fix(tunnel): give the unauthenticated tunnel its own acknowledgement

The network acknowledgement that install.sh writes for every passwordless LAN install also satisfied the tunnel guard, so one click on the welcome screen's tunnel link published full terminal control to a public URL with no login and no confirm. The tunnel now needs CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL or --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel (carried by web -d and service install), and with no login the browser asks before every enable, reading a new loginConfigured field from GET /api/tunnel/status.

The guard is now decided once per request and required again where the tunnel starts, so a save that found the tunnel running can no longer restart it unguarded after a concurrent stop.

Closes #706
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JD committed 2026-10-26 03:13:25 -04:00
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@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ In order of how much they matter:
1. **Do not expose it without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`.** Binding a non-loopback host without one
starts, but warns loudly. A tunnel refuses outright unless you acknowledge the exposure
in the UI.
in the UI, which asks every time, or set `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL`. The
installer's `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` covers the LAN bind only.
2. **Prefer Tailscale over a public tunnel.** Keeping the loopback bind and putting a
private network in front of it removes the public attack surface entirely, and gives you
real HTTPS. See [Remote Access](Remote-Access).