fix(tunnel): give the unauthenticated tunnel its own acknowledgement

The network acknowledgement that install.sh writes for every passwordless LAN install also satisfied the tunnel guard, so one click on the welcome screen's tunnel link published full terminal control to a public URL with no login and no confirm. The tunnel now needs CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL or --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel (carried by web -d and service install), and with no login the browser asks before every enable, reading a new loginConfigured field from GET /api/tunnel/status.

The guard is now decided once per request and required again where the tunnel starts, so a save that found the tunnel running can no longer restart it unguarded after a concurrent stop.

Closes #706
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JD committed 2026-10-26 03:13:25 -04:00
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@@ -105,7 +105,9 @@ The warning points at three ways to secure the instance:
2. `--host 127.0.0.1` + an authenticated tunnel (`cloudflared` / `tailscale serve`).
3. `--allow-unauthenticated-network` / `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1`
— explicitly accept the risk (downgrades the warning to a one‑line note). This
flag is **only** an acknowledgement; it does not change reachability.
flag is **only** an acknowledgement; it does not change reachability. It covers
the bind and nothing else: it does **not** let the managed Cloudflare tunnel
start without a password, which has its own opt‑in (§2, the tunnel caveat).
`CODEMAN_API_URL` (used by hooks/child processes) is always derived as a loopback
address (`0.0.0.0`/`localhost`/`::1` → `127.0.0.1`) so in‑process hooks reach the
@@ -209,8 +211,15 @@ requests as local:
**Mitigation:** set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` whenever a loopback‑connecting tunnel is
up — it gates everything except the (secret‑gated) hook exemption and is the
documented practice; since COD‑55 enabling the managed tunnel **refuses** to start
without it unless `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` explicitly
acknowledges the exposure. Prefer `tailscale serve` (below), which authenticates
without a login (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` or multi‑user mode) unless
`CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL=1` / `--allow-unauthenticated-tunnel`
acknowledges the exposure, or the request carries `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel: true`
(what the browser sends after its confirm). The network acknowledgement
(`CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK`) does **not** count: the installer writes
it for every LAN install without a password, so it once turned a click on the
welcome screen's tunnel link into a public, login‑free URL with no confirm. With
no login the browser asks before every enable, whatever the server would accept,
reading `loginConfigured` from `GET /api/tunnel/status`. Prefer `tailscale serve` (below), which authenticates
at the tailnet layer so untrusted clients never reach the loopback port at all.
### Host‑header & Origin allowlist (DNS‑rebinding & CSRF defense)
@@ -585,7 +594,8 @@ Opt-in and off by default: the server POSTs the Web Push events (permission prom
| `--host` / `CODEMAN_HOST` | Bind host (default `127.0.0.1`) |
| `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` | Extra `Host`/`Origin` allowlist entries for reverse proxies (comma‑separated; exact host, or leading‑dot `.suffix` for subdomains) — see §3 |
| `--base-url` / `CODEMAN_BASE_URL` | Sub‑path prefix Codeman is mounted under behind a reverse proxy, e.g. `/codeman` (default `/`); the proxy must forward the prefix unchanged. Independent of `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` |
| `--allow-unauthenticated-network` / `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` | Acknowledge an unauthenticated non‑loopback bind (downgrades the warning) |
| `--allow-unauthenticated-network` / `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` | Acknowledge an unauthenticated non‑loopback bind (downgrades the warning). Does not cover the tunnel |
| `--allow-unauthenticated-tunnel` / `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL` | Let the managed Cloudflare tunnel start without a login (the browser still asks first). Never written by the installer |
| `--https` | Enable TLS (adds HSTS) |
| `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` | Scope tmux socket + data dir for isolation |
| `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` | Make the gesture overlay available (widens CSP) |