Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Codeman maintainer acd90efe73 fix(webview): the review items of #825
The owner of a managed dsh tab is compared with the server's starter only in
multi-user mode: a record created there keeps its owner, while a single-user
start records none, so that tab would never get its cookie again (new route
test). CLAUDE.md and the invariants doc name the cookie rules. The third item,
Codeman's session cookie filtered on the WebSocket leg whether or not the dsh
cookie is injected, came in with the merge itself, where it met #827.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 04:04:58 +01:00
Codeman maintainer f25e94141f Merge #825: proxied dashboards render in a web tab (dsh token, relative base, dynamic imports)
The DeepSeek Harness web tab trades the dsh web launch token for its session cookie, a relative <base href> resolves against the document's own directory, and root-absolute import("/...") inside scripts is rewritten onto the proxy prefix.

# Conflicts:
#	src/web/routes/webview-routes.ts
#	test/routes/webview-routes.test.ts
2026-11-20 04:00:05 +01:00
ArizeSky 677e393fc3 fix(webview): stop forwarding the session cookie on the websocket leg
The WebSocket leg sent the browser's whole Cookie header to a trusted dashboard, including Codeman's own codeman_session, which the dashboard could then replay against the API. Filter it through filterCookieHeader like the HTTP leg, and omit the header when nothing remains.
2026-11-16 16:46:10 +08:00
ArizeSky 2a3496b7b3 fix(webview): keep the browser's cookies on the websocket leg
The HTTP leg puts the server-held dsh credential in front of the browser's own
cookies; the upgrade leg replaced them with it. A managed dsh tab is trusted, so
its other cookies must survive there too. Filter the request the way the HTTP
leg does and merge the credential in front.

Order is the point: a `Cookie` header can name the same cookie twice, and the
first value is the one parsers keep, so appending the credential let a stale
browser copy of the same dsh cookie shadow the one the running process minted -
the tab would come back to the 401 this path exists to prevent. Both legs now
lead with it, and a route-level test asserts the bytes the upstream sees on the
upgrade, not only on the HTTP request.
2026-11-16 16:30:25 +08:00
ArizeSky cc413afdd1 fix(webview): resolve a relative base against the document directory
rebaseRelativeBase resolved a relative <base> against the proxy root, so
a document served from a subdirectory of its dashboard (for example
/webview/<cap>/app/page.html with <base href="./">) pointed at
/webview/<cap>/ and loaded its assets one level too high. Pass the
request's wildcard path into rewriteHtml and resolve the base against
the document URL, which keeps the proxy root for the landing page.
2026-11-16 16:11:58 +08:00
ArizeSky 6e3d6ebad9 test(webview): cover the managed dsh cookie at the route level
Drive the real proxy route against loopback listeners and assert the
Cookie header dsh would receive: the minted port gets it, another port,
an unmanaged tab and a multi-user owner without the grant get none, and
a granted multi-user owner still gets it.
2026-11-16 16:06:34 +08:00
Codeman maintainer 550e08a791 fix(webview): refuse link-local and cloud-metadata targets on the resolved address
The web-tab proxy, its Test probe and its WebSocket relay accepted any http(s)
host. A live PoC relayed an IMDSv2-shaped PUT with custom headers to a loopback
echo server through a capability and no cookie, and 169.254.169.254 (decimal,
hex, IPv6-mapped, or via a DNS name) was as valid a dashboard as any other.

Loopback and RFC1918 stay allowed on purpose: a localhost Grafana is the feature.
Only link-local and the fixed cloud-metadata addresses are refused
(169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10, fd00:ec2::254, 168.63.129.16, 100.100.100.200,
metadata.google.internal), at three stages that are each load-bearing:

- the Zod schema, so a save gets a clear refusal;
- a synchronous hostname check at every connect site, because net.connect skips
  DNS for an IP literal and a lookup hook never sees one;
- a `lookup` hook on an undici Agent (webviewFetch) and on the ws client, which
  judges the RESOLVED addresses of a name and refuses when any is blocked. This
  is what closes DNS rebinding, which a hostname-string check cannot.

Adds undici@^6 so the proxy runs the package's own fetch with the package's own
Agent; a package Agent handed to Node's bundled fetch can mismatch protocols.

Verified live on an isolated beta: 169.254.169.254.nip.io (a real name resolving
to the metadata address) is refused by probe, proxy (403) and WS relay (4003),
while 127.0.0.1.nip.io still passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WKtW48T1UjAaecHAJxKobE
2026-09-04 15:21:12 +02:00
Aamer Akhter 74194e4fc0 feat(tabs): COD-359 add owner-scoped tab layouts 2026-08-23 14:46:10 -04:00
Codeman maintainer b34fcaf928 feat(web-tabs): open dashboard URLs as tabs beside agent sessions
Adds a "Web / URL" section to the Run dropdown. A saved URL renders as a tab in
the same strip as Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions, with the same Alt+1..9 numbering,
so Codeman is one mission control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.

A webview is NOT a sixth SessionMode: no PTY, no tmux, no respawn, no idle
detection. It is a separate resource sharing only the tab strip and the main
content area, the same call that keeps Docker and remote-SSH as case overlays.

Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, because a direct iframe
fails three ways at once in the shipped deployment: prod serves HTTPS behind
tailscale serve, so http:// targets are hard-blocked as mixed content (with no
override at all on iOS Safari); Grafana/Portainer-class dashboards send
X-Frame-Options: DENY; and our own default-src 'self' CSP blocks cross-origin
frames. Proxying dissolves all three and leaves the production CSP byte-for-byte
unchanged, since /webview/... is already covered by 'self'. A useful side effect:
the fetch happens server-side, so a tailnet-only dashboard is reachable from a
phone that is not on the tailnet.

The proxy is not an API surface. It authenticates on a 192-bit capability in the
path (memory-only, rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, revoked on edit or
delete) and is correspondingly exempt from the cookie and Origin checks, because
a sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin: it sends no SameSite=lax cookie and its
writes arrive with Origin: null. The Host allowlist is never bypassed. A second
Referer-keyed form of the exemption exists for root-absolute assets and is fenced
to safe methods on non-/api, non-/ws, non-/q paths.

Iframes omit allow-same-origin unless a URL is explicitly marked trusted, since a
proxied page is served from Codeman's own origin and could otherwise read this
document and drive the agent-spawning API. Authorization and codeman_session are
stripped upstream in BOTH modes, so CODEMAN_PASSWORD cannot leak into a dashboard.

Two things only a real browser reveals, both presenting as the dashboard's own
"Failed to fetch" while the page itself renders fine:

- Runtime-built root-absolute URLs (fetch('/api/data')) escape <base href> and
  land on Codeman's root. Widening the Referer fallback into /api would trade
  security for it, so an injected shim patches fetch/XHR/WebSocket/EventSource
  inside the frame instead, removing the class rather than the guard.
- An opaque-origin document CORS-checks every request, including to the host it
  was served from. Script/css/img loads are not CORS-checked, which is why the
  page renders while its API calls die. The proxy now emits CORS headers and
  answers preflights itself. registerSecurityHeaders answered every OPTIONS with
  a bare 204 before routing, carrying no ACAO for Origin: null, so that
  short-circuit now exempts a valid capability.

Neither is reproducible with curl, which does not enforce CORS.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug found on the way: .toolbar has backdrop-filter,
making it a stacking context that trapped .run-mode-menu's z-index:1000, so
.welcome-overlay painted over the whole Run menu. With no session open, every
item in it (Claude Code included) was unclickable.

Verified end to end against a real tailnet dashboard: live data, WebSocket push,
no failed requests, and switching tabs does not reload the frame. 98 new tests
cover the pure rewrite helpers, the CORS helper, the shim's rewrite logic, route
CRUD, and every edge of the auth exemption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 17:06:36 +02:00