A remote host whose login shell is tcsh came up on 1.48.0, when the local
sh rewrote ${SHELL:-/bin/sh} to the Codeman host's shell. Since #770 the
launch reaches the far end verbatim and runs tcsh itself, and tcsh refuses
-i -l -c, -l -c and -i -l, so every stock launch left a dead pane.
The login flags are now picked on the far end, in the shape of
loginShellArgs(): set -- -i -l, cleared for csh and tcsh, then
exec "${SHELL:-/bin/sh}" "$@". The text is one brace group, so
cd <path> && { ...; } still starts nothing when the cd fails. bsd-csh takes
every flag combination, csh is listed because it is tcsh on macOS and the BSDs.
The version probe keeps its one statement: the login shell parses it, not
/bin/sh, so fish and tcsh refuse it either way, as they did on 1.48.0.
Measured with the real builder on a real sshd in a throwaway Debian container
(tcsh 6.24.07, bsd-csh, fish 3.6, bash) and through a fake sshd with
tcsh 6.24.10, fish, zsh, dash and bash, a real Codeman server on tcsh included.
The tcsh disclosure comes out of the docs and the changeset. They keep the two
limits 1.48.0 had too: tcsh has no export, so the PATH bootstrap only prints an
error, and the tmux probe needs a command executable, which Debian lacks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review follow-ups on #282. All four are the same failure shape: a list that
enumerates run modes, missed by the sweep that added 'pi'.
1. Cron ignored pi's project-trust clamp. The PR widened CronJobBaseSchema's
agentType to accept 'pi' but not the matching clamp beside gemini's, so a
non-granted multi-user owner's cron pi job spawned bare `pi` (pi's own
defaultProjectTrust, an interactive prompt they can answer "yes" to, which
loads and EXECUTES repo-local .pi/extensions TypeScript) while the same
user's UI/API launch was forced to --no-approve. The clamp is now a pure
exported helper, clampCronExternalCliConfigs(), so both it and gemini's
previously untested materialization are pinned.
2. POST /api/sessions/:id/interactive auto-enabled the Ralph tracker for pi:
its denylist covered opencode/codex/gemini/antigravity only. The tracker is
never fed for an external CLI (_processExpensiveParsers returns early), so a
pi session reported ralphEnabled and Ralph UI state no sibling backend shows.
3. REMOTE_CLI_BIN had no pi entry, so buildRemoteCliVersionProbeCommand()
returned null and Session.cliVersion stayed blank for every remote-SSH pi
session, even though the PR wired the remote launch command and the
per-mode override schema field.
4. The desktop home rail's badge map had no pi entry, and its lookup falls back
to '', which is what claude renders. A pi session read as Claude there while
the tab strip and phone overview badged it correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SessionMode gains 'pi', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
OpenCode, Codex, Gemini and Antigravity: its own PTY, tmux session, rose
tab identity, welcome button, run-mode entry, cron agentType, Docker and
remote-SSH command defaults, and clone-repo Brain option.
Pi is a different shape of CLI from the other four, and three decisions
follow from that:
- It has NO permission prompts and no sandbox, so there is no
--dangerously-skip-permissions analog and none was invented. The
privilege-shaped knob is the tri-state approveProjectTrust, which makes
pi load and EXECUTE repo-local .pi/extensions TypeScript and install
missing project packages. clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() therefore
puts pi in the MATERIALIZE branch: a non-granted multi-user owner gets
--no-approve even when no config was sent, because pi's own default is
a prompt the session user could answer themselves. That helper had zero
test coverage; it now has coverage for all four CLIs.
- Only the PI_ prefix joins the env allowlist. Pi's ~34 provider key vars
share no prefix and ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES is one global list with no mode
context, so admitting them would widen the allowlist for every mode at
once. Auth goes through pi's /login or the server's own environment.
--api-key is deliberately never wired: it would put a provider secret on
the spawn command line.
- pi stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode(). Its default TUI renders into the
main screen with terminal-owned scrollback, and its 0.84.0 fullscreen
mode is runtime-switchable via /settings; that flip was measured to put
the pane into the alt screen, which the strip would have corrupted.
pi-cli-resolver.ts additionally sanity-probes `pi --version` and requires
semver-shaped output, because `pi` is a short generic name a stray binary
can shadow; GET /api/pi/status surfaces path and version so a
misresolution is diagnosable rather than presenting as a broken mode.
Docker installs pi in its own --ignore-scripts step so that flag cannot
affect the other four CLIs, and seeds its credentials per-file rather than
whole-dir (~/.pi/agent also holds sessions, extensions and package trees).
Verified end to end against pi 0.84.1 on an isolated instance: resolver
search-dir fallback, flag construction, piConfig persistence across a full
server restart, the trust prompt and its --no-approve suppression, the
rose Run button on the default daylight-blue skin (the nested skin block
eats per-mode gradients unless the rule lives inside it), and the buffer
local-echo policy, which pi tolerates where codex did not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeman maintainer