.
- README.md: new "Isolated Docker Sessions" section + a More Features bullet.
- docs/security-architecture.md: new §10 "Docker container isolation" (hardening,
commit-safe creds, blast radius, untrusted-import safety, bridge-hooks) +
Quick-reference env vars.
docs/docker-cases.md (user guide) and docs/docker-cases-plan.md (design) were
shipped with the feature.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security (MAJOR): the terminal-output codeman://attach scanner registered any
matching path server-side with no user confirmation and broadcast the rawUrl
over SSE. Terminal output is attacker-influenceable (a prompt-injected session
can print an arbitrary path), so on the default no-auth deployment this was an
arbitrary host-file (png/pdf/docx/pptx/md/txt) read primitive reachable by any
SSE client. Magic-link registration is now force-confined to the session
workspace (forceWorkspaceConfinement) regardless of the global confine setting;
deliberate cross-workspace attach still works through the explicit,
Origin-guarded POST /attachments route and 'codeman attach' (which POSTs
directly inside a managed session). Documented in security-architecture.md.
Regression (MAJOR): .png was rerouted from the image-popup path to
attachment:detected, which has no frontend consumer — silently breaking the
dropped/pasted-screenshot popup. PNG stays on image:detected; only pdf/docx/pptx
(which never had a popup) emit attachment:detected.
Also:
- raw route streams the freshly-resolved path, not the stored one, so a
post-registration symlink swap can't redirect the stream (TOCTOU).
- 50MB cap on the attachment raw route, matching file-raw / download.
- per-session attachment registry cap (200) to bound the POST path.
- CLI reads creds via dataPath('.env'), honoring CODEMAN_INSTANCE.
Tests: forced-confinement reject/allow cases; PNG popup-path assertions updated.
Codeman maintainer