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fix: say what Allow network access really opens (release review)
The setting told users the sandbox and approvals stay on. With it on, a command in Codex's sandbox can call Codeman's API, which can start a session outside the sandbox with no approval prompt. Measured on codex 0.162.0 with `codex sandbox`: a touch the sandbox refused landed through POST /api/sessions, and from inside a Codeman pane it landed with a password set too, because a pane inherits CODEMAN_PASSWORD. Without that password the same call gets 401. The settings row, the wiki, the skill and the changeset now say so, the wiki Security page and security-architecture name it, and the docs scope the claims to what the code does: app-wide, local launches only, not cron jobs, and --no-daemon is a local launch's flag. Agent-CLIs gains the --no-daemon trade-off. A test pins that no surface sells the sandbox as still in charge. Text only: the switch, the clamp and the launch are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -669,9 +669,13 @@ const CODEX: CliEntry = {
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{ flag: '--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox', when: { param: 'bypassApprovals', is: true } },
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// Lets commands in codex's workspace-write sandbox open network connections,
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// Codeman's own API on loopback included (the codeman skill's curl calls fail
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// with "couldn't connect" without it). Narrower than the bypass above: the
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// sandbox and the approval prompts stay. Measured on 0.162.0 (`codex sandbox` and
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// with "couldn't connect" without it). Measured on 0.162.0 (`codex sandbox` and
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// a live pane): loopback stays blocked under workspace-write until this is set.
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// ⚠️ Not a safe middle ground below the bypass above: that API can start a session
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// outside the sandbox with no approval prompt, so codex's sandbox no longer contains
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// a command once this is on. Measured 2026-11-06: a `touch` the sandbox refused
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// landed through POST /api/sessions, and with a password set too from inside a
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// Codeman pane, which inherits CODEMAN_PASSWORD by design.
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// ⚠️ Workspace-write ONLY: a folder codex runs read-only (one it does not trust,
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// such as a fresh non-git case) keeps the network closed and asks per command.
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// Deliberately not paired with `--sandbox workspace-write` (owner decision,
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