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fix: apply the review items for #684 at merge
Multi-user: add a (username, IP) failure bucket checked before verifyPassword, capped at AUTH_FAILURE_MAX, with the same decay as the other buckets; the per-IP pre-gate stays at AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX and the per-username bucket stays after the verify A correct password now also clears that account's (username, IP) bucket, beside the IP and per-username buckets The new bucket is disposed on server stop like the others; the comments above the gate and the constants' JSDoc describe the three buckets Tests: 10 wrong then the correct password from one IP is a 429, the same account logs in from another IP, another account behind that IP is unaffected, and a correct password clears the pair bucket test/multiuser-auth.test.ts: the spray test loops to AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX instead of a literal 50 Reworded the rate-limit lines in auth-config.ts, security-architecture.md, README.md, README.zh-CN.md, wiki/Security.md, endpoints.md (plus the plugin mirror), CLAUDE.md and architecture-invariants.md docs/wiki/Remote-Access.md: add the multi-user note to the tunnel page Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ by presence in a server‑side map, so they cannot be forged offline.
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### Rate limiting / lockout recovery
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Failed logins are tracked **per IP**: 10 failures (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`) → `429`, with a 15‑minute decay. Multi-user mode replaces that with a wider per-IP **pre-gate** of 50 failures (`AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX`), checked before the scrypt verify, plus a **per-username** bucket that exists in multi-user mode only and answers `429` from the 10th failed guess (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`; the count is incremented before the check), so the wider per-IP cap (for users sharing one egress IP) does not widen guessing against any one account.
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Failed logins are tracked **per IP**: 10 failures (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`) → `429`, with a 15‑minute decay. Multi-user mode replaces that with three buckets, all with the same decay: a wider per-IP **pre-gate** of 50 failures (`AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX`), checked before the scrypt verify, which bounds scrypt cost from one source and tolerates many users behind one egress IP; a **per-(username, IP)** gate of 10 failures (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`), also checked before the verify, which is what caps verified guesses against one account from one source; and a **per-username** bucket, checked after the verify, that answers `429` to failed guesses from the 10th on, from any IP (the count is incremented before the check). The last two exist in multi-user mode only. So the wider per-IP cap does not widen guessing against any one account from one IP, and other IPs cannot lock an account out.
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The QR path has its own separate limiter.
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The lockout check sits **after** the cookie/credential checks (step 4, not first).
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@@ -158,9 +158,13 @@ immediately** even while an attacker is hammering the same IP — important beca
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all traffic through a tunnel shares one source IP (loopback). Wrong credentials
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are still counted and still hit the `429` at the threshold, so brute‑force
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protection is unchanged.
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The multi-user per-IP pre-gate is the exception: it runs before the password is
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verified, so once it trips even a correct password gets `429` until the decay,
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which is why its cap is wider than the per-username one.
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The two multi-user pre-verify gates are the exception: once the per-IP pre-gate
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or an account's (username, IP) gate trips, even a correct password from that IP
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gets `429` until the decay (for the pair gate, only for that account; the same
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account from another IP still logs in), which is why the per-IP cap is the
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widest. The per-username bucket stays after the verify on purpose: checked
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first, a username-wide lockout let throwaway IPs keep a known account (admin
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included) locked out even with the right password.
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---
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