fix: say what Allow network access really opens (release review)

The setting told users the sandbox and approvals stay on. With it on, a
command in Codex's sandbox can call Codeman's API, which can start a session
outside the sandbox with no approval prompt. Measured on codex 0.162.0 with
`codex sandbox`: a touch the sandbox refused landed through POST /api/sessions,
and from inside a Codeman pane it landed with a password set too, because a
pane inherits CODEMAN_PASSWORD. Without that password the same call gets 401.

The settings row, the wiki, the skill and the changeset now say so, the wiki
Security page and security-architecture name it, and the docs scope the claims
to what the code does: app-wide, local launches only, not cron jobs, and
--no-daemon is a local launch's flag. Agent-CLIs gains the --no-daemon
trade-off. A test pins that no surface sells the sandbox as still in charge.

Text only: the switch, the clamp and the launch are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Codeman maintainer committed 2026-11-06 03:25:00 +01:00
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@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ Stated plainly, because a security page that only lists strengths is not useful:
bypass requires a secret unconditionally when auth is on.
- **The agent CLIs have their own trust models.** Pi's project trust executes repo-local
TypeScript, for instance. See [Agent CLIs](Agent-CLIs).
- **Allow network access takes Codex's sandbox out of the picture.** The setting (App
Settings, Codex, off by default) lets commands in Codex's sandbox call Codeman's API,
which can start a session outside the sandbox with no approval prompt. A password does
not stop this, because a session inherits the server's password. It applies to every new
local Codex session, so a prompt-injected command in any of them can run anything you
can. Leave it off unless you trust what those sessions run.
## Privacy