fix(auth): keep the single-user login throttle at 10, widen only the multi-user pre-gate

Single-user mode has no per-username bucket, so its per-IP bucket is the
only limit on guesses against the one password, and behind a tunnel every
client shares 127.0.0.1. Put it back on AUTH_FAILURE_MAX (10).

AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX (50) now gates only the multi-user per-IP pre-gate,
which runs before the scrypt verify and so refuses even a correct password;
the per-username bucket still caps each account at 10.

Move the headroom test out of the single-user suite and add a multi-user
test that sprays wrong passwords across usernames (9 each) and expects 401
for the first 50, then 429 for the 51st and for a correct password.

Update the docs that still described 10 per IP for every mode, and resync
the plugin mirror of the codeman skill.
This commit is contained in:
Aamer Akhter committed 2026-10-22 21:21:49 -04:00
1 parent ebb9e00de9
commit 175e3b8320
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@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ loginctl enable-linger $USER
1. First request → browser shows Basic Auth prompt (username: `admin` or `CODEMAN_USERNAME`)
2. On success → server issues a `codeman_session` cookie (24h TTL, auto-extends on activity)
3. Subsequent requests authenticate silently via cookie
4. 10 failed attempts per IP → 429 rate limit (15-minute decay)
4. 10 failed attempts per IP → 429 rate limit (15-minute decay). In multi-user mode the per-IP cap is 50, and each username is capped at 10 failed guesses
**Always set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`** before exposing via tunnel — without it, anyone with the URL has full access to your sessions.
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ By default Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so t
- **Loopback by default** — the server binary binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box (the guided installer asks about network access and configures the binding + password for you). Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
- **Optional auth, real sessions** — HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. Success issues an opaque 256-bit `codeman_session` cookie (`randomBytes(32)`) — validated server-side, not client-signed, so it can't be forged offline (24h TTL, auto-extend, device-context audit log)
- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers _immediately_ even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter
- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers _immediately_ even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. Multi-user mode allows 50 failures per IP instead (checked before the password, so past it a correct password also waits for the decay), plus 10 failed guesses per username. QR auth has its own separate limiter
- **Configurable permission mode** - `--dangerously-skip-permissions` is only the default. **App Settings → Agents & CLIs → Claude → Startup Mode** can switch new sessions to Anthropic's classifier-guarded `auto` mode (low-prompt, needs Claude Code 2.1.207+), `normal` prompting, or an explicit allowed-tools list. In multi-user mode, non-granted users are forced to `auto`, and shell sessions / skip-permissions require an explicit per-user grant
### Always-on browser hardening (v0.9.5)