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feat(file-preview): render local HTML files as sandboxed pages
Clicking an agent's `.html` path showed source text or downloaded it, so a generated report could only be viewed by asking the agent to start a web server. Render it instead, without serving HTML same-origin: - POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view mints a capability for the file's own directory (workspace path, or outside it under the attachment guard). - GET /html-view/:cap/* serves the page and its relative assets with `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT allow-same-origin, so the page runs in an opaque origin (also as a top-level tab) and cannot read the Codeman document, its cookies or its API. - Served files: non-dot, asset-allowlisted, realpath-confined to that directory, blocklist applied; GET only. Capabilities are memory-only with a rolling TTL and are revoked with the web-tab ones on logout. - Frontend: the file preview renders HTML in a sandboxed iframe (popout opens the same URL); terminal `.html` links go to the preview, not the log viewer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ import {
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} from '../../user-store.js';
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import { getAuthUser, requireAdmin, revokeUserSessions } from '../route-helpers.js';
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import { webviewCapabilities } from '../../webview-capabilities.js';
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import { htmlViewCapabilities } from '../../html-view-capabilities.js';
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import { appendAdminAudit } from '../admin-audit.js';
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import { SseEvent } from '../sse-events.js';
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import type { AuthPort } from '../ports/auth-port.js';
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@@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ export function registerAdminRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Aut
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// Web-tab proxy capabilities are a second credential the cookie purge does not
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// touch; a forced logout that left them alive would not be a logout.
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const revokedWebviews = webviewCapabilities.revokeOwner(normalizeUsername(username));
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htmlViewCapabilities.revokeOwner(normalizeUsername(username));
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audit(req, 'user.logout', username, { revoked, revokedWebviews });
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return { success: true, data: { revoked } };
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});
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@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ export function registerAdminRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Aut
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}
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revokeUserSessions(ctx.authSessions, username);
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webviewCapabilities.revokeOwner(normalizeUsername(username));
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htmlViewCapabilities.revokeOwner(normalizeUsername(username));
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if (deleteSpace) await deleteUserSpace(username);
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audit(req, 'user.delete', username, { deleteSpace, killedSessions: owned.length });
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ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.AdminUsersChanged, {});
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@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
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/**
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* @fileoverview Render a local HTML file (an agent's report, a generated page) as a
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* page instead of as source text.
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*
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* Routes:
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* - `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` (authenticated) — `{ path }` of an `.html` file;
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* returns `{ url }`, an `/html-view/<cap>/<file>` URL for that file.
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* - `GET /html-view/:cap/*` (capability) — the HTML file and its sibling assets.
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*
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* ⚠️ Every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox ...` WITHOUT
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* `allow-same-origin`, so the page runs in an opaque origin whether it is framed or
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* opened as a top-level tab: it can run its own scripts but cannot read the Codeman
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* document, its cookies or its API. That is what makes rendering safe at all; see
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* html-view-capabilities.ts for why the route authenticates on a capability.
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*
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* Path policy: the HTML file itself is admitted like the file preview admits a file
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* (inside the session workspace, or outside it under the attachment guard), and the
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* capability then serves ONLY the files in that file's own directory tree, filtered
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* by the same blocklist plus an asset-extension allowlist and a no-dotfile rule, so
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* a page cannot use its own directory to pull a `.env` out through the browser.
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*/
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import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
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import { createReadStream, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
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import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
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import { basename, dirname, extname, isAbsolute, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
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import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse } from '../../types.js';
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import { isBlockedAttachmentPath, isUnderTree, loadAttachmentGuardConfig } from '../../config/attachment-guard.js';
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import { HTML_VIEW_PREFIX, htmlViewCapabilities } from '../../html-view-capabilities.js';
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import { findSessionOrFail, ownerFor, validateSessionFilePath } from '../route-helpers.js';
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import { exceedsDownloadLimit } from '../../config/buffer-limits.js';
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import type { SessionPort } from '../ports/index.js';
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/** Extensions that open as a rendered page. */
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export const HTML_VIEW_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['html', 'htm']);
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/** What a rendered page may load from its own directory, with the type it is served as. */
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const ASSET_TYPES: Record<string, string> = {
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html: 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
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htm: 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
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css: 'text/css; charset=utf-8',
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js: 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
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mjs: 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
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json: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
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map: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
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txt: 'text/plain; charset=utf-8',
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csv: 'text/csv; charset=utf-8',
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md: 'text/plain; charset=utf-8',
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svg: 'image/svg+xml',
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png: 'image/png',
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jpg: 'image/jpeg',
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jpeg: 'image/jpeg',
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gif: 'image/gif',
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webp: 'image/webp',
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avif: 'image/avif',
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ico: 'image/x-icon',
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bmp: 'image/bmp',
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woff: 'font/woff',
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woff2: 'font/woff2',
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ttf: 'font/ttf',
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otf: 'font/otf',
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wasm: 'application/wasm',
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mp4: 'video/mp4',
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webm: 'video/webm',
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mp3: 'audio/mpeg',
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wav: 'audio/wav',
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pdf: 'application/pdf',
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};
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/**
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* The sandbox every response is served under. No `allow-same-origin`: that one
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* token is the difference between "a page" and "a page that can drive Codeman".
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*/
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const SANDBOX_CSP = 'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups allow-modals allow-downloads';
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function extensionOf(path: string): string {
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return extname(path).toLowerCase().replace(/^\./, '');
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}
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export function registerHtmlViewRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort): void {
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app.post('/api/sessions/:id/html-view', async (req, reply) => {
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const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail(ctx, id, req);
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const body = (req.body || {}) as { path?: string };
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if (!body.path || typeof body.path !== 'string') {
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reply.code(400).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Missing path parameter'));
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return;
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}
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if (session.remote) {
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reply
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.code(400)
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.send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'HTML pages in a remote (SSH) case cannot be rendered'));
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return;
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}
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if (!HTML_VIEW_EXTENSIONS.has(extensionOf(body.path))) {
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reply.code(400).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Not an HTML file'));
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return;
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}
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// Inside the workspace: the same check every file route uses. Outside it: the
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// attachment guard, exactly as an external file preview is admitted.
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let resolvedPath: string;
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const inWorkspace = validateSessionFilePath(session.workingDir, body.path);
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if (inWorkspace) {
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resolvedPath = inWorkspace.resolvedPath;
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} else {
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if (!isAbsolute(body.path)) {
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reply.code(404).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'File not found'));
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return;
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}
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try {
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resolvedPath = realpathSync(body.path);
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} catch {
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reply.code(404).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'File not found'));
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return;
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}
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const guard = await loadAttachmentGuardConfig();
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if (guard.confineToWorkspace || isBlockedAttachmentPath(resolvedPath, guard.blockedTrees)) {
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reply.code(403).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Access to this file is blocked'));
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return;
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}
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}
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const stat = await fs.stat(resolvedPath).catch(() => null);
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if (!stat?.isFile()) {
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reply.code(404).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'File not found'));
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return;
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}
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const cap = htmlViewCapabilities.mint(dirname(resolvedPath), ownerFor(req));
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return {
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success: true,
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data: { url: `${HTML_VIEW_PREFIX}/${cap}/${encodeURIComponent(basename(resolvedPath))}` },
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};
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});
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app.get(`${HTML_VIEW_PREFIX}/:cap/*`, async (req, reply) => {
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const { cap, '*': rest } = req.params as { cap: string; '*': string };
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const record = htmlViewCapabilities.resolve(cap);
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const notFound = () => reply.code(404).header('Content-Type', 'text/plain; charset=utf-8').send('Not found');
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if (!record) return notFound();
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// Fastify has already percent-decoded the wildcard. Hidden files and
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// directories are never served, whatever their extension.
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const segments = (rest || '').split('/').filter(Boolean);
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if (segments.length === 0 || segments.some((s) => s.startsWith('.'))) return notFound();
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const ext = extensionOf(segments[segments.length - 1]);
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const contentType = ASSET_TYPES[ext];
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if (!contentType) return notFound();
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let resolvedPath: string;
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try {
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resolvedPath = realpathSync(resolve(record.rootDir, segments.join(sep)));
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} catch {
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return notFound();
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}
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// Symlinks are resolved above, so this is the real containment check.
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if (!isUnderTree(resolvedPath, record.rootDir)) return notFound();
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const guard = await loadAttachmentGuardConfig();
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if (isBlockedAttachmentPath(resolvedPath, guard.blockedTrees)) return notFound();
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const stat = await fs.stat(resolvedPath).catch(() => null);
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if (!stat?.isFile() || exceedsDownloadLimit(stat.size)) return notFound();
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reply.header('Content-Security-Policy', SANDBOX_CSP);
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reply.header('Content-Type', contentType);
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reply.header('Content-Length', String(stat.size));
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reply.header('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
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reply.header('Referrer-Policy', 'no-referrer');
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// The sandboxed page is opaque-origin, so even its fetch() of a sibling
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// `data.json` is CORS-checked with `Origin: null`. `*` without credentials is
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// enough, and widens nothing: these bytes are already readable by anyone
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// holding the capability URL.
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reply.header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
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return reply.send(createReadStream(resolvedPath));
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});
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}
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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ export { registerPushRoutes } from './push-routes.js';
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export { registerTeamRoutes } from './team-routes.js';
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export { registerMuxRoutes } from './mux-routes.js';
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export { registerFileRoutes } from './file-routes.js';
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export { registerHtmlViewRoutes } from './html-view-routes.js';
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export { registerScheduledRoutes } from './scheduled-routes.js';
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export { registerCronRoutes } from './cron-routes.js';
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export { registerSystemRoutes } from './system-routes.js';
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@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import {
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import type { PaneCaptureOptions } from '../../mux-interface.js';
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import { SseEvent } from '../sse-events.js';
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import { webviewCapabilities } from '../../webview-capabilities.js';
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import { htmlViewCapabilities } from '../../html-view-capabilities.js';
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import {
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CreateSessionSchema,
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SessionNameSchema,
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@@ -849,6 +850,7 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
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// logout has to retire them too or every dashboard URL opened during this
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// login keeps relaying without one (WebviewCapabilityStore.revokeOwner).
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webviewCapabilities.revokeOwner(ownerFor(req));
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htmlViewCapabilities.revokeOwner(ownerFor(req));
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reply.clearCookie(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: '/' });
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return {};
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});
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