feat(agent): make coordination routes opt-in and address review

Gate inspect, stage and submit behind the synced agentCoordinationEnabled
setting (default OFF, App Settings > Cross-session features, zh-CN
strings). While off, all three routes answer 403 FORBIDDEN naming the
setting, checked before session lookup; the CLI verbs print it verbatim.

Remember the attributed Codex rollout per session and re-verify only its
head on later calls, rescanning only date directories not older than it
for a /new conflict. The first walk reads 1 KiB prefixes first, so a
store of 2,100+ unrelated rollouts still attributes.

Answer unexpected inspection errors with 422 OPERATION_FAILED and log
the session id and error code only.

Read the guarded composer glyph and footer from the CLI registry: codex
workDetect.promptGlyph and a new workDetect.composerFooterLine
capability, compiled through compileVersionRegex. Codex footer effort
words are one shared list with modelDetect.screenLine.

Fix the wiki API reference link, frame the versioning policy entry as a
case of the experimental rule, join the CLAUDE.md Agent CLI paragraph,
and update the changeset, skill reference and architecture notes.
This commit is contained in:
Aamer Akhter committed 2026-10-24 22:54:17 -04:00
1 parent 1a2c3be0ea
commit c78635a3d3
32 files changed
+848 -124

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@@ -593,11 +593,20 @@ request returns. The capture runs synchronous tmux calls on the server; the
**Experimental:** `codeman agent inspect`, `stage` and `submit`, and their
`/api/v1/sessions/:id/inspect|stage|submit` routes (including `/api` aliases),
are excluded from the stable CLI/HTTP contract. Their commands, flags, paths,
are labeled experimental, so the versioning policy's rule for experimental
surfaces applies (`docs/versioning-policy.md`, "Experimental agent
coordination"): they are not part of the stable contract. Their commands, flags, paths,
payloads and behavior may change or be removed in a minor or patch release.
Pin a compatible Codeman version when automating them. Authentication and
session ownership checks still apply.
**Opt-in:** all three routes answer `403 FORBIDDEN` while the synced
`agentCoordinationEnabled` setting is off (the default; App Settings,
Cross-session features, **Experimental agent coordination**), with a message
naming it. The check runs before session lookup and body validation, and reads
the saved setting on every request, so turning it on needs no restart.
`codeman agent inspect|stage|submit` print that refusal verbatim (exit 1).
These authenticated routes use the standard envelope and session ownership checks.
`/api/v1` aliases `/api`; an inaccessible session returns `404 NOT_FOUND` before
any transcript, pane or receipt lookup.
@@ -617,7 +626,14 @@ keeping UTF8/JSONL boundaries. Evidence bytes exclude response metadata and JSON
escaping. Record scans cap at 256 KiB plus bounded identity anchors; attribution
separately caps at 8192 directory entries, eight directory levels, 8 MiB of
negative-filter prefix reads and 1 MiB of candidate metadata reads (including
final identity verification). Unreachable workspace/home/metadata directories
final identity verification). The negative filter reads 1 KiB of each rollout
first and 4 KiB only when that window holds no complete `originator` field. Once
a rollout is attributed, later calls re-verify only that file (same file identity,
same strict metadata) and rescan only the `sessions/YYYY/MM/DD` directories not
older than its own, for a second candidate such as a codex `/new`; a failed check
falls back to one full walk. So the caps bound the first call, not every call.
An unexpected read error is `422 OPERATION_FAILED` (logged with the session id
and error code only), not a retryable `409`. Unreachable workspace/home/metadata directories
are probed with a bounded past-cap probe before canonical reads and remain
unattributed. A full incremental page can be continued with its cursor; only a
first pending record too large for the budget reports an output-budget block.
@@ -643,7 +659,10 @@ filesystem path is returned as cursor/identity metadata; evidence retains the
owner's native record content, which can itself contain paths.
Guarded input initially requires a local characterized Codex composer, one
unwrapped visible line, a recognized footer and a cursor at its exact end.
unwrapped visible line, a recognized footer and a cursor at its exact end. The
composer glyph and footer are the CLI registry's
`capabilities.workDetect.promptGlyph` and `composerFooterLine`; a CLI that
declares no `composerFooterLine` is refused.
Unknown/working/modal/shell/remote/container composers fail closed. Stage accepts
at most 8192 UTF8 bytes, no C0/C1/DEL controls, multiline text, or trailing
whitespace (the existing mux transport trims it). Before typing, it checks the
+28 -5
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@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Further detail: ⚠️ An ADOPTED container may back SEVERAL cases at different
⚠️ `external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` are three INDEPENDENT capabilities on purpose; deriving one from another shipped the `until=stop`-hangs-on-shell bug.
⚠️ Four capability fields carry a REGEX from config (`discovery.version.regex`, `capabilities.workDetect.workingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.watchingLine` and `capabilities.workDetect.awaitingLine`) and all four must compile through `compileVersionRegex()`, which caps length and refuses nested quantifiers; `workingLine` is the one that runs on the PTY hot path.
⚠️ Several capability fields carry a REGEX from config (`discovery.version.regex`, `capabilities.workDetect.workingLine`, `watchingLine`, `awaitingLine`, `blockedLine`, `composerFooterLine` and `capabilities.modelDetect.screenLine`) and all of them must compile through `compileVersionRegex()`, which caps length and refuses nested quantifiers; `workingLine` is the one that runs on the PTY hot path.
⚠️ **`param` is TWO namespaces.** `launch.params` keys, `env.configSetenv[].fromParam` and `capabilities.privilegedParams[].param` all name a LAUNCH PARAM; the legacy `<Mode>Config` wire field is a separate namespace, bridged only by `launch.legacyConfigAliases`. Getting `privilegedParams[].param` wrong is SILENT — it is the multi-user bypass clamp's only handle on a CLI's privilege switch, and a wrong name clamps nothing with no load error and no failing test — so `schema.ts` rejects an entry naming a param it never declared. Codex is the entry where the two names differ (`bypassApprovals` vs `dangerouslyBypassApprovals`) and therefore the one that catches a regression.
@@ -1264,8 +1264,15 @@ Its CLI knowledge is a GENERATED block (`npm run generate:cli-catalog`, markers
## Agent inspection and guarded submission
These three operations are experimental across both CLI and HTTP, including the
`/api/v1` paths and unversioned aliases. See `docs/versioning-policy.md` for the
explicit stability exception; do not infer stability from the URL prefix.
`/api/v1` paths and unversioned aliases: a case of the "labeled experimental" rule
in `docs/versioning-policy.md`, so do not infer stability from the URL prefix.
⚠️ They are opt-in. All three routes answer `403 FORBIDDEN` with a message naming
`agentCoordinationEnabled` (synced, default OFF, App Settings, Cross-session
features) until it is on, the `cliManagementEnabled` / `mcpSyncEnabled` shape. The
gate runs first, before session lookup or body validation, and reads
`settings.json` fresh on every request, so a toggle applies without a restart.
`codeman agent inspect|stage|submit` pass the 403 through verbatim.
`agent-session-routes.ts` is registered by `WebServer` with the other route
modules. Ownership is checked before transcript/pane/receipt lookup. Inspection
@@ -1275,8 +1282,24 @@ complete UTF8 JSONL records. A full page advances its cursor without claiming a
blocked record. Opaque cursors bind caller/session/lifecycle/file identity; pane
geometry is excluded so changing devices does not invalidate transcript paging.
Staging requires a fresh, known local Codex composer/caret capture. The footer
uses the shared `CODEX_REASONING_EFFORTS` vocabulary. Before any write, available
⚠️ Codex never prunes `~/.codex/sessions`, so attribution must not cost a store
walk per call. The first call walks (negative-filter prefixes read 1 KiB first,
4 KiB only when that window holds no complete `originator` field; non-UUID file
names are skipped unread), then the attributed `{path, dev:ino}` and its strict
metadata are remembered per session (`attributionMemo`, bounded LRU). A later call
re-verifies only that file's head, then scans just the date directories not older
than its own (`sessions/YYYY/MM/DD`, compared numerically; any non-numeric name is
never pruned) for a second candidate, which is how a codex `/new` or a new owned
rollout beside a configured resume is still caught. A failed check drops the memo
and falls back to one full walk. Non-`InspectionConflict` errors are `422
OPERATION_FAILED` (never a retryable `409`) and are logged with the session id and
error code only, never the path.
Staging requires a fresh, known composer/caret capture. The composer glyph and
footer are registry data (`capabilities.workDetect.promptGlyph` and
`composerFooterLine`, compiled through `compileVersionRegex()`), and only a CLI
declaring `composerFooterLine` takes guarded input (codex today). Codex's footer
words come from the same `CODEX_EFFORT_WORDS` as its `modelDetect.screenLine`. Before any write, available
columns are calculated from actual captured geometry and the rendered prefix,
including indentation; reaching the last column or wrapping is refused. Stage
cancels older verifier retries and sends no Enter. Receipts contain hashes and
+16 -3
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@@ -47,9 +47,10 @@ interface CliEntry {
env: CliEnv; // exports, tmux setenv keys, the env-override allowlist
capabilities: CliCapabilities; // what every call site reads instead of the id
// .workDetect?: { promptGlyph, workingLine, watchingLine?, watchingLines?, awaitingLine?,
// blockedLine?, blockedLines? }
// blockedLine?, blockedLines?, composerFooterLine? }
// (how this CLI's pane shows work, work it started in the background, a turn
// that ended waiting for workers it will resume from, and a dialog it is blocked on)
// that ended waiting for workers it will resume from, a dialog it is blocked on,
// and the rows under its idle composer that guarded input relies on)
// .modelDetect?: { screenLine, screenLines? }
// (where this CLI's own chrome names the model it runs: SessionState.displayModel)
// .launchDefaults?: { [launchParam]: settingsKey }
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ interface CliEntry {
### Regexes that come from config
Six capability fields carry a regular expression an override file can set: `discovery.version.regex`, `capabilities.workDetect.workingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.watchingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.awaitingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine` and `capabilities.modelDetect.screenLine`. All six go through `compileVersionRegex()`, which caps the source at 200 characters, refuses the nested-quantifier shapes that cause catastrophic backtracking, and returns `null` rather than throwing so every caller degrades instead of crashing.
Seven capability fields carry a regular expression an override file can set: `discovery.version.regex`, `capabilities.workDetect.workingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.watchingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.awaitingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.composerFooterLine` and `capabilities.modelDetect.screenLine`. All seven go through `compileVersionRegex()`, which caps the source at 200 characters, refuses the nested-quantifier shapes that cause catastrophic backtracking, and returns `null` rather than throwing so every caller degrades instead of crashing.
`workingLine` is the one that matters most, because it is compiled once per session and then run against every accumulated PTY chunk and every pane capture. A nested quantifier there is a ReDoS against the event loop for the whole server, not just that session. The guard therefore runs in two places, and neither is redundant: `schema.ts` rejects the entry at LOAD time so a bad pattern never reaches a session, and `_workingLinePattern()` in `session.ts` compiles through the same helper so the runtime cannot end up with a pattern the schema would have refused.
@@ -124,6 +125,18 @@ below, open PERMISSION items, which a watching label never acknowledges), so a f
costs a wrong badge and cannot silence an alert. Before giving a CLI idle signals and a
pattern, make sure its row is one the agent cannot write.
### The idle composer guarded input reads (`composerFooterLine`)
The experimental guarded `stage`/`submit` routes (`src/agent-staging.ts`, opt-in through
`agentCoordinationEnabled`) type into a composer only after proving, from a fresh capture,
that the newest `promptGlyph` row is the CLI's own composer at rest, with the caret at the
exact end of its text. `composerFooterLine` is the second half of that proof: every
non-blank row below the composer (at most three) must match it, one row at a time. A CLI
that declares none never takes guarded input; only codex declares one, built from the same
effort-word list as its `modelDetect.screenLine` (`CODEX_EFFORT_WORDS` in `stock.ts`), so a
codex footer change is a one-place edit. Like `blockedLine`, the rows it sees are near the
foot of the screen, so a pattern must anchor on chrome only that CLI draws there.
### Dialogs a CLI blocks on (`blockedLine`)
`blockedLine` is the screen-read source of the `blocked` state for a CLI with no hook to
+16 -11
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@@ -64,17 +64,22 @@ These may change in a **MINOR** (or even PATCH) release without a MAJOR bump:
### Experimental agent coordination
`codeman agent inspect`, `codeman agent stage` and `codeman agent submit` are
experimental. The matching `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/inspect`,
`POST /api/v1/sessions/:id/stage` and `POST /api/v1/sessions/:id/submit` routes,
including their unversioned `/api` aliases, share this designation. This is an
explicit exception to both the CLI and HTTP stability promises above: these
commands, flags, endpoint paths, payloads and behavior may change or be removed
in a MINOR or PATCH release without a stable-surface deprecation period. Pin a
compatible Codeman version when automating them. Existing authentication,
ownership and shared response-envelope rules still apply. Other agent commands
and API routes retain their existing stability guarantees. Promotion to stable
requires an explicit documented decision.
`codeman agent inspect`, `codeman agent stage` and `codeman agent submit`, and
the matching `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/inspect`, `POST /api/v1/sessions/:id/stage`
and `POST /api/v1/sessions/:id/submit` routes (with their `/api` aliases, since
every `/api` route is also served under `/api/v1`), are labeled experimental, so
item 3 above applies to them: their commands, flags, endpoint paths, payloads and
behavior may change or be removed in a MINOR or PATCH release. They are also
opt-in: the routes answer `403 FORBIDDEN` with a message naming the synced
`agentCoordinationEnabled` setting (default OFF) until it is turned on, so
automation cannot come to depend on them without choosing to. Pin a compatible
Codeman version when automating them. Existing authentication, ownership and
shared response-envelope rules still apply. The session behavior underneath them
(input revision tracking in the session's write paths, the SubmitVerifier
re-press going through the shared write boundary) runs for every session and is
covered like any other stable behavior. Other agent commands and API routes keep
their existing guarantees. Promotion to stable requires an explicit documented
decision.
## Deprecation policy
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@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ SID=$(codeman agent spawn scratch-1 --mode claude) # quick-start + wait f
codeman agent send "$SID" 'review src/, then say DONE' --until stop,exit --timeout 300000
codeman agent read "$SID" # last answer (as the server reads it for that mode)
codeman agent read "$SID" --tail 3000 # terminal tail, ANSI stripped (every mode)
codeman agent inspect "$SID" --max-bytes 8192 --json # recent evidence + opaque cursor (pane snapshots are labeled)
codeman agent stage "$SID" --message-file /tmp/prompt.txt --json # no Enter; known local Codex composer only
codeman agent submit "$SID" --stage-id "$STAGE_ID" --confirm-sha "$SHA256" --json # one conditional Enter
codeman agent inspect "$SID" --max-bytes 8192 --json # experimental, opt-in: recent evidence + opaque cursor
codeman agent stage "$SID" --message-file /tmp/prompt.txt --json # experimental, opt-in: no Enter; local Codex composer only
codeman agent submit "$SID" --stage-id "$STAGE_ID" --confirm-sha "$SHA256" --json # experimental, opt-in: one conditional Enter
codeman agent send "$SID" 'run the tests, then print WORKDONE followed by _4711' # hook-less modes: the marker in halves …
codeman agent wait "$SID" --match WORKDONE_4711 # … and the wait on the joined form
codeman agent interrupt "$SID" # a bare ESC, conversation intact
@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@ codeman agent rm "$SID" # any session except t
`ls` shows each session's mail in an INBOX column. Mail lives in memory unless
**Keep agent inbox across restarts** is on (see [Settings Reference](Settings-Reference)),
and goes when its session is deleted.
- **`inspect`, `stage`, `submit`** are experimental and opt-in: they answer `403 FORBIDDEN`
naming the setting until **Experimental agent coordination** is on (see
[Settings Reference](Settings-Reference); `agentCoordinationEnabled`, synced, off by
default), and they may change in any release. `inspect` returns bounded evidence with an
opaque cursor. `stage` types one printable UTF8 line without trailing whitespace into a
local Codex composer, with no Enter, and returns a receipt that expires after two minutes;
`submit` sends one Enter only if the composer still shows exactly that text, and never
replays it. `send --no-enter` alone has no receipt. Details:
[API reference](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/docs/api-reference.md#experimental-bounded-agent-inspection-and-guarded-input).
- **Exit codes** are the same for every verb: `0` done, `1` error, `2` timeout, `3` the
worker exited, `4` refused. `--json` prints the response's `data`.
@@ -267,5 +276,3 @@ failing the spawn, because a cosmetic field must never break a worker.
- [Hooks And Integrations](Hooks-And-Integrations) - events flowing the other way.
- [Watching Agents Work](Watching-Agents-Work) - seeing the fan-out in the UI.
- [`skills/codeman/SKILL.md`](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/skills/codeman/SKILL.md) - the skill itself.
Bounded inspection and guarded stage/submit details: [API reference](../api-reference.md#bounded-agent-inspection-and-guarded-input). Stage accepts one printable UTF8 line without trailing whitespace; receipts expire after two minutes. Submit refuses changed/unprovable composers and never automatically replays Enter. `send --no-enter` alone has no receipt.
+8
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@@ -106,6 +106,14 @@ memory and a restart empties it; switching it off deletes the file and keeps wha
memory. Messages expire 12 hours after they were posted either way. See
[Driving Codeman From An Agent](Driving-Codeman-From-An-Agent#the-codeman-agent-commands).
**Experimental agent coordination** (under **Cross-session features**, synced, off by
default) turns on the `codeman agent inspect`, `stage` and `submit` commands: bounded,
paged reads of another session's output, and typing a prompt into a local Codex composer
that is sent with one Enter only after Codeman checks it is unchanged. Off, their HTTP
routes answer `403 FORBIDDEN` naming the setting (`agentCoordinationEnabled`). They are
experimental and may change in any release. See
[Driving Codeman From An Agent](Driving-Codeman-From-An-Agent#the-codeman-agent-commands).
### Appearance
| Setting | Notes |