Every run mode Codeman can launch — Claude Code, Terminal/Shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek Harness, OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI — is a `CliEntry`: a data record describing how to find the binary, how to build its command line, what environment it needs, and what it can do. Code that used to ask "which CLI is this?" asks the entry instead.
`src/session-cli-registry-bridge.ts` maps the legacy per-mode option bag onto the engine, and `src/utils/cli-resolver.ts` / `src/utils/cli-launcher.ts` do registry-driven binary resolution and launcher-profile dispatch.
`~/.codeman/clis.json` (instance-scoped through `dataPath()`) holds overrides and custom entries only, never a copy of the stock catalog: `{ "clis": { "<id>": { ...partial entry... } } }`. Objects merge key-wise onto the stock entry, arrays replace wholesale. **The file must be mode 0600**; the loader refuses any group/world permission bit, read bits included, so a file created with a normal umask (0644) is ignored until you `chmod 600` it. Every reason a file was ignored or an entry dropped is logged once, prefixed `[cli-registry]`, on the first load. A stock entry whose override fails validation falls back to the shipped definition; a custom entry that fails is dropped. The file is read once per process and re-read after a change made through CLI management (below).
## Managing CLIs from Settings
App Settings → Agents & CLIs → **CLI management** (`cliManagementEnabled`, default OFF; admin-only in multi-user mode) lists every entry with an installed/not-installed badge and:
- toggles any entry on or off. A `kind: 'shell'` entry cannot be disabled, and the row shows no switch for it. A disabled CLI disappears from the Run menu, the welcome screen and the phone overview, and new session requests for it are rejected.
- installs a missing **stock** CLI by running its shipped install command, after a confirm that names the exact command. Only one install per CLI runs at a time, and the command runs without any `CODEMAN_*` variable in its environment. An `npm install -g` command is pointed at `~/.local` (which every resolver searches) when the npm global prefix is not writable by the server user, for example a system node under `/usr`; a writable prefix, a prefix that does not exist yet but could be created, and an explicit `NPM_CONFIG_PREFIX` are left alone. A custom entry's install command is never executed.
- adds, edits and deletes **custom** entries (id, label, badge, binaries, launch argv). The server re-validates the whole assembled entry through `CliEntrySchema`, so the form cannot bypass the load-time rules.
These are the only writes to `clis.json`. They are serialized, and a file that does not parse or has unsafe permissions is refused rather than overwritten; fix it (or `chmod 600` it) and retry. The HTTP routes are listed in `docs/api-reference.md` under *CLI management*.
shortBadge: string;// short label ("Run CX", the Settings CLI list), e.g. 'CX'; tabs show the run-mode-dot logo instead (no mark at all with CLI Logos on Tabs off)
overlays: CliOverlays;// remote-SSH / Docker pane commands, credential store
}
```
`capabilities` is the important part. It is what `isExternalCliMode()`, `isAltScreenStripMode()`, `hooksAvailableForMode()` and every other former per-mode branch actually read.
Six capability fields carry a regular expression an override file can set: `discovery.version.regex`, `capabilities.workDetect.workingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.watchingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.awaitingLine`, `capabilities.workDetect.blockedLine` and `capabilities.modelDetect.screenLine`. All six go through `compileVersionRegex()`, which caps the source at 200 characters, refuses the nested-quantifier shapes that cause catastrophic backtracking, and returns `null` rather than throwing so every caller degrades instead of crashing.
`workingLine` is the one that matters most, because it is compiled once per session and then run against every accumulated PTY chunk and every pane capture. A nested quantifier there is a ReDoS against the event loop for the whole server, not just that session. The guard therefore runs in two places, and neither is redundant: `schema.ts` rejects the entry at LOAD time so a bad pattern never reaches a session, and `_workingLinePattern()` in `session.ts` compiles through the same helper so the runtime cannot end up with a pattern the schema would have refused.
`modelDetect.screenLine` names the model a session runs, for the tile grid's and the split pane's headers (`SessionState.displayModel`). It must have exactly ONE capture group, the model, which `schema.ts` checks at LOAD time, and it runs over the last `screenLines` (1 to 8, default 1) non-blank rows of the capture the idle/working probe already takes, joined with newlines so a pattern can anchor on the row above. Like `watchingLine`, the rows are pane text the agent writes most of, so a pattern must anchor on chrome only that CLI draws. The two stock ones, measured on live panes: dsh-TUI's status line on the row under its composer's rounded border (`╰─+╯\n ?(<model>)`, three rows), codex's ` <model> <effort> · ` footer (its last row, or the row above codex 0.162's indented hint row, so a two-row window), and opencode's composer agent row (`┃ Build <model> <provider>`, directly above the box's `╹` edge, eight rows because its home screen puts up to five rows of its own chrome below it). opencode's field is the model AND the provider, since only colour separates them on that row; the pattern takes the LAST such row in the window, so a composer-shaped row the agent prints higher up cannot stand in for it. A screen that does not match keeps the last model the session reported; a CLI without the field shows its launch model, if any. Claude needs none: its statusLine exporter reports `model.display_name` on every render. ⚠️ dsh-TUI's first field is the model only while its status bar's model field is on; switched off, it is the next field: the reasoning effort (` medium · <cwd>`), the session mode, or the folder name. So a captured field is not taken when it is one of the CLI's declared `modelDetect.rejectWords` (single tokens, compared ignoring case; dsh lists every effort id its adapters offer and the shipped mode ids) or the session's own working-directory basename (the shared reader's rule, for every CLI). Anything else the pattern captures is the model, so the official `deepseek-chat` / `deepseek-reasoner` ids are read.
`modelDetect.configResolver` names a READER in `src/model-config-resolvers.ts` (a name, never code in config, like a launcher profile) that resolves the model the CLI's own config pins for one session, for while its screen names none (the `config` source of `displayModel`, ranked below any report from the running CLI). It runs at every pane start, attach and relaunch, with the session's own launch config and env, and must be read-only, bounded (probe before read, no synchronous filesystem call) and return the model id alone. The one stock reader, `deepseek-route` (`src/deepseek-route-config.ts`), resolves dsh-TUI's route the way dsh composes it for the session's profile under the session's `DSH_HOME`: the last of `profiles/<profile>/cordis.patch.yml` and `$DSH_HOME/cordis.patch.yml` carrying `config` for the `dsh-tui` row counts, and only when it names both `provider` and `model`. Anything in doubt answers nothing: a half-pinned route, a profile without dsh-TUI, an unreadable, oversized or symlinked-out layer, a file beyond its narrow YAML subset.
`external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` describe three different, deliberately unequal sets, and deriving any one from another has already shipped a bug. `shell` has no hooks but is **not** an external CLI, so a hooks predicate written as `!isExternalCliMode()` accepted `until=stop` on a shell session and then blocked the caller for their entire timeout. `deepseek` is the mirror image: it IS external and it DOES have hooks.
`test/cli-capability-predicates.test.ts` asserts that no two of the three are equivalent across the catalog, so collapsing them fails the build rather than a user's session.
`agentSkillInjection` says a CLI's sessions get the agent skill (`skills/codeman`) and its per-session preamble when the synced `agentSkillEnabled` setting is on; `agentSkillDir` says which workspace directory the CLI scans for skills, read through `agentSkillDir()` (hooks-config.ts), so no call site branches on a CLI id. Absent with the boolean on means `.claude/skills`, which is what the boolean meant before the field existed.
Measured 2026-10-11 against the installed builds or their source: every CLI in the middle row scans `<workspace>/.agents/skills/` (gemini only in its cwd, dsh only at the git root, else cwd), and Claude Code does not read it, so a case shared with a claude session lists the skill once there (opencode, grok and omp read both directories and see the same skill twice, identical, under one name). ⚠️ pi is left out on purpose: any project-level `.agents/skills` or `.pi/skills` makes pi ask "Trust project folder?" at startup, which would stall a spawned worker on a dialog; it reads the user-level `~/.agents/skills` without the prompt (`npx skills add Ark0N/Codeman --skill codeman -g`). A codex, gemini or other session's copy in a case that pi sessions also use triggers that prompt once for the human there. ⚠️ `agentSkillDir` is a closed enum (`AGENT_SKILL_DIRS`, schema.ts), never a free path: `clis.json` can set it and it decides where the server writes. ⚠️ Two codex traps the skill names rather than fixes: codex's default sandbox blocks network even to loopback (the skill needs **Bypass approvals and sandbox**), and codex 0.162 runs tool commands through a shared `app-server` daemon whose environment (`CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`, `CODEMAN_API_URL`) is that of the session that started it.
`capabilities.newline` (`'line-feed'` | `'esc-enter'`, absent = line feed) is the byte sequence the `send-key` route types into the pane for Shift+Enter. A line feed (`0x0a`, also Ctrl+Enter) is what Claude Code's Ink input reads as "insert a newline"; `esc-enter` (`ESC CR`, the Option/Alt+Enter chord) is there for a composer that ignores a bare line feed. No stock CLI declares it today: the bytes are typed by tmux on the server, so the browser's OS cannot change what a CLI reads, and Codex 0.147.0 was checked to take a line feed (a Shift+Enter that submits is the keypress leak fixed in #520, not a byte problem). A user `clis.json` can set it for a CLI that needs it. It is an enum rather than a byte string on purpose: config never carries bytes that get typed into a pane. Settings → Terminal & Input → **Key tester** prints what a browser reports for keydown/keypress/keyup, to see whether a device is sending what you think.
The composed command line is interpolated into `bash -c "…"` inside tmux, which makes command construction a security boundary. Four independent layers keep config out of it:
1.**Config contains no shell text.** There is no `command: "..."` field anywhere in the schema. An entry declares a sequence of typed tokens; `argv.ts` is the only place that turns them into a string, and it owns every separator itself — one space between tokens, ` || ` between fallback variants. Neither can originate from config, because config has no field that could hold either.
2.**Every literal is validated at LOAD time** against a safe-word pattern (no space, quote, backtick, `$`, `;`, `&`, `|`, redirection, parens, braces, newline or backslash). A bad literal **rejects the whole entry** rather than being dropped, because a silently dropped flag would change security-relevant behaviour — losing `--no-approve` is not a cosmetic difference.
3.**Values resolve through NAMED patterns.** A value placeholder selects a `TokenPattern` (`model`, `uuid`, `slug`, `path-segment`, `tool-list`, …) from `patterns.ts`; config can never supply its own regex for a value, so a `clis.json` structurally cannot widen its own validation. A value that fails its pattern drops the whole argument, exactly as the hand-written builders did: an invalid `--model` omits `--model`, it never substitutes something else.
4.**Escaping is independent of validation.**`renderToken()` re-checks the resolved value before emitting it unquoted, and single-quotes anything else — so even a value that somehow bypassed validation is quoted, never concatenated raw.
The only config-supplied regexes are `discovery.version.regex` and `discovery.identity.regex`. Both run against **command output** rather than a shell token, both are compiled through `compileVersionRegex()` (length cap, nested-quantifier rejection, never the `g` flag), and the output they see is truncated first.
## Named profiles: the escape hatch
Some differences genuinely need to run code rather than be described. Those are **named profiles**: a capability field holds a profile NAME, and the implementation lives in one place keyed by that name — never by CLI id.
-`discovery.launcherProfile` — for a CLI whose binary is not the agent. `dsh` boots `$DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>`, so "installed" and "runnable" have different answers; the profile answers both, plus why a specifically-named target will not work. Implemented in `utils/cli-launcher.ts`.
-`env.setenvProfile` — per-CLI environment setup that is more than a list of keys, such as DeepSeek's status bridge.
-`capabilities.transcript` — which on-disk history reader understands this CLI (`claude-jsonl`, `codex-rollout`, `deepseek-zstd`, `omp-jsonl`, `none`).
-`capabilities.echo.predictProfile` — the predictive-echo model a composer needs.
The names live in `profiles.ts`, which is kept free of imports so `schema.ts` can validate a name at load time. A profile this build does not implement is a load-time error naming the field, rather than a CLI that silently looks permanently uninstalled.
## DeepSeek: the four assumptions it breaks
DeepSeek is worth reading before assuming an entry looks like its siblings — the schema carries four extensions because of it.
| Its permission switch is the **`DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` env var**, not a flag — the harness has none. | `env.configSetenv` (so the ordinary `privilegedParams` clamp still reaches it) **and**`capabilities.privilegedEnvKeys`. |
| It is the only non-claude mode with real hook signals, and for it that is a per-SESSION question. | `capabilities.hooks: 'supervised'` — a third state, not a boolean. |
| Its transcript is zstd session files, one frame per write. | `capabilities.transcript: 'deepseek-zstd'`. |
`discovery.identity` asks the binary whether it is the program we meant, and it runs **before** the version probe, because a version probe cannot tell an impostor from the real thing. Debian ships an unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell) that answers `--version` perfectly happily, and npm carries squatters for both `pi` and `grok`.
`discovery.version.requireVersionMatch` is the weaker companion: a binary whose version output has the wrong shape counts as ABSENT rather than present-with-unknown-version. That is what a short, generic binary name needs, and it is what keeps `codeman doctor` and the run mode from telling the user opposite things about the same binary — both read the same regex off the same entry.
## The no-id-branching rule
`test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` fails the build if a CLI id comparison appears outside the stock catalog. It builds its id list from the live catalog, blanks comment lines before scanning (comments legitimately quote the pattern to explain why a branch was removed, and blanking rather than dropping is what keeps reported line numbers pointing at the real file), and keeps an allowlist in which **every entry carries its reason**.
It matches four shapes, not one: `mode === '<id>'`, `mode !== '<id>'`, `case '<id>':`, and `['<id>', …].includes(mode)`. The first version matched `===` only, and that gap was not academic — the refactor it guards converted the `===` sites and left the negated ones, so 36 `!==` branches survived it, including a seven-mode chain auto-enabling Ralph under a comment asking the next person to keep it in step with a predicate by hand while the sibling code path already read the capability. A guard that sees half the shapes reports a count measured over the half it happens to catch.
The allowlist is not a formality. If a branch is about what a CLI can DO it belongs in `CliCapabilities`; the entries that remain are things that are not CLI-behaviour branches at all — chiefly the legacy per-mode `<Mode>Config` objects on `POST /api/sessions`, which are a fact about the public HTTP API rather than about any CLI, plus a few documented cases where `mode === 'claude'` is genuinely the right question (Read My Mind reads Claude's _own_ transcript, so a capability there would be actively wrong).
`test/frontend-cli-no-id-branching.test.ts` is the same guard for the two frontend files the CLI registry's Run-menu consolidation touches, `session-ui.js` and `mobile-overview.js` — deliberately not the rest of `src/web/public/`, whose per-CLI rules stay out of scope for now (see "Fields declared for later" below). Its allowlist keys on `<file>::<expression>` with no line number, since a single unrelated edit to a contended file would otherwise shift every subsequent line and make every entry go stale at once, and each entry additionally carries the exact number of approved call sites — a bare key would let a brand-new branch reusing an already-approved expression land unreviewed. Its comparison shape differs from the backend guard's in one respect: the left-hand side may be any identifier, not only one named `mode`, `id` or `agentType`, because the review of #458 found `const m = this._runMode; if (m === 'codex')` slipping past the named form while the scanned file already filters with `(m) => m !== 'shell'`.
`launch.params` keys, `env.configSetenv[].fromParam` and `capabilities.privilegedParams[].param` all name a **launch param**. The **legacy wire field** a param arrives as is a separate namespace, and `launch.legacyConfigAliases` is the only bridge between the two.
This matters because it is invisible when it is wrong. `capabilities.privilegedParams[].param` is the multi-user bypass clamp's only handle on a CLI's privilege switch, and a name from the wrong namespace clamps **nothing**: no load error, no failing test, the clamp simply stops running. Codex is the entry where the two names differ (`bypassApprovals` as the param, `dangerouslyBypassApprovals` on the wire), so it is the one that catches a regression. `schema.ts` rejects any entry naming a param it never declared, on both `configSetenv.fromParam` and `privilegedParams.param`.
`accent`, `capabilities.echo`, `capabilities.wheelForward`, `capabilities.keyboardAccessory` and `capabilities.maxFrameBytes` are **declared but not yet read**. (`shortBadge` was on this list until the CLI management list in Settings started showing it.) They all describe frontend behaviour, and the frontend is deliberately untouched here: `app.js`, `terminal-ui.js` and `styles.css` keep their own hand-authored per-CLI rules, and moving them is its own piece of work verified by a browser/mobile suite the CI gate cannot see.
Treat those values as **transcribed, not authoritative** — nothing enforces that `echo.policy` matches `_updateLocalEchoState`'s fallthrough, so re-measure before wiring one up. `accent` is the one exception: it was measured against styles.css on 2026-09-21 (method in the comment above `CLAUDE` in `stock.ts`), though nothing keeps it in step with the CSS either. A field that is both wrong and unread is worse than an absent one, because the next reader trusts it; `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` pins the list so it cannot quietly grow, and wiring one up makes its line there fail, which is the direction you want.
`overlays.credStore` is in the same category, for a sharper reason: the Docker credential-seeding path still reads its own `CRED_STORES` table, because this shape allows ONE store per CLI and the live table needs two for gemini (`.gemini` for the CLI's own auth plus `.config/gcloud` for Vertex), while deepseek declares none here even though `.dsh` is seeded. Wiring it means making the field an array and correcting those two entries — a change to credential seeding, which is simultaneously the worst thing here to get wrong and the least covered by tests, since every docker IO path is no-op'd under vitest.
Everything else in the interface is live, including `overlays.remote` / `overlays.docker`, which back `defaultRemoteCommandForMode()` and `defaultDockerCommandForMode()` directly. Those two used to be hardcoded `Record<…CommandMode, string>` tables duplicating the registry with nothing keeping the two in step; `test/location-overlay-commands.test.ts` pins every resulting command as a literal string.
Three rules, and the middle one is why the embed matters:
1.**The server never executes an entry's `install.command`.** Unchanged, and still enforced by nothing executing it: the field is display text (`CliDiscovery.install.command`).
2.**`install.sh` executes only commands embedded in itself.** Those arrive in the same file, over the same TLS fetch, in the same commit as the `curl \| bash` line that fetched the script — identical trust to the hardcoded vendor one-liners it replaces.
Anything reading the registry must resolve it when it is asked, not when its module is first imported. `sessionModeSchema()`, `allowedEnvPrefixes()`, `dependencyRegistry()` and each resolver's `searchDirs` thunk all re-read the catalog per call.
A module-level const freezes at first import, and the failure is asymmetric: a CLI enabled while the server is running moved the run menu but not the frozen surface, so validation rejected a mode the menu offered, or `codeman doctor` reported a catalog nobody had any more.
2. Run `npm run generate:cli-catalog` and commit **both** artifacts (`config/clis.stock.json` and `install.sh`). The installer's detection, its install menu, its reminder text and the Docker agent image all follow from that one step — this is what makes upstream `b6d0f1fa` ("wire OMP into install.sh's CLI detection, it had none") impossible rather than merely fixed.
3. Add a golden spawn-command pin to `test/cli-registry-spawn-golden.test.ts`, a row to `test/cli-capability-predicates.test.ts`, its remote/docker commands to `test/location-overlay-commands.test.ts`, and its search paths to `test/install-sh-detection-parity.test.ts`.
4. Only if it cannot install with a plain `npm install -g <pkg>`: give it a layer in `docker/agent.Dockerfile` and set `discovery.install.agentImageLayer: { kind: 'dedicated', reason }` on its entry in `stock.ts`. `test/docker-agent-image-coverage.test.ts` requires both, so an exclusion cannot quietly become an omission. An entry with no `npmPackage` needs only the Dockerfile layer, since it never enters the shared npm layer in the first place.
5. That is usually all. If you find yourself wanting to add an `if` somewhere, the guard test will tell you — and the answer is a capability field, or a named profile if it genuinely needs to run code.
`capabilities.mcpConfig` (`{ path, format, relocation? }`, `path` relative to the home directory) names the file a CLI keeps its user-level MCP server list in and the dialect it is written in. `src/mcp-sync.ts` reads that list from every ENABLED CLI that declares one, and that is installed or already has the file (a CLI that is neither is reported `absent`, never created), and adds any server a CLI is missing from the others. It writes other tools' own config, so it is **opt-in**: `mcpSyncEnabled` (synced, default OFF) gates `GET`/`POST /api/mcp-sync` (403 while off) and the Settings → Agents & CLIs → MCP servers controls. Declared today for claude, gemini, codex, opencode and antigravity (and GitHub Copilot CLI, below); every format was checked against what the CLI's own `mcp add` writes, except opencode's (documented, not installed to check). A CLI with no entry (pi, grok, omp, deepseek) is not guessed at: it is listed as `unsupported` in the result when enabled. Adding one is a registry entry plus a small adapter in `mcp-sync.ts`, and a verified fixture in `test/mcp-sync.test.ts`.
**Tools that are not run modes, or that declare no `mcpConfig`.**`src/mcp-sync-targets.ts` declares such tools as plain data (`MCP_SYNC_ONLY_TOOLS`: id, label, config path, dialect, relocation var, the binary whose presence means "installed"). They join the registry CLIs as sync targets (listed after them, so a registry CLI's definition wins a same-name difference), under the same rules: installed or already configured, otherwise `absent`. GitHub Copilot CLI is both: its registry entry declares `mcpConfig`, so while the run mode is enabled the sync-only row is skipped, and it applies only if the run mode is disabled. Copilot's dialect is `copilot-json` (`~/.copilot/mcp-config.json`, relocated by `COPILOT_HOME`; checked against `copilot mcp add` 1.0.94): `mcpServers`, each entry with `tools` (`["*"]` = all), `type``local` | `http` | `sse`, `command`/`args`/`env` or `url`/`headers`. `copilot mcp disable` does not mark the entry: it lists the name under `disabledMcpServers` in `settings.json` beside the config. Sync reads that list (never writes it) so a disabled server is not copied, and reports the target `unreadable` if `settings.json` is not valid JSON rather than guessing.
`relocation` (`{ envVar, path }`) names the env var the CLI itself reads to move that file: claude `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` (`.claude.json` under it), codex `CODEX_HOME` (`config.toml`), opencode `XDG_CONFIG_HOME` (`opencode/opencode.json`), gemini `GEMINI_CLI_HOME` (`.gemini/settings.json`) copilot `COPILOT_HOME` (`mcp-config.json`); antigravity follows `$HOME` only, so it declares none. The var is read from the SERVER process env at call time, which is the env the CLIs Codeman spawns inherit. An absolute value moves the file to `<value>/<relocation.path>`, an empty one counts as unset (as it does for each CLI), and anything else reports the target `skipped` with the reason instead of writing a file the CLI never reads. A per-session relocation (a session's own `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` in `envOverrides`) is not followed: the sync only knows the server's environment.
The rules the module keeps and the tests pin: it only ADDS (a name already defined, in any shape, is never edited or removed; a same-name difference is reported as a conflict); a server switched off in its own CLI is not copied; it never writes a file it could not parse (opencode JSONC with comments, a TOML file with a duplicate table) and re-parses the new text before writing; codex TOML is read with a real parser (`smol-toml`), so CRLF files and inline tables are handled; names such as `__proto__` are ignored and every table keyed by an untrusted name has no prototype; a symlinked config is written through, not replaced; a file that receives `env`/`headers` is left `0600`; only one apply runs at a time; and its result carries server names only, never env values or headers, and never file text: a parse failure is reported by line and column, not by the parser's message (smol-toml prints a code frame of the offending lines and V8's JSON errors quote source, either of which can hold a secret). The schema restricts `path` and `relocation.path` to a relative path without `..`, since sync writes to it.
`copilot` (npm `@github/copilot`) is a stock entry. A bare launch is `copilot`, in its own Manual Approval mode. The launch parameters follow the grok/omp shape: `model` (`--model`), `resumeId` (`--resume <id>`, an id, id prefix or session name: a single word that starts with a letter or digit, so a flag-shaped value such as `--yolo` is dropped rather than read as its own flag) and `continueSession` (`--continue`, skipped when a resume id is set), plus `allowAll` (`--yolo`: allow every tool, path and URL). The legacy config object is `copilotConfig` (`{ model, allowAll, resumeSessionId, continueSession }`). The Run button sends `allowAll: true` like the other agent CLIs' bypass switches, and `allowAll` is declared in `privilegedParams`, so a non-granted multi-user owner has it forced back to `false` (an absent config is never materialized: a bare spawn is already safe). Session history resume goes through `copilotConfig.resumeSessionId` / `continueSession`. The tab names the model it reads from the footer (`modelDetect`). Its `altScreen` is `strip-mux-and-mouse`, like opencode: Copilot turns mouse tracking on itself, and left in, a plain drag is reported to the TUI instead of selecting (Auto Copy and copy-on-select did nothing); stripped, a drag is a local selection, clicks go through the hand-encoded tap, and the wheel is forwarded as SGR reports while `cliMouseTracking` is on. It declares `mcpConfig` (`~/.copilot/mcp-config.json`, relocated by `COPILOT_HOME`) and no `credStore`: its token sits in `config.json` in plain text on a host without a keyring, so a Docker case is not seeded and you sign in inside the container. `env.allowedKeys` is empty on purpose: a headless host sets `COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN`, which the `COPILOT_` prefix admits, and `GH_TOKEN`/`GITHUB_TOKEN` stay out of the one global allowlist.
Measured on 1.0.94 inside tmux: an alternate-screen TUI with mouse tracking on, whose composer is the `❯` between two rules. While a turn runs the footer reads `◉ Working esc edit prompt` (the dot alternates `◉`/`◎`), which is the `workDetect` working line. Keystrokes sent with `tmux send-keys` reach the composer, Shift+Enter inserts a newline, and a shell tool call completes inside tmux; github/copilot-cli#4180 (a driven PTY ignores input) and #4223 (a shell command never completes under tmux) report both failing on 1.0.70 to 1.0.74 and neither reproduces on 1.0.94. `COPILOT_HOME` and `COPILOT_ALLOW_ALL` are privileged env keys, so a non-granted multi-user owner cannot set them through `envOverrides`, and so are the other `COPILOT_*` variables (read from the 1.0.98 bundle, far more than `copilot help environment` lists) that switch approvals, run code with no approval row or send the sign-in token elsewhere. The `COPILOT_` prefix admits whatever a later release adds, so the list needs a look whenever the measured version moves.