fix(auth): keep the single-user login throttle at 10, widen only the multi-user pre-gate

Single-user mode has no per-username bucket, so its per-IP bucket is the
only limit on guesses against the one password, and behind a tunnel every
client shares 127.0.0.1. Put it back on AUTH_FAILURE_MAX (10).

AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX (50) now gates only the multi-user per-IP pre-gate,
which runs before the scrypt verify and so refuses even a correct password;
the per-username bucket still caps each account at 10.

Move the headroom test out of the single-user suite and add a multi-user
test that sprays wrong passwords across usernames (9 each) and expects 401
for the first 50, then 429 for the 51st and for a correct password.

Update the docs that still described 10 per IP for every mode, and resync
the plugin mirror of the codeman skill.
This commit is contained in:
Aamer Akhter committed 2026-10-22 21:21:49 -04:00
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@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ by presence in a server‑side map, so they cannot be forged offline.
### Rate limiting / lockout recovery
Failed logins are tracked **per IP**: 50 failures (`AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX`) → `429`, with a 15‑minute decay. In multi-user mode a separate **per-username** bucket still returns `429` after 10 failed guesses (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`), so the wider per-IP cap (for clients sharing one egress IP) does not widen guessing against any one account.
Failed logins are tracked **per IP**: 10 failures (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`) → `429`, with a 15‑minute decay. Multi-user mode replaces that with a wider per-IP **pre-gate** of 50 failures (`AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX`), checked before the scrypt verify, plus a **per-username** bucket that exists in multi-user mode only and answers `429` from the 10th failed guess (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`; the count is incremented before the check), so the wider per-IP cap (for users sharing one egress IP) does not widen guessing against any one account.
The QR path has its own separate limiter.
The lockout check sits **after** the cookie/credential checks (step 4, not first).
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ immediately** even while an attacker is hammering the same IP — important beca
all traffic through a tunnel shares one source IP (loopback). Wrong credentials
are still counted and still hit the `429` at the threshold, so brute‑force
protection is unchanged.
The multi-user per-IP pre-gate is the exception: it runs before the password is
verified, so once it trips even a correct password gets `429` until the decay,
which is why its cap is wider than the per-username one.
---