Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Codeman maintainer b89f15c12f fix: make the tunnel-guard test fail on a settings.json write that skips the temp file and rename (release review)
settingsWrites() now requires every writeFile to be a settings.json temp file that a rename put in
place, with one rename per write, and the concurrent-stop harness stores a direct write to
settings.json at once. A stray fs.writeFile(SETTINGS_PATH) in the PUT handler passed all 34 tests
before and now fails 20 of them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 02:54:19 +01:00
Codeman maintainer 82ef8b1edd Merge pull request #719: fix(settings): serialize settings.json writes so a quick-start cannot tear the file
Conflict in src/web/routes/system-routes.ts (PUT /api/settings) resolved by
keeping both sides: #718's line that never stores an unauthorized
tunnelEnabled:true runs first, then #719's serialized mutateSettingsFile()
write replaces the inline read and plain writeFile.

test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.test.ts: #718's new tests asserted
plain writeFile calls on settings.json. With #719 every write goes to a temp
file renamed over it, so the assertions read writes through a settingsWrites()
helper (writeFile contents keyed by their rename), and the concurrent-stop
harness applies a write and the stop at the rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 02:10:35 +01:00
JD fc0ecc6051 fix(tunnel): give the unauthenticated tunnel its own acknowledgement
The network acknowledgement that install.sh writes for every passwordless LAN install also satisfied the tunnel guard, so one click on the welcome screen's tunnel link published full terminal control to a public URL with no login and no confirm. The tunnel now needs CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL or --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel (carried by web -d and service install), and with no login the browser asks before every enable, reading a new loginConfigured field from GET /api/tunnel/status.

The guard is now decided once per request and required again where the tunnel starts, so a save that found the tunnel running can no longer restart it unguarded after a concurrent stop.

Closes #706
2026-10-26 03:13:25 -04:00
JD 8fa5b340c1 fix(settings): serialize settings.json writes so a quick-start cannot tear the file
Quick-start saved lastUsedCase with an un-awaited, non-atomic read-modify-write, and the settings PUT, model config, case order, case rename, Ralph start and the boot tunnel reset each ran their own. Two overlapping truncate-then-write calls left one write's bytes over the tail of the other (the CI flake in test/quick-start.test.ts), and most writers then read the torn file as {} and wrote back only its own keys, erasing the rest of the user's settings.

All of them now go through one writer that runs one change at a time, replaces the file atomically, and refuses (409 CONFLICT) to overwrite a file that does not parse.
2026-10-26 03:08:09 -04:00
Codeman maintainer a0ac10a07c feat(tunnel,ui): purple tunnel button + opt-in unauthenticated tunnel with warning (v1.1.9)
- Daylight Blue: Cloudflare Tunnel welcome button is now purple (was orange),
  keeping Claude blue / Tunnel purple / OpenCode green distinct.
- Allow enabling the Cloudflare tunnel with no CODEMAN_PASSWORD via the UI: the
  toggle now pops a security confirm dialog and, on confirm, sends an explicit
  per-request acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true (new action field, never persisted).
  Server logs a loud warning whenever a passwordless public tunnel starts.
  curl/API/CLI stay refused unless password/env/flag — no accidental exposure.

Tests: extend test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.test.ts (ack allows + not
persisted; ack:false still refuses). Verified e2e on an isolated instance
(purple button, confirm dialog, retry carries the flag, no real tunnel opened).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 18:44:03 +02:00
Aamer Akhter 42f0b28c75 feat(security): hook-event auth secret + tunnel password guard
Two hardening fixes for the public-tunnel exposure path (COD-54 / COD-55).

COD-54 — gate the /api/hook-event localhost bypass when a tunnel is up:
`cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
loopback origin, so a tunneled hook request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1
and the old bare-localhost bypass would pass it unauthenticated. Now:
- tunnel running  → bypass requires a shared per-instance hook secret
  (X-Codeman-Hook-Secret header; constant-time compare) + per-IP rate limiting
- tunnel not running (loopback-only, the normal case) → unchanged, so
  already-deployed credential-less hooks keep working.
New src/config/hook-secret.ts; auth middleware takes a getTunnelRunning probe
(wired from server.ts via tunnelManager.isRunning()).

COD-55 — refuse starting the Cloudflare tunnel without auth:
enabling the tunnel publishes full terminal control to a public URL; with no
CODEMAN_PASSWORD the auth middleware is inactive and the bind guard never trips
(tunnel binds loopback). PUT /api/settings now refuses tunnelEnabled:true with a
403 (before persisting) unless CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set or
CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1 is acknowledged. New
isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged() in network-auth-policy; settings-ui
surfaces the refusal as an error toast and reverts the toggle.

Scope: the always-on CSRF/Origin guard, Host-header allowlist, and
network-auth-policy itself are already upstream (#113) and not re-proposed here.

Verification: tsc, eslint, prettier, check:frontend-syntax clean; full test:ci
green (2723 passed), incl. test/cod54-hook-event-auth and
test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.
2026-06-10 12:25:26 -04:00