mirror of
https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman.git
synced 2026-11-17 19:59:33 +01:00
fix: say what Allow network access really opens (release review)
The setting told users the sandbox and approvals stay on. With it on, a command in Codex's sandbox can call Codeman's API, which can start a session outside the sandbox with no approval prompt. Measured on codex 0.162.0 with `codex sandbox`: a touch the sandbox refused landed through POST /api/sessions, and from inside a Codeman pane it landed with a password set too, because a pane inherits CODEMAN_PASSWORD. Without that password the same call gets 401. The settings row, the wiki, the skill and the changeset now say so, the wiki Security page and security-architecture name it, and the docs scope the claims to what the code does: app-wide, local launches only, not cron jobs, and --no-daemon is a local launch's flag. Agent-CLIs gains the --no-daemon trade-off. A test pins that no surface sells the sandbox as still in charge. Text only: the switch, the clamp and the launch are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
131a12d195
commit
353fe7ebcf
11 files changed
+90
-35
No files matched your search
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ Full feature guide: [`docker-cases.md`](docker-cases.md).
|
||||
- **It strictly improves network posture.** It removes the single shared `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` and gives each person a revocable credential; a non‑loopback bind and the tunnel‑enable guard are satisfied by "multi‑user with ≥1 enabled user" without a shared password.
|
||||
- **Auth is a parallel branch** (`middleware/auth.ts`) that leaves the single‑user path untouched: per‑user scrypt verify (`timingSafeEqual`, timing‑equalized against user enumeration), identity‑carrying cookies, a per‑username failure bucket (a botnet can't brute one account across IPs; one NATed user can't lock out the rest), and a `mustChangePassword` lockbox. The hook‑secret loopback bypass, host guard, and Origin/CSRF guard are unchanged (hooks authenticate the INSTANCE, not a user).
|
||||
- **Ownership is enforced server‑side only** and fails closed: `req.authUser` (a synthetic admin in single‑user), `findSessionOrFail` returns NOT_FOUND (never 403) for a foreign session, list/SSE/WS/file‑preview/search all filter by `session.owner`, and SSE routing defaults session‑scoped events to their owner (unresolved owner → withheld). The load‑bearing rule is **non‑admin `workingDir` confinement**: a non‑admin's session/one‑shot working dir must realpath‑resolve inside `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, checked BEFORE any disk write.
|
||||
- **Privileged actions are a one‑bit grant** (`canBypassPermissions`, default off): only granted users (and admins) get `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (others are silently downgraded to `--permission-mode auto`), shell‑mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, and other CLIs' bypass flags. Machine‑level resources (remote/Docker host definitions, tunnel, self‑update, settings writes) are admin‑only.
|
||||
- **Privileged actions are a one‑bit grant** (`canBypassPermissions`, default off): only granted users (and admins) get `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (others are silently downgraded to `--permission-mode auto`), shell‑mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, other CLIs' bypass flags, and Codex's **Allow network access** (`networkAccess`, forced off for a user without the grant, since it lets a command in Codex's sandbox call Codeman's API and start a session outside that sandbox). Machine‑level resources (remote/Docker host definitions, tunnel, self‑update, settings writes) are admin‑only.
|
||||
- **Clone Repo does not lend the server's git sign-in to non-admins.** A clone writes only inside the caller's own case space, so it is not admin-gated, but the server account's git credential helpers (the Docker image's opt-in `gh`/`az` helpers, or any `gh auth setup-git`) are shared by every user. A non-admin's clone and preflight therefore run with `git -c credential.helper=`, which empties the helper list including the URL-scoped entries (`cloneWithoutCredentialHelpers` in `case-routes.ts`, argv pinned in `test/git-clone.test.ts`). This closes the Clone Repo path only: the account's SSH keys still apply to an `ssh://` URL, and a non-admin's agent sessions run as the same account, consistent with the first bullet above. Docker cases are a second route to the same sign-in: with `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH`/`_AZ` on, a non-admin's Docker case with credential seeding on (the default) receives a copy of the server account's `gh`/`az` sign-in, exactly as it receives the Claude and Codex credentials.
|
||||
- **Admin actions are audited** append‑only to `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl` (acting admin, action, target, IP). Passwords set by an admin create/reset are one‑time (returned once, force change). Under Basic auth, `logout` only truly ends QR‑issued sessions — to lock someone out, disable the account or reset the password (a proper login form is a deferred Phase 6).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user