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fix(deepseek): make the Harness web tab render, not just authenticate
`dsh web` gates its own index behind a per-process launch token it prints on boot, and only that URL mints the `dsh-auth-*` cookie every later request needs. The managed tab stores the clean URL, so nothing on the browser side could present the token: the iframe rendered dsh's 401 text, a blank tab. Read the token out of the captured boot output, trade it for the cookie once at startup (`redirect: 'manual'`, since the 303 is what carries Set-Cookie), and let the proxy present it on both the HTTP and WebSocket legs. Scoped to the exact loopback authority the cookie was minted for; a token-less banner (an older dsh) keeps the previous behaviour untouched. The banner is scanned on its own 256 KB budget rather than the 16 KB error-tail buffer: a chatty profile can fill that cap before the banner prints. Authentication alone was not enough. dsh ships `<base href="./">`, which a browser resolves against the DOCUMENT url — and the proxy's runtime shim rewrites that url to strip the `/webview/<cap>/` prefix. The base therefore landed on Codeman's root: every module script 404'd and the page painted its inline `#151517` background with nothing on it (the black screen that replaced the white one). `rewriteHtml` now resolves a relative base against the proxy prefix before the mask can run, leaving a cross-origin base exactly as written. Verified against dsh 0.2.1-rc.5 and a live Codeman build: bare GET 401, captured cookie 200, proxied `/api` WebSocket 101, and a headless-Chrome load of the proxied tab boots the full Harness UI with no console errors.
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@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@
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* - **Failures reported, not swallowed.** The shell tab used to be where the
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* stack trace landed. With no tab, the spawn's own output is captured and
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* handed back to the caller instead.
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* - **The launch token traded, not forwarded.** `dsh web` gates its own index
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* behind a one-time token it prints on stdout and exchanges for a browser
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* cookie. The tab stores a clean URL, so nothing on the browser side could
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* ever present that token and every load answered 401. This module trades it
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* here, once, and hands the cookie to the proxy (`getDeepSeekWebCookie`).
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*/
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import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';
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@@ -53,6 +58,23 @@ const READY_POLL_MS = 400;
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const KILL_GRACE_MS = 3_000;
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/** Bound on captured child output, so a chatty boot cannot grow without limit. */
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const OUTPUT_CAP = 16_384;
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/**
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* Bound on the boot-output window searched for the launch banner.
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*
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* Deliberately larger and separate from {@link OUTPUT_CAP}: that one only has to
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* keep an error tail, while this one must survive a chatty plugin tree's boot
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* logs long enough to see a banner printed after them. 256 KB of one-line output
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* is far beyond anything a real boot prints, and a bound still exists because a
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* wedged child can print forever.
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*/
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const BANNER_SCAN_CAP = 262_144;
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/** How long boot waits for `dsh web` to print the launch URL it gates itself on. */
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const LAUNCH_URL_WAIT_MS = 4_000;
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/** Bound on the one-shot token→cookie exchange (loopback, so this is generous). */
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const TOKEN_EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
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/** Cookie name `dsh web` mints for a browser session that presented the token. */
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const DSH_AUTH_COOKIE_PREFIX = 'dsh-auth-';
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export interface DeepSeekWebStatus {
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running: boolean;
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@@ -67,6 +89,18 @@ interface RunningServer {
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port: number;
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authority: string;
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output: () => string;
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/**
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* Boot output scanned for the launch banner, on its own (larger) budget than
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* `output`. Read through this rather than `output` so a banner printed after
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* the error-tail cap filled is still found.
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*/
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banner: () => string;
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/**
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* The `dsh-auth-*` cookie bought with this process's launch token, once the
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* exchange succeeded. Null on a dsh old enough to serve its index without a
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* token, which is why "no cookie" is not a startup failure.
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*/
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cookie: string | null;
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}
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let current: RunningServer | null = null;
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@@ -105,6 +139,101 @@ async function answersHttp(port: number): Promise<boolean> {
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}
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}
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/**
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* The authenticated URL `dsh web` prints once it is up.
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*
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* Its browser-auth gate made the index private: boot writes
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* `dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:<port>/?token=<one-time token>` and only a request
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* carrying that token is answered with the cookie that authorizes everything
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* after it. The token is per process, so it can be neither guessed nor carried
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* across restarts — it has to be read out of the boot output.
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*
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* Null for output without one, which is the older-dsh case and stays working.
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*
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* @param output - captured stdout+stderr so far.
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* @returns absolute http(s) URL carrying a `token`, or null.
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*/
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export function parseLaunchUrl(output: string): string | null {
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// Strip SGR sequences first: a coloured banner would otherwise hide the URL
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// behind escape codes and turn a perfectly working server into a 401. Built
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// from the code point rather than written as `\x1b` so the linter's
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// no-control-regex rule does not read it as an accidental control character.
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const plain = output.replace(new RegExp(`${String.fromCharCode(27)}\\[[0-9;]*m`, 'g'), '');
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const match = /dsh web:\s*(\S+)/.exec(plain);
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if (!match) return null;
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let url: URL;
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try {
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url = new URL(match[1]);
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') return null;
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return url.searchParams.get('token') ? url.href : null;
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}
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/**
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* Trade the launch URL for the `dsh-auth-*` cookie the proxy will present.
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*
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* `redirect: 'manual'` is load-bearing: the 303 is the response that carries
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* `Set-Cookie`, and following it would burn the token on a redirect to `./`
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* while dropping the only credential the exchange produces.
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*
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* @param launchUrl - token-bearing URL from {@link parseLaunchUrl}.
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* @returns `name=value` pair ready for a Cookie header, or null.
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*/
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async function exchangeLaunchToken(launchUrl: string): Promise<string | null> {
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try {
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const response = await fetch(launchUrl, {
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redirect: 'manual',
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signal: AbortSignal.timeout(TOKEN_EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT_MS),
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});
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for (const header of response.headers.getSetCookie()) {
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const pair = header.split(';', 1)[0]?.trim();
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if (pair?.startsWith(DSH_AUTH_COOKIE_PREFIX)) return pair;
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}
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return null;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Wait for the banner, then exchange it.
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*
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* Never fails startup: a dsh without the gate prints a token-less banner, which
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* is answered as "nothing to exchange" immediately rather than after the whole
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* wait, and a gate that changes shape must not turn a serving UI into a boot
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* failure.
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*
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* @param running - the just-started server, read for its captured output.
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* @returns the cookie to hand the proxy, or null.
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*/
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async function captureSessionCookie(running: RunningServer): Promise<string | null> {
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const deadline = Date.now() + LAUNCH_URL_WAIT_MS;
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while (Date.now() < deadline) {
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const banner = running.banner();
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const launchUrl = parseLaunchUrl(banner);
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if (launchUrl) {
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const cookie = await exchangeLaunchToken(launchUrl);
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// The URL is a credential: never log it, only the fact that it did not work.
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if (!cookie) {
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console.warn(
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'[DeepSeek web] the launch token was printed but could not be exchanged for a session cookie; ' +
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"the tab will show dsh's 401 page until `dsh web` is restarted"
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);
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}
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return cookie;
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}
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// Only a printed http(s) URL settles this: it is the older dsh, which needs
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// no cookie. Any other line carrying the prefix (a diagnostic, a truncated
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// write) is not a banner, so the wait continues instead of giving up early.
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const printed = /dsh web:\s*(\S+)/.exec(banner)?.[1];
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if (printed && /^https?:\/\//.test(printed)) return null;
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await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
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}
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return null;
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}
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/**
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* Signal the whole process group.
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*
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@@ -134,6 +263,22 @@ export function getDeepSeekWebStatus(): DeepSeekWebStatus {
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};
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}
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/**
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* The cookie this server's launch token bought, for the proxy to present.
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*
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* Keyed by `port` because the cookie is signed for the authority it was minted
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* under (`127.0.0.1:<port>`): handing it to a web tab pointed at some other
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* server would neither authenticate nor be that server's to receive. Null also
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* covers a dsh old enough to need no cookie at all.
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*
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* @param port - loopback port the upstream request is bound for.
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* @returns `name=value` cookie pair, or null.
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*/
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export function getDeepSeekWebCookie(port: number): string | null {
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if (!current || current.port !== port) return null;
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return current.cookie;
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}
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/** Stop the background server, if one is running. Safe to call when none is. */
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export async function stopDeepSeekWeb(): Promise<void> {
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const running = current;
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@@ -223,8 +368,15 @@ async function startDeepSeekWebLocked(dshDir: string, authority: string): Promis
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// The pipes must be drained whether or not anyone reads them: a full pipe
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// blocks the child. Storage is capped; draining is not.
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let output = '';
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// Scanned for the launch banner separately from `output`. That cap exists to
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// bound the error tail, and a chatty profile can fill it before the banner is
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// printed — losing the banner there produces exactly the 401 tab this module
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// exists to prevent, so the two buffers must not share a limit.
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let banner = '';
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const capture = (chunk: Buffer) => {
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if (output.length < OUTPUT_CAP) output += chunk.toString('utf-8');
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const text = chunk.toString('utf-8');
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if (output.length < OUTPUT_CAP) output += text;
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if (banner.length < BANNER_SCAN_CAP) banner += text;
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};
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child.stdout?.on('data', capture);
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child.stderr?.on('data', capture);
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@@ -241,7 +393,7 @@ async function startDeepSeekWebLocked(dshDir: string, authority: string): Promis
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if (current?.child === child) current = null;
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});
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const running: RunningServer = { child, port, authority, output: () => output };
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const running: RunningServer = { child, port, authority, output: () => output, banner: () => banner, cookie: null };
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current = running;
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const deadline = Date.now() + READY_TIMEOUT_MS;
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@@ -255,6 +407,10 @@ async function startDeepSeekWebLocked(dshDir: string, authority: string): Promis
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return { ok: false, error: tail ? `dsh web exited during startup: ${tail}` : 'dsh web exited during startup' };
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}
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if (await answersHttp(port)) {
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// Bought before this call resolves, so the first proxied page load
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// already carries a credential — a tab opened a moment earlier would
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// otherwise get the 401 this whole module exists to prevent.
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running.cookie = await captureSessionCookie(running);
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return { ok: true, port, url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, reused: false };
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}
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, READY_POLL_MS));
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