One conflict, in install.sh's help text: both sides extended the same line of
environment variables. Kept both additions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
auto-resume, custom model endpoints, prompt uploads and the image watcher. `stop` waits
are a 400, and so are `blocked` waits unless Codeman reads that CLI's dialogs off its
screen (codex), `git-status`, `git-fetch` and Edit history (`.../edits`) answer
`unsupported` with `reason: "adopted"`, `git-diff` and `git-fetch-settings` answer
`400 INVALID_INPUT`, and `last-response` answers empty, since Codeman knows no transcript
for it. Its `paneExit`
stays absent, because the pane holds a `tmux attach` and not the agent. Reboot restore
does not rebuild one. A wrapper that cannot start answers `OPERATION_FAILED` and leaves
the tab to be tried again: Codeman never starts a local process in its place.
## Approvals Inbox
Cross-session queue of prompts waiting on a human (permission dialogs,
@@ -1358,9 +1471,9 @@ The target is judged before anything is written:
- The folder must not exist, or must be an **empty** directory; a folder with contents is Link Existing's job: `409 ALREADY_EXISTS`. A symlink or a plain file at the target is `400`.
- `409 ALREADY_EXISTS` also for a case name already in use (in the cases dir or the registry) and for a folder that is already a case.
Admin only in multi-user mode (`403`), like `POST /api/cases/link`: it writes outside the cases directory and into the shared, ownerless registry. If anything fails after the first write, what this call created is removed (the whole folder if it created it, otherwise only the scaffold inside the empty folder you picked) and the response is `500`.
Admin only in multi-user mode (`403`), like `POST /api/cases/link`: it writes outside the cases directory and into the shared, ownerless registry. If anything fails after the first write, what this call created is removed (the whole folder if it created it, otherwise only the scaffold inside the empty folder you picked) and the response is `500`, or `409 ALREADY_EXISTS` when the name was linked meanwhile, or `409 CONFLICT` when `linked-cases.json` cannot be read or is not a JSON object. Such a file is refused and left as it is, because writing over it would unlink every other case; `POST /api/cases/link` refuses it the same way.
`POST /api/cases/clone` takes the same optional `path`, with `{ name, repository, ref?, shallow?, description?, path? }`. Without `path` the repository is cloned to `<cases dir>/<name>` as always. With `path` the repository is cloned **into that exact folder** (no `<name>` subfolder is added) and registered as a linked case, judged by the same rules as above: `400` for an invalid or blocked path (or a symlink or file at the target), `404` for a missing parent, `422` for an unreachable parent, and `409 ALREADY_EXISTS` for a folder that has files, a name already in use or a folder that is already a case. Admin only in multi-user mode (`403`). An existing empty folder is cloned into directly and is kept, emptied again, if the clone fails; a second clone into the same folder while one is running is refused with `409`. A destination at or inside a Docker case workspace is refused `400 INVALID_INPUT` (git would run the new repository's hooks and filters on the host, and a container can write there), and `503` when the Docker case list cannot be read. If the clone succeeds but the registry write fails (or the name was linked while git ran, which is `409`), the cloned folder is kept and the error names it: `500 OPERATION_FAILED`, then use Link Existing.
`POST /api/cases/clone` takes the same optional `path`, with `{ name, repository, ref?, shallow?, description?, path? }`. Without `path` the repository is cloned to `<cases dir>/<name>` as always. With `path` the repository is cloned **into that exact folder** (no `<name>` subfolder is added) and registered as a linked case, judged by the same rules as above: `400` for an invalid or blocked path (or a symlink or file at the target), `404` for a missing parent, `422` for an unreachable parent, and `409 ALREADY_EXISTS` for a folder that has files, a name already in use or a folder that is already a case. Admin only in multi-user mode (`403`). An existing empty folder is cloned into directly and is kept, emptied again, if the clone fails; a second clone into the same folder while one is running is refused with `409`. A destination at or inside a Docker case workspace is refused `400 INVALID_INPUT` (git would run the new repository's hooks and filters on the host, and a container can write there), and `503` when the Docker case list cannot be read. If the clone succeeds but the case cannot be registered, the cloned folder is kept and the error names it, then use Link Existing: `409 ALREADY_EXISTS` when the name was linked while git ran, `409 CONFLICT` when `linked-cases.json` is refused as above, and `500 OPERATION_FAILED` when the write itself fails.
## Git status
@@ -1382,23 +1495,23 @@ Both routes accept two optional query parameters, which the UI sends from its pe
- `state: 'ok'`: `repos[]`, each `{ name, path, status }` where `name` is the repository folder's name, `path` its root relative to the working directory, and `status` is:
`branch` (null when `detached`), `upstream`, `ahead`, `behind`, `hasRemote`, `counts` (`staged`, `unstaged`, `untracked`, `conflicted`, `uncommitted` = distinct paths, `stashes`), `files[]` (`path` relative to `repoRoot`, `origPath` for a rename, `index` and `worktree` status letters, `kind`: `staged` \| `unstaged` \| `untracked` \| `conflicted`; a file that is staged *and* modified again appears once per kind), `filesTruncated`, `unpushedCount` (exact) and `unpushed[]` (newest first: `hash`, `author`, `time` in epoch seconds, `subject`), `repoRoot`, `checkedAt`.
- `state: 'not-a-repo'`: no repository here, above (that counts) or within two levels below.
- `state: 'unsupported'` with `reason: 'remote' | 'docker'`: those sessions are never inspected (a Docker workspace is writable from inside its sandbox, and git here would run on the host).
- `state: 'unsupported'` with `reason: 'remote' | 'docker' | 'adopted'`: those sessions are never inspected (a Docker workspace is writable from inside its sandbox, and git here would run on the host; an adopted session's `workingDir` is a neutral `/tmp`, not its workspace).
- `state: 'error'` with a short `error` (git missing, timed out, or git's first stderr line with any `user:token@` credentials redacted).
Lists are capped (300 files and 50 commits per repository) while the counts stay exact. A branch with no upstream reports the commits no remote has (`HEAD --not --remotes`); a repository with no remote reports `unpushedCount: 0`, since there is nothing to push to. Concurrent polls of one folder share a single git invocation; `?fresh=1` (what the panel's Refresh button and opening the panel send) skips the short-lived caches, though it still joins a computation already running.
`POST /api/sessions/:id/git-fetch` is the panel's **Fetch** button: one `git fetch --quiet` per repository the panel would show, through the same resolver so the two cannot disagree about which repositories belong to a workspace, with the same `maxRepos` and `timeout` clamps. It is the only git command the Git panel runs that writes (cloning and worktree management write too, but only when you asked for them at the moment you asked), and it writes remote-tracking refs only: nothing commits, checks out, merges or touches the working tree. It is not quite as harmless as a read: a fetch holds git's ref lock, so an agent's own `git pull` in the same clone can hit the same `cannot lock ref` while a fetch is running, which is why one folder is fetched by one run at a time. It runs on that click, or on the interval below and never otherwise, and `git fetch` is exactly the command that can run a repository's own hooks (`reference-transaction`, `pre-auto-gc` through the automatic maintenance a fetch triggers, and config commands such as `credential.helper`), which is why nothing runs on a timer until you opt in, and why a repository at or inside a Docker case workspace is refused before any git runs. Remote and Docker sessions answer `state: 'unsupported'` like the status route. Bounded: 4 repositories at a time across the whole run (one shared bound, not one per repository group; a scheduled tick keeps that one bound for all its folders, so 4 folders do not mean 4 × 4, and works at most 4 folders at a time), one spawn per repository with the same per-command timeout, which reaches the whole process group rather than only the `git` parent (a fetch over http spawns helper processes, and a timeout that signals the parent alone can leave one running after the answer goes out), `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` plus BatchMode ssh so a repository that needs a login fails fast instead of hanging the request on an invisible prompt. Codeman supplies no credentials, so a repository your own git is already signed in to works because that is your existing setup. That BatchMode ssh is a default, never an override: your own `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` and the repository's `core.sshCommand` are honoured, and ⚠️ the default's `StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new` records an unknown host key in `~/.ssh/known_hosts` without asking: BatchMode stops a prompt, not a write. A click joins a run already going for the same folder, and the click publishes the trigger of the run it actually did (`click` when the click was the run, `interval` when it joined a tick already going, because a click that fetched nothing cannot report itself as the fetch) as the session's `gitFetch` state (below), so another tab open on the same folder sees the same run.
`POST /api/sessions/:id/git-fetch` is the panel's **Fetch** button: one `git fetch --quiet` per repository the panel would show, through the same resolver so the two cannot disagree about which repositories belong to a workspace, with the same `maxRepos` and `timeout` clamps. It is the only git command the Git panel runs that writes (cloning and worktree management write too, but only when you asked for them at the moment you asked), and it writes remote-tracking refs only: nothing commits, checks out, merges or touches the working tree. It is not quite as harmless as a read: a fetch holds git's ref lock, so an agent's own `git pull` in the same clone can hit the same `cannot lock ref` while a fetch is running, which is why one folder is fetched by one run at a time. It runs on that click, or on the interval below and never otherwise, and `git fetch` is exactly the command that can run a repository's own hooks (`reference-transaction`, `pre-auto-gc` through the automatic maintenance a fetch triggers, and config commands such as `credential.helper`), which is why nothing runs on a timer until you opt in, and why a repository at or inside a Docker case workspace is refused before any git runs. Remote, Docker and adopted sessions answer `state: 'unsupported'` like the status route. Bounded: 4 repositories at a time across the whole run (one shared bound, not one per repository group; a scheduled tick keeps that one bound for all its folders, so 4 folders do not mean 4 × 4, and works at most 4 folders at a time), one spawn per repository with the same per-command timeout, which reaches the whole process group rather than only the `git` parent (a fetch over http spawns helper processes, and a timeout that signals the parent alone can leave one running after the answer goes out), `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` plus BatchMode ssh so a repository that needs a login fails fast instead of hanging the request on an invisible prompt. Codeman supplies no credentials, so a repository your own git is already signed in to works because that is your existing setup. That BatchMode ssh is a default, never an override: your own `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` and the repository's `core.sshCommand` are honoured, and ⚠️ the default's `StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new` records an unknown host key in `~/.ssh/known_hosts` without asking: BatchMode stops a prompt, not a write. A click joins a run already going for the same folder, and the click publishes the trigger of the run it actually did (`click` when the click was the run, `interval` when it joined a tick already going, because a click that fetched nothing cannot report itself as the fetch) as the session's `gitFetch` state (below), so another tab open on the same folder sees the same run.
`data` is `{ state, repos, reposTruncated, repoLimit, fetchedAt }`, `repos[]` each `{ name, path, ok }` and, when it failed, `failure` (`{ code, message, stderr }`: the codes as in the clone failures, plus `NO_REMOTE`). A repository that could not be fetched keeps its row rather than being dropped. The panel shows the result under its list and then re-reads, so `behind` reflects what this fetch brought.
The interval is two **synced** settings in `PUT /api/settings` (`src/git-fetch-scheduler.ts`): `gitFetchEnabled` (default `false`) and `gitFetchIntervalSeconds` (30 to 3600, default 300, the gap between runs timed from the start of a run so a slow repository does not push the next one out). Synced, not per-device, because the server is what acts on them; the scheduler reads them fresh on each 15 s tick, so a change works without a restart. A session can override both, and the override wins even while the app-wide switch is off: `POST /api/sessions/:id/git-fetch-settings` takes `{ "enabled": true | false | null, "intervalSeconds": number | null }` (`null` on a field clears that half so the app value applies again, a field left out of the body leaves the other half as it was), is `400 INVALID_INPUT` for a remote or Docker session, and answers `200` with `{ gitFetchSettings: { enabled, intervalSeconds } }` where `null` means the session follows the app. What the last run did rides the session state as `gitFetch` (`{ ranAt, trigger, state, repos, failed, firstFailure? }`, `trigger` is `click` or `interval`), on the existing `SessionUpdated` event: no new event. Sessions on the same folder share one run and both see its result, the schedule is keyed by folder, and a folder is fetched by at most one run at a time; a folder is due when ANY session open on it is due, so the order the sessions were read cannot decide which interval wins, and the folder is probed once for the whole group rather than once per session on it; every session open on a folder is remembered, so closing the one that holds the override does not stop that folder's fetching while another session is still open on it. The tick skips anything its bounded probe does not confirm is a directory, stamps each folder's schedule when it picks it, and does not run a second tick over a selection still going. Remote and Docker sessions are never fetched on a timer, and the Docker rule is re-checked against the CURRENT Docker roots every tick. Both fetch paths fail closed on a Docker case list (`docker-cases.json`) that exists but cannot be read or parsed: a click answers `200` with `state: 'error'` and publishes that as its `gitFetch`, and a tick fetches nothing and leaves its folders due for the next tick, since without the list nothing tells which folders a container can write to (the read-only status and diff routes keep reading such a list as no Docker workspaces).
The interval is two **synced** settings in `PUT /api/settings` (`src/git-fetch-scheduler.ts`): `gitFetchEnabled` (default `false`) and `gitFetchIntervalSeconds` (30 to 3600, default 300, the gap between runs timed from the start of a run so a slow repository does not push the next one out). Synced, not per-device, because the server is what acts on them; the scheduler reads them fresh on each 15 s tick, so a change works without a restart. A session can override both, and the override wins even while the app-wide switch is off: `POST /api/sessions/:id/git-fetch-settings` takes `{ "enabled": true | false | null, "intervalSeconds": number | null }` (`null` on a field clears that half so the app value applies again, a field left out of the body leaves the other half as it was), is `400 INVALID_INPUT` for a remote, Docker or adopted session, and answers `200` with `{ gitFetchSettings: { enabled, intervalSeconds } }` where `null` means the session follows the app. What the last run did rides the session state as `gitFetch` (`{ ranAt, trigger, state, repos, failed, firstFailure? }`, `trigger` is `click` or `interval`), on the existing `SessionUpdated` event: no new event. Sessions on the same folder share one run and both see its result, the schedule is keyed by folder, and a folder is fetched by at most one run at a time; a folder is due when ANY session open on it is due, so the order the sessions were read cannot decide which interval wins, and the folder is probed once for the whole group rather than once per session on it; every session open on a folder is remembered, so closing the one that holds the override does not stop that folder's fetching while another session is still open on it. The tick skips anything its bounded probe does not confirm is a directory, stamps each folder's schedule when it picks it, and does not run a second tick over a selection still going. Remote, Docker and adopted sessions are never fetched on a timer, and the Docker rule is re-checked against the CURRENT Docker roots every tick. Both fetch paths fail closed on a Docker case list (`docker-cases.json`) that exists but cannot be read or parsed: a click answers `200` with `state: 'error'` and publishes that as its `gitFetch`, and a tick fetches nothing and leaves its folders due for the next tick, since without the list nothing tells which folders a container can write to (the read-only status and diff routes keep reading such a list as no Docker workspaces).
## Edit history
What the Edit history panel reads (Settings → Header & Panels → Header, per-device, default off): the edits a **local claude session** made, main agent and subagents, read from its transcripts. Read-only. Every route resolves the session through `findSessionOrFail` (another user's session is `404`). Remote, Docker and non-claude sessions answer `state: 'unsupported'` and are never read.
What the Edit history panel reads (Settings → Header & Panels → Header, per-device, default off): the edits a **claude session** made (local or remote SSH), main agent and subagents, read from its transcripts. Read-only. Every route resolves the session through `findSessionOrFail` (another user's session is `404`). A remote session is read over ssh and never woken: a sleeping host answers `unavailable`. Docker, non-claude and adopted sessions answer `state: 'unsupported'` and are never read.
`GET /api/sessions/:id/edits[?sync=1]` lists the stored edits, newest first, without diffs: `{ state, reason?, backfillTruncated, agents, entries }`. With `sync=1` it first reads what the transcripts gained since the last read (after `/clear` or a resume, the previous conversation's transcripts to their end first); without it the server reads nothing. `state` is `ok`, `unavailable` (stored entries only; `reason` is `no-transcript` before the session has a transcript Codeman can find, `removed` while the session's history is being deleted, or the read error; the transcript is the one the session's hooks report, else the newest `<id>.jsonl` under the session's `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` override or the server's config dir) or `unsupported` (`reason`: `remote`, `docker`, `mode`). Each entry is `{ id, ts, path, relPath, kind: 'code'|'image', tool, created, added, removed, truncated, agentId? }`, where `tool` is the edit tool, `bash` for an image a Bash call produced or `sent` for one the agent sent; `relPath` is relative to the workspace (a subagent's worktree for its edits). `agents` maps a subagent id to `{ description, agentType, worktreeBranch? }`. `backfillTruncated: true` means older edits can still be loaded.
`GET /api/sessions/:id/edits[?sync=1]` lists the stored edits, newest first, without diffs: `{ state, reason?, backfillTruncated, agents, entries }`. With `sync=1` it first reads what the transcripts gained since the last read (after `/clear` or a resume, the previous conversation's transcripts to their end first); without it the server reads nothing. `state` is `ok`, `unavailable` (stored entries only; `reason` is `no-transcript` before the session has a transcript Codeman can find, `removed` while the session's history is being deleted, or the read error; the transcript is the one the session's hooks report, else the newest `<id>.jsonl` under the session's `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` override or the server's config dir; a remote session sends no hooks, so its host is asked over ssh for the conversation the pane's claude writes now, else the most recently written of the stored conversation, the session's `claudeSessionId` and its id, under the host's `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` or `~/.claude`) or `unsupported` (`reason`: `docker`, `mode`, `adopted`). Each entry is `{ id, ts, path, relPath, kind: 'code'|'image', tool, created, added, removed, truncated, agentId? }`, where `tool` is the edit tool, `bash` for an image a Bash call produced or `sent` for one the agent sent; `relPath` is relative to the workspace (a subagent's worktree for its edits). `agents` maps a subagent id to `{ description, agentType, worktreeBranch? }`. `backfillTruncated: true` means older edits can still be loaded.
`GET /api/sessions/:id/edits/:entryId` returns one edit's diff as unified text: `{ diff, truncated }` (each edit's diff is capped at 64 KiB). `404` for an edit the session does not have.
@@ -1458,7 +1571,7 @@ A local case whose folder is the top of a git repository can keep **worktrees**
A non-admin's `POST /api/quick-start` and `POST /api/ralph-loop/start` work as before but do not record their case as `lastUsedCase` (a server-wide key).
`POST /api/cases/:name/rename` (body `{ newName, renameFolder?, stopSessions? }`, strict) renames a case. It is not one of the admin-only writes above: in multi-user mode a non-admin renames their own cases, and only the `settings.json` part is skipped for them. A case under the cases directory is its folder, so it always moves; a linked case renames its alias in `linked-cases.json` and moves its real folder (next to the old one, named `newName`) only with `renameFolder: true`. Remote and Docker cases are `400`. The new name must be free in every namespace the list merges (`409`). Live sessions whose working directory is at or inside the folder that would move make it `409` with `requiresStop: true` and `sessions: [{ id, name }]`; retry with `stopSessions: true` to end them first (they are closed as by `DELETE /api/sessions/:id`, nothing is restarted); another user's session is `403`. The folder is held by an in-process lock for the whole operation (an overlapping rename is `409 BUSY`, and `new Session` refuses a working directory inside it); a session that is still being created in the folder (constructed, not yet registered, so it can be neither listed nor stopped) makes a folder move `409` with `renameCode: "BUSY"` too, and a retry once it is registered lists it like any open session; the move is retried for a transient `EBUSY`/`EPERM`/`EACCES` and then answers `423` with `renameCode: "LOCKED"`, a cross-device move is `400`, and if the registries cannot be written afterwards `settings.json` and the folder are put back (when the folder cannot be moved back, the `500` says it is now at the new path). An error from the rename itself carries `stoppedSessions`: how many sessions it ended before it failed. On success the response is `{ oldName, newName, oldPath, newPath, folderMoved, stoppedSessions }`; `caseOrder` and `lastUsedCase` (in multi-user mode, by an admin's rename only), `linked-cases.json` and Claude Code's `projects/<path>` history are updated (history already at the new path is merged into, never overwritten), and `case:renamed` is broadcast. A linked case is admin only in multi-user mode: for a non-admin the name is looked up in their own case space only (`404` when they have no case of that name).
`POST /api/cases/:name/rename` (body `{ newName, renameFolder?, stopSessions? }`, strict) renames a case. It is not one of the admin-only writes above: in multi-user mode a non-admin renames their own cases, and only the `settings.json` part is skipped for them. A case under the cases directory is its folder, so it always moves; a linked case renames its alias in `linked-cases.json` and moves its real folder (next to the old one, named `newName`) only with `renameFolder: true`. Remote and Docker cases are `400`. The new name must be free in every namespace the list merges (`409`). Live sessions whose working directory is at or inside the folder that would move make it `409` with `requiresStop: true` and `sessions: [{ id, name }]`; retry with `stopSessions: true` to end them first (they are closed as by `DELETE /api/sessions/:id`, nothing is restarted); another user's session is `403`. The folder is held by an in-process lock for the whole operation (an overlapping rename is `409 BUSY`, and `new Session` refuses a working directory inside it); a session that is still being created in the folder (constructed, not yet registered, so it can be neither listed nor stopped) makes a folder move `409` with `renameCode: "BUSY"` too, and a retry once it is registered lists it like any open session; the move is retried for a transient `EBUSY`/`EPERM`/`EACCES` and then answers `423` with `renameCode: "LOCKED"`, a cross-device move is `400`, and if the registries cannot be written afterwards `settings.json` and the folder are put back (when the folder cannot be moved back, the answer is `500` and says it is now at the new path). A failed write is `500`. A linked case's entry is checked again where it is written, after any folder move, and a refusal there puts everything back the same way: a new name linked since the first check is `409 ALREADY_EXISTS` with `renameCode: "EXISTS"`, an old entry unlinked or changed since then is `409 CONFLICT` with `renameCode: "BUSY"`, and a `linked-cases.json` that stopped being readable or a JSON object is `409 CONFLICT` with no `renameCode` (one already damaged when the rename starts reads as empty, so a linked name answers `404`). An error from the rename itself carries `stoppedSessions`: how many sessions it ended before it failed. On success the response is `{ oldName, newName, oldPath, newPath, folderMoved, stoppedSessions }`; `caseOrder` and `lastUsedCase` (in multi-user mode, by an admin's rename only), `linked-cases.json` and Claude Code's `projects/<path>` history are updated (history already at the new path is merged into, never overwritten), and `case:renamed` is broadcast. A linked case is admin only in multi-user mode: for a non-admin the name is looked up in their own case space only (`404` when they have no case of that name).
**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` (`mode === 'opencode' || 'codex' || 'gemini' || 'antigravity' || 'pi' || 'grok' || 'deepseek'`) gates Claude-specific behavior — Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token/CLI-info parsing, and ❯-prompt readiness detection are all skipped (these CLIs render their own TUIs; readiness = output stabilization instead). ⚠️ **Work detection left this gate in #385** and is now per-CLI `capabilities.workDetect` data (`promptGlyph` + `workingLine`), because gating it on the mode left every Codex session reporting `idle` for its entire life; a CLI declaring neither falls back to Claude's pair, which is logic-identical to the pre-registry behaviour. All seven modes **require tmux — no direct PTY fallback** — because secrets are injected via `tmux setenv` (socket-scoped `${this.tmux()} setenv`, never on the spawn command line): OpenCode gets `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT` etc., Codex gets `OPENAI_API_KEY`/`CODEX_API_KEY`/`CODEX_HOME` (`setCodexEnvVars`), Gemini gets `GEMINI_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`/`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`/`GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI` etc. (`setGeminiEnvVars`, all in `tmux-manager.ts`). Codex specifics: command built by `buildCodexCommand()` (`--model`, `--config model_reasoning_effort=<level>` from `reasoningEffort`, `--config tui.animations=<bool>` from `animations`, `resume <id>`, `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` from the `codexConfig` payload / `codexDangerouslyBypassApprovals` app setting; `renderMode` is schema-coerced to `'hybrid'`, the only supported mode). Gemini specifics: command built by `buildGeminiCommand()` (`--skip-trust` always, `--approval-mode <default|auto_edit|yolo|plan>` defaulting to `yolo` for parity with Claude's `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--model`, `--resume` from the `geminiConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/gemini/status` — session/quick-start routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`npm install -g @google/gemini-cli`) when missing. Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP export `COLORTERM=truecolor` and unset `NO_COLOR`; `opencode` unsets `COLORTERM`. **Terminal colour env** under Session launch modes covers Claude and says which panes those declarations actually reach. Gemini joins `isAltScreenStripMode()` (Codex/Claude/Gemini are Ink TUIs that repaint inline → strip alt-screen/`3J` so scrollback survives). Codex availability via `GET /api/codex/status`. Antigravity specifics: command built by `buildAntigravityCommand()` (`--model`, `--conversation <id>` resume, `--dangerously-skip-permissions` from the `antigravityConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/antigravity/status` — routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash`) when missing. Unlike the other three it is NOT an npm package (standalone binary, `~/.local/bin/agy`), which is why `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it with its own `--dir /usr/local/bin` step rather than in the `npm install -g` line, and why it does NOT join `isAltScreenStripMode()`. Frontend: run-mode dropdown → `runCodex()`/`runGemini()` in `session-ui.js` ("Run CX"/"Run GM" labels), App Settings → Agents & CLIs → Codex; Respawn/Ralph options are Claude-only, so session options open on the Session tab for external CLI sessions. ⚠️ `run*()` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope (`(await res.json()).data.available` / `data.data.sessionId`) — reading the raw shape silently breaks the run. Tests: `test/run-mode-ui.test.ts` + `test/gemini-mode.test.ts` (vm-sandbox harness, no real DOM). Grok specifics: command built by `buildGrokCommand()` (`--always-approve` from `grokConfig.alwaysApprove` — grok's `bypassPermissions` permission mode, deny rules still apply; `--model`; `--resume <id>` / `--continue`, id-regexed so grok's resume-by-TITLE feature can never put an arbitrary string on the spawn line); availability via `GET /api/grok/status`, which carries `version` because the resolver version-probes candidates (`grok` has npm squatters, e.g. @vibe-kit/grok-cli — `GROK_VERSION_REGEX` is shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode agree). Like antigravity it is a standalone binary (xAI installer → `~/.grok/bin`, symlinked into `~/.local/bin`), so `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it in its own step (copy to `/usr/local/bin`, drop root's `~/.grok` in the same layer) and it stays OUT of `isAltScreenStripMode()` (fullscreen alt-screen TUI with mouse support — the opencode case, which is now `isMuxMouseStripMode`, not the Ink case). Env allowlist: `GROK_*` plus the vendor namespace `XAI_*` (`XAI_API_KEY` is grok's documented headless auth var — the same narrow-vendor-namespace reasoning as `GOOGLE_*` for gemini). Docker cred seeding is per-file (`auth.json`, `config.toml`, `pager.toml` from `~/.grok` — the dir also holds `sessionsLine truncated
**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek, OMP)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` (`mode === 'opencode' || 'codex' || 'gemini' || 'antigravity' || 'pi' || 'grok' || 'deepseek'`) gates Claude-specific behavior — Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token/CLI-info parsing, and ❯-prompt readiness detection are all skipped (these CLIs render their own TUIs; readiness = output stabilization instead). ⚠️ **Work detection left this gate in #385** and is now per-CLI `capabilities.workDetect` data (`promptGlyph` + `workingLine`), because gating it on the mode left every Codex session reporting `idle` for its entire life; a CLI declaring neither falls back to Claude's pair, which is logic-identical to the pre-registry behaviour. All seven modes **require tmux — no direct PTY fallback** — because secrets are injected via `tmux setenv` (socket-scoped `${this.tmux()} setenv`, never on the spawn command line): OpenCode gets `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT` etc., Codex gets `OPENAI_API_KEY`/`CODEX_API_KEY`/`CODEX_HOME` (`setCodexEnvVars`), Gemini gets `GEMINI_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`/`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`/`GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI` etc. (`setGeminiEnvVars`, all in `tmux-manager.ts`). Codex specifics: command built by `buildCodexCommand()` (`--no-daemon` behind the `noDaemonFlag` gate at 0.162.0, measured against codex's own version, local launches only; `--model`, `--config model_reasoning_effort=<level>` from `reasoningEffort`, `--config sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=true` from `networkAccess` (the **Allow network access** app setting `codexNetworkAccess`, a launch default and a privileged param; ⚠️ with it on, a command in codex's sandbox can call Codeman's API and start a session outside that sandbox, password or not), `--config tui.animations=<bool>` from `animations`, `resume <id>`, `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` from the `codexConfig` payload / `codexDangerouslyBypassApprovals` app setting; `renderMode` is schema-coerced to `'hybrid'`, the only supported mode). Gemini specifics: command built by `buildGeminiCommand()` (`--skip-trust` always, `--approval-mode <default|auto_edit|yolo|plan>` defaulting to `yolo` for parity with Claude's `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--model`, `--resume` from the `geminiConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/gemini/status` — session/quick-start routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`npm install -g @google/gemini-cli`) when missing. Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP export `COLORTERM=truecolor` and unset `NO_COLOR`; `opencode` unsets `COLORTERM`. **Terminal colour env** under Session launch modes covers Claude and says which panes those declarations actually reach. Gemini joins `isAltScreenStripMode()` (Codex/Claude/Gemini are Ink TUIs that repaint inline → strip alt-screen/`3J` so scrollback survives). Codex availability via `GET /api/codex/status`. Antigravity specifics: command built by `buildAntigravityCommand()` (`--model`, `--conversation <id>` resume, `--dangerously-skip-permissions` from the `antigravityConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/antigravity/status` — routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash`) when missing. Unlike the other three it is NOT an npm package (standalone binary, `~/.local/bin/agy`), which is why `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it with its own `--dir /usr/local/bin` step rather than in the `npm install -g` line, and why it does NOT join `isAltScreenStripMode()`. Frontend: run-mode dropdown → `runCodex()`/`runGemini()` in `session-ui.js` ("Run CX"/"Run GM" labels), App Settings → Agents & CLIs → Codex; Respawn/Ralph options are Claude-only, so session options open on the Session tab for external CLI sessions. ⚠️ `run*()` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope (`(await res.json()).data.available` / `data.data.sessionId`) — reading the raw shape silently breaks the run. Tests: `test/run-mode-ui.test.ts` + `test/gemini-mode.test.ts` (vm-sandbox harness, no real DOM). Grok specifics: command built by `buildGrokCommand()` (`--always-approve` from `grokConfig.alwaysApprove` — grok's `bypassPermissions` permission mode, deny rules still apply; `--model`; `--resume <id>` / `--continue`, id-regexed so grok's resume-by-TITLE feature can never put an arbitrary string on the spawn line); availability via `GET /api/grok/status`, which carries `version` because the resolver version-probes candidates (`grok` has npm squatters, e.g. @vibe-kit/grok-cli — `GROK_VERSION_REGEX` is shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode agree). Like antigravity it is a standalone binary (xAI installer → `~/.grok/bin`, symlinked into `~/.local/bin`), so `docker/agent.Dockerfile` installs it in its own step (copy to `/usr/local/bin`, drop root's `~/.grok` in the same layer) and it stays OUT of `isAltScreenStripMode()` (fuLine truncated
**DeepSeek Harness (`dsh`) specifics** — the mode that breaks three of the assumptions the six above share, so read this before changing anything about it.
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Pure helpers unit-tested in `test/base-path.test.ts` + `test/webview-proxy.test.
Model is NOT a session field: it is a composition entry in the profile's config tree (`agent-default-model`), configured in `~/.dsh/settings.yaml` + `cordis.patch.yml`, so both create paths deliberately resolve no model for this mode. Env allowlist: `DSH_*` + `DEEPSEEK_*`; provider keys named by a settings-file `apiKeyEnv` stay OUT, which is pi's 34-provider-key problem in a new shape and gets the same answer. Docker seeds `~/.dsh` per-file (`.env`, `settings.yaml`, `cordis.patch.yml`) and the image installs its OWN profile, because `profiles/` is a per-profile `node_modules` tree — host-arch-specific and far too large to copy per container start. Stays OUT of `isAltScreenStripMode()` (third-party fullscreen TUI — the opencode case, i.e. `isMuxMouseStripMode` is the shape to measure here too). ⚠️ `classifyProfile()` reads the profile's BUNDLES, and "unknown means launchable" is deliberate (anyone can publish an app bundle), but it has one knowably-wrong case: `readProfile()` returns an empty bundle list for a `package.json` with no `dsh.profile.bundles`, which made the SHIPPED `web`/`headless` profiles look third-party and launchable. The directory name is therefore consulted as a LAST resort (`STOCK_NON_INTERACTIVE_PROFILES`), after the bundle patterns, so real bundle evidence always wins over a name the user chose. The loose `tui` arm carries word boundaries for the same reason: it decides which profile boots by default, and matching the middle of `intuition` is not a rule anyone could predict. ⚠️ The generated shim is written **temp + rename**, not in place: the TUI can be exec'ing that exact path while an upgraded Codeman refreshes it, and a half-written file is a syntax error the caller then retries four times per state change forever. Bump `SHIM_VERSION` whenever `SHIM_SOURCE` changes, or an existing shim keeps matching the embedded marker and is never refreshed. Availability via `GET /api/deepseek/status`, the widest per-CLI status shape (`available`/`runnable`/`path`/`version`/`dshHome`/`defaultProfile`/`profiles`); `POST /api/deepseek/install-profile` bootstraps a profile and is the only endpoint in Codeman that installs third-party code — regex-confined specifier, argv-array spawn, privileged grant required in multi-user mode, and the held-open request is bounded by a HAND-ROLLED timeout over a `detached: true` process group (negative-pid SIGTERM→SIGKILL, as `runGit()` does in git-clone.ts). ⚠️ Node's own `spawn``timeout` is NOT enough: a plugin install fans out into package-manager children, the built-in timeout signals only the direct child, and the survivors hold the inherited stdio pipes open so `close` never fires and the request leaks forever. User guide: `docs/deepseek-integration.md`. Tests: `test/deepseek-mode.test.ts`, `test/deepseek-cli-resolver.test.ts`.
**Pi specifics** (#206, `docs/pi-integration.md`): command built by `buildPiCommand()` (`--model` — the only builder whose model regex admits `:` and `/`, for `sonnet:high` and `openai/gpt-4o` — plus `--provider`, `--thinking`, `--session <id>` / `-c`, and the TRI-STATE `--approve`/`--no-approve`). ⚠️ **Pi has no permission prompts and no sandbox**, so there is no `--dangerously-skip-permissions` analog and Codeman must not invent one; the privilege-shaped knob is `approveProjectTrust`, which makes pi LOAD AND EXECUTE repo-local `.pi/extensions` TypeScript and npm-install missing project packages. It therefore joins `clampExternalCliBypassForOwner()`'s **materialize** branch (gemini's, not codex/antigravity's only-if-sent one): an absent config still yields `--no-approve` for a non-granted owner, because pi's own default is an interactive prompt the session user could answer themselves. ⚠️ `--api-key` is NEVER wired — it would put a provider secret on the spawn command line. ⚠️ Pi stays **out** of `isAltScreenStripMode()`: its default TUI renders into the main screen with terminal-owned scrollback (nothing to strip), and since 0.84.0 the user can flip to a fullscreen TUI at runtime via `/settings`, where the alt screen is load-bearing — being out of the list is exactly what makes that switch safe. ⚠️ Only the `PI_*` env prefix was added; pi's ~34 provider keys share no prefix and `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` is a single GLOBAL list with no mode context, so admitting them would widen the allowlist for every mode at once (a mode-aware allowlist is the tracked follow-up). ⚠️ `pi` is a short, GENERIC binary name, so unlike the sibling resolvers `pi-cli-resolver.ts` sanity-probes `pi --version` (cached, vitest-skipped) and requires semver-shaped output; `GET /api/pi/status` carries `version` on top of the sibling `{available, path}` shape so a misresolution is diagnosable. Local echo: pi lands on the `'buffer'` overlay via the fallthrough in `_updateLocalEchoState` (pinned in `test/local-echo-codex-gating.test.ts`); if pi's live composer turns out to fight it the way codex's did, the fallback is one `'off'` branch. Tests: `test/pi-mode.test.ts`, `test/routes/external-cli-bypass-clamp.test.ts` (first-ever coverage of the clamp).
**Pi specifics** (#206, `docs/pi-integration.md`): command built by `buildPiCommand()` (`--model` — the only builder whose model regex admits `:` and `/`, for `sonnet:high` and `openai/gpt-4o` — plus `--provider`, `--thinking`, `--session <id>` / `-c`, and the TRI-STATE `--approve`/`--no-approve`). ⚠️ **Pi has no permission prompts and no sandbox**, so there is no `--dangerously-skip-permissions` analog and Codeman must not invent one; the privilege-shaped knob is `approveProjectTrust`, which makes pi LOAD AND EXECUTE repo-local `.pi/extensions` TypeScript and npm-install missing project packages. It therefore joins `clampExternalCliBypassForOwner()`'s **materialize** branch (gemini's, not codex/antigravity's only-if-sent one): an absent config still yields `--no-approve` for a non-granted owner, because pi's own default is an interactive prompt the session user could answer themselves. ⚠️ `--api-key` is NEVER wired — it would put a provider secret on the spawn command line. ⚠️ Pi stays **out** of `isAltScreenStripMode()`: it takes the mouse strip instead, because its TUI is fullscreen by default since 1.0.0 (`tuiMode`) and inline with terminal-owned scrollback under `tuiMode: regular`, the default below 1.0.0, so the full strip's `3J` removal would have no owner in the second shape. See "Pi is the same shape" in the scrollback section. ⚠️ Only the `PI_*` env prefix was added; pi's ~34 provider keys share no prefix and `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` is a single GLOBAL list with no mode context, so admitting them would widen the allowlist for every mode at once (a mode-aware allowlist is the tracked follow-up). ⚠️ `pi` is a short, GENERIC binary name, so unlike the sibling resolvers `pi-cli-resolver.ts` sanity-probes `pi --version` (cached, vitest-skipped) and requires semver-shaped output; `GET /api/pi/status` carries `version` on top of the sibling `{available, path}` shape so a misresolution is diagnosable. Local echo: pi lands on the `'buffer'` overlay via the fallthrough in `_updateLocalEchoState` (pinned in `test/local-echo-codex-gating.test.ts`); if pi's live composer turns out to fight it the way codex's did, the fallback is one `'off'` branch. Tests: `test/pi-mode.test.ts`, `test/routes/external-cli-bypass-clamp.test.ts` (first-ever coverage of the clamp).
**OMP (`omp`, Oh My Pi) specifics** (`docs/omp-integration.md`): architecturally the simplest of the family — omp owns its own auth, provider routing, and trust decisions entirely in `~/.omp` config files (default `tools.approvalMode: yolo`), so `buildOmpCommand()` only ever emits `--model`/`--resume <id>`/`--continue`, and there is no bypass-permissions flag for Codeman to wire or clamp. ⚠️ **That does NOT make the multi-user clamp a no-op**: `OMP_*` is an allowlisted `envOverrides` prefix and admits `OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL`/`OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN` (where omp resolves credentials from), both dropped for a non-granted owner in `clampEnvOverridesForOwner()` — the same shape as `DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL` — even though, unlike DeepSeek, Codeman forwards no operator-held key into an omp pane today (found in Ark0N/Codeman#353 review). `--continue` alone is ambiguous the moment any other omp conversation has touched the same working directory more recently, since it just picks the newest session file on disk — `resolveAndClaimOmpSessionId()` (`src/utils/omp-session-resolver.ts`) resolves and PINS the real id instead, verifying each candidate's own file header (`{"type":"session","id",cwd"}`, not just the mangled-directory match) and tracking already-claimed ids in a process-wide registry so two omp tabs in the same case dir can't alias onto each other's conversation. ⚠️ Resolution/pinning happens ONLY at the point a respawn is actually confirmed (`_pinOmpRespawnId()`, called from `_setupOrAttachMuxSession()`'s dead-pane branch and `reattachRemote()`) — earlier code resolved eagerly while merely building respawn options, which could mis-pin a still-ALIVE session's id purely from boot-recovery timing. `src/omp-transcript.ts` independently scans `~/.omp/agent/sessions/**/*.jsonl` for Past Sessions history, the omp analog of Claude's own transcript scan, so a conversation survives even a full "Kill Tmux". ⚠️ omp's own env knobs are mostly `PI_*`, not `OMP_*` (`PI_CONFIG_DIR`, `PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR`, `PI_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR`, `PI_SUBPROCESS_CMD`, `PI_SHELL_PREFIX`), and `PI_*` is already allowlisted globally for pi — so a redirected `PI_CONFIG_DIR` silently moves the `~/.omp` tree the resolver and transcript scanner hardcode, degrading pinning/history with no error; a known gap shared with pi, not fixed here. ⚠️ Docker: `appendResumeFlag()`'s `case 'omp'` keys off the top-level `resumeSessionId`, which Docker panes never receive for omp (built from `defaultDockerCommandForMode`, with no `ompConfig` threaded through) — host-side history recovery and pinning work through the shared `sessions/` mount, but `--resume` does not currently reach an in-container omp process on respawn (flagged in review, not yet fixed). Stays out of `isAltScreenStripMode()` (narrow scrollback strip, alt-screen toggles only) and lands on the `'buffer'` local-echo policy via the `_updateLocalEchoState` fallthrough, same as grok and pi. Resolver: `omp-cli-resolver.ts` version-probes like pi/grok (`omp` is a short, generic name) and requires `omp/<semver>`-shaped output; `OMP_SEARCH_DIRS` leads with `~/.local/bin` (omp.sh's installer targets `$HOME/.local/bin` with no `--dir` override — verified against a real `--no-cache` Docker build, `~/.omp/bin` was the wrong first guess). Tests: `test/omp-mode.test.ts`, `test/omp-cli-resolver.test.ts`, `test/omp-session-resolver.test.ts`, `test/omp-fresh-run-no-resume.test.ts`.
@@ -81,20 +81,38 @@ OMP's registry entry declares `privilegedParams: []` and a launch spec that only
Further detail: ⚠️ **Auto-reconnect revives ONLY when the durable remote tmux session is verifiably still alive** (`remoteTmuxSessionAlive()`, a `has-session` probe over ssh, #355): a clean agent exit (Ctrl-C, Ctrl-D, `exit`) tears that session down, and `isPaneDead()` cannot tell it from a transport drop, so the watcher used to relaunch a FRESH agent after every clean exit (claude only looked fine because its `|| --resume` fallback masked it). An unreachable host answers `undefined`, which also means do not revive. ⚠️ `has-session` prints NOTHING on success, so the probe is classified by EXIT STATUS (`classifyRemoteAliveExit`: 0 alive, ssh's 255 or a timeout unknown, anything else gone); reading stdout classified every live session as gone and silently disabled transport-drop reconnects. The answer is cached per session and forgotten whenever the pane is seen alive again, or a stale `true` from one transport drop would revive the next clean exit.
⚠️ The image watcher never watches a remote session's `workingDir` (a path on the remote host, which it would watch on the LOCAL disk): every call site that starts a watch skips `session.remote` (`setupSessionListeners()`, the app-wide toggle in `PUT /api/settings`, and `POST /api/sessions/:id/image-watcher`, which refuses `enabled: true` with `INVALID_INPUT`), so a new call site must too. File reads in a remote case are the second ssh surface (see Remote SSH cases below). The reason writes, office previews and thumbnails are deliberately unsupported over ssh is that no remote file is ever copied onto the server's disk. ssh children are bounded because terminal output in a remote session is written on the remote host, so a prompt-injected agent there can print hundreds of `codeman://attach` links. The third surface is a remote session's full-history load, which reads the scrollback from the remote tmux (`src/remote-pane-history.ts`) through the same limiter, with a bounded slot wait (`maxWaitMs`) since the local capture is its fallback.
⚠️ The image watcher never watches a remote session's `workingDir` (a path on the remote host, which it would watch on the LOCAL disk): every call site that starts a watch skips `session.remote` (`setupSessionListeners()`, the app-wide toggle in `PUT /api/settings`, and `POST /api/sessions/:id/image-watcher`, which refuses `enabled: true` with `INVALID_INPUT`), so a new call site must too. File reads in a remote case are the second ssh surface (see Remote SSH cases below). The reason writes, office previews and thumbnails are deliberately unsupported over ssh is that no remote file is ever copied onto the server's disk; the one exception is the Edit history store, which keeps the diffs parsed from a remote session's transcripts under `dataPath('edit-history')` (see [Edit history panel](#edit-history-panel)). ssh children are bounded because terminal output in a remote session is written on the remote host, so a prompt-injected agent there can print hundreds of `codeman://attach` links. The third surface is a remote session's full-history load, which reads the scrollback from the remote tmux (`src/remote-pane-history.ts`) through the same limiter, with a bounded slot wait (`maxWaitMs`) since the local capture is its fallback.
### Remote SSH cases
**Remote host wake-on-LAN from user input**: an optional `RemoteHost.wakeMac` (magic packet built and broadcast by Codeman) or `RemoteHost.wakeCommand` (a single executable path, run WITHOUT a shell, and the explicit override) lets the input route — and an explicit `POST /api/sessions/:id/wake` — wake a SLEEPING host instead of writing into a stalled ssh pane; `tmux send-keys` succeeds against a stalled pane, so the bytes used to vanish silently. The wake flow lives in `src/remote-wake.ts` and is reachable **only** from an EXPLICIT user request: `POST /api/sessions/:id/input`, that explicit wake route, and the create/attach path (`POST /api/quick-start` for a remote case, `POST /api/sessions` with `attachRemoteSession`, via `ensureHostAwake`), because "the user pressed Run on a sleeping host" is the same kind of request and the tmux probe would otherwise fail with a misleading "needs tmux installed". Everything TIMER-driven must never wake a host: the COD-108 auto-reconnect watcher, `Server.handleRemoteSessionDropped` and boot recovery have no access to the registry, or a host would be re-woken seconds after each suspend and could never stay asleep (asserted by wiring guards in `test/remote-wake.test.ts`, not just documented — including that `ensureHostAwake` is called from the HTTP route only, since `cron-service.ts` builds sessions through the shared service with nobody waiting on the answer). `GET /api/sessions/:id/reachability` only ASKS — it never wakes — and feeds the amber "host unreachable" banner (`host-wake-ui.js`) whose action is either Wake or, with no target configured, "Configure WoL" → `#wakeConfigModal` (saved via `PUT /api/remote-hosts/:id`). Detection is a throttled bare TCP probe (no ssh, no `ServerAliveInterval` — keepalives would move bytes into an idle connection every interval; and a host behind a jump host/SOCKS proxy is reachability-UNKNOWN, never "asleep": `isProbeable()` keeps the registry from buffering, gating or bannering on a probe that cannot reach it), input is buffered and flushed in order after `reattachRemote()` (the send-and-wait path blocks instead, as does the create path, with a shorter request budget), and the wake fields are re-read from `remote-hosts.json` on recovery AND (throttled, cached) live for a running session, because the persisted `remote` snapshot would never see a field added later (`rehydrateRemoteHostFields` + `RemoteWakeDeps.resolveRemote`). Design + invariants: `docs/remote-sessions.md` §Wake-on-LAN from user input.
**Remote SSH cases** (COD-94/#145): cases can point at a **remote host** (`~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` via `src/remote-hosts.ts`; CRUD under `/api/cases` — cases route file). A remote session launches a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh <host>` that creates a durable REMOTE tmux session on a **dedicated socket**`-L codeman-remote` with name `codeman-ssh-<id>` — deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman instance on the target host never adopts it; no `-g` global tmux options are set remotely. `remotePath`/`identityFile` are schema-guarded against shell injection (backticks/`$` rejected — same approach as `extraSshOptions`); remote tmux availability is probed via `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable()` in quick-start (ssh args carry `-o ConnectTimeout=10`). Remote claude defaults to an idempotent `claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>` pair under a login shell, so a respawn or reattach continues the SAME conversation rather than starting a fresh one (remote omp gets the same treatment via `--continue`; ⚠️ because the claude arm is an `a || b` pair under `-c`, that pane's PID is the login shell, not the agent); per-host `commands.*` override. Session kill best-effort kills the remote tmux too. `SessionState.remote`/`MuxSession.remote` round-trip through recovery (`restoreMuxSessions` passes `remote` back into the Session constructor). ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start` (which resolves the remote case and skips LOCAL CLI availability gates) — `POST /api/sessions` stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`. `envOverrides`/`effort`/`modelOverride`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig` are rejected for remote quick-starts (not silently dropped). UI: Create Case modal → Remote tab. Tests: `test/remote-hosts.test.ts`, `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`. ⚠️ **Reading a file in a remote case goes over ssh too** (#415): `src/remote-files.ts` is the single remote-READ layer (`buildRemoteFileCommand` = `buildSshConnectionArgs` + one shellescaped remote command; `remoteProbePaths` returns remote realpath + stat; `remoteCreateReadStream` streams a `Range` via `tail -c +N | head -c L` and its `close()` must be wired to the response's `close` or the ssh child outlives an aborted download). The guard order matches the local path exactly (`validateSessionFilePathLexical` → remote realpath of BOTH file and workspace root → containment → sensitive-path → size cap on the REMOTE size), a request path arrives from the browser and is only ever interpolated as a `shellescape`d token, and an unreachable host answers **502**, never a 404. ⚠️ The probe's symlink resolution FAILS CLOSED: `readlink -f` where it exists, otherwise a `cd -P`/`pwd -P` directory walk plus a bounded plain-`readlink` loop over the last component, and anything it cannot fully resolve is reported unresolvable (404), never as the unresolved string — the first version resolved the directory chain only, so on a host without `readlink -f` a `ws/notes.txt -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` link passed containment under its own path while `cat` served the key. Records are NUL-separated and index-keyed so a newline in a filename cannot shift the mapping. ⚠️ ssh children are BOUNDED: probes and buffered reads go through `src/remote-ssh-limiter.ts` (a `document-conversion-limiter`-shaped semaphore, default 4), the attachment-history list probes its whole history in ONE batched call (`probeRemoteAttachmentHistory`, threaded into `registerExternalAttachment({remoteProbes})`), and probes chunk at 40 paths — a prompt-injected agent printing `codeman://attach` links in a remote session used to fork one `ssh` per link. `describeExecError` never returns Node's `Command failed: <ssh line>` message (identity path + probe script in a 502 body). The `PUT /file-content` guard sits AHEAD of `validateSessionFilePath`, which resolves LOCALLY, or a same-named local directory (an sshfs mount) takes the write. Under `VITEST` the three IO functions refuse rather than connect. This covers the ATTACHMENT routes too, which is the half a clicked path needs when the file is OUTSIDE the case directory (`_isExternalPreviewPath` sends it to `POST …/attachments`): registration, by-id `raw`, metadata and the history list all resolve over ssh (`registerExternalAttachment({remote})`, `resolveServableRemoteAttachment`), and what decides the host is the SESSION, never the path string — the same absolute path means a different file on each host. Deliberately NOT supported over ssh: writes (`edit=1`/`PUT` answer 400, `editable` is always false), office previews/thumbnails, the file tree/picker, `tail-file`. The Ralph file routes follow the same rules (`ralph-routes.ts`): `POST .../fix-plan/read` reads `@fix_plan.md` on the remote host through `remote-files.ts` (one probe of the file and the workspace, confined with the shared `isPathWithinRoot`, capped at 1 MB; missing or outside theLine truncated
**Remote SSH cases** (COD-94/#145): cases can point at a **remote host** (`~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` via `src/remote-hosts.ts`; CRUD under `/api/cases`, cases route file). A remote session launches a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh <host>` that creates a durable REMOTE tmux session on a **dedicated socket**`-L codeman-remote` with name `codeman-ssh-<id>`, deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman instance on the target host never adopts it; no `-g` global tmux options are set remotely. `remotePath`/`identityFile` are schema-guarded against shell injection (backticks and `$` rejected; `extraSshOptions` refuses backticks and `$(` only, so a bare `$` passes there and reaches `ssh` as those literal characters); remote tmux availability is probed via `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable()` in quick-start (ssh args carry `-o ConnectTimeout=10`). Remote claude defaults to an idempotent `claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>` pair under a login shell, so a respawn or reattach continues the SAME conversation rather than starting a fresh one (remote omp gets the same treatment via `--continue`; ⚠️ because the claude arm is an `a || b` pair under `-c`, that pane's PID is the login shell, not the agent); per-host `commands.*` override. Session kill best-effort kills the remote tmux too. `SessionState.remote`/`MuxSession.remote` round-trip through recovery (`restoreMuxSessions` passes `remote` back into the Session constructor). ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start` (which resolves the remote case and skips LOCAL CLI availability gates): `POST /api/sessions` stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`. `envOverrides`/`effort`/`modelOverride`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig` are rejected for remote quick-starts (not silently dropped). UI: Create Case modal → Remote tab. Tests: `test/remote-hosts.test.ts`, `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`. ⚠️ **Reading a file in a remote case goes over ssh too** (#415): `src/remote-files.ts` is the single remote-READ layer (`buildRemoteFileCommand` = `buildSshConnectionArgs` + one shellescaped remote command; `remoteProbePaths` returns remote realpath + stat; `remoteCreateReadStream` streams a `Range` via `tail -c +N | head -c L` and its `close()` must be wired to the response's `close` or the ssh child outlives an aborted download). The guard order matches the local path exactly (`validateSessionFilePathLexical` → remote realpath of BOTH file and workspace root → containment → sensitive-path → size cap on the REMOTE size), a request path arrives from the browser and is only ever interpolated as a `shellescape`d token, and an unreachable host answers **502**, never a 404. ⚠️ The probe's symlink resolution FAILS CLOSED: `readlink -f` where it exists, otherwise a `cd -P`/`pwd -P` directory walk plus a bounded plain-`readlink` loop over the last component, and anything it cannot fully resolve is reported unresolvable (404), never as the unresolved string: the first version resolved the directory chain only, so on a host without `readlink -f` a `ws/notes.txt -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` link passed containment under its own path while `cat` served the key. Records are NUL-separated and index-keyed so a newline in a filename cannot shift the mapping. ⚠️ ssh children are BOUNDED: probes and buffered reads go through `src/remote-ssh-limiter.ts` (a `document-conversion-limiter`-shaped semaphore, default 4), the attachment-history list probes its whole history in ONE batched call (`probeRemoteAttachmentHistory`, threaded into `registerExternalAttachment({remoteProbes})`), and probes chunk at 40 paths: a prompt-injected agent printing `codeman://attach` links in a remote session used to fork one `ssh` per link. `describeExecError` never returns Node's `Command failed: <ssh line>` message (identity path + probe script in a 502 body). The `PUT /file-content` guard sits AHEAD of `validateSessionFilePath`, which resolves LOCALLY, or a same-named local directory (an sshfs mount) takes the write. Under `VITEST` the three IO functions refuse rather than connect. This covers the ATTACHMENT routes too, which is the half a clicked path needs when the file is OUTSIDE the case directory (`_isExternalPreviewPath` sends it to `POST …/attachments`): registration, by-id `raw`, metadata and the history list all resolve over ssh (`registerExternalAttachment({remote})`, `resolveServableRemoteAttachment`), and what decides the host is the SESSION, never the path string: the same absolute path means a different file on each host. Deliberately NOT supported over ssh: writes (`edit=1`/`PUT` answer 400, `editable` is always false), office previews/thumbnails, the file tree/picker, `tail-file`. The Ralph file routes follow the same rules (`ralph-routes.ts`): `POST .../fix-plan/read` reads `@fix_plan.md` on the remote host through `remote-files.ts` (one probe of the file and the workspace, confined wiLine truncated
**Remote tmux PATH**: every SSH command that invokes or locates tmux uses `withRemoteTmuxPath()` (`remote-hosts.ts`) before the complete remote script is shell-escaped: link preflight, launch/attach, alive probes, discovery, history/screen capture, and cleanup. Non-interactive SSH shells can omit Homebrew and per-user binaries even when the user's interactive shell finds them. The wrapper double-quotes the exported PATH value (including inherited PATH) so homes with spaces work under dash; it leaves the existing SSH options, socket/target and inner CLI login-shell handling intact. tmux gives a new pane the PATH of the client that created it (measured on tmux 3.4), so every new remote pane, agent or shell, now starts on the widened PATH before its login shell runs. Keep new remote tmux operations on this same path. `test/remote-tmux-path.test.ts` exercises all builders under real sh/dash with a sparse PATH and a home containing spaces, using offline SSH/tmux stubs. Local and Docker tmux commands keep their own setup.
**Remote tmux PATH**: every SSH command that invokes or locates tmux uses `withRemoteTmuxPath()` (`remote-hosts.ts`) before the complete remote script is shell-escaped: link preflight, launch/attach, alive probes, discovery, history/screen capture, and cleanup. Non-interactive SSH shells can omit Homebrew and per-user binaries even when the user's interactive shell finds them. The wrapper double-quotes the exported PATH value (including inherited PATH) so homes with spaces work under dash; it leaves the existing SSH options, socket/target and inner CLI login-shell handling intact. tmux gives a new pane the PATH of the client that created it (measured on tmux 3.4), so every new remote pane, agent or shell, now starts on the widened PATH before its login shell runs. ⚠️ The bootstrap only works if it reaches the far end verbatim, so a remote launch, and an adopted ssh attach with it, goes to the local `bash -c` single-quoted (`bashCArg()` in tmux-manager.ts): in double quotes the local `sh` expanded `$HOME` and `$PATH` on this host first, and a remote user with another home found no tmux (#760, exit 127). ⚠️ Codeman's stock pane text is POSIX (`"${SHELL:-/bin/sh}"`), so it goes to `/bin/sh -c` as separate tmux arguments: tmux runs a ONE-argument command through the remote default-shell and exec's two or more directly (measured on 3.4), and fish refuses `${…}` with status 127. A `commands.*` override stays one argument, since it is the user's text for their own shell. `test/remote-pane-command-shell.test.ts` pins that split without needing fish. Keep new remote tmux operations on this same path. `test/remote-tmux-path.test.ts` exercises all builders under real sh/dash with a sparse PATH and a home containing spaces, using offline SSH/tmux stubs. Local and Docker tmux commands keep their own setup.
Further wake-on-LAN detail: the wiring guards in `test/remote-wake.test.ts` are two; the second also pins that `server.ts` holds the registry for its LIFETIME only (`drop` on cleanup, `stop` on shutdown) and never calls a waking method. The create wake is wired in the route rather than the shared session service for exactly the no-timer-wakes reason. No `ServerAliveInterval`, because keepalives move bytes into an idle connection every interval and that is what a byte-threshold idle detector must not read as activity. For a host behind `jumpHost`/`socksProxy`/a `ProxyCommand` option, the probe connects to `host:port`, which such a host does not answer even while ssh works; the registry never gates create/attach on it (`'unprobeable'`), and `/reachability` answers `reachable: null, probeable: false`. The banner keys on a PROVEN `false`, and the banner's 30 s poller runs only for a host with a wake target (a timer connecting to a host Codeman cannot wake is the same timer-driven traffic the keepalive rule forbids).
Input arriving during a wake is buffered: a chunk over 4 KB is dropped whole, never delivered as a fragment, and the route answers `{buffered:true}` / `{buffered:true, dropped:true}` so the caller can tell. It is flushed in order after `reattachRemote()` with `fromUser`; a flush write that fails drops the rest (logged) rather than retaining it for a wake hours later. Send-and-wait blocks instead and answers `OPERATION_FAILED` when the host never returns. ⚠️ In multi-user mode the attach path 403s a non-admin BEFORE the host is looked up: the wake runs an executable, and remote hosts are admin-only infra everywhere else. ⚠️ Browser keystrokes travel over the WebSocket, which deliberately does NOT pass through the registry (that is the hot path), so only the HTTP input path ever queues anything; the banner must not promise queued input for the Wake button. A request that waits on the wake (create/attach, and the button) uses the 40 s `REMOTE_WAKE_REQUEST_READY_TIMEOUT_MS`, not the 90 s session default, because the dashboard's reverse proxy cuts a request at its own 60 s `proxy_read_timeout`. The `remote:` SSE family is session-scoped in multi-user mode; a create/attach wake names its requester (`username`) since it has no session yet. `remote-wake.ts` refuses real IO under `VITEST` like `remote-files.ts`.
### Adopted foreign tmux sessions
**Adopted sessions** (#510; `src/foreign-tmux.ts` pure, `src/foreign-tmux-discovery.ts` transport, `foreign-sessions.js`, `GET /api/mux/foreign`, `POST /api/sessions/adopt`): a tmux session a human started is listed on the home screen, and one click wraps it in a tab. Like remote-SSH and Docker it is a **LOCATION OVERLAY**, never a `SessionMode`: `Session.adopt` carries the connection, the mode comes from a bounded walk of the pane's process tree, and `Session.isAdopted` asks who launched the process, a different question from `isExternalCliMode()`, which is why the two are never folded together.
**The wrapper.** Adoption creates an ordinary `codeman-<8hex>` session on Codeman's own socket whose pane runs the attach, so `killSession` can only ever reach the wrapper and no shape of caller bug reaches the foreign server. The attach joins as a grouped `codeman-view-<id>` session with `status off` and `destroy-unattached on`. ⚠️ `new-session -t` does not fail on a missing target, it invents one (measured on tmux 3.4: joined `work-prod`, or made a fresh shell, or started a server on an empty socket), so an exact `has-session -t '=<name>'` guards it. The `=` cannot stand in for that guard on `new-session -t`, where a missing target makes a group literally called `=<name>`. ⚠️ The guard only holds for a name both commands read as a name, so a name `new-session -t` reads as target syntax (`TMUX_TARGET_SYNTAX`: a leading `=`, `@` or `%`, or a bare `~`) is refused at discovery: measured on tmux 3.4, `@1` joined the session holding window `@1` and input typed in the tab reached it, and `=eq` made a new group with a fresh shell. A `command -v tmux` runs first, because the guard fires on any failure and "tmux is not on this PATH" must not read as "your session is gone". The client is `tmux -u`, or a POSIX-locale container garbles the tab, and the probe's `list-panes` is too, or a name reads as underscores the guard then cannot find. A `docker exec` outlives its client, so that view is killed explicitly on close. ⚠️ Nothing is ever set on the foreign server beyond our own view: not `window-size` (a window option on a shared window, it survives our detach) and not the prefix table (server-wide, unlike `nestedPrefixTableResetCommands` on the servers Codeman runs itself). ⚠️ While the view exists an owner's `kill-session` leaves the window alive under it until the tab closes. ⚠️ The wrapper's pane IS the owner's pane, so nothing may be typed into it on start: `startShell()`'s new-session `clear\n` submitted whatever the owner had half-typed (measured) until it was gated on `!this._adopt`, and the trust-dialog auto-accept stays off for the same reason. `shell` is also the classifier's answer for anything it cannot name, such as vim or psql.
**Names are the injection surface.** A session name is chosen by someone else and several shells parse the attach line on its way to tmux; in `bash -c "<JSON>"`, the form it first crossed, `$` and backticks were live. Names and socket paths pass an allowlist at DISCOVERY, so a bad one gets no id and the adopt route, which re-resolves through discovery, can only 404. The ssh probe and attach run in an explicit `sh` behind `withRemoteTmuxPath()`, since the guard chain is POSIX and the login shell may be fish. ⚠️ The attach line reaches `bash -c` single-quoted through `bashCArg()` at both launch sites, the path a remote or docker launch takes (#760), never a bare `JSON.stringify()`, or the ssh attach's `$HOME` and `$PATH` expand on THIS host and a tmux in the remote `~/.local/bin` is found by discovery and missed by the attach. Single quotes also keep a real newline, which JSON escaping left as the two characters `\n`. That closes the first shell only, so the discovery allowlist stays. `test/tmux-manager.test.ts` compares what bash receives with the built line at create and at respawn, for all three locations. Docker discovery spawns `dockerEngineArgv()`, never the shell-quoted `buildDockerBaseArgs()`.
**A server that stops answering.** A tmux client never returns from a stopped server, and it hands dups of its stdout to the server, so that server holds our pipe open after the client is dead (measured: SIGTERM ended the client and no EOF came). ⚠️ So a watchdog around `list-panes` cannot work, and the same hold would keep `docker exec` and `ssh` waiting. `buildForeignProbeScript()` pings each socket with `has-session` at `/dev/null` under `FOREIGN_SOCKET_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, in the script because no signal of ours reaches a client inside a container or across ssh, and only a server that answered gets the real stdout. One that did not prints `CMFH` and costs its own rows and a note. The watchdog reports through its own exit status, since a client ended by SIGTERM exits 0. `runForeignProbe()` runs all three transports in their own process group, signals the group at the deadline, destroys its end of the pipe by hand (or one handle leaks per scan) and keeps the rows it read. ⚠️ Sockets have no count cap: in glob order `codeman*` sorts before `default`, and a box with many instances would never reach the sessions this feature is for (212 sockets measured here). The sweep is bounded by time.
**Text from someone else's process.** The parser and the classifier run synchronously on the event loop over what a pane, a container or an ssh host printed, and the row caps do not help when one row is the whole 2 MiB. ⚠️ So every step stays linear in that text: no regex tail over an argv (`launcherPrefixes()` is a scan), `.*` under the `s` flag so `$` cannot fail and hand `\s+` its spaces back, a `Set` for the socket rows, `FOREIGN_MAX_ARGV_CHARS` on what is kept, and one `createForeignSignatureMatcher()` per scan, since every pane of a hostile host can claim the same process tree and repeat the same rows.
**One wrapper per target.** `foreignTargetKey()` is the ONE key, read by the adopt route and `adoptedBy`, built from the location, the host identity, the socket and the name: a socket and a name alone collide across containers and hosts. Both read live `Session`s, since the mux record only exists after the first attach.
**No workspace.** ⚠️ An adopted session keeps its connection on `adopt.remote`/`adopt.docker`, so `session.remote` and `session.docker` are undefined, and its `workingDir` is the neutral `/tmp`. Code that branches on those two reads an in-container or over-ssh adoption as a local session working in `/tmp`. So anything that treats `workingDir` as the session's workspace must also test `session.isAdopted` (`adopt` on a pure view): uploads, the upload GC, git status, git fetch and its scheduler, the image watcher, Read My Mind's git signals, the Discord folder, `last-response`, guarded input and Ralph's `@fix_plan.md` and `@ralph_prompt.md` routes all do. The file surfaces (Files panel, File Viewer and its edit mode, `html-view`, absolute-path links) are the one standing exception (owner decision 2026-11-06): they still treat `/tmp` and this host's paths as the workspace, even on a container or ssh tab, so such a tab shows this host's files and not the far end's. It gives no privilege: `/tmp` is world-writable anyway, and adoption is admin-only in multi-user mode. Gating them for remote and Docker adoptions, while keeping a local adopted tab's absolute-path links, is the planned follow-up. A claude wrapper reports `statusLineExporter: 'remote'`, which is also what keeps keep-warm off it.
**Lifecycle.** `paneExitApplies` is false for a wrapper, so an attach that ended is never `paneExit` and the sweep never closes the tab. ⚠️ `remain-on-exit` still keeps Codeman's own tmux client on the dead pane, where a pid and `busy` hid it and both attach routes refused it, so `detachEndedAdoptedAttaches()` detaches that client on the reconnect watcher's tick: the tab closes nothing, its pid goes null, and selecting it (or "Go to tab" once a session of that name is back) runs the guard again. Boot recovery re-attaches a dead wrapper, which prints that the session is gone and exits. Reboot restore refuses one, since all Codeman ever had was an attach command. ⚠️ A wrapper that cannot start fails the start, and selecting the tab tries it again (`_failAdoptedStart()`). It never takes the direct-PTY fallback, which would run a new local `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` or a server-account shell in `/tmp` under the foreign session's name, and `runPrompt()` refuses it for the same reason.
### Docker cases
**Docker cases** (shipped 1.4.0; user guide `docs/docker-cases.md`, design `docs/docker-cases-plan.md`): a case can point at a **container** instead of a local/remote path, and any of the CLI run modes runs INSIDE it. Like remote-SSH, it is a **LOCATION OVERLAY on cases, never a `SessionMode` of its own** (`SessionMode` is unchanged). Storage `~/.codeman/docker-hosts.json` + `docker-cases.json` via `src/docker-hosts.ts` (direct mirror of `remote-hosts.ts`: `readDockerHosts`/`readDockerCases`, `toSessionDocker`, `dockerDisplayPath`, and the PURE builders `buildDockerBaseArgs`/`buildDockerCreateArgs`/`containerApiUrl`/`hostGatewayAlias`/`dockerConfigHash`). CRUD `/api/docker-hosts` + `/api/cases/docker-link`, plus **one-click**`/api/cases/docker-quickcreate` (Create New "Run in Docker" checkbox → case folder in `CASES_DIR` + auto-provisioned shared `default` host + auto-start a session inside; an expandable Template picker Small/Medium/Large/GPU or any override creates a per-case `q-<name>` host), and export/import (`/api/docker-cases/:name/export`, `/api/docker-cases/import`, `GET/DELETE /api/docker-exports`) — all in `case-routes.ts`. Run flows route through `POST /api/quick-start` like remote (session-routes.ts docker branch, skips LOCAL CLI-availability gates). **Launch model**: exactly one long-lived container **per case** (`codeman-case-<slug>`, PID1 `sleep infinity` under `--init`); a LOCAL tmux pane runs `docker exec -it` into a **durable in-container tmux** on dedicated socket `-L codeman-docker`, session `codeman-dkr-<id8>` (deliberately fails `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman running INSIDE the container never adopts it, exactly like remote's `codeman-ssh-<id8>`). Builders `buildDockerLaunchCommand`/`buildDockerKillCommand` in `tmux-manager.ts` (image-check → `docker inspect||create` → start → exec, all idempotent). The container is **shared by all sessions of the case**: `buildDockerKillCommand` kills ONLY that session's in-container tmux session, NEVER `docker stop` while siblings remain; `docker rm -f` happens only on case-delete (plus an instance-scoped boot reaper keyed on the `codeman.instance` label). **Two-layer durability/resume** (the central design point): (1) Codeman-PROCESS restart with the container still up → `tmux new-session -A` reattaches the SAME live agent (paneCommand ignored); (2) container stop/reboot/OOM → inner tmux is gone, so the re-run pane command resumes the conversation from the bind-mounted transcript: claude mode pins a DETERMINISTIC conversation id via `claudeDockerPaneCommand()` (`tmux-manager.ts`) — fresh launch `claude --session-id <sessionId> || claude --resume <sessionId>` (a duplicate `--session-id` exits 1 "already in use", so the fallback RESUMES after a container stop; verified CLI behavior), explicit resume `--resume <rid> || --session-id <sid>` so a stale id never dead-panes (leading `exec ` is stripped — an exec'd first branch could never fall back); codex `resume <id>` / gemini `--resume` keep `appendResumeFlag`. The resume id rides `resumeSessionId` through create/respawn options and persists on `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId` via `persistDockerCaseClaudeSessionId()` (written at quick-start launch, and again on hook/last-response conversation-id adoption so post-`/clear` switches track; seeded back when `resumeOnStart`, default true); `-A` makes the pane command self-selecting (inert on reattach, active only when tmux was re-created). **Config drift** (`dockerConfigHash` → `codeman.confighash` label): quick-start compares via `checkDockerConfigDrift()` and REFUSES a drifted launch with `CONFLICT`; the UI confirm calls `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/recreate` (refused while case sessions are live) which `docker rm -f`s so the next launch recreates with the new config — host config edits actually take effect. **Workspace** is a REAL host dir bind-mounted at the SAME absolute path (mirror, `dst==src`), so `Session.workingDir = hostWorkspacePath` keeps file-routes/attachments/watchers on real host bytes AND the in-container transcript projHash matches the host so subagent/workflow correlation (and thus resume-id capture) works; `resolveMuxAttachCwd` returns `/tmp` for docker (the local pane only runs `docker exec`). **Creds** arrive commit-safe and ISOLATED (1.4.1; replaced the whole-dir RW mounts that let in-container CLIs write refreshed tokens/state back to the host): shared RW across the boundary is ONLY what host-side reads/resume need (`~/.claude/projects` transcripts; codex `sessions/` + `history.jsonl` for response-viewer/`codex resume`); everything else is SEEDED (RO mount, copied into container HOME once at launch via `[ -e ] || cp`; the container refreshes its own copy and never writes back): `~/.claude.json` is merged through `buildSeamlessClaudeConfig()` (forces `hasCompletedOnboarding` + theme + workspace trust, so no login wizard/theme picker/trust prompt inside the container), plus `.claude/{.credentials.json,setLine truncated
@@ -231,21 +249,23 @@ Further detail: the `<prefix>: <title>` form (`w3-myapp: fix the login redirect`
### Terminal scrollback: strip flavors and wheel/touch forwarding
**Three strip flavors, one carry** (#205, `session.ts:_handleTerminalOutput`): the FULL strip (`isAltScreenStripMode` = codex/claude/gemini) removes alt-screen toggles, `3J`, and mouse-tracking DECSETs. The MOUSE strip (`isMuxMouseStripMode` = opencode and copilot) removes alt-screen toggles AND the mouse DECSETs but KEEPS `3J` — the middle case, for a mouse-capable full-screen TUI: its tracking DECSETs reach the browser (tmux `mouse off` passes the pane's modes through to the client), xterm obeys them, and then every DRAG is reported to the TUI instead of selecting text — so mark-and-copy silently did nothing (measured 62 `none` / 18 `any` over 16s, 5/5 dead drags while `any`) and the obvious fallback, Ctrl+C, is opencode's `app_exit`. Copilot is the same shape (measured on 1.0.95: alt screen, mouse reporting on): left on the narrow strip, Auto Copy and copy-on-select did nothing and only Shift+drag selected. `3J` stays because a TUI is not a `clear` consumer. Every other mode (shell/antigravity/pi/grok/deepseek/omp) gets the NARROW strip (`isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode`) — alt-screen toggles ONLY — and only when tmux-backed (`useMux`). Rationale: the tmux CLIENT emits `smcup` as its first bytes at attach, before any program runs, parking xterm in the scrollback-less alternate buffer for the whole session (touch scrolling no-ops; xterm's own wheel handler converts the wheel to Up/Down arrows = readline history cycling — both #205 symptoms). tmux never forwards a pane program's alt-screen toggles to its client (it repaints instead; measured — vim/less inside a pane emit zero to the client), so the only thing the narrow strip ever removes is tmux's own smcup. It keeps `3J` (a user's `clear` is a deliberate scrollback wipe) and the mouse DECSETs (tmux passes those through even with `mouse off`; stripping them would break htop/vim mouse support — which is exactly why the mouse strip is opt-in per CLI and not part of the narrow flavour). ⚠️ The `useMux` gate is load-bearing: `startShell()`/`startInteractive()` fall back to a DIRECT PTY when mux creation fails, and there the inner program's own `?1049h` really does reach xterm — stripping it would break vim/less/htop for real. The replay path (`session-routes.ts`, via `session.usesMux`) applies the same three branches; the frontend gate (`_shouldReportMouseToCli()`) keeps no mode list at all: it reads only the published `cliMouseTracking`, which the server sets solely in a DECSET-stripping branch (full or mouse), so it can only be true for a mode whose DECSETs are stripped — the modes where the browser's hand-encoded tap (`_sendSyntheticSgrTap`) is the only way a click still reaches the CLI. Whichever modes the registry strips, the browser follows (pinned in `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`). The chunk-boundary carry (`_altScreenSeqCarry`) runs for all three flavors. Tests: `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`, `test/terminal-touch-tap.test.ts`.
**Three strip flavors, one carry** (#205, `session.ts:_handleTerminalOutput`): the FULL strip (`isAltScreenStripMode` = codex/claude/gemini) removes alt-screen toggles, `3J`, and mouse-tracking DECSETs. The MOUSE strip (`isMuxMouseStripMode` = opencode, copilot and pi) removes alt-screen toggles AND the mouse DECSETs but KEEPS `3J` — the middle case, for a mouse-capable full-screen TUI: its tracking DECSETs reach the browser (tmux `mouse off` passes the pane's modes through to the client), xterm obeys them, and then every DRAG is reported to the TUI instead of selecting text — so mark-and-copy silently did nothing (measured 62 `none` / 18 `any` over 16s, 5/5 dead drags while `any`) and the obvious fallback, Ctrl+C, is opencode's `app_exit`. Copilot is the same shape (measured on 1.0.95: alt screen, mouse reporting on): left on the narrow strip, Auto Copy and copy-on-select did nothing and only Shift+drag selected. `3J` stays because a TUI is not a `clear` consumer. Every other mode (shell/antigravity/grok/deepseek/omp) gets the NARROW strip (`isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode`) — alt-screen toggles ONLY — and only when tmux-backed (`useMux`). Rationale: the tmux CLIENT emits `smcup` as its first bytes at attach, before any program runs, parking xterm in the scrollback-less alternate buffer for the whole session (touch scrolling no-ops; xterm's own wheel handler converts the wheel to Up/Down arrows = readline history cycling — both #205 symptoms). tmux never forwards a pane program's alt-screen toggles to its client (it repaints instead; measured — vim/less inside a pane emit zero to the client), so the only thing the narrow strip ever removes is tmux's own smcup. It keeps `3J` (a user's `clear` is a deliberate scrollback wipe) and the mouse DECSETs (tmux passes those through even with `mouse off`; stripping them would break htop/vim mouse support — which is exactly why the mouse strip is opt-in per CLI and not part of the narrow flavour). ⚠️ The `useMux` gate is load-bearing: `startShell()`/`startInteractive()` fall back to a DIRECT PTY when mux creation fails, and there the inner program's own `?1049h` really does reach xterm — stripping it would break vim/less/htop for real. The replay path (`session-routes.ts`, via `session.usesMux`) applies the same three branches; the frontend gate (`_shouldReportMouseToCli()`) keeps no mode list at all: it reads only the published `cliMouseTracking`, which the server sets solely in a DECSET-stripping branch (full or mouse), so it can only be true for a mode whose DECSETs are stripped — the modes where the browser's hand-encoded tap (`_sendSyntheticSgrTap`) is the only way a click still reaches the CLI. Whichever modes the registry strips, the browser follows (pinned in `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`). The chunk-boundary carry (`_altScreenSeqCarry`) runs for all three flavors. Tests: `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`, `test/terminal-touch-tap.test.ts`.
⚠️ **What a mouse-DECSET strip (full or mouse) removes, it must REMEMBER.** Stripping the mouse DECSETs means xterm's `modes.mouseTrackingMode` is permanently `'none'` for those modes, so the browser hand-encodes click reports to compensate (`_sendSyntheticSgrTap`). With no state to consult it did that on EVERY click, which delivered mouse reports to programs that never asked for them: the same pane runs a plain shell whenever the CLI has exited or a `shell` was started inside a claude-mode session, and a shell prints the report as literal text (`[<0;88;20M`), garbling the next line typed. `_recordStrippedMouseMode()` therefore records each stripped sequence as it goes and publishes `cliMouseTracking` through `toState()`, and `_shouldReportMouseToCli()` requires it. ⚠️ Only the TRACKING modes count (1000/1001/1002/1003): 1005/1006 select an ENCODING and 1007 is alt-scroll, and counting those would put the stray reports straight back. ⚠️ The change broadcasts IMMEDIATELY rather than through `broadcastSessionStateDebounced`, because the flag flips when a dialog opens and the user can click that dialog inside the 500ms debounce window. Measured on a live claude 2.x: the CLI holds a tracking mode on continuously in fullscreen (so clicks keep being reported exactly as before; the default inline renderer holds none, measured on 2.1.283 even with `/model` open), while a bash prompt in the same stripped mode reports nothing. Fails toward silence: after a server restart the flag is false until the CLI re-emits, which tmux does at client attach.
**Wheel forwarding requires observed mouse tracking: Claude ≥ 2.1.187, tracked Codex or tracked Copilot** (`terminal-ui.js:_shouldForwardWheelToApp`). The original #227 measurement remains valid for **Codex 0.147.0 inline**: `alternate_on=0`, `mouse_any_flag=0`, growing tmux history, and SGR wheel reports do nothing. Claude 2.1.280 inline similarly reports `alternate_on=0`, `mouse_any_flag=0`; forwarding there swallows gestures, so it keeps local scrollback. Fullscreen Claude (`CLAUDE_CODE_NO_FLICKER=1` or `"tui": "fullscreen"`) enables mouse tracking and accepts reports. **Fresh Codex 0.163.0 fullscreen measurement (2026-10-18, isolated local tmux pane)**: `alternate_on=1`, `mouse_any_flag=1`; one `\x1b[<64;10;10M` report moves the transcript one row upward, and `\x1b[<65;10;10M` restores the original screen. This is capability evidence, not a minimum-version promise: untracked Codex (including a 0.162.0 measurement (2026-10) with `mouse_any_flag=0`) keeps local history or the hollow-pane paging fallback. Codex does not publish the Claude-only CLI version field, so its gate requires the observed flag rather than a Claude version. The registry records this as `wheelForward.mode: 'always'` (observed mouse tracking is still required); Claude remains `version-gated`. A stale/false flag after startup cannot authorize forwarding. ⚠️ A strip mode alone is not evidence that a CLI consumes SGR reports. Verify with a real `\x1b[<64;c;rM` write into a live pane before adding a mode here. Hand-encoded SGR taps remain independently gated by `_shouldReportMouseToCli()`; the older #325 no-op measurement describes untracked inline Codex and must not be generalized to newer tracked fullscreen renderers. Shift/local-history opt-outs and xterm's native mouse/alternate-screen handling remain intact.
**Wheel forwarding requires observed mouse tracking: Claude ≥ 2.1.187, tracked Codex, tracked Copilot or tracked Pi** (`terminal-ui.js:_shouldForwardWheelToApp`). The original #227 measurement remains valid for **Codex 0.147.0 inline**: `alternate_on=0`, `mouse_any_flag=0`, growing tmux history, and SGR wheel reports do nothing. Claude 2.1.280 inline similarly reports `alternate_on=0`, `mouse_any_flag=0`; forwarding there swallows gestures, so it keeps local scrollback. Fullscreen Claude (`CLAUDE_CODE_NO_FLICKER=1` or `"tui": "fullscreen"`) enables mouse tracking and accepts reports. **Fresh Codex 0.163.0 fullscreen measurement (2026-10-18, isolated local tmux pane)**: `alternate_on=1`, `mouse_any_flag=1`; one `\x1b[<64;10;10M` report moves the transcript one row upward, and `\x1b[<65;10;10M` restores the original screen. This is capability evidence, not a minimum-version promise: untracked Codex (including a 0.162.0 measurement (2026-10) with `mouse_any_flag=0`) keeps local history or the hollow-pane paging fallback. Codex does not publish the Claude-only CLI version field, so its gate requires the observed flag rather than a Claude version. The registry records this as `wheelForward.mode: 'always'` (observed mouse tracking is still required); Claude remains `version-gated`. A stale/false flag after startup cannot authorize forwarding. ⚠️ A strip mode alone is not evidence that a CLI consumes SGR reports. Verify with a real `\x1b[<64;c;rM` write into a live pane before adding a mode here. Hand-encoded SGR taps remain independently gated by `_shouldReportMouseToCli()`; the older #325 no-op measurement describes untracked inline Codex and must not be generalized to newer tracked fullscreen renderers. Shift/local-history opt-outs and xterm's native mouse/alternate-screen handling remain intact.
**Copilot also receives forwarded reports** (1.0.95 measured in tmux: alt screen, `mouse_any_flag=1`): its mouse DECSETs are stripped so a drag selects, which also stops xterm encoding the wheel for it, so `_shouldForwardWheelToApp` sends the same SGR reports by hand while `cliMouseTracking` is true; six `\x1b[<64;…M` reports moved its transcript 18 lines, a phone swipe takes the same gate, and there is NO version gate.
**Pi is the same shape, and the reason it moved to the mouse strip** (fullscreen is the default `tuiMode` since 1.0.0; 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.4.0 and 1.5.0 measured in tmux with default settings: `alternate_on=1`, `history_size=0`, `mouse_any_flag=1`, SGR): pi enables mouse tracking ONCE at start. Left on the narrow strip, the wheel worked only until Codeman replayed the buffer (tab switch, reload): the replay carries no DECSETs, xterm's `mouseTrackingMode` fell to `'none'` with `baseY` 0, and the wheel hit an empty local buffer until a resize made pi redraw. Measured on a fresh session: `drag` right after the first select, `none` after a tab switch and after a reload. With the mouse strip the server records the tracking (`cliMouseTracking`), which survives the replay; `_shouldForwardWheelToApp` forwards by hand while it is true. One SGR wheel report moves pi's transcript one row at a low rate, and pi's `fullscreenWheelScrollLines` default accelerates a fast spin. Under `tuiMode: regular`, the default below 1.0.0, pi is inline and emits no mouse DECSET, so the strip finds nothing and the flag stays false; a pi from 0.84.0 set to fullscreen does emit them (0.84.1 and 0.99.2 with `--tui-mode fullscreen` measured: `alternate_on=1`, `mouse_any_flag=1`, `mouse_sgr_flag=1`; default settings all 0), and the flag covers that case. ⚠️ Pi deliberately has no `transcriptPageKeys`: fullscreen pi does page on PageUp/PageDown, but pi binds those keys to its editor in regular mode too, where they page nothing and move the caret of a multi-line draft, so the hollow-buffer fallback sent the next keystroke to the wrong line (measured on 1.1.0, 1.4.0 and 1.5.0). The fallback would need a capability to tell the two modes apart, since `_localScrollbackIsHollow` takes no id. The cost: a fullscreen pi with "Wheel scrolls local history" on has no paging fallback, so the wheel does nothing there. That is an accepted exception to "A false gate on a hollow pane must not mean a DEAD gesture" below.
Codex 0.163.0 approval check in that isolated read-only/on-request session: the "Would you like to run the following command?" prompt remained on `1. Yes, proceed` after SGR wheel-up and wheel-down over both the transcript and approval option rows 36/37; the requested marker file was not created. The background transcript can scroll while the approval prompt remains fixed. Codeman does alert on this prompt: `src/web/screen-blocked.ts` reads Codex dialogs off the pane (`capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine`) and broadcasts `hook:permission_prompt`, which `_onHookPermissionPrompt` (settings-ui.js) records and `updateTabAlertFromHooks` (app.js) turns into the `'action'` tab alert, and both page-key fallbacks check it. The SGR wheel path deliberately does not consult that alert, because this measurement showed wheel reports leave the approval selection unchanged. Native Codex owns its approval selection; do not mistake a hook-only unit fixture for approval-dialog evidence.
Native wheel travel retains upstream pixel/line/page units (100 px = 4 lines; Firefox 3-line events = 3 lines); no one-tick-per-event policy is introduced here. A fresh native gesture at or above 0.1 row (2.5px) rounds its opening travel to at least one tick (subject to the per-event cap), so an isolated 4px mouse click responds, 40px sends two ticks and 120px sends five. The signed remainder is carried forward; travel discarded by the per-event cap does not become a backlog. The signed remainder is debt repaid by subsequent same-direction events: ten 2.5px events still total one tick. Debt/fractions expire after a 150ms gap; a reversal inside that gap discards the old debt without another pre-payment. Sub-threshold jitter does not pre-pay. The first native report of each tab visit bypasses the 40 ms batching timer; later reports coalesce and only unsent bytes can be cancelled on reversal. Every queued batch belongs to its originating session, so switching tabs cannot send its bytes into the newly selected pane. Zero-delta events leave pending movement untouched. Tiles use the same helpers and their own queue/session.
**Wheel/touch forwarding is NOT gated on viewport-at-bottom** (#205, `terminal-ui.js:_shouldForwardWheelToApp`): for sessions verified to scroll their own transcript on SGR wheel reports (Claude ≥ 2.1.187 or tracked Codex, with observed `cliMouseTracking`; see the native measurement above), the plain wheel AND touch drags forward as coalesced SGR reports (`_forwardScrollToApp` → `_sendSyntheticSgrWheel`, 40ms batches after the first native report, 5-tick per-event cap; no aggregate byte/tick limit). It used to gate on the viewport being at the bottom so both scrollbacks stayed reachable, but a repaint-mode CLI keeps NO terminal scrollback of its own — xterm's buffer holds only replayed repaint frames, so local scrolling drags the CLI's pinned prompt box up the screen over stale frames; and `scrollToLastNonEmptyLine()` routinely parked the viewport off-bottom, silently pinning the wheel to local. Forwarding now snaps the viewport home first (SGR coordinates address the LIVE screen — a report computed from a scrolled-up viewport would hit-test the wrong row). Local scrollback remains on Shift+wheel and the `terminalWheelLocalScrollback` opt-out (both also cover touch via the shared gate; touch has no Shift, so the setting is its only local pin). Touch asks `_shouldForwardTouchToApp()`, which is that gate plus one branch: in any session mode, a drag and its fling momentum also forward as SGR wheel reports while xterm itself tracks the mouse (`modes.mouseTrackingMode` other than `none`/`x10`) with SGR encoding (`_core.coreMouseService.activeEncoding === 'SGR'`, an xterm private pinned by `test/xterm-private-api.test.ts`; DEFAULT, X10 and SGR-pixel apps fail closed). xterm encodes a native wheel for such an app itself, but the touch listeners consume the drag, and a local scroll shows nothing useful: a direct-PTY app is on xterm's alternate screen, and in a tmux-backed session xterm stays in the normal buffer holding stale tmux repaints. `_wheelScrollLinesFloat()` normalizes `deltaMode` (Firefox fires LINE deltas ≈3/notch — read as pixels that rounded to 0 and fell to the ±1 fallback, ~4× too slow; PAGE deltas scale by `terminal.rows`) while keeping the #154 Shift-axis trap (macOS trackpads put Shift+scroll magnitude on deltaX). Tests: `test/terminal-touch-tap.test.ts`.
**A false gate on a hollow pane must not mean a DEAD gesture** (#205 round 2, `_maybePageCliTranscript`): every way `_shouldForwardWheelToApp()` returns false leaves a repaint-mode pane scrolling a buffer that has nothing in it (`baseY === 0`) — the version probe came back empty, the CLI really is older than 2.1.187, the `cliMouseTracking` flag is unset (inline claude, or fullscreen right after a server restart), or the user turned on `terminalWheelLocalScrollback`. **opencode is the fifth case, and the gate is false there by design**: its TUI runs on the ALTERNATE SCREEN (1.18.31 measured: tmux `alternate_on=1`, `history_size=0`), so the buffer is hollow, and it IGNORES SGR wheel reports entirely (six `\x1b[<64;…M` reports against an idle pane left the capture byte-identical) while still paging its transcript on PageUp/PageDown (`messages_page_up/down`) — so paging is the only gesture that can reach it, and without it the wheel was silently dead in every opencode tab. The 1.12.0 retest reported exactly that shape for Claude: a wheel that did nothing at all while Fn+Up (PageUp) paged back through intact text, which is the proof that the CLI's own history and the PTY input path were both fine. So under the guard (`_localScrollbackIsHollow()`: the `transcriptPageKeys` capability, gate false, `baseY === 0`) wheel and touch travel is translated into coalesced `\x1b[5~` / `\x1b[6~` through the same 40ms queue as the SGR reports, at half a screen of travel per page key (the key jumps a whole screen; a 1:1 mapping was unusably slow with a discrete wheel). ⚠️ **`baseY === 0` with a pane that still REPORTS scrollback is not hollow, it is unloaded** (`paneHistoryLines` > 0, the last capture's `#{history_size}`): after a server restart the byte recording a tab switch replays (`?tail=`) holds only the tmux client's attach repaint, which scrolls nothing, so an inline Claude session landed here and the page keys moved its composer cursor instead of the transcript (measured 2026-10-21 on the second select after a restart, until a page reload). That case falls through to local scrolling, whose top-of-buffer pull (`_maybeLoadMoreHistoryOnScroll` to `_maybeRefetchFullHistory`) fetches `full=1`, and the gesture scrolls on from there once the pull lands (a slow response can outlive the gesture; the next one scrolls); 0 and unknown counts keep paging (fullscreen Claude, codex, opencode; a remote pane reports no count and a Docker pane 0). Page keys already queued and the gesture debt are dropped on the way out, since they belong to the abandoned route. The `[scroll]` line prints `paneHistoryLines` next to `localScrollbackRows`, and a count turning positive re-logs, so the two states read apart. The trade-off is accepted: while that pull is in flight or has failed, the gesture scrolls an empty buffer and the next upward gesture after the 4 s cooldown retries it, where paging would have moved the composer. An error envelope (`success: false`) records no count, in the pull, the refresh path and the tab switch alike, so one failed capture does not hand the gesture back to paging. ⚠️ The first event of a gesture pages AT ONCE, for any opening event under one page, and the travel it skipped is owed back by the rest of the gesture (one page per half screen still). Waiting for half a screen first meant an ordinary trackpad flick (well under 19 rows on a 38-row pane) sent nothing at all, and a mouse sent nothing for its first 5 notches (100 px is 4 rows; 7 on Firefox's 3-line notches, issue #697). An opener of `PAGE_KEY_IMMEDIATE_MAX_ROWS` (2) rows or more is treated as a mouse-wheel notch and tagged `notch`: its debt lasts `PAGE_KEY_NOTCH_DEBT_MS` (3 s) instead of `PAGE_KEY_DEBT_MS`, so slow notches repay one page instead of each paging a full screen; past 3 s of quiet each notch pages. The signal is the opener's size, not the device (a touch contact whose first touchmove is 2 rows or more, or a brisk flick that opens large, is treated the same). A new opener keeps same-direction travel left over from the gesture before, so a run of notches still pages once per half screen of travel. ⚠️ What starts a NEW gesture (and so may pre-pay) is narrow, because every boundary is another free page: (1) a TOUCH CONTACT is one gesture, never split by time: the touch paths tag every call, touchmove and momentum frames alike, with `touchId` (one per touchstart), and a different id (or a wheel event after a touch) is a boundary. touchmove only calls once per whole cell of finger travel, so a slow drag arrives as single lines further apart than any gap; on the gap alone 12 lines at 170 ms each sent 12 PageUps (measured through the real listeners, `test/terminal-touch-paging.browser.test.ts`). (2) Outside a contact, 150 ms of quiet (`PAGE_KEY_GESTURE_GAP_MS`), stretched to one second (`PAGE_KEY_DEBT_MS`), or `PAGE_KEY_NOTCH_DEBT_MS` (3 s) for a notch-sized opener, while a pre-paid page is still owed in the SAME direction, so slow smalLine truncated
**A false gate on a hollow pane must not mean a DEAD gesture** (#205 round 2, `_maybePageCliTranscript`): every way `_shouldForwardWheelToApp()` returns false leaves a repaint-mode pane scrolling a buffer that has nothing in it (`baseY === 0`) — the version probe came back empty, the CLI really is older than 2.1.187, the `cliMouseTracking` flag is unset (inline claude, or fullscreen right after a server restart), or the user turned on `terminalWheelLocalScrollback`. ⚠️ Pi is an accepted exception: it declares no `transcriptPageKeys`, so a false gate on a fullscreen pi stays dead, for the reason in "Pi is the same shape" above. **opencode is the fifth case, and the gate is false there by design**: its TUI runs on the ALTERNATE SCREEN (1.18.31 measured: tmux `alternate_on=1`, `history_size=0`), so the buffer is hollow, and it IGNORES SGR wheel reports entirely (six `\x1b[<64;…M` reports against an idle pane left the capture byte-identical) while still paging its transcript on PageUp/PageDown (`messages_page_up/down`) — so paging is the only gesture that can reach it, and without it the wheel was silently dead in every opencode tab. The 1.12.0 retest reported exactly that shape for Claude: a wheel that did nothing at all while Fn+Up (PageUp) paged back through intact text, which is the proof that the CLI's own history and the PTY input path were both fine. So under the guard (`_localScrollbackIsHollow()`: the `transcriptPageKeys` capability, gate false, `baseY === 0`) wheel and touch travel is translated into coalesced `\x1b[5~` / `\x1b[6~` through the same 40ms queue as the SGR reports, at half a screen of travel per page key (the key jumps a whole screen; a 1:1 mapping was unusably slow with a discrete wheel). ⚠️ **`baseY === 0` with a pane that still REPORTS scrollback is not hollow, it is unloaded** (`paneHistoryLines` > 0, the last capture's `#{history_size}`): after a server restart the byte recording a tab switch replays (`?tail=`) holds only the tmux client's attach repaint, which scrolls nothing, so an inline Claude session landed here and the page keys moved its composer cursor instead of the transcript (measured 2026-10-21 on the second select after a restart, until a page reload). That case falls through to local scrolling, whose top-of-buffer pull (`_maybeLoadMoreHistoryOnScroll` to `_maybeRefetchFullHistory`) fetches `full=1`, and the gesture scrolls on from there once the pull lands (a slow response can outlive the gesture; the next one scrolls); 0 and unknown counts keep paging (fullscreen Claude, codex, opencode; a remote pane reports no count and a Docker pane 0). Page keys already queued and the gesture debt are dropped on the way out, since they belong to the abandoned route. The `[scroll]` line prints `paneHistoryLines` next to `localScrollbackRows`, and a count turning positive re-logs, so the two states read apart. The trade-off is accepted: while that pull is in flight or has failed, the gesture scrolls an empty buffer and the next upward gesture after the 4 s cooldown retries it, where paging would have moved the composer. An error envelope (`success: false`) records no count, in the pull, the refresh path and the tab switch alike, so one failed capture does not hand the gesture back to paging. ⚠️ The first event of a gesture pages AT ONCE, for any opening event under one page, and the travel it skipped is owed back by the rest of the gesture (one page per half screen still). Waiting for half a screen first meant an ordinary trackpad flick (well under 19 rows on a 38-row pane) sent nothing at all, and a mouse sent nothing for its first 5 notches (100 px is 4 rows; 7 on Firefox's 3-line notches, issue #697). An opener of `PAGE_KEY_IMMEDIATE_MAX_ROWS` (2) rows or more is treated as a mouse-wheel notch and tagged `notch`: its debt lasts `PAGE_KEY_NOTCH_DEBT_MS` (3 s) instead of `PAGE_KEY_DEBT_MS`, so slow notches repay one page instead of each paging a full screen; past 3 s of quiet each notch pages. The signal is the opener's size, not the device (a touch contact whose first touchmove is 2 rows or more, or a brisk flick that opens large, is treated the same). A new opener keeps same-direction travel left over from the gesture before, so a run of notches still pages once per half screen of travel. ⚠️ What starts a NEW gesture (and so may pre-pay) is narrow, because every boundary is another free page: (1) a TOUCH CONTACT is one gesture, never split by time: the touch paths tag every call, touchmove and momentum frames alike, with `touchId` (one per touchstart), and a different id (or a wheel event after a touch) is a boundary. touchmove only calls once per whole cell of finger travel, so a slow drag arrives as single lines further apart than any gap; on the gap alone 12 lines at 170 ms each sent 12 PageUps (measured through the real listeners, `test/terminal-touch-paging.browser.test.ts`). (2) Outside a contact, 150 ms of quiet (`PAGE_KEY_GESTURE_GAP_MS`), stretchedLine truncated
**Why the wheel went where it went is LOGGED** (`_logScrollRouting`): one console line per session per distinct decision — `[scroll] <id> → forward-sgr|page-keys|page-keys-dialog-open|page-keys-menu-open|local-scrollback|repull-refused-downgrade (mode=…, cliVersion=…, localScrollbackOptOut=…, mouseTracking=…, localScrollbackRows=…)`. #205 ran two rounds of remote guesswork over questions this line answers directly; keep it when touching the routing.
@@ -403,7 +423,7 @@ A file path an agent prints is a link on both surfaces it can appear on, and cli
**One pattern, two consumers.** `FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN` / `absoluteFilePathPattern()` live in `constants.js`; the xterm link provider (`registerFilePathLinkProvider`, terminal-ui.js) and the response viewer's `_linkifyFilePaths()` (app.js) both reach it through `findFilePathLinks()` (below), which builds a fresh instance per call. ⚠️ Fresh per call, never one shared object: `lastIndex` is per-object state on a `/g` regex. The pattern is anchored on a known absolute root and terminated by a known extension, so a fraction (`3/4`) or a date can't match and trailing punctuation stays out. Roots include `Users` and `mnt`, without which nothing was clickable on macOS or WSL. The linear-time guard and the "terminal-ui builds from the factory" structural check are in `test/link-provider-regex.test.ts`.
**The chat linkifier walks text nodes.** `_linkifyFilePaths()` builds anchors with `createElement`/`textContent` on the rendered subtree, never by rebuilding sanitized markup as a string — the source is model output. Subtrees already inside an `<a>` are skipped (marked autolinks URLs; a nested anchor would swallow the click), and the anchor's text is the path verbatim so "copy code" still yields what the agent printed. Before the walk it also rewrites existing anchors whose href is a scheme-less, non-`//` path (Codex cites files as `[label](/abs/path.json)`, which otherwise opens as a same-origin URL) into the same `a.rv-path` shape, plus `rv-path-link` so the label keeps the prose font, on purpose without `FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN`'s root and extension filter: the href is a link target the agent chose. `test/response-viewer-file-links.test.ts` pins both properties and the anchor rewrite.
**The chat linkifier walks text nodes.** `_linkifyFilePaths()` builds anchors with `createElement`/`textContent` on the rendered subtree, never by rebuilding sanitized markup as a string — the source is model output. Subtrees already inside an `<a>` are skipped (marked autolinks URLs; a nested anchor would swallow the click), and the anchor's text is the path verbatim so "copy code" still yields what the agent printed. Before the walk it also rewrites existing anchors whose href is a scheme-less, non-`//` path (Codex cites files as `[label](/abs/path.json)`, which otherwise opens as a same-origin URL) into the same `a.rv-path` shape, plus `rv-path-link` so the label keeps the prose font, on purpose without `FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN`'s root and extension filter: the href is a link target the agent chose. The anchors the walk builds carry `dir="ltr"`, so a path at the head of a right-to-left sentence does not decide that sentence's direction; a rewritten link keeps no `dir`, since its label is prose (#715). ⚠️ `_applyBlockDirection()` runs after the linkifier in both consumers, never before it: a block already carrying `dir="auto"` re-resolves its direction on every text node replaced under it.`test/response-viewer-file-links.test.ts` pins both properties and the anchor rewrite, `test/response-viewer-rtl.test.ts` the direction and the order.
**Out-of-workspace paths go through the attachment routes, not the file routes.** `file-content`/`file-raw` resolve against `workingDir` and 404 anything that escapes it, which is correct and unchanged — but the paths agents most often print (a `/tmp` capture, Claude's own scratchpad, another checkout) are exactly that, so clicking one used to report "File not found" for a file sitting on disk. `openFilePreview()` now detects the case (`_isExternalPreviewPath`, a string compare for ROUTING only; the real decision stays server-side) and registers the path via `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` first, rendering by id. ⚠️ That registration passes `notify: false`, which suppresses ONLY the `attachment:detected` broadcast — the guard, the registry entry and the by-id routes are identical either way. Without it every click also popped an attachment card announcing the file already filling the screen. ⚠️ The click is an explicit user action on the **explicit, Origin-guarded** registration route, which is why it may cross the workspace boundary at all; the passive magic-link scanner stays force-confined. A type outside `SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` (`.svg`, `.bmp`) is refused with a message naming what IS previewable, rather than the registry's own policy term.
@@ -435,7 +455,7 @@ The terminal provider scans `terminalLinkLine()`, which extends `terminalPathLin
### Filesystem path picker
**Filesystem path picker** (Link Existing "Browse" button + the extended mobile keyboard's `📁 Path` key): a lazy one-directory-at-a-time browser over `GET /api/filesystem/browse`, with `GET /api/filesystem/preview` serving the tapped file. It starts at the active session's working directory (falling back to the Codeman Cases root, then `/mnt/d`, then the first root), hides dot entries, and inserts the chosen path **without** Enter so the prompt is not submitted. The companion `⌫ All` key clears only the current unsent prompt buffer and must never emit the agent's `/clear` command. **New folder** (opt-in per caller, `allowNewFolder`; Link Existing has it): `POST /api/filesystem/mkdir``{ path, name, sessionId? }` creates ONE folder (non-recursive) directly inside a folder the picker may browse, resolved through the same roots, ownership and blocked-tree rules as browse (`403` outside them or in a blocked tree or unwritable, `404` missing parent, `409` exists, `400` a parent that is a file, or a name outside letters, digits, space and `_ - . ~`, containing `..`, starting with a dot or a tilde or over 255 bytes, so every name it accepts is one Link Existing accepts, and `400` a parent that is a cases directory, where a folder is already a case (Add Case > New Case makes one there); `showHidden` is forwarded like browse's); the picker reloads the folder and selects the new one. A picker that browses somewhere this route cannot create in (the container-workdir picker, `fetchListing`) must not set the flag.
**Filesystem path picker** (every Add Case "Browse" button: Link Existing, Create New's custom folder, Clone Repo, Docker; + the extended mobile keyboard's `📁 Path` key): a lazy one-directory-at-a-time browser over `GET /api/filesystem/browse`, with `GET /api/filesystem/preview` serving the tapped file (Docker's Container Workdir picker passes its own `fetchListing` over `POST /api/docker-cases/browse` instead, admin-only, which always lists dot entries and skips the allowlist, blocked-tree and ownership rules below). It starts at the form field's value or, for the `📁 Path` key, the active session's working directory (falling back to the Codeman Cases root, then `/mnt/d`, then the first root) and hides dot entries. A Browse fills its form field; the `📁 Path` key inserts the chosen path **without** Enter so the prompt is not submitted. The companion `⌫ All` key clears only the current unsent prompt buffer and must never emit the agent's `/clear` command. **New folder** (opt-in per caller, `allowNewFolder`; Link Existing, Create New's custom folder and Clone Repo's parent folder have it): `POST /api/filesystem/mkdir``{ path, name, sessionId? }` creates ONE folder (non-recursive) directly inside a folder the picker may browse, resolved through the same roots, ownership and blocked-tree rules as browse (`403` outside them or in a blocked tree or unwritable, `404` missing parent, `409` exists, `400` a parent that is a file, or a name outside letters, digits, space and `_ - . ~`, containing `..`, starting with a dot or a tilde or over 255 bytes, so every name it accepts is one Link Existing accepts, and `400` a parent that is a cases directory, where a folder is already a case (Add Case > Create New with no custom folder makes one there); `showHidden` is forwarded like browse's); the picker reloads the folder and selects the new one. A picker that browses somewhere this route cannot create in (the container-workdir picker, `fetchListing`) must not set the flag.
⚠️ **This is a second file-serving surface, so it carries the same confinement burden as [Attachments](#attachments) and does not inherit it automatically.** Traversal is allowlisted to Home, `CASES_DIR`, `/mnt/d`, or extra roots explicitly configured via `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS`; sensitive trees are blocked and symlink escapes are rejected after `realpath` resolution rather than before. Without the realpath step a symlink inside an allowed root would walk straight out of it. `preview` reuses the shared conversion cache and the **global**`document-conversion-limiter`, which is what stops N concurrent large-document previews from forking N multi-minute converter processes. Content types are pinned: images and PDF inline, DOCX/PPTX through the converters, and Markdown/TXT/JSON as inert `text/plain` (never `text/html`, which would be stored XSS on our own origin). Size caps are 2MB for text and 50MB for binary/document previews.
**Clone Repo tab** (issue #236, proposed by @DodgyBadger): `POST /api/cases/clone` clones a public repository into the caller's case space and registers it as a normal local case; `POST /api/cases/clone-preflight` answers "can this be cloned anonymously, and what refs does it have?" while the user is still typing. Core in `src/git-clone.ts`, split into a PURE half (URL parse, argv/env, `ls-remote` parse, stderr classification) and a thin IO half (`probeGitRemote`, `cloneRepository`). An optional `path` (the **Clone into a custom folder** checkbox) is the folder the repository is cloned INTO, exactly as given (the casename adds no subfolder), and it registers a LINKED case, the same way `POST /api/cases` with a `path` does: it is judged by `prepareNewCasePath()` (`web/case-path.ts`: blocked trees, symlinks, parent must exist), is admin-only in multi-user mode (it writes an absolute path into the shared linked-cases registry), and must be empty or not exist yet. An existing empty folder is cloned into directly (`CloneOptions.intoEmptyDir`: no temporary sibling and no rename, so a mount point works; a failed attempt empties it again but never removes it); a folder with anything in it is refused. Deleting such a case unlinks it and never removes the files. If the registry write fails after git finished, the folder is kept and the error says where it is.
**Clone Repo tab** (issue #236, proposed by @DodgyBadger): `POST /api/cases/clone` clones a public repository into the caller's case space and registers it as a normal local case; `POST /api/cases/clone-preflight` answers "can this be cloned anonymously, and what refs does it have?" while the user is still typing. Core in `src/git-clone.ts`, split into a PURE half (URL parse, argv/env, `ls-remote` parse, stderr classification) and a thin IO half (`probeGitRemote`, `cloneRepository`). An optional `path` is the folder the repository is cloned INTO, exactly as given (the API adds no case-name subfolder; the **Clone into a custom folder** field on the page is a parent, so the tab sends `<folder>/<case name>`, see UI below), and it registers a LINKED case, the same way `POST /api/cases` with a `path` does: it is judged by `prepareNewCasePath()` (`web/case-path.ts`: blocked trees, symlinks, parent must exist), is admin-only in multi-user mode (it writes an absolute path into the shared linked-cases registry), and must be empty or not exist yet. An existing empty folder is cloned into directly (`CloneOptions.intoEmptyDir`: no temporary sibling and no rename, so a mount point works; a failed attempt empties it again but never removes it); a folder with anything in it is refused. Deleting such a case unlinks it and never removes the files. If the registry write fails after git finished, the folder is kept and the error says where it is. The name is checked again inside `mutateLinkedCases()` when the entry is written, so of two clones that claim one name only the first to finish links it; the other answers 409 `ALREADY_EXISTS` and keeps its folder.
- ⚠️ **The URL is a code-execution surface, which is why it is parsed rather than forwarded.**`ext::sh -c <cmd>` makes git run an arbitrary command as its transport, and ANY `<name>::<payload>` dispatches to a `git-remote-<name>` helper, so every `::` form is refused outright. A repository starting with `-` is read by git as a flag; that is rejected AND every spawn puts `--` before the operands, because either defence alone is one edit away from being a hole. Spawns are argv arrays, never a shell (unlike `remote-hosts.ts`, which does build a shell line and must `shellescape`). The Zod schema deliberately only length-bounds `repository` — a weaker regex duplicate of `parseGitRepositoryUrl` would be the copy that drifts.
- ⚠️ **Non-interactive or it hangs the request.** The clone is synchronous by design (no job store, no polling, no cancellation surface), so an invisible credential prompt would pin an open HTTP request until the timeout. `gitNonInteractiveEnv()` closes all four prompt paths at once: `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`, empty `GIT_ASKPASS`/`SSH_ASKPASS` + `SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=never` + empty `DISPLAY`, `GCM_INTERACTIVE=never`, and `ssh -oBatchMode=yes`. `HOME`/`PATH` are inherited on purpose — a user whose own agent or credential helper already works keeps working (so a private repo may well clone; Codeman just never collects or stores credentials, and refuses a `user:password@` URL). ⚠️ In multi-user mode a NON-ADMIN's clone and preflight run with `git -c credential.helper=` (`cloneWithoutCredentialHelpers`), because the helpers belong to the one server account every user shares; admins and single-user mode keep them. The Docker server image relies on exactly this: when built with the opt-in `CODEMAN_INSTALL_GH`/`CODEMAN_INSTALL_AZ` args it configures `gh` (github.com) and an `az`-backed helper (`docker/git-credential-azure-cli`, Azure DevOps) in its SYSTEM gitconfig, both silent until the user signs the CLI in, so a private clone there still fails fast rather than prompting.
- **Failure leaves nothing behind.** The destination is removed only when it did not exist before the attempt, and a pre-existing directory is refused rather than cloned into, so a failed clone never squats on a case name and never touches an existing tree.
- ⚠️ **Error detail comes from the LAST diagnostic line, not the first.**`git clone` opens with `Cloning into '<dest>'…`, so a first-line pick reported the destination path as the reason a bad branch failed (observed against a real remote). `NOT_FOUND` wording must also say "or private": GitHub answers "Repository not found" for a private repo and a typo alike when unauthenticated.
- **Multi-user**: NOT admin-gated, unlike `/api/cases/link` — it writes only inside the caller's own `resolveCasesDir`. The exception is a `local`-transport source (an absolute path or `file://`), which is admin-only there because per-user spaces live inside one `$HOME` and a local clone would read straight through that boundary.
- **UI** (`case-clone` tab in the Add Case modal): debounced preflight paints a verdict under the field, fills the case name from the parsed repo (until the user types their own), and turns the branch/tag field into a datalist of the remote's real refs. The **Brain** picker sets the toolbar run mode on success (gated by `isCliAvailable()`, like `#runModeMenu`), so Run already points at the chosen CLI; starting a session stays opt-in. The tab hides itself when the server reports no `git` (injected via `window.__codemanCliAvailable`).
- **UI** (`case-clone` tab in the Add Case modal): the **Clone into a custom folder** field is a PARENT folder, like Create New's: the tab sends `<folder>/<case name>` as `path` (`_cloneTargetPath()`), so the API's `path` stays the exact target; debounced preflight paints a verdict under the field, fills the case name from the parsed repo (until the user types their own), and turns the branch/tag field into a datalist of the remote's real refs. The **Brain** picker sets the toolbar run mode on success (gated by `isCliAvailable()`, like `#runModeMenu`), so Run already points at the chosen CLI; starting a session stays opt-in. The tab hides itself when the server reports no `git` (injected via `window.__codemanCliAvailable`).
Tests: `test/git-clone.test.ts` (pure half exhaustively, plus REAL git against a REAL local bare repo for clone/ref/timeout/cleanup), `test/routes/case-clone-routes.test.ts` (deliberately **unmocked fs**, real clone through the endpoint).
Tests: `test/git-clone.test.ts` (pure half exhaustively, plus REAL git against a REAL local bare repo for clone/ref/timeout/cleanup), `test/routes/case-clone-routes.test.ts` (deliberately **unmocked fs**, real clone through the endpoint), `test/clone-custom-folder-ui.test.ts` (the tab's parent folder, the request and the preview, against the real markup).
Further detail: the synchronous clone request is bounded by `GIT_CLONE_TIMEOUT_MS`.
@@ -620,6 +640,10 @@ Adding the header changed the preamble, so `CODEMAN_PREAMBLE` was bumped (1.22.0
`CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=1` drops `--memory-swap` (and filters only that one kernel warning) for hosts without swap accounting; `--memory` still applies.
⚠️ **`docker/.env` is generated FROM `.env.example`, at 0600, never from a list of keys.** `Start-Codeman.sh`'s first run (only when nothing exists at that path: a dangling symlink or a directory is refused) rewrites the five `KEY=` lines it asks about and copies every other line, because `diffRequiredEnvKeys` refuses an in-app update while the user's file lacks a key the target release's example sets, so a hand-picked subset would block the very next update. Compose's dotenv is not bash: a backslash escapes a single-quoted value's closing quote (measured on 2.33.0 and 5.5.0), so `accept_password` and `accept_appdata_path` refuse a trailing backslash as well as a single quote. Compose also prefers the shell environment over the file, so setup unsets what it wrote, or a preset would beat a typed answer. `test/docker-start-setup.test.ts` pins all of it, against a stub that reproduces both rules.
⚠️ **`changeme` is refused by BOTH scripts**, before anything is built or stopped: the container publishes on every interface and holds the Docker socket, so that password is host root. `Update-Codeman.sh` needs its own check, ahead of its `down`, because a refusal found only at the handoff to `Start-Codeman.sh` would leave the stack stopped.
⚠️ The deployment ALSO self-updates in place (the repo bind mount at `/opt/codeman` + a restart-by-exiting supervisor) — see Self-update and `docs/docker-self-update.md` before touching `server.Dockerfile`, the compose file or `.env.example`, since each is an input to the updater's environment gate. User guides: `docs/docker-compose.md` + `docker/README.md`.
### DeepSeek web UI
@@ -638,7 +662,7 @@ Adding the header changed the preamble, so `CODEMAN_PREAMBLE` was bumped (1.22.0
⚠️ The actual per-CLI redirect is `capabilities.customModelInjection` on the CLI registry (four kinds: `env` for claude/gemini/copilot, `configContentEnv` reusing opencode's existing `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT`, `configDir` for codex/pi/grok/omp/deepseek, writes an isolated per-session config file, NEVER the user's real `~/.codex`/`~/.pi`/`~/.omp`/grok config/dsh home; deepseek's redirect is a per-session `DSH_HOME` holding only the generated `cordis.patch.yml`, whose `linkFromRealHome` recipe field symlinks `profiles`/`sessions`/`settings.yaml` back out of the real dsh home (resolved session-`DSH_HOME`-first, lstat-guarded so a dangling link survives re-apply) instead of stranding them, and `unsupported` for antigravity, which has no known mechanism), computed by the pure `custom-model-injection.ts` (mirrors `session-cli-builder.ts`'s no-IO discipline). ⚠️ `PI_CONFIG_DIR` does NOTHING for pi or omp (grepped pi's entire bundled JS source, the string appears nowhere); both hardcode `~/.pi/agent/models.json` / `~/.omp/agent/models.yml` with no dedicated override, so the real redirect for both is the child process's own **`HOME`**, and both need `models` as an ARRAY of `{id}` objects (an object keyed by id silently loads zero models). Grok's real mechanism turned out to be a `config.toml``[model.<name>]` block redirected via `GROK_HOME`, its original env-var-based recipe was flat-out wrong (produced "Not signed in" against a real binary), not just unverified.
⚠️ **Two launch paths, chosen by mechanism, not preference**: opencode/codex/gemini/pi/grok/deepseek/omp apply the selection ONE-SHOT, before the session/process ever exists, with no restart at all; claude alone still applies a selection by **restarting the session's CLI process in place** via `Session.restartCli()`, a de-restricted `reattachRemote()` reusing the same `respawn-pane -k` primitive local/remote respawns already share, because every one of these harnesses reads its endpoint config at process start, never per-turn, so there is no live hot-swap; `Session.setCustomModel()` undoes the PREVIOUS selection's env keys (and deletes its old `configDir`) before merging the new ones in, so switching endpoints or clearing back to native cloud never leaves a stale key behind. ⚠️ Deleting a key from `_envOverrides` is NOT enough on its own: `tmux setenv` persists at the tmux-session level and is inherited by `respawn-pane` (measured: `setenv FOO bar` survived two successive `respawn-pane -k`), so the retired keys are queued (`_pendingEnvUnsets`) and ride `RespawnPaneOptions.unsetEnvKeys` into `applyEnvOverrides()`, which `setenv -u`s them BEFORE re-applying the live overrides. ⚠️ `restartCli()` relaunches a CLI in an existing pane, so a CLI whose launch declares a `fallback` chain (claude) gets a conversation pinned as `resumeSessionId` for that one respawn: `--session-id <id>` refuses an id that already has a transcript (`Session ID ... is already in use`), and without the `--resume <id> || --session-id <id>` shape the docker/remote pane commands already use, applying a model killed the pane and lost the session. The dead-pane respawn shares this pin, see [Dead-pane respawn: the resume pin](#dead-pane-respawn-the-resume-pin). ⚠️ pi, omp and grok need the config file AND a `model` launch param (`custom/<id>` for pi/omp, grok's `[model.codeman-custom]` block name), and codex gets one too (`--model <bare modelId>`, its pattern changed to `model-plain-colon`, which admits qwen3-style colon ids and requires a letter or digit first, for the native App Settings Codex model too): that is the registry's `customModelInjection.launchModel` template, applied onto the respawn options through `legacyConfigField` by `_withCustomModelLaunchModel()`, never by id, and a model id the CLI's `model` token pattern cannot carry is refused with a 400 rather than silently dropped by the argv engine. ⚠️ Remote (SSH) and Docker sessions are REFUSED (400): their `restartCli()` reattaches a durable tmux rather than restarting the agent and the env lands on the local pane, so they used to report `restarted:true` and change nothing. The selection survives a Codeman restart as the disk-only `__customModel` (bookkeeping: env KEYS, config dir, launch model; never the values, which carry the API key and are re-derived from the endpoint store on recovery), the config dir is removed with the session, and every secret-bearing file (`custom-model-hosts.json`, the per-session config dir) is written 0600.
⚠️ **Two launch paths, chosen by mechanism, not preference**: opencode/codex/gemini/pi/grok/deepseek/omp apply the selection ONE-SHOT, before the session/process ever exists, with no restart at all; claude alone still applies a selection by **restarting the session's CLI process in place** via `Session.restartCli()`, a de-restricted `reattachRemote()` reusing the same `respawn-pane -k` primitive local/remote respawns already share, because every one of these harnesses reads its endpoint config at process start, never per-turn, so there is no live hot-swap; `Session.setCustomModel()` undoes the PREVIOUS selection's env keys (and deletes its old `configDir`) before merging the new ones in, so switching endpoints or clearing back to native cloud never leaves a stale key behind. It also puts back what the session had set itself under an injected key (`CustomModelBookkeeping.ownEnv`, read after the undo so a switch carries it across): an own `DSH_HOME` or `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` used to be deleted with the injected value, which moved the session to the server's tree or the default Claude account. ⚠️ `ownEnv` can hold a credential in memory, so `getCustomModelForPersist()` writes only its `homeEnvVar` entry, and only as an absolute path (the registry types that name as any env var, so a `clis.json` override can point it at a credential), which it must write because the selection overwrote the tmux `setenv` that was the only other copy. `_restoreCustomModel()` always states `ownEnv` (empty for an older record) after `clampEnvOverridesForOwner()`: after a restart `_envOverrides` holds what the previous run INJECTED, and reading that as the session's own would pin it to a directory the clear deletes. The re-apply's real-home lookup has the same rule: the route reads `Session.ownEnvValue()` and recovery that clamped record (probed under the bulk cap, since it walks every saved session), never `envOverrideValue()`, so an entry the own home lacks is skipped rather than filled from the server's home. Quick-start hands the `Session` constructor the caller's overrides alone so `setCustomModel()` can see them. ⚠️ Deleting a key from `_envOverrides` is NOT enough on its own: `tmux setenv` persists at the tmux-session level and is inherited by `respawn-pane` (measured: `setenv FOO bar` survived two successive `respawn-pane -k`), so the retired keys are queued (`_pendingEnvUnsets`) and ride `RespawnPaneOptions.unsetEnvKeys` into `applyEnvOverrides()`, which `setenv -u`s them BEFORE re-applying the live overrides. ⚠️ `restartCli()` relaunches a CLI in an existing pane, so a CLI whose launch declares a `fallback` chain (claude) gets a conversation pinned as `resumeSessionId` for that one respawn: `--session-id <id>` refuses an id that already has a transcript (`Session ID ... is already in use`), and without the `--resume <id> || --session-id <id>` shape the docker/remote pane commands already use, applying a model killed the pane and lost the session. ⚠️ The pin looks in `<isolated>/projects`, so `linkSharedProjectsDir()` links it from the session's own `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` when it has one (`guardSessionConfigDirHome()` covers `configDirVar` too): the server's tree would hide the conversation on apply and leave the endpoint's transcript behind on clear. The dead-pane respawn shares this pin, see [Dead-pane respawn: the resume pin](#dead-pane-respawn-the-resume-pin). ⚠️ pi, omp and grok need the config file AND a `model` launch param (`custom/<id>` for pi/omp, grok's `[model.codeman-custom]` block name), and codex gets one too (`--model <bare modelId>`, its pattern changed to `model-plain-colon`, which admits qwen3-style colon ids and requires a letter or digit first, for the native App Settings Codex model too): that is the registry's `customModelInjection.launchModel` template, applied onto the create and respawn options through `legacyConfigField` by `_withCustomModelLaunchModel()`, never by id and never onto the stored `<Mode>Config` (that config is what a clear falls back to; the quick-start route used to write the launch model there, so a clear relaunched the endpoint's id on the native backend), and a model id the CLI's `model` token pattern cannot carry is refused with a 400 rather than silently dropped by the argv engine. ⚠️ Remote (SSH) and Docker sessions are REFUSED (400): their `restartCli()` reattaches a durable tmux rather than restarting the agent and the env lands on the local pane, so they used to report `restarted:true` and change nothing. The selection survives a Codeman restart as the disk-only `__customModel` (bookkeeping: env KEYS, config dir, launch model, `homeEnvVar` and the session's own home path; never an injected value, which carries the API key and is re-derived from the endpoint store on recovery, and never any other own value), the config dir is removed with the session, and every secret-bearing file (`custom-model-hosts.json`, the per-session config dir) is written 0600.
⚠️ **Security**: every env var this feature can redirect (`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, `GOOGLE_GEMINI_BASE_URL`, `CODEX_HOME`, `GROK_HOME`, `HOME` for pi/omp, `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT`, etc.) is in that CLI's `privilegedEnvKeys` — several of these were reachable via the generic `envOverrides` field's prefix allowlist BEFORE this feature existed (the env allowlist is global and prefix-based, not per-CLI-scoped), so building this surfaced and closed a pre-existing gap rather than opening a new one. `ANTHROPIC_*` is deliberately NOT in claude's `allowedPrefixes` at all — Anthropic-traffic redirection can only happen through this feature's own admin-configured, SSRF-guarded route, never a plain client-supplied `envOverrides`.
⚠️ **A query turns that endpoint into a FLAT match list rather than a nested tree**, and the walk deliberately recurses past non-matching directories, since the whole point of searching is to reach a file whose ancestors do not match. An empty or whitespace-only query compiles to `null`, which is what keeps the default tree response byte-identical when no search is requested.
⚠️ **Both walks are a per-directory round-robin (breadth-first) over ONE 5,000-node budget.** They used to recurse depth-first through name-sorted folders, so an early folder could spend the whole budget: 4 of 57 top-level folders were shown in one real workspace. Each round divides what is left equally among the directories queued so far, and a folder's own files count as one more share beside the subfolders it has just found (`walkTurnEnd()`). Those subfolders are read in a later round, so a folder that spent all of its share on its own files left them nothing, alone in its round or beside a sibling, and search hits inside them were lost. A turn that found no subfolder holds nothing back. That is fair per directory, not per subtree: a folder of thousands of one-file subfolders still crowds out its neighbours one level down (`a/b/c/d/needle.ts` beside such a `z/` is found depth-first and missed here), and that trade is accepted, since a file browser wants the shallow levels first. Search results therefore arrive shallow-first.
⚠️ **The budget caps what a listing returns, never what it reads.** Taking turns means opening every folder found so far, where the depth-first walk stopped reading soon after its budget ran out, and a share of 16 entries costs the same read as a share of 5,000. So `readWalkFolder()` keeps only what the listing can use (the entries it lists, sorted, no more than the budget has left, with `more` recording that it dropped some: such a cursor stays queued and is flagged), and `MAX_WALK_ENTRIES_READ` (250,000) stops opening folders. The folder that crosses that line is read whole, as any folder always was, the ones not opened yet wait in `unread` and are flagged, and what was already read keeps its turns. Without the two, 100 folders of 50,000 files cost one GET 5 million entries and a 400 MB heap died (which ends the server, not the request). The price is that folders adding up to the ceiling leave later ones unread: flagged, not hidden, but not the fairness the budget gets, and a depth-first walk over the same tree showed less.
⚠️ **A folder below the walk's root is probed before it is read** (rule #516), because the round-robin reaches folders the depth-first walk stopped short of, each with an unbounded `readdir`. It is a bulk scan, so default options and the stall cap apply. `unknown` is never `absent`, so a folder the probe could not answer for goes on `unread` (`cursor.unanswered`), which flags it `incomplete` and sets `truncated`: a healthy mount that merely took longer than `PATH_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS` on first touch would otherwise list as empty, and a search would miss it in silence. It stays unread until a later listing asks again. Only `absent` or `file`, a folder that left while the walk ran, drops out with no flag. With the cap engaged (two unrelated paths stalled, by default) every folder below the root is flagged, until one answers, which is the honest outcome: none of them was read. The root is not probed: a refused probe there would blank a healthy workspace. A `readdir` that fails after a good probe (permission denied) is still treated as an empty folder, as it always was.
⚠️ A directory gets its node, with `children: []`, when it is counted and is read in a later round, so every cursor still queued after the loop, and every one in `unread`, is a folder that is unread or half read: it must carry `incomplete: true` or it reads as an empty folder, the failure that went from 0 to 635 such folders before the flag existed. `renderFileBrowserTree` draws one dim, inert row under it while it is expanded, worded to fit either reason, and the row is not a `.file-tree-item`, so the click wiring leaves it alone. The budget check inside the round runs BEFORE each `shift()`, so a directory the round skips stays queued and keeps its flag. Hidden and excluded entries are dropped at the read, so they never leave a folder looking unfinished, but a folder found as the budget ended is flagged unread even if it would have turned out to be empty: only reading it could tell. The walk's root has no node, so `truncated` is its only signal, and a folder dropped at the depth cap is not flagged: it looks the same as it always has.
⚠️ **Globs are never compiled into a RegExp**: `*a*a*a…` translated to `^.*a.*a.*a…$` is a classic backtracking blowup evaluated synchronously against every walked path, so one pathological query would freeze the event loop for the whole server (the same reason `search-service.ts` is regex-free). `globMatch()` is a two-pointer wildcard walk instead, O(text · pattern) with both operands short by construction, and an overlong query (`MAX_QUERY_LENGTH`, 256) also compiles to `null` rather than running.
Matching semantics: a query containing `/` matches the relative path, otherwise the bare entry name; globs match anchored and case-insensitively (`*` spans any run, slashes included, `?` exactly one character), everything else is a plain case-insensitive substring.
Matching semantics: a query containing `/` matches the path relative to the folder being walked (`workingDir`, or the worktree of a `root=live` listing; the returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir` either way), otherwise the bare entry name; globs match anchored and case-insensitively (`*` spans any run, slashes included, `?` exactly one character), everything else is a plain case-insensitive substring.
### Files panel in a worktree
**Files panel in a worktree** (#765, `src/live-worktree.ts`, `root=live` on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): Claude Code's EnterWorktree moves the running process into `<repo>/.claude/worktrees/<name>`, while `Session.workingDir` is the session's identity and stays on the main checkout, so the panel kept listing a tree the agent had left. `paneCwd` does follow, in both directions, because tmux reads the process cwd (measured on 2.1.318). Hook payloads are the wrong signal: their `cwd` follows every `cd` in a Bash call too.
When `paneCwd` changes, `refreshLiveWorktree()` (server.ts) runs `findLiveWorktree()`, which walks up from the pane and recognises a linked worktree by its `.git` FILE (`gitdir: .../worktrees/<id>`). It never runs git, since this fires from the pane watcher and a file read starts no process, config or filter. The walk stops at `workingDir`, at a repository or submodule of its own and at anything it cannot read; probes are bounded (#516), and a `.git` that is a symlink or a FIFO is refused before anything opens it. The answer is published as `SessionState.liveWorktree`. A plain subfolder is deliberately no answer, or a `cd` in a shell would re-root the panel.
⚠️ **That answer is lexical and goes stale.** It is judged only when the pane moves, and a symlink can take the place of the folder, or of a parent, afterwards without moving the pane, while `probePathKind()` and `readdir` both follow one. So `root=live` checks again on every request: `canWalkLiveWorktree()` (file-routes.ts) probes the folder, resolves it and `workingDir`, and the walk starts at the worktree only when that resolves strictly inside the resolved `workingDir`; otherwise it starts at `workingDir`, as it does for a worktree that has gone. The 1.49.0 release review reproduced the escape end to end on tmux 3.4: without this check a symlink swapped in after the lookup listed the names and sizes of a folder outside the workspace, though `file-content` and `file-raw` refused those paths. The root is the only place this can happen, because the walk does not follow a symlink below it (`Dirent.isDirectory()` is false for one). A swap between the check and the `readdir` is the same check-then-use race any path route accepts.
⚠️ **Only the check uses resolved paths.** The walk keeps the session's spelling, or a workspace reached through a symlink stops producing paths relative to `workingDir`, and the listing's `path`s stop working on the file routes.
⚠️ `liveWorktree` only moves where a listing STARTS, so never make it a confinement root. Returned `path`s stay relative to `workingDir`, which is why `file-content`, `file-raw` and the edit route need nothing new. Serving a worktree outside the folder (`git worktree add ../feature`) would need a second root, so those stay unfollowed, and so does a worktree of a session started below the repository's top, because Claude Code puts it at the top, outside the session's folder.
⚠️ A listing reports `worktree` whichever folder it walked, even when the worktree has gone or the check refused it: `_followFileBrowserWorktree()` compares that report with the session's state, and an absent report would reload forever.
Two surfaces do not move with it. The Git panel keeps working from `workingDir`, so it shows the main checkout's branch while the strip names the worktree. And `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` applies its dot-segment rule below `workingDir`, so while the session's folder is the main checkout a page under `.claude/worktrees/<name>` is refused and opens as source (a session started in the worktree renders it). Tests: `test/live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-live-worktree.test.ts`, `test/file-browser-worktree.test.ts`.
### Raw file bodies: streamed and range-aware
@@ -752,7 +800,7 @@ Matching semantics: a query containing `/` matches the relative path, otherwise
### Edit history panel
**Edit history panel** (issue #643; `showEditHistory`, per-device, default OFF): which files a local claude session edited (main agent and subagents), each edit's diff, and images a Bash call produced, read from the session's transcripts by byte offset, never from git. Parser `src/edit-history-parse.ts` (pure), store `src/edit-history-store.ts`, reader `src/edit-history-local-source.ts`, sync `src/web/edit-history-sync.ts`, routes `src/web/routes/edit-history-routes.ts` (`GET /api/sessions/:id/edits[?sync=1]`, `GET …/edits/:entryId`, `POST …/edits/older`, all through `findSessionOrFail` WITH `req`), panel `edit-history-ui.js`. User guide: `docs/wiki/Working-With-Files.md` § Edit history.
**Edit history panel** (issue #643; `showEditHistory`, per-device, default OFF): which files a claude session edited, local or remote SSH (main agent and subagents), each edit's diff, and images a Bash call produced, read from the session's transcripts by byte offset, never from git. Parser `src/edit-history-parse.ts` (pure), store `src/edit-history-store.ts`, reader `src/edit-history-local-source.ts` (remote: `remoteLocateClaudeTranscript` / `remoteReadClaudeEditSources` in `src/remote-files.ts`), sync `src/web/edit-history-sync.ts`, routes `src/web/routes/edit-history-routes.ts` (`GET /api/sessions/:id/edits[?sync=1]`, `GET …/edits/:entryId`, `POST …/edits/older`, all through `findSessionOrFail` WITH `req`), panel `edit-history-ui.js`. User guide: `docs/wiki/Working-With-Files.md` § Edit history.
⚠️ **Reads only on request, opt-in all the way down.**`server.ts` builds the `EditHistorySync` and hands it to the routes; its only own calls are `remove` (through `forgetEditHistory`, when the session's persisted record goes), `sweep` (startup) and `flushAll` (shutdown). No hook, no timer, no second watcher. The panel drives every read: `?sync=1` when it opens, and while it is open on that session a debounced (600 ms) re-read after a `transcript:tool_end` of an edit-capable tool (Edit, Write, MultiEdit, NotebookEdit, Bash, Agent, Task, SendUserFile), which the existing `TranscriptWatcher` already broadcasts, or the session's `session:idle` (the end of a turn, via `_onSessionIdle`; it also catches a background subagent that writes after the tool end that started it). Not `transcript:complete`: it fires on a `result` line, which claude's interactive transcript never has. A closed panel reads nothing and keeps no badge. Guarded by the "reads only on request" wiring test in `test/edit-history-sync.test.ts`.
@@ -762,11 +810,15 @@ Matching semantics: a query containing `/` matches the relative path, otherwise
⚠️ **The store holds secrets.** Every diff an agent wrote ends up in `dataPath('edit-history')/<sessionId>.json`, API keys and `.env` contents included. It is written 0600 via tmp + rename (a fresh file each time, so an existing store never keeps wider bits; a new directory is created 0700) and bounded per session: `MAX_ENTRIES` (500) and `MAX_STORE_BYTES` (4 MiB of diff text, paths and ids), oldest dropped, also on load. Each edit's diff is capped at `MAX_HUNK_BYTES` (64 KiB); the file also holds one cursor per transcript file of the current conversation, at most `MAX_PENDING_BASH` (200) unanswered Bash calls of at most 8,192 characters of command text each (a call with an id, cwd or agent id over 4,096 characters is not kept, and dropped on load) and `MAX_AGENTS` (501) subagent labels of at most 1,024 characters per string. `load()` takes the file as untrusted: one over `MAX_FILE_BYTES` (32 MiB) is not parsed, and the rest is rebuilt from its known fields under the same bounds (unknown fields and non-string diff lines dropped, the per-edit cap applied again, a transcript id with anything but `[A-Za-z0-9._-]` dropped, since the previous transcript's path is built from it). Writes are serialized. The store lives as long as the session's persisted record: `forgetEditHistory` runs when `cleanupSession` with `killMux` removes the record (a pinned session's record is only demoted and keeps its history), on the persisted-only `DELETE /api/sessions/:id`, for every record `cleanupStaleSessions` drops at startup and every one `POST /api/cleanup-state` drops. After that startup cleanup, `sweep` deletes the `edit-history/*.json` files whose session is neither live nor recorded (left behind by a crash between removing the record and deleting the file, or by an older build) and tmp files of earlier runs (named per process start, so a pid used again, a container's pid 1, does not keep one). While `remove()` runs, nothing writes the file again: a sync in flight stops after its current read, and a request meanwhile reads nothing (`unavailable` / `removed`). The routes start a sync in the same tick as their session check, so a request that passed the check before the deletion cannot start one afterwards. Then the session's slot goes, and a session that comes back with the same id (reboot restore re-creates it) starts afresh. A store that is not loaded is deleted without being parsed. The store is blocked in `isSensitivePath` (`/.codeman*/edit-history/`, same reasoning as `intents.json`) and never fed to `/api/search`.
⚠️ **Images only through existing file surfaces.** A Bash image candidate counts only when the file's mtime lies in the call's window (start − 2 s … end + 2 s) and no entry already covers that file version; `SendUserFile` images need no window. The panel shows a thumbnail only inside the workspace, through the confined `file-raw` route. An image outside it gets no thumbnail (each would mint an attachment id per render); a click opens the shared file preview, which registers it once through `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` with `notify: false` (its extension allowlist and `isSensitivePath` apply). SVGs get no thumbnail. No route of this feature serves a file, least of all a transcript path.
⚠️ **Images only through existing file surfaces.** A Bash image candidate counts only when the file's mtime lies in the call's window (start − 2 s … end + 2 s) and no entry already covers that file version; `SendUserFile` images need no window. The panel shows a thumbnail only inside the workspace, through the confined `file-raw` route. An image outside it gets no thumbnail (each would mint an attachment id per render); a click opens the shared file preview, which registers it once through `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` with `notify: false` (its extension allowlist and `isSensitivePath` apply). SVGs get no thumbnail, and neither does any image of a remote session (its `file-raw` streams over ssh, one read per listed row); a click previews it. No route of this feature serves a file, least of all a transcript path.
⚠️ **Transcript paths are agent-printed, so they are probed BOUNDED and scanned in linear time** (#516; #693 review). `probeLocalPaths()` sends each candidate through `probePathKind()` (no `pastCap`: a bulk scan), one at a time, and only a path that answered `'file'` gets `realpath` + `stat`; a path on a mount that stopped answering costs one stalled stat, never a sync, a queued sync or `remove()` that cannot finish (`test/edit-history-probe-stall.test.ts`). `PATH_TOKEN_RE` runs synchronously in the request, over Bash output of up to 30,000 characters: an unquoted token may start only at a token boundary (line start or a token-ending character, `:` excluded so URLs stay ignored), and the `file://` branch stops at the next `file://` (`:` stays allowed for timestamped names). A lookbehind that merely excludes some characters lets a match start at every character of a long token and rescan it, quadratic in the line (2.7 s for 30,000 `#`). Time-budget regression tests in `test/edit-history-parse.test.ts`. Forward reads and "Load older" yield to the event loop between the files they parse (up to 8 MiB each); a store removed meanwhile ends the read before its images are probed. Remote, Docker and non-claude sessions never load a store on any route.
⚠️ **Transcript paths are agent-printed, so they are probed BOUNDED and scanned in linear time** (#516; #693 review). `probeLocalPaths()` sends each candidate through `probePathKind()` (no `pastCap`: a bulk scan), one at a time, and only a path that answered `'file'` gets `realpath` + `stat`; a path on a mount that stopped answering costs one stalled stat, never a sync, a queued sync or `remove()` that cannot finish (`test/edit-history-probe-stall.test.ts`). A remote session's candidates go through `remoteProbePaths()` instead, one bounded ssh round trip per 40 paths; a failed probe ends the probing for that read, and its edits stay in.`PATH_TOKEN_RE` runs synchronously in the request, over Bash output of up to 30,000 characters: an unquoted token may start only at a token boundary (line start or a token-ending character, `:` excluded so URLs stay ignored), and the `file://` branch stops at the next `file://` (`:` stays allowed for timestamped names). A lookbehind that merely excludes some characters lets a match start at every character of a long token and rescan it, quadratic in the line (2.7 s for 30,000 `#`). Time-budget regression tests in `test/edit-history-parse.test.ts`. Forward reads and "Load older" yield to the event loop between the files they parse (up to 8 MiB each); a store removed meanwhile ends the read before its images are probed. Docker and non-claude sessions never load a store on any route.
Paths, agent descriptions and diff lines render via `textContent` only (browser test with a hostile path). The header button uses the marker-class pattern (`btn-edit-history--hidden`) and stays off phones (`mobile.css`, locked in `test/mobile-header-buttons-policy.test.ts`). Remote, Docker and non-claude sessions answer `unsupported` and are never read.
Paths, agent descriptions and diff lines render via `textContent` only (browser test with a hostile path). The header button uses the marker-class pattern (`btn-edit-history--hidden`) and stays off phones (`mobile.css`, locked in `test/mobile-header-buttons-policy.test.ts`). Docker, non-claude and adopted sessions answer `unsupported` and are never read.
⚠️ **Remote (SSH) sessions: read over ssh, never woken.** The sync stays path-based; its deps get the session, and `server.ts` routes them to the local reader or to `remote-files.ts`. `transcriptPath` is one ssh round trip (`buildRemoteClaudeTranscriptLocateCommand`): first the conversation the claude process in the session's remote pane writes now (its `<config dir>/sessions/<pid>.json`, found through the pane's process tree, since a remote host sends Codeman no hooks), else the most recently written `<config dir>/projects/*/<id>.jsonl` of the stored history's conversation, `<claudeSessionId>` and `<id>` (`remoteTranscriptIds`; nothing moves `claudeSessionId` after a remote `/clear`, and no fixed order is right both after a `/clear` and after a respawn that resumed the launch conversation); the result is an absolute path on the host. A read pass is one more round trip (`buildRemoteClaudeEditSourcesCommand`), or several with more than 300 subagent requests (below), with the local reader's semantics: offset clamped to the size, a block with `len` ends at `offset + len`, a new file reads its tail, one budget shared main-first, `onlyRequested` for "Load older", at most 8 KiB of `meta.json` per subagent (within a 4 MiB meta budget per read, which the local reader does not have: a meta comes only with a subagent's first read, so one past the budget is never sent and that subagent shows its id instead of its description). `test/remote-edit-sources.test.ts` runs both scripts on a real `sh` against a temp `$HOME` and compares the read byte for byte with `readClaudeEditSources` on seeded random transcripts, so `/clear` catch-up, "Load older", cursors and the store LRU behave remotely as locally. Every request value reaches the script only after validation (id `[A-Za-z0-9._-]`, relPath `main` or `subagents/agent-<id>.jsonl`, integer offsets) and shellescaped; the scripts run under `sh -c` with `LC_ALL=C`. The config dir is an absolute `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` of the ssh command's environment, else `$HOME/.claude` (claude's own rule); the remote claude runs under `$SHELL -i -l -c`, the lookup under a plain `sh`, so a value set only in a login or interactive profile (`.profile`, `.bash_profile`, `.zshrc`) is not seen. A round trip's timeout grows with its byte cap (`remoteEditSourcesTimeoutMs`: 30 s plus the transfer at 256 KiB/s), since a forward pass may carry 13 MiB and "Load older" 29 MiB. ⚠️ **Never wakes:** the lookup and the reads go through `buildRemoteEditHistoryCommand` (`buildRemoteFileCommand` with `exec`, so a timeout reaches ssh and not only the local `sh -c`, which on dash stays its parent), the image probes through `remoteProbePaths`, and all of them through `runWithRemoteSshLimit` (`ConnectTimeout=10`), so a sleeping host is a connect timeout and the panel shows `unavailable` with the stored entries; the edit-history read path reaches neither `remote-wake.ts` nor `session-routes.ts`, even transitively (guard in `test/remote-edit-sources.test.ts`). Without hooks there is no `transcript:tool_end`, so an open panel re-reads on `session:idle` and the refresh button only.
⚠️ **A read with more than 300 subagent requests spans several round trips** (`planRemoteEditSourceRounds`, `EDIT_SOURCE_REQUESTS_PER_ROUND_TRIP`). The script is one argument of the ssh line, Linux caps a single argv string at 128 KiB (`E2BIG` at about 1000 subagents), the cursors have no cap and the stored conversation is read first, so one script for all of them left a long history `unavailable`, and not even a `/clear` got past it. The cut is by NAME RANGE, not only by count: the script takes a file no `case` line names for a new one (its tail, its meta), so plain groups would read each other's files as new. Each round trip walks only the names between its cuts (one `awk` per round trip, never a fork per file), so a new file lands in exactly one range. Main comes with the first round trip, budget and meta budget carry over, and a later round trip still lists its files, because a requested file missing from the result loses its cursor. A failed round trip fails the whole read and nothing of it reaches the store; each one takes its own limiter slot. The merged result equals the local reader's, byte for byte (the fuzz test cuts every read at a random size). A read of up to 300 runs no `awk` at all. ⚠️ No `case` inside a `$(…)`: bash 3.2, macOS `sh`, cannot parse it, which is why the names come from a shell function.
### Config backups
@@ -1297,7 +1349,7 @@ Its CLI knowledge is a GENERATED block (`npm run generate:cli-catalog`, markers
⚠️ It executes ONLY commands from the embedded block (`CLI_INSTALL_CMD_TRUSTED`) — there is no network fetch of the catalogue at install time to worry about at all.
**No-admin route** (`--no-admin` / `CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN`, 2026-11-05). Everything Codeman writes was always under `$HOME`; administrator rights were only ever spent on prerequisites. `resolve_admin_mode` decides once per run whether those rights may be asked for: root yes; a Mac account outside the `admin` group no (unless a Homebrew it can write to exists); on Linux no without a `sudo` binary, or when the account is outside `sudo`/`wheel`/`admin` AND `sudo -n true` fails. ⚠️ It is never decided by `sudo -v`: that prompts, and a refused password from an account outside sudoers is reported to the administrator. A refused password on the system route offers this route instead of ending the run (`sudo_session_try`).
**No-admin route** (`--no-admin` / `CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN`, 2026-11-05). Everything Codeman writes was always under `$HOME`; administrator rights were only ever spent on prerequisites. `resolve_admin_mode` decides once per run whether those rights may be asked for: root yes; a Mac account outside the `admin` group no (unless a Homebrew it can write to exists); on Linux no without a `sudo` binary, or when the account is outside `sudo`/`wheel`/`admin` AND `sudo -n true` fails. ⚠️ It is never decided by `sudo -v`: that prompts, and a refused password from an account outside sudoers is reported to the administrator. A refused password on the system route offers this route instead of ending the run (`sudo_session_try`). ⚠️ The group test is a judgment, not a fact: no probe can read sudoers without reporting to the administrator, so an account sudoers lists by name, with a password, lands here too. `NO_ADMIN_REASON` must therefore say the rights could not be confirmed (`NO_ADMIN_UNCONFIRMED`), never that the account may not use `sudo`, and every message that ends or sums up the route carries `no_admin_override_hint`, which names `CODEMAN_NO_ADMIN=0` for that reason alone (`--no-admin` asked for the route; a `sudo` that is missing or refused has no way back).
On this route Node.js comes from nodejs.org (`latest-v<major>.x/SHASUMS256.txt` names the tarball AND carries its checksum, one fetch, no JSON parsing) into `~/.codeman/runtime/node`, and tmux from the tmux project's `tmux-builds` release into `~/.codeman/runtime/bin`. ⚠️ `tmux-builds` publishes no checksum file, so `tmux_build_sha256` pins all four digests of `TMUX_BUILD_VERSION`; bump the version and the digests together (the GitHub release API returns them as `digest`). ⚠️ A download is verified BEFORE it is unpacked or run, and an empty expected digest never passes. `node`, `npm`, `npx` and `tmux` are linked from `~/.local/bin` (`link_into_local_bin` refuses to replace a file that does not already point into the runtime, and uninstall removes only such links): the `codeman` launcher is `#!/usr/bin/env node`, and a non-interactive shell never reads the PATH line written to an interactive profile. The runtime's `node/bin` also goes on PATH and on the LaunchAgent's `svc_path`, since `npm install -g` puts AI CLIs beside that Node.js.
@@ -121,6 +121,13 @@ curl -X POST localhost:3000/api/quick-start -d '{"caseName":"sandbox","mode":"cl
## Attach to a container you already run
⚠️ Two different things are called "adopted". This section is about a CONTAINER
(`DockerCase.owned === false`). A tmux SESSION a human started inside a container is
listed by `GET /api/mux/foreign?docker=1` and wrapped by `POST /api/sessions/adopt`, for
which the container needs a Docker case but no adoption of its own. That one is
`Session.isAdopted`, with the connection on `Session.adopt.docker` and `session.docker`
undefined. See `docs/architecture-invariants.md#adopted-foreign-tmux-sessions`.
The tab's **Attach to an existing container** toggle points a case at a container **you**
built and run. Codeman only ever `docker exec`s into it: it never creates, starts, stops,
restarts or removes it, and it seeds no credentials into it, so the CLIs inside must already
@@ -202,7 +209,7 @@ The host-gateway mapping, `CODEMAN_API_URL` derivation, host-guard allowlist, an
## Notes & limits
- Requires Docker (or Podman) with a reachable daemon; tmux must be present in the base image (a hard prerequisite, probed at link time).
- Per-session `envOverrides` / `effort` / per-CLI config are rejected for docker cases (they do not cross into the container); configure the container via the docker host's per-mode command override instead.
- Per-session `envOverrides` / `effort` / per-CLI config are rejected for docker cases (they do not cross into the container); configure the container via the docker host's per-mode command override instead. A `$` in that override expands inside the container, never on this host, and a bare `$VAR` in `extraCreateArgs`/`extraExecArgs` reaches `docker` as those literal characters, so write the value out.
- macOS Docker Desktop takes a dedicated uid path (the baked image uid; memory caps are subject to the VM ceiling).
@@ -12,14 +12,25 @@ It can also include the GitHub CLI (`gh`) and the Azure CLI (`az`) with the `azu
## Prerequisites
- Docker Engine or Docker Desktop with Docker Compose v2
- A reachable Docker daemon
- Docker Engine or Docker Desktop with the Docker Compose v2 plugin, version 2.27.2 or newer
- A reachable Docker daemon, usable by your account without sudo (on Linux, membership of the `docker` group)
The application container mounts the Docker daemon socket so Codeman can create and manage its isolated Docker cases. Treat anyone who can administer this Compose project as having Docker-host-equivalent access.
## Start
Copy the environment template, set a strong password, and confirm `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH`. The example maps `/mnt/user/appdata/codeman` on the host to `/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}` in the container, preserving Codeman state and CLI credentials outside Docker-managed volumes.
On Linux, clone the repository and run the start script:
The first run checks Docker, Compose and the daemon, then asks for a data folder (default `~/codeman-docker`), a port (default 3000, or the next free one) and a password (Enter generates one, shows it on your terminal and keeps it in `docker/.env`). It writes `docker/.env` from `docker/.env.example`, builds the image, starts the container and waits until Codeman answers, then prints the URL and how to sign in. `--yes` takes every default without asking, and `--setup-only` writes `docker/.env` and stops so it can be reviewed first. The full description, including the options, is the Start section of the [Docker deployment guide](../docker/README.md#start).
The data folder is mounted at `/home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}` in the container, so Codeman state and CLI credentials stay on the host outside Docker-managed volumes. On every start the script determines `PUID` and `PGID` from the owner of that folder, and `DOCKER_SOCKET_GID` from the configured Docker socket, before invoking Compose. A root-owned data folder is rejected so the runtime account cannot become UID 0.
To write `docker/.env` by hand instead (Unraid and other root-only hosts, or Compose without the script), copy the template, set a strong password, and confirm `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH`. The example value `/mnt/user/appdata/codeman` is an Unraid layout.
```sh
cp docker/.env.example docker/.env
@@ -31,12 +42,6 @@ On PowerShell, use the following command instead.
Copy-Itemdocker/.env.exampledocker/.env
```
On Linux, run the stack with the start script. It determines `PUID` and `PGID` from the owner of `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH`, and `DOCKER_SOCKET_GID` from the configured Docker socket, before invoking Compose. A root-owned application-data directory is rejected so the runtime account cannot become UID 0.
```sh
bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh
```
On other platforms, run Compose directly. `PUID` and `PGID` default to `1000:1000`; set them in `docker/.env` when the application-data directory has a different owner. Naming the file with `-f` disables Compose's own discovery of `docker/docker-compose.override.yml`, so add a second `-f` for it when you keep one (see `docker/README.md`, Local customisation).
The container starts as root, corrects the ownership of a bind source the daemon had to create, and drops to `PUID:PGID` with `setpriv` before Codeman starts; the capabilities that needs are declared in `docker/docker-compose.yaml` and named by the entrypoint when a compose file written elsewhere lacks them.
Open `http://localhost:3000` and sign in with the username and password from `docker/.env`.
Open the URL the script printed (`http://localhost:3000` by default) and sign in with the username and password from `docker/.env`.
Tracking issue: [#206 "Plans to support pi.dev?"](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/issues/206)
**SUPERSEDED in part (PR #771, 2026-11):** what this record says about pi's default screen and
the strips no longer holds. Fullscreen became pi's default in 1.0.0, and pi now takes the mouse
strip (`altScreen: 'strip-mux-and-mouse'`). Each affected passage carries a SUPERSEDED note;
current behaviour is in `docs/pi-integration.md` and the "Pi is the same shape" paragraph of
`docs/architecture-invariants.md`.
Status: **IMPLEMENTED 2026-08-13** (see `docs/pi-integration.md` for the user-facing
guide). Everything below is the design record; the open questions were resolved
empirically against pi 0.84.1 and the answers are recorded inline as **RESULT**
@@ -29,7 +35,7 @@ against the upstream docs in `packages/coding-agent/docs/`.
| Config dir | `~/.pi/agent` (override: `PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR`). Holds `auth.json`, `trust.json`, `settings.json`, `models.json` (user-defined providers), `models-store.json` (cached catalogs), `keybindings.json`, `extensions/`, `skills/`, `prompts/`, `themes/`, `AGENTS.md`, `SYSTEM.md`, and the package trees `npm/` + `git/` |
| Sessions | `~/.pi/agent/sessions/--<cwd with / replaced by ->--/<timestamp>_<uuid>.jsonl`, tree-structured (`id`/`parentId`), format v3. Overrides: `PI_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR`, `--session-dir` |
| Credentials | `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` (OAuth subscriptions + API keys, auto-refresh), plus ~34 provider env vars with **no common prefix**. 0.84.1 adds `pi auth check` (auth preflight with optional credential output) |
| TUI | Default: **main screen with terminal-owned scrollback**. Since **0.84.0** an experimental fullscreen mode exists, selectable via `--tui-mode fullscreen`**or at runtime through `/settings`**; the default remains the main-screen mode |
| TUI | Default: **main screen with terminal-owned scrollback**. Since **0.84.0** an experimental fullscreen mode exists, selectable via `--tui-mode fullscreen`**or at runtime through `/settings`**; the default remains the main-screen mode. **SUPERSEDED (PR #771, 2026-11):** fullscreen is the default since pi 1.0.0, and `tuiMode: regular` keeps the main screen |
| Providers | 15+ (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Azure, Bedrock, Mistral, Groq, xAI, OpenRouter, Copilot, Baseten since 0.84.0, ...). OAuth subscription login via `/login` for six: ChatGPT Plus/Pro, Claude Pro/Max, GitHub Copilot, xAI, OpenRouter, Radius |
| Permission model | **No permission prompts at all.** No built-in sandbox, no MCP (none planned), no sub-agents, no plan mode, no to-dos, no background bash. Tools run with the user's own permissions |
| Trust model | "Project trust" gates **loading** of project-local `.pi/` config/extensions/skills and **installing missing project packages**, not tool execution. Triggered only when the cwd (or an ancestor) contains `.pi/settings.json`, `.pi/extensions\|skills\|prompts\|themes`, `.pi/SYSTEM.md`/`.pi/APPEND_SYSTEM.md`, or `.agents/skills`; a bare `.pi/` directory does NOT prompt. Global `defaultProjectTrust`: `ask` (default) / `always` / `never` |
@@ -88,6 +94,12 @@ for pi, i.e. pi appears in none of them): the replay-side strip in `session-rout
live-stream twin in `session.ts`, and the frontend `_sessionUsesServerMouseStrip()` in
`terminal-ui.js` (usages `:3432`, `:3697`).
**SUPERSEDED (PR #771, 2026-11):** pi still stays out of `isAltScreenStripMode()`, but it is no
longer outside every strip: it takes the mouse strip (`isMuxMouseStripMode()`), which removes the
alt-screen toggles and the mouse enables and keeps `3J`. Fullscreen is its default since 1.0.0, the
enables are recorded as `cliMouseTracking`, and the wheel is forwarded from that flag, so it survives
a tab switch or reload. A `/settings` flip of `tuiMode` is followed in both directions.
### 2.3 tmux required, no direct-PTY fallback, no per-mode configurator
Same rule as the other external CLIs: `pi` mode throws if tmux is unavailable. Add a fourth block to
@@ -340,6 +352,7 @@ because the result lands in a `bash -c "..."` string):
-`--tui-mode` (released in 0.84.0): never passed by Codeman. The main-screen default is the
friendly case for the browser terminal, and fullscreen remains the user's own runtime choice via
`/settings` (§2.2 is designed for that). `--use-theme` (still unreleased) likewise.
**SUPERSEDED (PR #771, 2026-11):** still never passed, but fullscreen is the default since pi 1.0.0.
-`--name <name>` (`-n`): nice for `/resume` readability, but names contain spaces and would be the
first user-controlled value needing real shell quoting in `buildSpawnCommand`. Defer.
| `pi` resolves to an unrelated binary | `pi --version` + semver-shape check in the resolver (§2.6); path and version shown in `/api/pi/status` |
| Pi's TUI repaints in a way the browser terminal handles badly | Test scrollback and repaint early (step 3 of §7); pi's default is main-screen with terminal-owned scrollback, which is the friendly case |
| Fullscreen TUI mode (shipped 0.84.0, runtime-switchable) | Already designed for: pi stays OUT of the strip list, so a user flipping `/settings` to fullscreen gets opencode-like alt-screen behavior, not corruption. §7 step 7 tests the flip explicitly |
| Fullscreen TUI mode (shipped 0.84.0, runtime-switchable) | Already designed for: pi stays OUT of the strip list, so a user flipping `/settings` to fullscreen gets opencode-like alt-screen behavior, not corruption. §7 step 7 tests the flip explicitly. **SUPERSEDED (PR #771, 2026-11):** fullscreen is the default since pi 1.0.0 and pi now takes the mouse strip, see §2.2 |
| The buffer local-echo overlay fights pi's live composer | §2.10: explicit E2E gate (§7 step 4) with the one-line `'off'` fallback; predictive echo for pi is a tracked follow-up, not a v1 blocker |
| Pi moves fast (pre-1.0; 9 releases in the 7 weeks before 0.84.1) | Keep the flag surface small; every flag validated and droppable; nothing pinned in the Dockerfile beyond the `--no-cache` rebuild cadence. Live example of the hazard: `--tui-mode` went from main-only docs to released between the two drafts of this plan |
| Docker image grows | Pi is an npm package; the layer is modest next to the ~190MB `agy` binary |
Replace `patch` with `minor` or `major` as needed. Include `"xterm-zerolag-input": patch` on a separate line if that package changed too.
**Write it in the shape the release page is built from.** `CHANGELOG.md` keeps changesets' format, and the `Release` workflow rebuilds the GitHub release from that section (`scripts/generate-release-notes.mjs`, which also titles it `Codeman <x.y.z>`). The in-app update toast reads the same bold lead-ins:
```markdown
### Thanks
- @someone for what they did (#123).
**What the change does for the user (#123).** Two or three plain sentences.
**Fixes.**
- **What works now (#124).** What was wrong. Behaviour change: what a user has to do differently.
**Fixes applied while landing.** One sentence each.
**Docs and tests.** One sentence.
```
`### Thanks` stays first and opens the page. A bold lead-in that ends in punctuation becomes a heading under What's new, so make it a short headline. `**Fixes.**` and its list become a Fixes section, and the last two labels share an Also in this release section (the labels are `SECTION_LABELS` in `scripts/lib/whats-new.mjs`). `Behaviour change:` and `Breaking:` are put in bold wherever they appear, so use those words for anything a user has to act on. Keep each change short: how it works belongs in the docs, and a long paragraph is a wall of text even under a heading. Text the script does not recognise stays on the page as plain paragraphs. After step 3, `node scripts/generate-release-notes.mjs` prints the page. If the workflow warns that it kept the changesets notes, fix the changelog and run `gh release edit codeman@<x.y.z> --notes-file <file>`.
3. **Consume the changeset**: `npm run version-packages` (auto-bumps `package.json` files, updates `CHANGELOG.md`, runs `npm install --package-lock-only`, and verifies lockfile sync via `scripts/check-lockfile-sync.mjs` — all in one command; never hand-edit `CHANGELOG.md` or `package-lock.json` versions. It also writes `src/web/public/whats-new.json` (`scripts/generate-whats-new.mjs`): the bold lead-in of each change in the new `CHANGELOG.md` section, which the browser announces once per version in a toast. Commit it with the release; `test/whats-new.test.ts` fails when its version differs from `package.json`, so a hand bump needs `node scripts/generate-whats-new.mjs && npx prettier --write src/web/public/whats-new.json` too. A release whose notes have no bold lead-ins ships an empty list and shows no toast)
4. **Sync CLAUDE.md version**: Update the `**Version**` line in the root `CLAUDE.md` (under COM Shorthand) to match the new version from `package.json`
5. **Commit and deploy**: verify the branch first (`git branch --show-current`), then stage EXPLICIT paths — never `git add -A`, which has swept another session's WIP into a release. `git status --short` and account for every line before committing:
6. **Refresh the getcodeman.com version badge**: the landing page's status bar carries the release version (`v<x.y.z> · getcodeman.com · MIT`), so it goes stale on every release if nobody bumps it. The site source and its deploy script are maintained outside this repository, on the maintainer's machine only; follow the local site handbook there, which also covers the numbers strip and `sitemap.xml` refresh that belong in the same pass. Poll production (`curl -s https://getcodeman.com/ | grep v<x.y.z>`) before calling it done, since the edge lags a deploy by up to a minute. Not applicable to contributor clones — skip it and say so.
7. **Wait for CI**: after `git push`, TWO workflows fire per master push — `CI` and `Release` (the npm publish + GitHub release). List both runs for the pushed commit with `gh run list --commit $(git rev-parse HEAD) --json databaseId,workflowName` and watch EACH with `gh run watch <id> --exit-status`. Confirm both pass before considering the release done (`gh run list -L 1` returns only one of the two).
7. **Wait for CI**: after `git push`, TWO workflows fire per master push: `CI` and `Release` (the npm publish, the GitHub release and the MCP registry publish). List both runs for the pushed commit with `gh run list --commit $(git rev-parse HEAD) --json databaseId,workflowName` and watch EACH with `gh run watch <id> --exit-status`. Confirm both pass before considering the release done (`gh run list -L 1` returns only one of the two).
8. **Publish the new version to the MCP registry**: `codeman mcp` is listed in the official MCP registry as `io.github.Ark0N/codeman`, and the registry does not follow npm, so every release is published there by hand or the listing stays on the old version. `npm run version-packages` has already written the new version into `config/mcp-registry/server.json` (`scripts/sync-plugin.mjs`). Wait until npm serves it (`npm view aicodeman version`; it can lag the green `Release` run by several minutes), because the registry checks that the npm package exists and carries `mcpName: io.github.Ark0N/codeman`. Then run `cd config/mcp-registry && mcp-publisher publish`, preceded by `mcp-publisher login github` when the saved login has expired, signed in as the account that owns the `io.github.Ark0N/` namespace. Use mcp-publisher 1.8.1 or newer (`mcp-publisher --version`), the release binary from https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases: the Snap Store package is stuck at 1.1.0 and rejects the current `$schema` with a false "deprecated schema detected", so never edit `server.json` for that error. Older publishers also save their login as `.mcpregistry_github_token` and `.mcpregistry_registry_token` (live tokens) in the current directory; move those out of the repo, never commit them. Confirm with `curl -s 'https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/servers?search=io.github.Ark0N/codeman' | jq -r '.servers[] | "\(.server.version) latest=\(._meta["io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/official"].isLatest)"'`: the new version must be the one with `latest=true`. Maintainer only (it needs that GitHub account); contributor clones skip it and say so.
8. **Check the MCP registry**: `codeman mcp` is listed in the official MCP registry as `io.github.Ark0N/codeman`, and the registry does not follow npm, so every release is published there. The `Release` workflow does this itself in its `MCP registry` job (`.github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml`): it waits until npm serves the version, because the registry checks that the npm package exists and carries `mcpName: io.github.Ark0N/codeman`, signs in with the workflow's GitHub OIDC token (no secret, no browser) and publishes the `config/mcp-registry/server.json` that `npm run version-packages` wrote (`scripts/sync-plugin.mjs`). A version the registry already has is skipped. Confirm with `curl -s 'https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/servers?search=io.github.Ark0N/codeman' | jq -r '.servers[] | "\(.server.version) latest=\(._meta["io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/official"].isLatest)"'`: the new version must be the one with `latest=true`. If the job failed, `gh workflow run publish-mcp.yml` publishes the version on master again. Its publisher is pinned: bump `MCP_PUBLISHER_VERSION` and `MCP_PUBLISHER_SHA256` together, the digest from the release's asset. The local fallback is `cd config/mcp-registry && ~/.local/bin/mcp-publisher login github && ~/.local/bin/mcp-publisher publish`, signed in as the account that owns the `io.github.Ark0N/` namespace, with mcp-publisher 1.8.1 or newer, the release binary from https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases: the Snap Store package is stuck at 1.1.0 and rejects the current `$schema` with a false "deprecated schema detected", so never edit `server.json` for that error. Older publishers also save their login as `.mcpregistry_github_token` and `.mcpregistry_registry_token` (live tokens) in the current directory; move those out of the repo, never commit them.
9. **Announce it in Discussions**: every release gets a post in the [Announcements](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/discussions/categories/announcements) category, shaped like #418 and #302: the short version first (one bold lead-in per theme, features before fixes, what it does for the user rather than how it works), contributor @-mentions inline where their work is described (a mention notifies them, and a contributor reposting is the cheapest reach this project has), a link to the release, and the Thanks names at the end. Casual first-person voice, no em-dashes, humanizer pass when the skill is available. A same-day follow-on patch (1.28.1 after 1.28.0) is folded into the previous post as an edit, never a second thread. Post it with `gh api graphql -F body=@<file> -f title='Codeman <x.y.z>: <hook>' -f repo=R_kgDOQ-SMDg -f cat=DIC_kwDOQ-SMDs4DCHZE -f query='mutation($repo:ID!,$cat:ID!,$title:String!,$body:String!){createDiscussion(input:{repositoryId:$repo,categoryId:$cat,title:$title,body:$body}){discussion{number url}}}'` (the repo's node id and its Announcements category id; `pinDiscussion` does not exist in the API, so pinning stays a click in the UI). This step exists because announcements stopped at 1.18 (#302) while ten releases shipped with nobody notified; #418 is the backfill covering 1.19.0 to 1.28.1, and release notes only count as content once they reach a surface people are subscribed to.
@@ -483,6 +483,15 @@ transient mount blip at launch poisons tmux's long‑lived cwd and crashes
never executes. Large hand‑formatted/generated assets (`app.js`, the gesture
bundle, vendored libs) are `.prettierignore`d for the style pass, but the NUL +
syntax checks still cover them.
- **Installer downloads without a package manager:** on the no-admin route
(`docs/wiki/Installation.md`) `install.sh` fetches and runs software no system
package manager vetted, each checked before it is unpacked or run. The Node.js
tarball is checked against the `SHASUMS256.txt` fetched from nodejs.org over the
same TLS connection, which proves integrity, not independent provenance: the
signature on that file is not checked. The tmux build is checked against a
SHA-256 pinned per platform in the installer. `install.sh cloudflared` takes the
latest cloudflared release into `~/.local/bin` unverified, as the system routes
take the same release, because Cloudflare publishes no checksum file.
---
@@ -558,7 +567,7 @@ Full feature guide: [`docker-cases.md`](docker-cases.md).
- **It strictly improves network posture.** It removes the single shared `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` and gives each person a revocable credential; a non‑loopback bind and the tunnel‑enable guard are satisfied by "multi‑user with ≥1 enabled user" without a shared password.
- **Auth is a parallel branch** (`middleware/auth.ts`) that leaves the single‑user path untouched: per‑user scrypt verify (`timingSafeEqual`, timing‑equalized against user enumeration), identity‑carrying cookies, a per‑username failure bucket (a botnet can't brute one account across IPs; one NATed user can't lock out the rest), and a `mustChangePassword` lockbox. The hook‑secret loopback bypass, host guard, and Origin/CSRF guard are unchanged (hooks authenticate the INSTANCE, not a user).
- **Ownership is enforced server‑side only** and fails closed: `req.authUser` (a synthetic admin in single‑user), `findSessionOrFail` returns NOT_FOUND (never 403) for a foreign session, list/SSE/WS/file‑preview/search all filter by `session.owner`, and SSE routing defaults session‑scoped events to their owner (unresolved owner → withheld). The load‑bearing rule is **non‑admin `workingDir` confinement**: a non‑admin's session/one‑shot working dir must realpath‑resolve inside `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, checked BEFORE any disk write.
- **Privileged actions are a one‑bit grant** (`canBypassPermissions`, default off): only granted users (and admins) get `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (others are silently downgraded to `--permission-mode auto`), shell‑mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, and other CLIs' bypass flags. Machine‑level resources (remote/Docker host definitions, tunnel, self‑update, settings writes) are admin‑only.
- **Privileged actions are a one‑bit grant** (`canBypassPermissions`, default off): only granted users (and admins) get `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (others are silently downgraded to `--permission-mode auto`), shell‑mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, other CLIs' bypass flags, and Codex's **Allow network access** (`networkAccess`, forced off for a user without the grant, since it lets a command in Codex's sandbox call Codeman's API and start a session outside that sandbox). Machine‑level resources (remote/Docker host definitions, tunnel, self‑update, settings writes) are admin‑only.
- **Clone Repo does not lend the server's git sign-in to non-admins.** A clone writes only inside the caller's own case space, so it is not admin-gated, but the server account's git credential helpers (the Docker image's opt-in `gh`/`az` helpers, or any `gh auth setup-git`) are shared by every user. A non-admin's clone and preflight therefore run with `git -c credential.helper=`, which empties the helper list including the URL-scoped entries (`cloneWithoutCredentialHelpers` in `case-routes.ts`, argv pinned in `test/git-clone.test.ts`). This closes the Clone Repo path only: the account's SSH keys still apply to an `ssh://` URL, and a non-admin's agent sessions run as the same account, consistent with the first bullet above. Docker cases are a second route to the same sign-in: with `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH`/`_AZ` on, a non-admin's Docker case with credential seeding on (the default) receives a copy of the server account's `gh`/`az` sign-in, exactly as it receives the Claude and Codex credentials.
- **Admin actions are audited** append‑only to `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl` (acting admin, action, target, IP). Passwords set by an admin create/reset are one‑time (returned once, force change). Under Basic auth, `logout` only truly ends QR‑issued sessions — to lock someone out, disable the account or reset the password (a proper login form is a deferred Phase 6).
| **Create New** | A fresh `~/codeman-cases/<name>` with a scaffolded `CLAUDE.md`, or with **Create in a custom folder**, a new folder inside a parent you choose, scaffolded the same way and registered in place like a linked case. |
| **Clone Repo** | A repo cloned into `~/codeman-cases/<name>` (or straight into a folder you choose, which must be empty or not exist yet) and registered as a case. Private repos need this machine's own git credentials (see below). |
| **Clone Repo** | A repo cloned into `~/codeman-cases/<name>` (or, with **Clone into a custom folder**, into `<parent folder you choose>/<name>`, which must be empty or not exist yet) and registered as a case. Private repos need this machine's own git credentials (see below). |
| **Link Existing** | An existing folder anywhere on disk, registered in place. Nothing is copied or moved. |
Linked cases keep living where they are. Deleting a case in Codeman removes the
@@ -274,7 +291,7 @@ Full detail, including logs and the self-updater, is in
| Installer, without git | Re-run the one-liner. The in-app updater says so instead of offering an update. |
| npm | `npm update -g aicodeman` |
| git clone | `git pull && npm install && npm run build`, then restart. |
| Docker Compose | Re-run `Start-Codeman.sh`. The in-app updater works too, and refuses a release that changes the container definition until you re-run the script. |
| Docker Compose | `git pull`, then re-run `Start-Codeman.sh`. The in-app updater works too, and refuses a release that changes the container definition until you re-run the script. |
The in-app updater covers git-clone installs supervised by systemd or launchd. It restarts
the process that is running it, so the actual work happens in a detached script and the
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ be wrong for at least one of them:
| **File Viewer** | Real path resolution before boundary checks, so symlinks cannot escape. Sensitive trees blocked. Edit mode adds an extension allowlist, a size cap, `.git` denial, and optimistic concurrency. It never creates files. |
| **Attachments** | An id-based registry, so browser requests never carry absolute paths. The magic-link scanner is prompt-injectable by nature and is therefore force-confined to the session's workspace. Extension allowlist, not a blocklist. |
| **Path picker** | Its own root allowlist rather than the workspace confinement. In multi-user mode a non-admin gets only their own user space, because per-user spaces live inside the home directory. |
| **Remote cases** | Reads go over the session's own ssh connection and are resolved and contained on the remote host, with a bounded number of ssh children. Nothing is copied to the Codeman host; writes, Office previews and thumbnails are refused. |
| **Remote cases** | Reads go over the session's own ssh connection and are resolved and contained on the remote host, with a bounded number of ssh children. Nothing is copied to the Codeman host, apart from the diffs the Edit history panel reads from a remote Claude session's transcripts while it is open, kept in a private bounded store (0600) that is deleted with the session's record. Writes, Office previews and thumbnails are refused. |
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ as usual and tells them that server-wide settings can only be changed by an admi
### Updates
Current version, a manual check, and the in-app updater. Covers git-clone installs
supervised by systemd or launchd; npm installs report as non-updatable. See
[Running As A Service](Running-As-A-Service).
supervised by systemd or launchd; npm installs and installs without git report as
non-updatable. See [Running As A Service](Running-As-A-Service).
### Terminal & Input
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ supervised by systemd or launchd; npm installs report as non-updatable. See
| Keep Size Under Keyboard | On | For local Claude sessions, the on-screen keyboard no longer resizes the session: the terminal keeps its rows and the view scrolls so the prompt sits just above the keyboard. Resizing made Claude reprint its screen and drop transcript lines from history. Codex, Claude's fullscreen mode, remote and Docker sessions resize as before. See [Mobile Guide](Mobile-Guide). |
| CJK Input | Off | IME composition through a dedicated text field. |
| Extended Keyboard Bar | Per device | Which accessory bar phones get. Shell sessions override it while they are active. |
| Wheel Scrolls Local History | Off | Keeps the wheel on the local buffer instead of forwarding it to the CLI. |
| Wheel Scrolls Local History | Off | Keeps the wheel on the local buffer instead of forwarding it to the CLI. Fullscreen pi leaves that buffer empty and has no paging fallback, so with this on the wheel does nothing there. |
| Auto Copy Selection | Off | Copies highlighted terminal text to the clipboard the moment you finish selecting it. Ctrl+C still copies on demand. |
| Trim The Pane Margin On Copy | On | Takes the left margin a full-screen agent CLI paints down its own edge off a copy, so the text pastes flush. Each CLI declares its own width, and the strip never exceeds the indent every selected line shares, so nesting is kept. Claude Code and Codex declare a margin; a shell does not. |
| Normal / Bold font weight | xterm defaults | Per device, each slot from 100 to 900. The bundled JetBrains Mono renders every step, so a lighter normal weight makes Claude's bold headings stand out. Applies live to the terminal, both echo overlays and open team panes. |
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ records an unknown host key in `~/.ssh/known_hosts` without asking: BatchMode st
**Edit history** (per device, off by default, never on phones) adds a header button for the
active session's edit history: every edit the agent and its subagents made, with its diff, and
images it produced. Local Claude sessions only. Nothing is read until you open the window, and it
images it produced. Claude sessions, local and remote (SSH). Nothing is read until you open the window, and it
stores those diffs (secrets included) under `~/.codeman/edit-history/`; see
[Working With Files](Working-With-Files#edit-history).
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ instead of its native cloud backend. See [Custom Model Endpoints](Custom-Model-E
| Default Codex model | Model for new local Codex sessions; empty uses Codex's own config. Letters, digits, `.``_``-``/` only. |
| Default Codex reasoning effort | Reasoning level for new local Codex sessions; empty uses Codex's own config. |
| Bypass approvals and sandbox | Starts new Codex sessions with `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox`. Read [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs) before enabling. |
| Allow network access | Starts new local Codex sessions (Run menu, Resume and the API; not scheduled jobs) with `sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=true`, so commands in Codex's workspace-write sandbox can use the network. The [Codeman Skill](Codeman-Skill) needs it to reach this server from a Codex session. It applies to every such session, and those commands can then call Codeman's API, which can start a session outside the sandbox with no approval prompt, even when a password is set: see [Security](Security#what-codeman-does-not-protect-against). It applies where Codex runs the folder in workspace-write (a project you trusted in Codex) and does not change Codex's sandbox mode: a folder Codex runs read-only keeps the network closed, and Codex asks for approval per command. Synced, off by default; forced off for users without the privileged-commands grant in multi-user mode. |
| Animated status effects | Cosmetic. |
| MCP server sync | Copies the MCP servers each installed, enabled CLI (Claude, Codex, Gemini, OpenCode, Antigravity) and GitHub Copilot CLI has into the others' own config files. Synced, off by default, admin only in multi-user mode. Turn it on and **Apply** or **Save** (Apply keeps Settings open), then **Preview** shows what would change and **Sync now** applies it. It only adds missing servers, keeps the previous file as `.codeman-bak`, and leaves a file that receives env values or headers readable by you only. A config dir moved by `CODEX_HOME`, `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, `GEMINI_CLI_HOME` or `COPILOT_HOME` in Codeman's own environment is followed. |
| Text and code | Plain preview with Lines (line numbers) and Wrap toggles in the header. Long files are truncated in plain preview. |
| Markdown | Rendered by default: headings, tables, code blocks with copy buttons, images and links relative to the file (root-relative ones resolve from the workspace root, as on GitHub). Links to another heading of the same file (`[Install](#installation)`) scroll to it, with GitHub's heading names (lower-case, punctuation dropped, repeats numbered `-1`, `-2`), and never leave the page. Opened from an attachment card, where the file's folder is unknown, relative images show their alt text and relative links show as plain text. The MD pill in the header flips to source. |
| Markdown | Rendered by default: headings, tables, code blocks with copy buttons, images and links relative to the file (root-relative ones resolve from the workspace root, as on GitHub). Links to another heading of the same file (`[Install](#installation)`) scroll to it, with GitHub's heading names (lower-case, punctuation dropped, repeats numbered `-1`, `-2`), and never leave the page. Opened from an attachment card, where the file's folder is unknown, relative images show their alt text and relative links show as plain text. Persian, Arabic and Hebrew read right to left, each block following its own first letter, while code stays left to right. The MD pill in the header flips to source. |
| Images | Inline. |
| Audio and video | Inline with a working scrub bar, because range requests are supported. |
| Spreadsheets (`.xlsx`) | Read-only grid, parsed in your browser (never on the server), up to 10 MB. `.xls` and `.ods` are download only. |
@@ -126,9 +136,11 @@ can send what it can read to any host, open HTML only from sources you trust, as
your own desktop. The **Page**
pill in the viewer header switches to the source view (where **Edit** works as for any text
file), and the viewer falls back to source on its own when a page cannot be rendered: a remote
(SSH) case, an HTML file inside a hidden folder, or one sitting directly in a broad folder such
as your home folder or `/tmp` (the page may read the filesin its own folder tree, so move it
into a folder of its own). The raw file routes still serve HTML as a download only.
(SSH) case, an HTML file inside a hidden folder (which includes `.claude/worktrees/<name>` after
an agent [moved into a worktree](Git-Worktrees#when-an-agent-moves-into-a-worktree)), or one
sitting directly in a broad folder such as your home folder or `/tmp` (the page may read the
files in its own folder tree, so move it into a folder of its own). The raw file routes still
serve HTML as a download only.
Text previews are capped at the first 500 lines, fetched as a partial read, so clicking a
one-gigabyte log does not try to paint one.
@@ -147,8 +159,8 @@ session uses: one `realpath` plus `stat` probe for the file and the workspace ro
streamed `cat` (or a slice of it, so video seeking works). Symlinks are resolved on the host
that can resolve them, the size cap applies to the remote size before a byte is requested,
and an unreachable host answers 502 rather than pretending the file is missing. Nothing is
ever copied onto the Codeman host, and a same-named local file is never served under a
remote name.
ever copied onto the Codeman host, apart from the diffs the [edit history](#edit-history)
stores, and a same-named local file is never served under a remote name.
Not available over ssh, and said so with a 400 instead of a misleading 404: editing in
place, Office previews and generated thumbnails (both need the bytes on the server's disk),
@@ -157,30 +169,38 @@ their workspace is bind-mounted at the same path.
## The path picker
For choosing a path rather than typing one. It appears in two places:
For choosing a path rather than typing one. It appears in these places:
- **Browse** in **Add Case → Link Existing**.
- **Browse** in **Add Case → Create New**, under **Create in a custom folder**.
- **Browse** in **Add Case → Clone Repo**, under **Clone into a custom folder**.
- **Browse** on the folder fields of **Add Case → Docker**.
- The **📁 Path** key on the mobile keyboard bar.
It browses one directory at a time and can show hidden entries on request. The current
folder is an editable field: type or paste a path and press Enter (or **Go**) to jump
straight there, and a full file path lands in its folder with that file selected. The
**Sort** control orders each listing by name or by modified time (newest first is the
quick way to the file an agent just wrote), with folders always ahead of files; the
choice is remembered per device. The picker inserts the path into your prompt
**without** pressing Enter, so nothing is submitted by accident. Its sibling **⌫ All**
key clears the unsent prompt, and never sends the agent's `/clear` command.
It browses one directory at a time and can show hidden entries on request (the Docker
**Container Workdir** picker always lists them). The current folder is an editable
field: type or paste a path and press Enter (or **Go**) to jump straight there, and a
full file path lands in its folder with that file selected. The **Sort** control orders
each listing by name or by modified time (newest first is the quick way to the file an
agent just wrote), with folders always ahead of files; the choice is remembered per
device. A **Browse** button fills the field beside it. The **📁 Path** key inserts the
path into your prompt **without** pressing Enter, so nothing is submitted by accident.
Its sibling **⌫ All** key clears the unsent prompt, and never sends the agent's `/clear`
command.
In **Link Existing**'s picker, **+📁** (New folder) makes a folder inside the folder you
are viewing and selects it. Names use letters, numbers, spaces and `_ - . ~` (not starting
with a dot or `~`). The cases folder is refused, since every folder there is already a
case: use **Add Case → New Case** instead.
In the **Link Existing**, **Create New** (custom folder) and **Clone Repo** (custom folder)
pickers, **+📁** (New folder) makes a folder inside the folder you are viewing and selects
it. Names use letters, numbers, spaces and `_ - . ~` (not starting with a dot or `~`). The
cases folder is refused, since every folder there is already a case: pick a folder outside
it, or make the case with **Add Case → Create New** or **Clone Repo** (no custom folder).
This is a separate file-serving surface from the viewer, with its own rules: it allowlists
your home directory, the cases directory, and anything in `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS`, and
blocks sensitive trees. In multi-user mode a non-admin gets only their own user space as a
root, because per-user spaces live inside the home directory and a home-directory root would
expose everyone.
expose everyone. The Docker **Container Workdir** picker lists the inside of the container
instead, read-only, so these host rules do not apply to it; it is admin-only in multi-user
mode.
## Files into a session
@@ -306,20 +326,29 @@ Click it for a draggable window listing the active session's edits, newest first
first catches up on the ones it had not read yet. **Load older** then goes back within the new
conversation.
It works for local Claude sessions only. Remote (SSH), Docker and other CLIs' sessions say so instead.
It works for Claude sessions, local and remote (SSH). Docker sessions, other CLIs' sessions and
tmux sessions opened outside Codeman say so instead.
A remote session's images show no thumbnail (each would be one more SSH read); click one to
preview it. A remote host that is asleep is never woken for the history: the window shows the
stored edits with the SSH error on top.
How it reads:
- **Only while you look.** The history is read from the session's Claude transcript when you open
the window, and again after each tool call that can change files and at the end of each turn,
while it stays open on that session. A closed window reads nothing, and Codeman does no work in
the background for sessions nobody looks at.
while it stays open on that session (a remote session at the end of each turn only: its host
sends no tool events). A closed window reads nothing, and Codeman does no work in the
background for sessions nobody looks at.
- **The transcript is found through the session's hooks.** Each prompt tells Codeman where the
session's transcript is. Right after a server restart, before the next prompt, Codeman looks in
the session's `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` if you set one for it in Codeman, else in the default config
directory. A `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` set outside Codeman (in a shell profile or a wrapper script)
is only known after the next prompt; until then the window says "No transcript found for this
session yet".
session yet". A remote session's transcript is looked up on its host over SSH: the
conversation its Claude writes now, else the most recently written of the one the window
showed last and the session's own, under the remote user's `~/.claude`, or under
`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` when the host sets it for every SSH command (`.zshenv`,
`/etc/environment`); one set only in `.profile`, `.bash_profile` or `.zshrc` is not seen.
- **The history is stored, and it holds secrets.** Every diff an agent wrote is copied to
`~/.codeman/edit-history/<session-id>.json`, including API keys or `.env` contents it edited. The file is
readable by your user only, capped at 500 edits and 4 MiB of diff text per session (the oldest
Reference in new issue
Block a user
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
Codeman maintainer committed