fix(tunnel): give the unauthenticated tunnel its own acknowledgement

The network acknowledgement that install.sh writes for every passwordless LAN install also satisfied the tunnel guard, so one click on the welcome screen's tunnel link published full terminal control to a public URL with no login and no confirm. The tunnel now needs CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL or --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel (carried by web -d and service install), and with no login the browser asks before every enable, reading a new loginConfigured field from GET /api/tunnel/status.

The guard is now decided once per request and required again where the tunnel starts, so a save that found the tunnel running can no longer restart it unguarded after a concurrent stop.

Closes #706
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JD committed 2026-10-26 03:13:25 -04:00
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commit fc0ecc6051
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@@ -115,8 +115,10 @@ There is also a toggle in **App Settings → System → Remote access**.
**The tunnel refuses to start without a password.** That is on purpose: a public URL with no
authentication is a terminal on your machine handed to the internet. Acknowledging the risk
explicitly is possible from the UI toggle, and only from there; the API will not do it for
you.
explicitly is possible from the UI toggle, which asks you every time, or for the whole server
with `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL=1` (or `codeman web --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel`).
`CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK`, which the installer sets for a LAN install without a
password, does not count.
## LAN plus password
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@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ In order of how much they matter:
1. **Do not expose it without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`.** Binding a non-loopback host without one
starts, but warns loudly. A tunnel refuses outright unless you acknowledge the exposure
in the UI.
in the UI, which asks every time, or set `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL`. The
installer's `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` covers the LAN bind only.
2. **Prefer Tailscale over a public tunnel.** Keeping the loopback bind and putting a
private network in front of it removes the public attack surface entirely, and gives you
real HTTPS. See [Remote Access](Remote-Access).
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@@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ Some things are configured before the server starts, not in the UI:
| `CODEMAN_GESTURE` | Makes gesture control available to be enabled. |
| `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS` | Lets in-container hooks reach the host on a loopback bind. |
| `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS` | Extra roots for the path picker. |
| `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` | Acknowledges exposing the server with no password. |
| `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` | Acknowledges binding a non-loopback address with no password. Does not cover the tunnel. |
| `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL` | Lets the Cloudflare tunnel start with no password (`--allow-unauthenticated-tunnel` on `codeman web`). The browser still asks first. |
| `CODEMAN_BASE_URL` | Mounts Codeman under a sub-path behind a reverse proxy that forwards the prefix unchanged. See [Remote Access](Remote-Access). |
| `CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS` | Cap on concurrent sessions. 50 by default, 1 to 462 (a larger value is clamped to 462, anything that is not a positive integer falls back to 50). Read at startup. The 462 assumes the default `CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEWS` and no pinned closed sessions, which share the same 512-entry tab layout. In multi-user mode the per-user cap defaults to half of it unless `CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER` is set. |
| `CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES` | Cap on raw file bodies and downloads. 2 GB by default, `0` for none. |