Loaded on demand from the `codeman` skill. Assumes the guard variables from SKILL.md
(`$API`, `$SELF`, `"${CURL[@]}"`). Canonical contract: `docs/api-reference.md` in the
Codeman repo; this file is the agent-relevant subset, verified live.
## Envelope and errors
Every JSON response: `{"success":true,"data":…}` or
`{"success":false,"error":"…","errorCode":"…"}`. Branch on `errorCode`:
| `errorCode` | HTTP | Meaning |
|-------------|------|---------|
| `INVALID_INPUT` | 400 | malformed request; the message names the bad field |
| `UNAUTHORIZED` | 401 | auth required or failed (send `-u user:password`). ⚠️ The 401 body is plain text, NOT this envelope — `jq` dies with a parse error, see the guard in SKILL.md |
| `FORBIDDEN` | 403 | authenticated but not permitted: an admin-only route in multi-user mode, a `workingDir`/case path outside your own workspace, or a shell session without the can-bypass-permissions grant. ⚠️ **Not** what an ownership miss on a session returns: a session you do not own answers 404 `NOT_FOUND`, identically to one that does not exist (deliberate, it leaks no existence) |
| `SESSION_BUSY` | 409 | on a **wait**: this session's waiter cap (16, combined signal+output) is full. On **quick-start**: the 50-session cap is full, so clean up before starting more |
| unified list incl. history | `GET /api/v1/sessions/unified` → `.data.sessions[]` (NOT `.data[]`), and it folds in transcript history from the whole machine — never use it to verify cleanup; `GET /api/v1/sessions` is the cleanup check |
| start case + session in one call | `POST /api/v1/quick-start` |
| **read a worker's answer** (claude/codex) | `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/last-response` → `.data.{text,timestamp}` — clean transcript text, no TUI noise. ⚠️ **Poll it**: the transcript flush lags the `stop` signal, so a read taken the instant send-and-wait returns is `""` (verified live). Also `""` before the first completed turn, and always `""` for `shell`/`opencode`/`gemini`/`antigravity` (no transcript) |
| read terminal (tail is in **BYTES**, raw ANSI) | `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/terminal?tail=3000` → `.data.terminalBuffer` — for *diagnosis* (unsubmitted prompt?), not for reading answers |
| the case's intent profile (Read My Mind: user goals + recent real prompts) | `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/intent` → `.data.intent.{goals,recentPrompts}` (empty with `updatedAt: 0` until something is recorded) |
| replace the user-goals text on the case's intent profile | `PUT /api/v1/sessions/:id/intent` body `{"goals":"…"}` (≤ 8192 chars, strict schema; REPLACES the text, read + merge first) |
| forget the case's intent profile (only when the user asks) | `DELETE /api/v1/sessions/:id/intent` → `.data.deleted` |
| delete one session (yours only, via `delete_session`) | `DELETE /api/v1/sessions/:id` — never call it bare; the fail-closed helper in SKILL.md §0 is the only self-protection that exists. Answers `{"success":true,"data":{}}`: an **empty** body is the success signal, there is nothing to read back |
`DELETE /api/v1/sessions/:id` takes one undocumented query parameter, `killMux`, and
it defaults to `true` (anything other than the exact string `false` means kill). With
`?killMux=false` the call **detaches instead of killing**: the tmux session and the
agent inside it keep running, the session drops out of `GET /api/v1/sessions` so it
looks deleted, and it is deliberately left in persisted state for recovery (the
lifecycle log records `detached`, not `deleted`). That is the wrong tool for agent
cleanup: your worker keeps burning tokens where neither you nor the user can see it,
and the list you would check to confirm cleanup shows it gone. Delete plainly, and let
`wait.immediate:true` rides along and means the condition already held at call
time; if that is not what you meant, you wanted `fresh=1` or send-and-wait.
2.`wait.timedOut` — poll boundary; loop again.
3.`wait.ended` — session deleted/torn down mid-wait; stop looping.
## Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Cause / fix |
|---------|-------------|
| every curl fails with a certificate error | you dropped `-k`; `CODEMAN_API_URL` is HTTPS with a self-signed cert |
| `jq: parse error` on every call | plain-text 401s: the server has a password. Check with `-w '%{http_code}'`, use the guard's `.env` fallback, and if no `.env` exists, stop and ask the user for credentials |
| input arrives but nothing happens; later waits all time out | the input had no `\r`, so Enter was never sent; the text is sitting on the worker's prompt. **Submitting it with `{"input":"\r"}` is the ONLY recovery** — Ctrl+U (0x15) and Esc do NOT clear the composer (verified live) — and the flush costs one turn in which the worker reasons about the junk; open the next real prompt with "ignore the garbled line above:" |
| `GET .../sessions/$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` 404s | Docker case: the env id is truncated to 8 chars; find yourself with `startswith($SELF)`, and always self-compare by prefix, in both directions |
| `CODEMAN_MUX` unset but you seem to be in a session | remote-SSH case: the env vars are not exported there. Fail closed — refuse to act |
| connection refused from inside a container | a loopback-bound server is unreachable from a container, and `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1` does **not** fix that: it opens a hooks-only listener, so hook events start flowing but `/api/v1/*` stays refused. Driving the API from inside a Docker case needs a reachable bind (an operator decision); report it, don't retry |
| wait routes 404 on a valid session id | read the `.error` text: a `Route ...` prefix means the server predates the wait endpoints (< 1.13.0; a dev build can serve them while reporting an older version, so probe, never version-compare) — poll `terminal?tail=` and say so. `Session ... not found` means your id is wrong, not the server |
| wait on `stop` never resolves | non-claude mode, or hooks not reaching the server (Docker/remote), or a case created by Codeman < 1.13.0 against an `--https` install (its hook curls lacked `-k` and TLS-failed silently; a 1.13.0+ server rewrites them the next time a session starts in that case). Use markers or `idle,exit` |
| new claude worker ignores its first prompt | it was showing the first-run trust dialog and Codeman's auto-accept missed; use the readiness recipe in SKILL.md (wait for `shift+tab` first, accept the dialog only as the bounded fallback) |
| readiness burns its whole budget, then the worker answers fine anyway | you matched `bypass`, which is the statusline of ONE permission mode. Codeman spawns `--dangerously-skip-permissions` by default, but the server's `claudeMode` setting also has `auto` (`auto mode on`), `allowedTools` and `normal` (both `don't ask on`), and the mode is not exposed on `GET /api/v1/sessions/:id`. Match **`shift+tab`** instead: every mode's status bar ends `(shift+tab to cycle)` (measured per mode against claude-cli 2.1.226). ⚠️ It must go through `--data-urlencode`, or the `+` decodes to a space and you silently search for `shift tab`. Expect `blocked` signals mid-turn on the non-default modes |
| ANSI escapes survive the strip pipeline | `sed -e 's/\x1b…'` on macOS: `\x1b` is GNU-only, BSD sed matches nothing and strips nothing. Use the `ESC=$(printf '\033')` form above |
| ready claude worker missing from `ListAgents` | cross-session messaging is off for that end: CLI < 2.1.224, the feature flag not (yet) on (observed: two 2.1.226 sessions on one box, only one with an inbox socket), a telemetry-disabling env var, a Docker/remote case, or a non-claude mode. Not an error: drive it over the HTTP recipes. See `reference/messaging.md` |
| `SendMessage` says "not an agent in this conversation" | first contact with a peer needs the ref: re-send with the exact `name [ref]` string from the `ListAgents` row, or from that error's own suggestion |
| message sent, worker never acts, no reply, no `stop` | the message was held (permission-class mismatch: a non-default `claudeMode` spawns prompting-class workers, and the approval dialog expires unattended after ~5 min) or refused (`crossSessionInbound`). Run the bounded backstop, then deliver once over HTTP input. See `reference/messaging.md` |