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feat(adopt): adopt tmux sessions a human started, in all three locations
A tmux session someone opened by hand (`tmux new -s work`, then `claude`, or just a shell) is invisible to Codeman: it lives on the default socket, not the instance-scoped one Codeman owns. The home screen now lists those, and one click wraps one in a Codeman tab. Local, in-container and over-ssh all work. The shape is a WRAPPER session, not a direct attach: adoption creates an ordinary `codeman-<8hex>` session on our own socket whose pane runs the attach. That makes "detach, never kill the foreign session" structural rather than a matter of discipline — `killSession` can only ever reach our own wrapper, so no shape of caller bug reaches the foreign server. View reclamation differs by location: local relies on client death and ssh on SIGHUP, but a `docker exec` does NOT die with its client, so the in-container view has to be reclaimed explicitly on kill or every adoption leaks one. Measured facts, recorded in the code comments: - A grouped session (`new-session -t`) buys `status off` and an independent current window. It does NOT buy an independent size. A window is one object with one size and a group shares it: on tmux 3.3a a bare attach and a grouped attach both shrink a 200x49 target to 80x23. Only `window-size largest` holds it, and that is a shared window option which survives our detach, so setting it would permanently rewrite the owner's configuration. Left unset. - Session names come from other people, while the local launch chain ends in `bash -c` + `JSON.stringify`, which escapes neither `$` nor backticks — the outer shell performs command substitution before the inner single quotes are considered (verified: both substitutions inside the inner quotes ran). So session names and socket paths go through a character allowlist and are dropped at DISCOVERY, which means a non-conforming candidate never gets an id and the adopt endpoint fails closed when it re-resolves. - `pane_current_command` is `node` for both claude and codex, so the mode can only come from a bounded process-tree walk of `pane_pid`'s argv; anything unrecognized is treated as a shell. An adopted session has to say no to every assumption that Codeman owns the pane: respawn, Ralph, the orchestrator and hook waits all refuse. The hook check runs BEFORE the mode check, because adoption asks who launched the process and no mode can vouch for a workspace Codeman never touched. `paneExit` is forced to unknown, since the pane runs `tmux attach` rather than the agent and its exiting with 0 only means the connection ended. Reboot restore refuses too: all Codeman ever had was an attach command, and replaying it would build a connection to a foreign session a reboot has almost certainly taken with it, while presenting whatever it lands on as a session we restored. Adoption is admin-only under multi-user mode: adopting someone's shell is equivalent to arbitrary host execution. Discovery is read-only, never creates a session, and degrades to an empty list whenever a probe cannot reach its target.
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@@ -218,8 +218,15 @@ describe('adopted container: the host is not required to have the CLI', () => {
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expect(src.match(/if \(mode === '[a-z]+' && !cliDir\)/g)).toBeNull();
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});
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it('derives the flag from the docker metadata the session already carries', () => {
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expect(src).toContain('const cliRunsInContainer = !!docker;');
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it('derives the flag from the location metadata the session already carries', () => {
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// Adoption joined the condition for the same reason docker is in it: an
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// adopted session's CLI was started by a human in a process Codeman never
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// spawned, so the host binary is irrelevant there too — and demanding it
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// would reject adopting a claude that lives in a container, on an ssh host,
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// or simply outside the server process's PATH (the systemd/launchd case).
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// What the assertion still pins is that the flag comes from the session's
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// OWN metadata rather than from anything ambient.
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expect(src).toContain('const cliRunsInContainer = !!docker || !!adopt;');
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});
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});
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