settingsWrites() now requires every writeFile to be a settings.json temp file that a rename put in
place, with one rename per write, and the concurrent-stop harness stores a direct write to
settings.json at once. A stray fs.writeFile(SETTINGS_PATH) in the PUT handler passed all 34 tests
before and now fails 20 of them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflict in src/web/routes/system-routes.ts (PUT /api/settings) resolved by
keeping both sides: #718's line that never stores an unauthorized
tunnelEnabled:true runs first, then #719's serialized mutateSettingsFile()
write replaces the inline read and plain writeFile.
test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.test.ts: #718's new tests asserted
plain writeFile calls on settings.json. With #719 every write goes to a temp
file renamed over it, so the assertions read writes through a settingsWrites()
helper (writeFile contents keyed by their rename), and the concurrent-stop
harness applies a write and the stop at the rename.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The network acknowledgement that install.sh writes for every passwordless LAN install also satisfied the tunnel guard, so one click on the welcome screen's tunnel link published full terminal control to a public URL with no login and no confirm. The tunnel now needs CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL or --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel (carried by web -d and service install), and with no login the browser asks before every enable, reading a new loginConfigured field from GET /api/tunnel/status.
The guard is now decided once per request and required again where the tunnel starts, so a save that found the tunnel running can no longer restart it unguarded after a concurrent stop.
Closes#706
Quick-start saved lastUsedCase with an un-awaited, non-atomic read-modify-write, and the settings PUT, model config, case order, case rename, Ralph start and the boot tunnel reset each ran their own. Two overlapping truncate-then-write calls left one write's bytes over the tail of the other (the CI flake in test/quick-start.test.ts), and most writers then read the torn file as {} and wrote back only its own keys, erasing the rest of the user's settings.
All of them now go through one writer that runs one change at a time, replaces the file atomically, and refuses (409 CONFLICT) to overwrite a file that does not parse.
- Daylight Blue: Cloudflare Tunnel welcome button is now purple (was orange),
keeping Claude blue / Tunnel purple / OpenCode green distinct.
- Allow enabling the Cloudflare tunnel with no CODEMAN_PASSWORD via the UI: the
toggle now pops a security confirm dialog and, on confirm, sends an explicit
per-request acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true (new action field, never persisted).
Server logs a loud warning whenever a passwordless public tunnel starts.
curl/API/CLI stay refused unless password/env/flag — no accidental exposure.
Tests: extend test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.test.ts (ack allows + not
persisted; ack:false still refuses). Verified e2e on an isolated instance
(purple button, confirm dialog, retry carries the flag, no real tunnel opened).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening fixes for the public-tunnel exposure path (COD-54 / COD-55).
COD-54 — gate the /api/hook-event localhost bypass when a tunnel is up:
`cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
loopback origin, so a tunneled hook request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1
and the old bare-localhost bypass would pass it unauthenticated. Now:
- tunnel running → bypass requires a shared per-instance hook secret
(X-Codeman-Hook-Secret header; constant-time compare) + per-IP rate limiting
- tunnel not running (loopback-only, the normal case) → unchanged, so
already-deployed credential-less hooks keep working.
New src/config/hook-secret.ts; auth middleware takes a getTunnelRunning probe
(wired from server.ts via tunnelManager.isRunning()).
COD-55 — refuse starting the Cloudflare tunnel without auth:
enabling the tunnel publishes full terminal control to a public URL; with no
CODEMAN_PASSWORD the auth middleware is inactive and the bind guard never trips
(tunnel binds loopback). PUT /api/settings now refuses tunnelEnabled:true with a
403 (before persisting) unless CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set or
CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1 is acknowledged. New
isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged() in network-auth-policy; settings-ui
surfaces the refusal as an error toast and reverts the toggle.
Scope: the always-on CSRF/Origin guard, Host-header allowlist, and
network-auth-policy itself are already upstream (#113) and not re-proposed here.
Verification: tsc, eslint, prettier, check:frontend-syntax clean; full test:ci
green (2723 passed), incl. test/cod54-hook-event-auth and
test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.