Single-user mode has no per-username bucket, so its per-IP bucket is the
only limit on guesses against the one password, and behind a tunnel every
client shares 127.0.0.1. Put it back on AUTH_FAILURE_MAX (10).
AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX (50) now gates only the multi-user per-IP pre-gate,
which runs before the scrypt verify and so refuses even a correct password;
the per-username bucket still caps each account at 10.
Move the headroom test out of the single-user suite and add a multi-user
test that sprays wrong passwords across usernames (9 each) and expects 401
for the first 50, then 429 for the 51st and for a correct password.
Update the docs that still described 10 per IP for every mode, and resync
the plugin mirror of the codeman skill.
One AUTH_FAILURE_MAX (10 per 15 min) gated the single-user per-IP
bucket, the multi-user per-IP pre-gate, the per-username lockout and the
hook-secret bucket. Clients sharing one egress IP (NAT, a tunnel, an
automated client retrying) were throttled after 10 failures in total.
Add AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX = 50 and use it for the two per-IP login buckets
only. The per-username lockout and the hook-secret bucket keep
AUTH_FAILURE_MAX = 10, so guessing against any one account, or against
the hook secret, is no easier than before.
Four ports were shared by two files each — 3162 (qr-auth / auth-security), 3170
(multiuser-auth / routes/ws-routes), 3230 and 3231 (cod54-hook-event-auth /
routes/voice-routes). Files run serially (`fileParallelism: false`), so the pairs
never met inside one run; they collide between two runs on one host, or with
anything else holding the port. All six files now bind port 0 and read the
number back (`boundPort` for WebServer, `server.address()` after each listen for
the raw Fastify / ws servers).
test/test-ports-guard.test.ts fails on a WebServer built under test/ whose port
argument is not the literal 0 — `new WebServer(…)`, a subclass, or a destructured
alias (`{ WebServer: T }`, as quick-start.test.ts does) — outside a legacy list of
the 43 files that construct one with a non-zero port today; the follow-up sweep
converts them. A converted file cannot stay listed. What it does not cover (helper
parameters, `import { WebServer as X }`, raw listen sites) is written down in it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
COD-54 gated the /api/hook-event + /api/status-telemetry localhost bypass
behind the shared X-Codeman-Hook-Secret only WHILE a managed tunnel was
running, keeping a plain localhost bypass otherwise. But Codeman can't detect
a user's OWN loopback reverse proxy (their own `cloudflared --url`,
`tailscale serve`, nginx -> 127.0.0.1), which proxies internet traffic into
the loopback origin with req.ip === 127.0.0.1 — so that setup kept the unsafe
plain bypass.
Require the secret on the loopback bypass unconditionally. Managed-session
hooks already always present it (X-Codeman-Hook-Secret from
$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE, generated for every instance), so the legitimate
hook channel is unaffected; only the previously-unguarded own-proxy path is
now rejected. Drops the now-unused getTunnelRunning param from
registerAuthMiddleware.
Tests: cod54-hook-event-auth (tunnel-down now also requires the secret, plus
a good-secret positive case); auth-security (hook tests present the secret to
reach schema validation).
Aamer Akhter