fix(auth): reserve the throttle slots before the scrypt verify

In multi-user mode the per-IP and (username, IP) gates read their counts before
the verify and wrote them after it, so a concurrent burst from one IP passed both
on one stale read (29 wrong guesses plus the right password logged in). A request
that passes both gates now takes its slot before the await; a success clears it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Codeman maintainer committed 2026-10-24 14:44:02 +02:00
1 parent 9dec12b6e7
commit f1010da8a3
3 files changed
+75 -20

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+54 -11
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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { TunnelManager } from '../src/tunnel-manager.js';
import { createUser, invalidateUsersCache } from '../src/user-store.js';
import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { AUTH_FAILURE_MAX, AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX } from '../src/config/auth-config.js';
import type { StaleExpirationMap } from '../src/utils/stale-expiration-map.js';
vi.spyOn(TmuxManager, 'isTmuxAvailable').mockReturnValue(true);
@@ -88,6 +89,9 @@ afterAll(async () => {
const url = (p: string) => `http://localhost:${server.boundPort}${p}`;
/** The server's private failure buckets, read to count how many guesses reached the verify. */
type FailureBuckets = Record<'authFailures' | 'userFailures' | 'userIpFailures', StaleExpirationMap<string, number>>;
/**
* A fresh multi-user server (empty failure buckets) and a login helper that sets the
* client IP through inject's `remoteAddress`: a real fetch always arrives from
@@ -98,8 +102,9 @@ async function startIpServer() {
await s.start();
ipServers.push(s);
const app = (s as unknown as { app: FastifyInstance }).app;
return (ip: string, user: string, pass: string) =>
const login = (ip: string, user: string, pass: string) =>
app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/status', headers: { authorization: basic(user, pass) }, remoteAddress: ip });
return { login, buckets: s as unknown as FailureBuckets };
}
describe('multi-user auth', () => {
@@ -231,7 +236,7 @@ describe('multi-user auth', () => {
});
it('per-(username, IP) gate: failures lock that account on that IP only, before scrypt', async () => {
const login = await startIpServer();
const { login } = await startIpServer();
const ipA = '203.0.113.10';
const ipB = '203.0.113.20';
@@ -257,26 +262,64 @@ describe('multi-user auth', () => {
expect((await login(ipA, 'bob', 'bobpass123')).statusCode).toBe(429);
});
it('per-IP pre-gate: concurrent failures from one IP are all counted', async () => {
const login = await startIpServer();
it('per-IP pre-gate: a concurrent burst from one IP reaches the verify at most AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX times', async () => {
const { login, buckets } = await startIpServer();
const ip = '203.0.113.40';
// AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX wrong passwords in flight at once, spread so neither the pair
// nor the per-username bucket can refuse any of them. The per-IP count is written
// after the scrypt await, so each write must re-read it or the burst counts as one.
// More than AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX wrong passwords in flight at once, spread so neither
// the pair nor the per-username bucket can refuse any of them. All the gate reads
// happen before the first verify ends, so only a slot reserved before the scrypt
// await stops the burst passing the pre-gate on one stale count.
const extra = 10;
const perUser = AUTH_FAILURE_MAX - 1;
const burst = [];
for (let i = 0; i < AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX; i++) {
for (let i = 0; i < AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX + extra; i++) {
burst.push(login(ip, `burst${Math.floor(i / perUser)}`, `bad-${i}`));
}
await Promise.all(burst);
const codes = (await Promise.all(burst)).map((r) => r.statusCode);
// The bucket is full, so the next request from that IP is refused before scrypt.
// No account fills a bucket of its own here, so every verified guess is a 401 and
// every 429 is the pre-gate.
expect(codes.filter((c) => c === 401).length).toBe(AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX);
expect(codes.filter((c) => c === 429).length).toBe(extra);
// Each admitted guess counted once: reserved before the verify, not again after it.
expect(buckets.authFailures.get(ip)).toBe(AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX);
// The bucket is full, so the next request from that IP is refused before scrypt,
// a correct password included.
expect((await login(ip, 'burst-next', 'bad')).statusCode).toBe(429);
expect((await login(ip, 'alice', 'alicepass1')).statusCode).toBe(429);
});
it('per-(username, IP) gate: a concurrent burst cannot carry the right password past the cap', async () => {
const { login, buckets } = await startIpServer();
const ip = '203.0.113.50';
// AUTH_FAILURE_MAX + 5 logins for bob from one IP, all in flight at once, the LAST
// carrying the correct password. Counting only after the verify let every one of
// them past the gate on the same stale read, and the correct one logged in.
const burst = [];
for (let i = 0; i < AUTH_FAILURE_MAX + 4; i++) burst.push(login(ip, 'bob', `bad-${i}`));
burst.push(login(ip, 'bob', 'bobpass123'));
const codes = (await Promise.all(burst)).map((r) => r.statusCode);
expect(codes.at(-1)).toBe(429);
expect(codes.filter((c) => c !== 401 && c !== 429)).toEqual([]);
// Every failed verify adds one to bob's per-username bucket, so it counts the guesses
// that reached scrypt: exactly the AUTH_FAILURE_MAX the pair gate admits. (The last
// of those is a 429 from that bucket, which is why the 401s are fewer.)
expect(buckets.userFailures.get('bob')).toBe(AUTH_FAILURE_MAX);
expect(codes.filter((c) => c === 401).length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(AUTH_FAILURE_MAX);
// Reserved once each, not counted again on failure.
expect(buckets.userIpFailures.get(`${ip}\nbob`)).toBe(AUTH_FAILURE_MAX);
expect(buckets.authFailures.get(ip)).toBe(AUTH_FAILURE_MAX);
// The lockout is that pair's only: bob still logs in from another IP.
expect((await login('203.0.113.51', 'bob', 'bobpass123')).statusCode).toBe(200);
});
it('per-(username, IP) gate: a correct password clears the pair bucket', async () => {
const login = await startIpServer();
const { login } = await startIpServer();
const ip = '203.0.113.30';
for (let i = 0; i < AUTH_FAILURE_MAX - 1; i++) {