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fix(auth): keep the single-user login throttle at 10, widen only the multi-user pre-gate
Single-user mode has no per-username bucket, so its per-IP bucket is the only limit on guesses against the one password, and behind a tunnel every client shares 127.0.0.1. Put it back on AUTH_FAILURE_MAX (10). AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX (50) now gates only the multi-user per-IP pre-gate, which runs before the scrypt verify and so refuses even a correct password; the per-username bucket still caps each account at 10. Move the headroom test out of the single-user suite and add a multi-user test that sprays wrong passwords across usernames (9 each) and expects 401 for the first 50, then 429 for the 51st and for a correct password. Update the docs that still described 10 per IP for every mode, and resync the plugin mirror of the codeman skill.
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@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ When authentication is enabled:
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| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| **HTTP Basic** | `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) and `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. |
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| **Session cookie** | A 256-bit opaque token validated server side, so it cannot be forged offline. 24 hours, extended on activity, with a device-context audit trail. |
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| **Rate limiting** | Ten failed attempts per IP produce a `429` with a 15 minute decay. A correct password or valid cookie recovers immediately even under attack, which matters because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback address. |
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| **Rate limiting** | Ten failed attempts per IP produce a `429` with a 15 minute decay. A correct password or valid cookie recovers immediately even under attack, which matters because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback address. In multi-user mode the per-IP cap is 50 and is checked before the password, so past it a correct password also waits for the decay; each username is also capped at ten failed guesses. |
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| **QR auth** | Single-use 60-second tokens with their own separate rate limiter, so a mistyped password cannot lock out QR login. |
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| **Hook endpoints** | The hook and telemetry endpoints skip Basic auth because they are called from localhost by the CLI, but when auth is on, that bypass additionally requires a per-instance hook secret. |
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