fix(html-view): apply the dot and extension rules to the resolved path

The serving route checked hidden segments and the asset allowlist on the
requested name only; after realpath it checked containment and the
blocklist. A symlink `cfg.json -> .git/config` inside the page's folder
was therefore served as 200 application/json. The dot rule now also runs
on the segments of relative(rootDir, resolvedPath), and the extension
allowlist on the resolved file name, which also types the response.

Both realpath calls on the request path (the mint of an out-of-workspace
file and the serving route) are now `await fs.realpath` instead of
realpathSync, so a slow mount stalls one request, not the event loop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/architecture-invariants.md

@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ A file path an agent prints is a link on both surfaces it can appear on, and cli
 
 ⚠️ **The terminal routes an out-of-workspace path to the preview, not the log viewer.** The log viewer spawns `tail -f` and allows only the workspace, `/var/log` and `~/logs`, so an external `.log`/`.json`/code path answered `Path must be within working directory or allowed log directories` while the SAME path clicked in the response viewer previewed fine. `activate()` now checks `_isExternalPreviewPath` alongside `previewsInFileViewer`. In-workspace text keeps the tail viewer, which is the point of it (live follow), except `.html`/`.htm`, which always go to the preview so they render as a page (see below); nothing widened `file-stream-manager`'s allowlist, so no `tail -f` is spawned on an arbitrary host path.
 
-**Text reuses the edit-mode allowlist; markup stays download-only.** `TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS` (`config/file-editing.ts`) rather than a second curated list that would drift from it: if the viewer would open a file for editing inside the workspace, the same file outside it can be read. The justification for widening is that the agent in the session can already `cat` any of these and the picker already previews them, so the suffix was never the confidentiality gate; the path guard is (sensitive-file blocklist, `/root` and `/etc` trees, realpath first). ⚠️ Two consequences had to be handled at the same time: `~/.codeman*/state.json` joined `isSensitivePath` (it persists `SessionState.envOverrides`, and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names like `GEMINI_API_KEY`, so it can hold a live credential), and `html`/`htm` joined `svg` in `serveRawFile`'s **download-only** branch so that widening what can be READ never widens what can RUN on our own origin. Text with no dedicated MIME entry goes out as inert `text/plain; charset=utf-8` + `nosniff`, matching the picker. ⚠️ **The one place HTML renders is `/html-view/<cap>/...`** (`html-view-routes.ts`, `html-view-capabilities.ts`), never these routes: `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` mints a capability for the HTML file's own directory, and every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT `allow-same-origin`, so the page is opaque-origin even as a top-level tab and cannot read Codeman or drive its API. The directory is served recursively to the page's scripts (non-dot, asset-allowlisted, realpath-confined, blocklist applied, GET/HEAD only), which is why minting is refused for an HTML file in a hidden directory or directly in a broad root (`/`, home, `/tmp`, `/var/tmp` and `$TMPDIR` (named literally, since macOS sets `TMPDIR` in every terminal), the cases and user-space roots, a drive's mount point such as WSL's `/mnt/d`) or in any directory above one of them (`/home`, `/Users`, macOS's `/private`; `isBroadHtmlViewRoot`). The preview renders it by default; the **Page** pill (`htmlRendered`, per-device like `mdRendered`) and any refused mint fall through to the source view with its Edit button. Tests: `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts`, the html-view block in `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`, `test/webview-capability-revocation.test.ts`. The by-id text preview is bounded like the workspace one: a `Range` request for the first 512KB (a real partial read, not a discarded 50MB download) plus a 500-line cap, with the footer saying so.
+**Text reuses the edit-mode allowlist; markup stays download-only.** `TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS` (`config/file-editing.ts`) rather than a second curated list that would drift from it: if the viewer would open a file for editing inside the workspace, the same file outside it can be read. The justification for widening is that the agent in the session can already `cat` any of these and the picker already previews them, so the suffix was never the confidentiality gate; the path guard is (sensitive-file blocklist, `/root` and `/etc` trees, realpath first). ⚠️ Two consequences had to be handled at the same time: `~/.codeman*/state.json` joined `isSensitivePath` (it persists `SessionState.envOverrides`, and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names like `GEMINI_API_KEY`, so it can hold a live credential), and `html`/`htm` joined `svg` in `serveRawFile`'s **download-only** branch so that widening what can be READ never widens what can RUN on our own origin. Text with no dedicated MIME entry goes out as inert `text/plain; charset=utf-8` + `nosniff`, matching the picker. ⚠️ **The one place HTML renders is `/html-view/<cap>/...`** (`html-view-routes.ts`, `html-view-capabilities.ts`), never these routes: `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` mints a capability for the HTML file's own directory, and every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` WITHOUT `allow-same-origin`, so the page is opaque-origin even as a top-level tab and cannot read Codeman or drive its API. The directory is served recursively to the page's scripts (non-dot, asset-allowlisted, realpath-confined, blocklist applied, GET/HEAD only; the dot and extension rules run on the requested name AND on the symlink-resolved target, or a `cfg.json -> .git/config` link would serve the git config), which is why minting is refused for an HTML file in a hidden directory or directly in a broad root (`/`, home, `/tmp`, `/var/tmp` and `$TMPDIR` (named literally, since macOS sets `TMPDIR` in every terminal), the cases and user-space roots, a drive's mount point such as WSL's `/mnt/d`) or in any directory above one of them (`/home`, `/Users`, macOS's `/private`; `isBroadHtmlViewRoot`). The preview renders it by default; the **Page** pill (`htmlRendered`, per-device like `mdRendered`) and any refused mint fall through to the source view with its Edit button. Tests: `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts`, the html-view block in `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`, `test/webview-capability-revocation.test.ts`. The by-id text preview is bounded like the workspace one: a `Range` request for the first 512KB (a real partial read, not a discarded 50MB download) plus a 500-line cap, with the footer saying so.
 
 **Media is single-sourced across the two preview paths.** `VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` / `AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` live in `attachment-registry.ts` and are imported by `file-content`'s media classification, so a clip plays identically whether it is in the workspace or reached by id from outside it. They diverged first: the workspace path had its own inline sets and the registry allowlist had no media at all, so a video an agent wrote to `/tmp` was refused as an unsupported type while the same file inside the repo played. ⚠️ Three things have to line up for a player rather than a dead frame: the extension in the allowlist, a **real MIME entry** in `MIME_TYPES` (a `<video>` refuses to decode `application/octet-stream`, which presents as a player that renders and then does nothing), and the range-aware body (`serveRawFile` → `sendFileBody`) that makes the scrub bar work. `getAttachmentType()` returns the `video`/`audio` members of `AttachmentDetectedType` for them; the attachment card has no per-type CSS and its thumbnail falls back to the type label, since `generateFirstPageThumbnail` has no media branch and answers 204. ⚠️ The image-watcher keeps its OWN narrow detection list (`png/pdf/docx/pptx`), so this does not start popping cards for every video an agent writes.
 

docs/security-architecture.md

@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ A saved dashboard URL renders as a tab, served through Codeman's own origin at `
 - **The proxy is exempt from cookie auth and the Origin/CSRF guard, and that is deliberate.** The iframe is sandboxed without `allow-same-origin`, so it is opaque‑origin: its requests are cross‑site, meaning the `SameSite=lax` session cookie is never attached and its writes and WS upgrades arrive with `Origin: null`. The credential is instead a 192‑bit capability in the path, minted only by an authenticated `POST /api/webviews/:id/open`, held in memory (a restart invalidates every one), rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, and granting nothing but "relay bytes to this one saved URL". ⚠️ **The Host allowlist is NOT bypassed**, so DNS‑rebinding protection is unaffected. A second `Referer`‑keyed form exists for root‑absolute assets and is the only exemption decided by a request‑supplied header, so it is fenced to safe methods on non‑`/api`, non‑`/ws`, non‑`/q` paths. Edges pinned by `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`.
 - **The lost‑frame recovery page is the third unauthenticated 200, and the only one decided by request headers alone.** The proxy's runtime shim masks `/webview/<cap>/` off the page's own URL so a single‑page app routes on the path it expects; a navigation the page then starts itself (`location.reload()`, a root‑absolute `location.href`) lands on Codeman's root with no capability anywhere, no cookie (opaque origin) and a Referer naming the masked page. `serveLostWebviewFrame()` in `middleware/auth.ts` recognises it by shape (`GET`/`HEAD`, `Sec-Fetch-Dest: iframe` or `frame`, `Accept: text/html`, `Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate` or absent) and answers, BEFORE the credential checks and without counting an auth failure, with a static page whose only content is a `postMessage` of the lost path to the parent tab (`default-src 'none'` plus the hash of that one script, `no-store`, `referrer: no-referrer`, no reflected input). It is fenced to paths that are NOT registered routes and never `/api/`, `/ws/` or `/q/`, with one carve‑out: `/` itself, because the landing page masks to exactly `/` and its reload otherwise rendered Codeman's app shell inside the web tab. `/` is admitted only when the request carries neither the `codeman_session` cookie nor an `Authorization` header: nothing in Codeman frames its own root and a sandboxed frame has neither, while a framed `/` that does carry credentials still gets the shell. On a passwordless install no auth hook runs, so the index route applies the same test itself (`isLostWebviewRootFrame`). ⚠️ Known property, accepted rather than mitigated: those headers are trivially set by a non‑browser client, so an unauthenticated caller can distinguish a registered route (401) from a non‑route (200) and enumerate the route table; the routes are public in `docs/api-reference.md`, so nothing is learned. Pinned by `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` (password) and `test/webview-lost-root-frame.test.ts` (passwordless).
 - **Sandboxed by default; `allow-same-origin` is an explicit per‑dashboard opt‑in.** A proxied page is same‑origin with Codeman, so without the sandbox its JavaScript could read the Codeman document and call the agent‑spawning API. ⚠️ In BOTH modes the `Authorization` header and the `codeman_session` cookie are stripped before the upstream request, because a trusted (same‑origin) frame makes the browser attach Codeman's own Basic‑auth credentials to every proxied request; forwarding them would hand `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` to the dashboard.
-- **Rendered HTML files (`/html-view/<capability>/`) are the other capability-gated route that skips cookie auth.** A clicked `.html` file renders through it so an agent's report can be viewed from any device. The exemption is narrower than the proxy's: `GET`/`HEAD` only, the capability in the path only (no `Referer` form), and it is a separate store, so a web-tab capability never opens a page and vice versa. The capability is minted by an authenticated `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` (session ownership via `findSessionOrFail`, the attachment guard for out-of-workspace files), held in memory with a rolling TTL and revoked with the web-tab ones on logout, admin logout and user deletion. Every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` without `allow-same-origin`, so the page is opaque-origin even when opened as a top-level tab and cannot read Codeman's document, cookies or API. It may read its own directory tree (non-dot, asset-allowlisted, realpath-confined, blocklist applied), so minting is refused for an HTML file in a hidden directory or directly in a broad root (`/`, home, `/tmp`, `/var/tmp` and `$TMPDIR`, the cases and user-space roots, a drive's mount point) or in a directory above one (`/home`, `/Users`). Pinned by `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts` and the html-view block in `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`.
+- **Rendered HTML files (`/html-view/<capability>/`) are the other capability-gated route that skips cookie auth.** A clicked `.html` file renders through it so an agent's report can be viewed from any device. The exemption is narrower than the proxy's: `GET`/`HEAD` only, the capability in the path only (no `Referer` form), and it is a separate store, so a web-tab capability never opens a page and vice versa. The capability is minted by an authenticated `POST /api/sessions/:id/html-view` (session ownership via `findSessionOrFail`, the attachment guard for out-of-workspace files), held in memory with a rolling TTL and revoked with the web-tab ones on logout, admin logout and user deletion. Every response carries `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` without `allow-same-origin`, so the page is opaque-origin even when opened as a top-level tab and cannot read Codeman's document, cookies or API. It may read its own directory tree (non-dot, asset-allowlisted, realpath-confined, blocklist applied; the dot and extension rules hold for the symlink-resolved target as well as the requested name), so minting is refused for an HTML file in a hidden directory or directly in a broad root (`/`, home, `/tmp`, `/var/tmp` and `$TMPDIR`, the cases and user-space roots, a drive's mount point) or in a directory above one (`/home`, `/Users`). Pinned by `test/routes/html-view-routes.test.ts` and the html-view block in `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`.
 - **Not an open relay, and not a privilege boundary.** `resolveUpstreamUrl()` refuses anything leaving the saved origin, and cross‑origin redirects are handed back unchanged rather than followed. The proxy does reach whatever the SERVER can reach, which is not an escalation for someone who already commands `--dangerously-skip-permissions` agents, but in multi‑user mode it means a non‑admin's dashboard is fetched from the server's network position. Saved URLs are validated to plain http(s) with no embedded credentials, and there is deliberately **no magic‑link path**: terminal output can never create a webview (the mistake the attachment scanner had to be walled off from). The one refused destination class is link‑local and cloud‑metadata addresses (`169.254.0.0/16`, `fe80::/10`, `fd00:ec2::254`, `168.63.129.16`, `100.100.100.200`, `metadata.google.internal`): `webview-egress-policy.ts` refuses them at save time, and `webview-egress.ts` re‑judges the RESOLVED address at connect time through a `lookup` hook on the proxy's undici Agent and on its WebSocket client, so a DNS name pointing into those ranges is refused as well. Loopback and RFC1918 stay allowed on purpose. Capabilities are revoked on logout, admin logout and user deletion, and proxied responses carry `Referrer-Policy: same-origin` so a dashboard cannot hand the capability‑bearing URL to a third‑party host it links.
 
 ---