#604 makes `~/` links clickable and passes them through unchanged, since only
the server knows the session host's home. The html-view mint read `~/x.html`
as workspace-relative and answered 404, so the preview fell back to the
source view. It now expands `~/` against this host's home, as the attachment
route does, and refuses it in a Docker case (that `~` is the container's)
with the same message as the attachment and folder routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner decision 2026-10-13 (#547): a rendered .html page behaves like a
file opened from disk in a browser. It may load scripts, styles, fonts,
images and media from any host and make fetch, XHR, WebSocket, beacon
and form requests to any host.
The /html-view Content-Security-Policy is therefore the `sandbox`
directive alone (HTML_VIEW_CSP, now exported and documented): the same
sandbox flags as before, never `allow-same-origin`, and no fetch
directive. It replaces Codeman's own `default-src 'self'` policy on these
responses. Everything that confines a page stays: the opaque origin (no
Codeman cookies or document, API writes with `Origin: null` refused, API
reads not readable cross-origin), and the capability serving only the
page's own folder under every path, symlink, dot, extension and
confinement rule.
A new test builds the route behind registerSecurityHeaders, as in
production, and pins the exact header: one `sandbox` directive with the
current flags, no `allow-same-origin`, no `-src` directive. The security
architecture, architecture invariants, API reference, CLAUDE.md and the
Working With Files wiki page now say what a page can do (reach the
network, read its own folder) and cannot do (Codeman's origin, cookies,
API, other folders), and that this is the owner's decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A rendered page's own <video> or <audio> could not seek, because the
route streamed a plain 200 without Accept-Ranges. sendFileBody() and
localFileSource() are now exported from file-routes.ts and the serving
route uses them, so it advertises Accept-Ranges and answers a Range with
206 + Content-Range (or 416), exactly like file-raw, the attachment raw
route and /api/download. The body sender hijacks the reply and copies
every header set before it (the sandbox CSP, CORS, no-store), which the
new test pins on a 206.
Media types stay in ASSET_TYPES: with Range support they work, and they
are served under the same sandbox CSP as everything else.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mint checked the extension of the requested path, then built the page
URL from the symlink-resolved file name. A `report.html -> notes.txt` link
minted a page URL for the text file. The resolved name now has to be
.html or .htm as well, the mint-side counterpart of the serving route's
resolved-path extension check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view read `path` off an unchecked cast. It now
goes through HtmlViewOpenSchema in schemas.ts (a non-empty string of at
most 4096 characters without NUL or line breaks, no other keys) via
parseBody, like the other file routes, and keeps its "Missing path
parameter" message for an absent path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mint refused an HTML file whose absolute path had any dot segment, so
a workspace that itself lives under a hidden folder (~/.local/src/app)
could never render one of its own pages. For a file inside the workspace
the rule now covers the path below the workspace root, which is all the
page's tree can reach; outside the workspace it still covers the whole
path. A hidden directory below the workspace root is still refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The serving route checked the blocklist per request but not
attachmentConfineToWorkspace, while the attachment serve path
(file-routes.ts) re-checks it every time. A capability minted for a
folder outside the workspace before an admin turned confinement on kept
serving that folder for the rest of its TTL.
The capability record now says whether its folder was admitted from
outside the workspace, and the serving route refuses such a record while
confinement is on. The flag is part of the reuse key, so an
out-of-workspace mint never picks up a capability recorded as
in-workspace for the same folder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The serving route checked hidden segments and the asset allowlist on the
requested name only; after realpath it checked containment and the
blocklist. A symlink `cfg.json -> .git/config` inside the page's folder
was therefore served as 200 application/json. The dot rule now also runs
on the segments of relative(rootDir, resolvedPath), and the extension
allowlist on the resolved file name, which also types the response.
Both realpath calls on the request path (the mint of an out-of-workspace
file and the serving route) are now `await fs.realpath` instead of
realpathSync, so a slow mount stalls one request, not the event loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
os.tmpdir() returns $TMPDIR when it is set, and macOS sets it in every
terminal session, so with TMPDIR set /tmp, /private/tmp and /var/tmp were
never treated as broad and /tmp/report.html got a capability over all of
/tmp. The broad-root list now names /tmp and /var/tmp literally (through
canonical(), so macOS gets /private/tmp), refuses any directory that is an
ancestor of a broad root (/home, /Users, /private), and treats a drive's
mount point (/mnt/d on WSL, /media/x, /Volumes/x) as broad as well.
The new test sets TMPDIR elsewhere and still gets /tmp refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Refuse to mint for an HTML file in a hidden directory or directly in a
broad root (/, home, tmpdir, cases and user-space roots): the capability
serves the directory tree recursively to the page's own scripts.
- Keep HTML's source view and editor: a Page pill (per-device htmlRendered,
like MD) toggles to the file-content text path, and a refused mint (remote
case, broad root, hidden dir) falls through to it automatically.
- Tests: html-view auth exemption edges, revocation on logout / admin logout /
user deletion, out-of-workspace mint (blocked tree, confinement), hidden
and broad roots.
- Docs: Working-With-Files, architecture-invariants, security-architecture,
the file-routes comment and CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clicking an agent's `.html` path showed source text or downloaded it, so a
generated report could only be viewed by asking the agent to start a web
server. Render it instead, without serving HTML same-origin:
- POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view mints a capability for the file's own
directory (workspace path, or outside it under the attachment guard).
- GET /html-view/:cap/* serves the page and its relative assets with
`Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT allow-same-origin, so the page
runs in an opaque origin (also as a top-level tab) and cannot read the
Codeman document, its cookies or its API.
- Served files: non-dot, asset-allowlisted, realpath-confined to that
directory, blocklist applied; GET only. Capabilities are memory-only with a
rolling TTL and are revoked with the web-tab ones on logout.
- Frontend: the file preview renders HTML in a sandboxed iframe (popout opens
the same URL); terminal `.html` links go to the preview, not the log viewer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeman maintainer