fix(#592): doc drift around Copilot's resume, wheelForward and the env prefixes

- docs/cli-registry.md said Session history resume goes through
  copilotConfig.resumeSessionId / continueSession. Past Sessions sends only
  `continueSession: true` (terminal-ui.js, the modeConfigKey table);
  resumeSessionId is for API callers.
- The wheelForward JSDoc in cli-registry/types.ts read as if the value had
  effect. Nothing reads it (it is in the DECLARED-FOR-LATER list); the
  browser gate is _shouldForwardWheelToApp in terminal-ui.js with its own
  per-CLI rules, which the comment now says.
- The env-prefix lists in the CLAUDE.md Security table and the
  allowedEnvPrefixes() comment in schemas.ts stopped at DEEPSEEK_, missing
  both OMP_ and the new COPILOT_; the Multi-CLI prefix rule missed OMP_.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Codeman maintainer committed 2026-10-18 08:09:39 +02:00
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@@ -350,6 +350,6 @@ The rules the module keeps and the tests pin: it only ADDS (a name already defin
## GitHub Copilot CLI
`copilot` (npm `@github/copilot`) is a stock entry. A bare launch is `copilot`, in its own Manual Approval mode. The launch parameters follow the grok/omp shape: `model` (`--model`), `resumeId` (`--resume <id>`, an id, id prefix or session name: a single word that starts with a letter or digit, so a flag-shaped value such as `--yolo` is dropped rather than read as its own flag) and `continueSession` (`--continue`, skipped when a resume id is set), plus `allowAll` (`--yolo`: allow every tool, path and URL). The legacy config object is `copilotConfig` (`{ model, allowAll, resumeSessionId, continueSession }`). The Run button sends `allowAll: true` like the other agent CLIs' bypass switches, and `allowAll` is declared in `privilegedParams`, so a non-granted multi-user owner has it forced back to `false` (an absent config is never materialized: a bare spawn is already safe). Session history resume goes through `copilotConfig.resumeSessionId` / `continueSession`. The tab names the model it reads from the footer (`modelDetect`). Its `altScreen` is `strip-mux-and-mouse`, like opencode: Copilot turns mouse tracking on itself, and left in, a plain drag is reported to the TUI instead of selecting (Auto Copy and copy-on-select did nothing); stripped, a drag is a local selection, clicks go through the hand-encoded tap, and the wheel is forwarded as SGR reports while `cliMouseTracking` is on. It declares `mcpConfig` (`~/.copilot/mcp-config.json`, relocated by `COPILOT_HOME`) and no `credStore`: its token sits in `config.json` in plain text on a host without a keyring, so a Docker case is not seeded and you sign in inside the container. `env.allowedKeys` is empty on purpose: a headless host sets `COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN`, which the `COPILOT_` prefix admits, and `GH_TOKEN`/`GITHUB_TOKEN` stay out of the one global allowlist.
`copilot` (npm `@github/copilot`) is a stock entry. A bare launch is `copilot`, in its own Manual Approval mode. The launch parameters follow the grok/omp shape: `model` (`--model`), `resumeId` (`--resume <id>`, an id, id prefix or session name: a single word that starts with a letter or digit, so a flag-shaped value such as `--yolo` is dropped rather than read as its own flag) and `continueSession` (`--continue`, skipped when a resume id is set), plus `allowAll` (`--yolo`: allow every tool, path and URL). The legacy config object is `copilotConfig` (`{ model, allowAll, resumeSessionId, continueSession }`). The Run button sends `allowAll: true` like the other agent CLIs' bypass switches, and `allowAll` is declared in `privilegedParams`, so a non-granted multi-user owner has it forced back to `false` (an absent config is never materialized: a bare spawn is already safe). Session history resume (Past Sessions) sends only `copilotConfig.continueSession`, which continues the most recent conversation Copilot has for that directory; `resumeSessionId` is for API callers. The tab names the model it reads from the footer (`modelDetect`). Its `altScreen` is `strip-mux-and-mouse`, like opencode: Copilot turns mouse tracking on itself, and left in, a plain drag is reported to the TUI instead of selecting (Auto Copy and copy-on-select did nothing); stripped, a drag is a local selection, clicks go through the hand-encoded tap, and the wheel is forwarded as SGR reports while `cliMouseTracking` is on. It declares `mcpConfig` (`~/.copilot/mcp-config.json`, relocated by `COPILOT_HOME`) and no `credStore`: its token sits in `config.json` in plain text on a host without a keyring, so a Docker case is not seeded and you sign in inside the container. `env.allowedKeys` is empty on purpose: a headless host sets `COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN`, which the `COPILOT_` prefix admits, and `GH_TOKEN`/`GITHUB_TOKEN` stay out of the one global allowlist.
Measured on 1.0.94 inside tmux: an alternate-screen TUI with mouse tracking on, whose composer is the `❯` between two rules. While a turn runs the footer reads `◉ Working esc edit prompt` (the dot alternates `◉`/`◎`), which is the `workDetect` working line. Keystrokes sent with `tmux send-keys` reach the composer, Shift+Enter inserts a newline, and a shell tool call completes inside tmux; github/copilot-cli#4180 (a driven PTY ignores input) and #4223 (a shell command never completes under tmux) report both failing on 1.0.70 to 1.0.74 and neither reproduces on 1.0.94. `COPILOT_HOME` and `COPILOT_ALLOW_ALL` are privileged env keys, so a non-granted multi-user owner cannot set them through `envOverrides`, and so are the other `COPILOT_*` variables (read from the 1.0.98 bundle, far more than `copilot help environment` lists) that switch approvals, run code with no approval row or send the sign-in token elsewhere. The `COPILOT_` prefix admits whatever a later release adds, so the list needs a look whenever the measured version moves.