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/**
* @fileoverview Session management routes.
* Covers session CRUD, input/output, terminal buffer, quick-start, quick-run,
* auto-clear, auto-compact, image watcher, flicker filter, and logout.
*/
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import { FastifyInstance , type FastifyReply } from 'fastify' ;
import { z } from 'zod' ;
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import { join , dirname , extname , basename } from 'node:path' ;
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import { homedir } from 'node:os' ;
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import { existsSync , statSync , mkdirSync , writeFileSync } from 'node:fs' ;
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import { execFile } from 'node:child_process' ;
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import fs from 'node:fs/promises' ;
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import { randomBytes , randomUUID } from 'node:crypto' ;
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import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks' ;
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import {
ApiErrorCode ,
createErrorResponse ,
getErrorMessage ,
type ApiResponse ,
type SessionColor ,
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type SessionStatus ,
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type SessionMode ,
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type CodexConfig ,
type GeminiConfig ,
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type AntigravityConfig ,
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type PiConfig ,
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type GrokConfig ,
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type DeepSeekConfig ,
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type OmpConfig ,
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type RemoteHost ,
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} from '../../types.js' ;
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import {
Session ,
cliTakesSessionModel ,
isAltScreenStripMode ,
isExternalCliMode ,
isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode ,
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isMuxMouseStripMode ,
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} from '../../session.js' ;
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import type { PaneCaptureOptions } from '../../mux-interface.js' ;
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import { SseEvent } from '../sse-events.js' ;
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import { webviewCapabilities } from '../../webview-capabilities.js' ;
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import {
CreateSessionSchema ,
SessionNameSchema ,
SessionColorSchema ,
RunPromptSchema ,
SessionInputWithLimitSchema ,
ResizeSchema ,
AutoClearSchema ,
AutoCompactSchema ,
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AutoResumeSchema ,
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PinSessionSchema ,
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ImageWatcherSchema ,
FlickerFilterSchema ,
QuickRunSchema ,
QuickStartSchema ,
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InteractiveStartSchema ,
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SessionOrderUpdateSchema ,
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SessionWaitQuerySchema ,
SessionWaitOutputQuerySchema ,
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CustomModelSelectionSchema ,
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} from '../schemas.js' ;
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import { readCustomModelHosts } from '../../custom-model-hosts.js' ;
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import { applyCustomModelInjection , removeConfigDir } from '../../custom-model-injection-apply.js' ;
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import {
getLlamaSwapStatus ,
triggerLlamaSwapLoad ,
exceedsSafeContextFloor ,
CLAUDE_MIN_SAFE_CONTEXT_TOKENS ,
} from './custom-model-routes.js' ;
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import { matchesPattern } from '../../config/cli-registry/patterns.js' ;
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import { ownerLayoutKey } from '../../tab-layout-persistence.js' ;
import { TabLayoutValidationError } from '../../tab-layout.js' ;
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import {
sessionWaits ,
resolveWaitSignals ,
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sessionHookOptions ,
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signalForStatus ,
WaitCapacityError ,
type WaitSignal ,
type SignalWaitResult ,
} from '../session-wait-registry.js' ;
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import {
RemoteWakeRegistry ,
REMOTE_WAKE_REQUEST_READY_TIMEOUT_MS ,
createDefaultRemoteWakeDeps ,
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isProbeable ,
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type WakeableRemote ,
} from '../../remote-wake.js' ;
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import { clampWaitMs , MAX_BUFFER_SCAN_BYTES } from '../../config/agent-wait.js' ;
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import {
autoConfigureRalph ,
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canAccessOwned ,
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CASES_DIR ,
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findPersistedSessionOrFail ,
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findSessionOrFail ,
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getAuthUser ,
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isAdmin ,
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isPlainPromptInput ,
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isWorkingDirAllowed ,
ownerFor ,
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parseBody ,
persistAndBroadcastSession ,
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resolveAgentCaseOrigin ,
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resolveCasesDir ,
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resolveParentSessionId ,
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sessionCapacityMessage ,
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SETTINGS_PATH ,
validatePathWithinBase ,
} from '../route-helpers.js' ;
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import { buildAgentCaseMarker , writeAgentCaseMarker } from '../../agent-case-marker.js' ;
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import { canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands , resolveClaudeModeForUsername } from '../../user-store.js' ;
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import { clampEnvOverridesForOwner } from '../../session-env-clamp.js' ;
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import { enabledClis , getCli } from '../../config/cli-registry/registry.js' ;
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import type { AgentSkillDir , NewlineSequence } from '../../config/cli-registry/types.js' ;
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import { resolveCliLaunchError } from '../../utils/cli-launcher.js' ;
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import { applyLaunchDefaults } from '../launch-defaults.js' ;
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import { legacyConfigForMode } from '../../session-cli-registry-bridge.js' ;
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import { isMultiUserMode } from '../../config/multiuser.js' ;
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import { AUTH_COOKIE_NAME } from '../middleware/auth.js' ;
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import {
writeHooksConfig ,
updateCaseModel ,
stripCaseEnvKeys ,
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agentSkillDir ,
agentSkillDirFor ,
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applyAgentSkill ,
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refreshUserAgentSkill ,
seedAgentSessionPreamble ,
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applyWorkspaceHooks ,
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refreshStaleCodemanHooks ,
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} from '../../hooks-config.js' ;
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import { generateClaudeMd } from '../../templates/claude-md.js' ;
import { imageWatcher } from '../../image-watcher.js' ;
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import { convertHeicToJpeg } from '../heic-jpeg-converter.js' ;
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import { getLifecycleLog } from '../../session-lifecycle-log.js' ;
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import {
mergeUnifiedSessions ,
filterAndPaginate ,
type LiveSessionInput ,
type PersistedSessionInput ,
type LifecycleInput ,
type HistoryInput ,
type MuxStatInput ,
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type UnifiedSessionItem ,
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} from '../../services/unified-session-service.js' ;
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import {
buildHistorySessionIndexItems ,
setHistoryIndexRefresher ,
setHistorySessionIndex ,
} from '../session-history-index.js' ;
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import type { SessionPort , EventPort , ConfigPort , InfraPort , AuthPort , TabLayoutPort } from '../ports/index.js' ;
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import { RunSummaryTracker } from '../../run-summary.js' ;
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import { MAX_INPUT_LENGTH , MAX_SESSION_NAME_LENGTH } from '../../config/terminal-limits.js' ;
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import { MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES , MAX_PASTE_VIDEO_BYTES } from '../../config/buffer-limits.js' ;
import { VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS } from '../../attachment-registry.js' ;
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import { dataPath , getDataDir } from '../../config/instance.js' ;
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import {
checkRemoteTmuxAvailable ,
readRemoteCases ,
readRemoteHosts ,
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rehydrateRemoteHostFields ,
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toAttachedSessionRemote ,
toSessionRemote ,
} from '../../remote-hosts.js' ;
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import { fetchRemoteScrollback } from '../../remote-pane-history.js' ;
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import {
checkDockerAvailable ,
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checkDockerConfigDrift ,
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probeAdoptableContainer ,
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checkDockerTmuxAvailable ,
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ensureAgentBaseImage ,
DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE ,
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persistDockerCaseClaudeSessionId ,
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readDockerCases ,
readDockerHosts ,
toSessionDocker ,
} from '../../docker-hosts.js' ;
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import { LRUMap } from '../../utils/lru-map.js' ;
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import { describeUnknownPath , probePathKind } from '../../utils/index.js' ;
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import { findLatestOmpSessionId } from '../../utils/omp-session-resolver.js' ;
import { scanOmpSessionsHistory } from '../../omp-transcript.js' ;
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import { scanCodexSessionsHistory , codexThreadBySessionId } from '../../codex-transcript.js' ;
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import {
getLastTranscriptResponse ,
isExternalCliTranscriptMode ,
parseExternalCliTranscript ,
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selectLastAnsweredTurn ,
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} from '../response-viewer-transcript.js' ;
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import { readDeepSeekLastResponse } from '../../deepseek-transcript.js' ;
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import { appendClaudeCustomTitle } from '../../claude-session-title.js' ;
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import { UPLOADS_DIR } from '../paste-image-gc.js' ;
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// Path to linked-cases registry (same file used by case-routes resolveCasePath)
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const LINKED_CASES_FILE = dataPath ( 'linked-cases.json' );
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const CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR = getDataDir ();
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// Pre-compiled regex for terminal buffer cleaning (avoids per-request compilation)
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const CLAUDE_BANNER_PATTERN = /\x1b\[1mClaud/ ;
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const CTRL_L_PATTERN = /\x0c/g ;
const LEADING_WHITESPACE_PATTERN = /^[\s\r\n]+/ ;
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/**
* Match xterm alternate-screen mode toggles + the standalone scrollback-erase.
*
* - DECSET/DECRST 47, 1047, 1049 = enter/exit alternate screen buffer
* (1049 also saves cursor and clears the alt buffer).
* - CSI 3 J = erase saved lines (scrollback).
*
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* Codex AND Claude Code emit `\x1b[?1049h` and clear-scrollback sequences (the
* latter intermittently, e.g. full-screen pickers/dialogs). xterm.js obeys them
* by switching to the alt buffer (no native scrollback) and wiping saved lines,
* so the user's conversation history disappears on every tab switch / pane
* refresh (and scroll-up breaks live). Stripping these from the replayed byte
* stream keeps everything in the main buffer with scrollback intact. Mirrors the
* live-stream strip in Session._handleTerminalOutput (isAltScreenStripMode).
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*/
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const ALT_SCREEN_TOGGLE_PATTERN = /\x1b\[\?(?:47|1047|1049)[hl]/g ;
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const ERASE_SCROLLBACK_PATTERN = /\x1b\[3J/g ;
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// Mouse-tracking enables (X10/button/any-event/UTF-8/SGR/alt-scroll) — once on,
// xterm.js forwards wheel events to the app instead of scrolling the viewport.
// Live streams are stripped at the source, but buffers persisted BEFORE that
// strip existed can still carry them; strip on replay for parity.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const MOUSE_TRACKING_PATTERN = /\x1b\[\?(?:1000|1001|1002|1003|1005|1006|1007)[hl]/g ;
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/**
* The replay half of the strip parity triangle: what `_handleTerminalOutput` (session.ts)
* removes from the live stream, removed again from a stored buffer before it is replayed,
* because a buffer recorded before the live-side strip existed (or by an older server)
* still carries the sequences, and one replayed enable is enough to re-park xterm.
*
* - `strip-full` (claude/codex/gemini): alt-screen toggles, `3J` and mouse DECSETs.
* xterm obeys the toggles by switching to its scrollback-less alt buffer and wiping
* saved lines, so history disappeared on tab switch.
* - `strip-mux-and-mouse` (opencode, tmux-backed): alt-screen toggles and mouse DECSETs.
* A replayed tracking enable parks xterm in report mode, where a drag goes to the CLI
* instead of selecting text (and Ctrl+C without a selection is opencode's app_exit).
* `3J` stays: a TUI is not a `clear` consumer.
* - every other mode, tmux-backed: tmux's own client smcup only (#205).
*
* Exported so the parity with the live strip is a test (claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts).
*/
export function stripReplayBuffer ( buffer : string , mode : SessionMode , usesMux : boolean ) : string {
if ( isAltScreenStripMode ( mode )) {
return buffer
. replace ( ALT_SCREEN_TOGGLE_PATTERN , '' )
. replace ( ERASE_SCROLLBACK_PATTERN , '' )
. replace ( MOUSE_TRACKING_PATTERN , '' );
}
if ( isMuxMouseStripMode ( mode , usesMux )) {
return buffer . replace ( ALT_SCREEN_TOGGLE_PATTERN , '' ). replace ( MOUSE_TRACKING_PATTERN , '' );
}
if ( isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode ( mode , usesMux )) return buffer . replace ( ALT_SCREEN_TOGGLE_PATTERN , '' );
return buffer ;
}
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/**
* Strip redundant Ink spinner/status-bar redraw frames from the terminal buffer.
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* Ink (Claude Code's TUI) uses absolute cursor positioning (CSI n d = VPA) to animate
* the spinner and update the status bar. During long thinking phases, these frames
* accumulate to 500KB+ of repeated overwrites to the same rows.
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*
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* Strategy: detect "redraw clusters" — dense runs of VPA escapes where each is within
* FRAME_GAP bytes of the previous (i.e. continuous rerendering of the same UI region).
* Collapse each big cluster down to just the bytes from its last VPA onwards (the final
* frame). Content *between* clusters (Claude's streamed response text) is preserved.
*
* Without clustering, a single first-VPA-finds-all approach would discard the entire
* conversation after Claude's first render — losing 100KB+ of legitimate scrollback.
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*/
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export function stripInkRedrawBloat ( buffer : string ) : string {
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
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const vpaRe = /\x1b\[\d+d/g ;
const positions : number [] = [];
let m : RegExpExecArray | null ;
while (( m = vpaRe . exec ( buffer )) !== null ) {
positions . push ( m . index );
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}
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if ( positions . length < 10 ) return buffer ; // Too few VPAs to be bloat
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// Group consecutive VPAs into clusters separated by gaps > FRAME_GAP.
// Within a cluster, VPAs are close together (continuous rerenders).
// Between clusters, real terminal output (response text) lives.
const FRAME_GAP = 8 * 1024 ; // 8KB — one Ink frame is typically 1-4KB
const MIN_BLOAT_SIZE = 32 * 1024 ; // Only collapse clusters spanning >= 32KB
const clusters : { start : number ; end : number }[] = [];
let cs = positions [ 0 ];
let ce = positions [ 0 ];
for ( let i = 1 ; i < positions . length ; i ++ ) {
if ( positions [ i ] - ce <= FRAME_GAP ) {
ce = positions [ i ];
} else {
clusters . push ({ start : cs , end : ce });
cs = positions [ i ];
ce = positions [ i ];
}
}
clusters . push ({ start : cs , end : ce });
// For each big cluster, replace [start..end] with the bytes from `end` onwards
// (which contains the last frame's content up to where the next cluster, or
// post-cluster content, begins).
const parts : string [] = [];
let cursor = 0 ;
for ( const cl of clusters ) {
if ( cl . end - cl . start < MIN_BLOAT_SIZE ) continue ;
parts . push ( buffer . slice ( cursor , cl . start ));
cursor = cl . end ;
}
parts . push ( buffer . slice ( cursor ));
return parts . join ( '' );
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}
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/**
* Validate image bytes against a declared extension. Sniffs the first ~12 bytes
* for a known magic-number signature. Defends against polyglots (e.g. HTML or
* SVG disguised under a `Content-Type: image/png` header) and against simple
* extension-only spoofing — both the multipart filename and the Content-Type
* are attacker-controlled, the raw bytes are not.
*
* Signatures: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
*/
export function imageMagicMatchesExt ( data : Buffer , ext : string ) : boolean {
if ( data . length < 12 ) return false ;
const u32be = ( off : number ) : number => data . readUInt32BE ( off );
switch ( ext ) {
case '.png' :
return u32be ( 0 ) === 0x89504e47 && u32be ( 4 ) === 0x0d0a1a0a ;
case '.jpg' :
case '.jpeg' :
return data [ 0 ] === 0xff && data [ 1 ] === 0xd8 && data [ 2 ] === 0xff ;
case '.gif' :
return (
data [ 0 ] === 0x47 &&
data [ 1 ] === 0x49 &&
data [ 2 ] === 0x46 &&
data [ 3 ] === 0x38 &&
( data [ 4 ] === 0x37 || data [ 4 ] === 0x39 ) &&
data [ 5 ] === 0x61
);
case '.webp' :
// RIFF....WEBP
return u32be ( 0 ) === 0x52494646 && u32be ( 8 ) === 0x57454250 ;
case '.bmp' :
return data [ 0 ] === 0x42 && data [ 1 ] === 0x4d ;
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case '.heic' :
case '.heif' : {
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// ISO Base Media File Format: size + "ftyp" + major brand. The brand
// list matches heic-decode's own isHeic() — accepting more brands here
// would only route bytes into a conversion that always throws.
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if ( u32be ( 4 ) !== 0x66747970 ) return false ;
const brand = data . subarray ( 8 , 12 ). toString ( 'ascii' );
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return [ 'heic' , 'heix' , 'hevc' , 'hevx' , 'mif1' , 'msf1' ]. includes ( brand );
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}
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case '.mp4' :
case '.m4v' :
case '.mov' :
// ISO Base Media File Format / QuickTime: size + a top-level atom type. Brands
// vary too widely to enumerate (qt, isom, mp42, avc1, hev1, ...), and an older
// QuickTime file can open on an atom other than ftyp.
return [ 'ftyp' , 'moov' , 'mdat' , 'wide' , 'free' , 'skip' ]. includes ( data . subarray ( 4 , 8 ). toString ( 'ascii' ));
case '.webm' :
// EBML header (Matroska's WebM subset)
return u32be ( 0 ) === 0x1a45dfa3 ;
case '.ogv' :
// Ogg container ("OggS")
return u32be ( 0 ) === 0x4f676753 ;
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default :
return false ;
}
}
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/**
* Create or re-verify `{workingDir}/.codeman-uploads` for a prompt upload, or
* null when something other than a regular directory sits there. An agent or
* postinstall script could plant `.codeman-uploads -> ~/.ssh/` and redirect
* future writes outside workingDir: lstat (not stat) sees the symlink itself,
* and mkdir without `recursive` does not follow one for the leaf either;
* O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW on the file open makes the write itself symlink-safe.
* The folder ignores itself: a `.gitignore` of `*`, written once with O_EXCL,
* so the user's repository never sees uploads, their own ignore file is never
* touched, and a file already there is theirs and stays as it is.
*/
async function ensureUploadDir ( workingDir : string ) : Promise < string | null > {
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// workingDir exists (live session) and the caller bounded-probed its mount, so
// the lstat/mkdir below normally start on a reachable path; a mount that dies
// after that probe is the same residual race POST /api/sessions accepts.
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const uploadDir = join ( workingDir , UPLOADS_DIR );
try {
const dirStat = await fs . lstat ( uploadDir );
if ( dirStat . isSymbolicLink () || ! dirStat . isDirectory ()) return null ;
} catch ( err : unknown ) {
if (( err as NodeJS . ErrnoException ). code !== 'ENOENT' ) throw err ;
try {
await fs . mkdir ( uploadDir );
} catch ( mkErr : unknown ) {
// Concurrent uploads (a batch of photos) race to create the dir — the
// losers get EEXIST. Treat an already-present REAL directory as success,
// but re-verify it isn't a symlink a racing actor planted.
if (( mkErr as NodeJS . ErrnoException ). code !== 'EEXIST' ) throw mkErr ;
const raceStat = await fs . lstat ( uploadDir );
if ( raceStat . isSymbolicLink () || ! raceStat . isDirectory ()) return null ;
}
}
const ignoreFile = join ( uploadDir , '.gitignore' );
try {
// 'wx' = O_CREAT|O_EXCL, which also fails on a symlink at the path.
await fs . writeFile ( ignoreFile , '*\n' , { flag : 'wx' });
} catch ( err : unknown ) {
if (( err as NodeJS . ErrnoException ). code === 'EEXIST' ) return uploadDir ;
// The create can succeed before the write fails (ENOSPC): an empty ignore
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// file would read as the user's on the next upload, so take it back; its own
// failure must not replace the cause.
await fs . rm ( ignoreFile , { force : true }). catch (() => {});
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throw err ;
}
return uploadDir ;
}
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/** Open a fresh, uniquely named paste file for writing. */
async function openPasteFile ( imageDir : string , ext : string ) {
// Date.now() collides on same-ms uploads from two tabs (last-write wins
// silently). Append 8 hex chars so concurrent pastes get distinct names.
const filename = `paste- ${ Date . now () } - ${ randomBytes ( 4 ). toString ( 'hex' ) }${ ext } ` ;
const filepath = join ( imageDir , filename );
// O_EXCL: refuse to overwrite (collision is impossible with random suffix,
// but defends against TOCTOU). O_NOFOLLOW: refuse if filepath is a symlink.
const fh = await fs . open (
filepath ,
fs . constants . O_WRONLY | fs . constants . O_CREAT | fs . constants . O_EXCL | fs . constants . O_NOFOLLOW
);
return { filename , filepath , fh };
}
// Per-(IP, sessionId) token buckets for paste-image. Images: 30/min. Videos: 3/min,
// a much lower rate because one video can be up to MAX_PASTE_VIDEO_BYTES (1GB), so the
// 30/min cap would let a single authenticated client write 30GB of disk a minute; 3/min
// bounds that to 3GB. Bucket entries are pruned when they drift > 1h stale to bound
// memory against a flood of unique IP keys.
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const PASTE_RATE_TOKENS = 30 ;
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const VIDEO_RATE_TOKENS = 3 ;
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const PASTE_BUCKET_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000 ;
const PASTE_BUCKET_GC_THRESHOLD = 1000 ;
const pasteRateBuckets = new Map < string , { tokens : number ; lastRefill : number }>();
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const videoRateBuckets = new Map < string , { tokens : number ; lastRefill : number }>();
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function takeToken (
buckets : Map < string , { tokens : number ; lastRefill : number }>,
key : string ,
capacity : number ,
now : number
) : boolean {
if ( buckets . size > PASTE_BUCKET_GC_THRESHOLD ) {
for ( const [ k , b ] of buckets ) {
if ( now - b . lastRefill > PASTE_BUCKET_TTL_MS ) buckets . delete ( k );
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}
}
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let b = buckets . get ( key );
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if ( ! b ) {
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b = { tokens : capacity , lastRefill : now };
buckets . set ( key , b );
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}
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b . tokens = Math . min ( capacity , b . tokens + ( now - b . lastRefill ) * ( capacity / 60 _000 ));
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b . lastRefill = now ;
if ( b . tokens < 1 ) return false ;
b . tokens -= 1 ;
return true ;
}
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export function consumePasteToken ( key : string , now : number = Date . now ()) : boolean {
return takeToken ( pasteRateBuckets , key , PASTE_RATE_TOKENS , now );
}
// Videos stream to disk under a far larger per-file cap, so they draw on their own,
// much lower bucket (see the comment above the constants).
export function consumeVideoToken ( key : string , now : number = Date . now ()) : boolean {
return takeToken ( videoRateBuckets , key , VIDEO_RATE_TOKENS , now );
}
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// Test hook: reset between runs.
export function _resetPasteRateBuckets () : void {
pasteRateBuckets . clear ();
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videoRateBuckets . clear ();
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}
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/**
* Security (multi-user §6.3): the Claude-only permission-mode downgrade does not
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* cover the other CLIs' bypass switches. Codex `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox`,
* Gemini `--approval-mode yolo`, and Antigravity `--dangerously-skip-permissions` disable
* the safety classifier the non-granted-user downgrade is meant to keep on, so clamp them
* for a non-granted owner. buildGeminiCommand defaults an ABSENT approvalMode to yolo, so
* the gemini config must be MATERIALIZED (auto_edit) even when the request sent none.
* Antigravity is like Codex: an ABSENT config already defaults safe (no bypass flag), so
* only a sent config needs the flag forced off. No-op in single-user mode / for a granted
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* owner (canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands returns true when !isMultiUserMode()).
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*
* Pi has no permission prompts at all, so there is no bypass switch to clamp; its
* privilege-shaped knob is `approveProjectTrust`, which makes pi LOAD AND EXECUTE
* repo-local `.pi/extensions` TypeScript and npm-install missing project packages.
* Pi joins the gemini-style MATERIALIZE branch, not the codex/antigravity
* only-if-sent one: pi's absent-config default is an interactive trust prompt the
* session user could simply answer "yes" to in the terminal, so merely omitting
* `--approve` is not a clamp. Forcing `approveProjectTrust: false` makes
* buildPiCommand emit `--no-approve`, and the prompt never appears.
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*
* Grok is like Codex/Antigravity: the bypass switch is `alwaysApprove`
* (`--always-approve`), and an ABSENT config already spawns in grok's own
* ask-mode default, so only a sent config needs the flag forced off.
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*
* DeepSeek joins the same only-if-sent branch, but its switch is not a flag: the
* harness has no command-line permission option, and its sandbox/approval rows
* read `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE`. Omitting that export leaves the harness on its own
* `workspace-write` preset, which still asks, so an absent config is already
* safe; a sent one is forced down to `workspace-write` rather than to
* `read-only`, because the clamp exists to remove PRIVILEGE, not to break a
* session's ability to edit its own workspace.
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*/
async function clampExternalCliBypassForOwner (
owner : string | undefined ,
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configs : Record < string , unknown >
) : Promise < Record < string , unknown >> {
if ( await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands ( owner )) return configs ;
const out = { ... configs };
for ( const entry of enabledClis ()) {
const field = entry . launch . legacyConfigField ;
if ( ! field ) continue ;
// `privilegedParams[].param` names the REGISTRY param, so it has to be translated to the
// legacy wire field on the way out — the same `legacyConfigAliases` hop `configSetenvValues`
// already makes. Writing `param` straight through would put it in a DIFFERENT namespace
// from every other `param` in the schema, and a name that is right in one and wrong in the
// other is a SILENT no-op: no load error, no failing test, the clamp simply stops clamping.
// Codex is where the two names differ (`bypassApprovals` vs `dangerouslyBypassApprovals`),
// and `schema.ts` refuses an entry naming a param it never declared.
const aliases = entry . launch . legacyConfigAliases ?? {};
const existing = out [ field ] as Record < string , unknown > | undefined ;
let next = existing ;
for ( const { param , clampTo , materializeWhenAbsent } of entry . capabilities . privilegedParams ) {
// MATERIALIZE vs ONLY-IF-SENT is the whole design of this clamp, and the two are not
// interchangeable — see CliCapabilities.privilegedParams. Materialize where the CLI's
// own absent-config default is ITSELF unsafe (gemini defaults to yolo; pi's default is
// an interactive trust prompt the session user could just answer "yes" to), so a
// caller who sends no config at all still gets clamped.
if ( next === undefined && ! materializeWhenAbsent ) continue ;
next = { ...( next ?? {}), [ aliases [ param ] ?? param ] : clampTo };
}
if ( next !== existing ) out [ field ] = next ;
}
return out ;
}
/**
* Test hook, and the positional shape the clamp has always been called with in tests.
*
* The clamp itself is now generic over the registry, which is what makes a CUSTOM CLI's
* privileged flag clampable with no code here — previously the five config objects were
* named individually, so `privilegedParams` on anything outside that list was declared but
* unreachable.
*/
export async function _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner (
owner : string | undefined ,
codexConfig? : CodexConfig ,
geminiConfig? : GeminiConfig ,
antigravityConfig? : AntigravityConfig ,
piConfig? : PiConfig ,
grokConfig? : GrokConfig ,
deepSeekConfig? : DeepSeekConfig
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) : Promise < {
codexConfig : CodexConfig | undefined ;
geminiConfig : GeminiConfig | undefined ;
antigravityConfig : AntigravityConfig | undefined ;
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piConfig : PiConfig | undefined ;
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grokConfig : GrokConfig | undefined ;
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deepSeekConfig : DeepSeekConfig | undefined ;
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} > {
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const out = await clampExternalCliBypassForOwner ( owner , {
codexConfig ,
geminiConfig ,
antigravityConfig ,
piConfig ,
grokConfig ,
deepSeekConfig ,
});
return out as {
codexConfig : CodexConfig | undefined ;
geminiConfig : GeminiConfig | undefined ;
antigravityConfig : AntigravityConfig | undefined ;
piConfig : PiConfig | undefined ;
grokConfig : GrokConfig | undefined ;
deepSeekConfig : DeepSeekConfig | undefined ;
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};
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}
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/** Test hook: the env-var half of the same multi-user safety gate. */
export const _clampEnvOverridesForOwner = clampEnvOverridesForOwner ;
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Agent wait helpers (shared by GET /wait, GET /wait-output, POST /input)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/**
* Validate a wait query WITHOUT throwing away the Zod issue.
*
* `parseBody`'s message argument REPLACES the issue text, so `?timeout=30s` came
* back as a bare "Invalid wait parameters": the caller could not tell which of
* `until`, `timeout` or `fresh` it got wrong, and its only move was to retry with
* a different guess. These endpoints are driven by an LLM with no documentation in
* context — the error message IS the documentation, which is why the signal parser
* one line later goes to the trouble of naming the bad token and listing the valid
* ones. This keeps the endpoint label AND names the offending field.
*/
function parseWaitQuery < T >( schema : z.ZodType < T >, query : unknown , label : string ) : T {
const result = schema . safeParse ( query );
if ( result . success ) return result . data ;
const issue = result . error . issues [ 0 ];
const field = issue && issue . path . length > 0 ? issue . path . join ( '.' ) : '' ;
const detail = issue ? . message ?? 'validation failed' ;
const message = field ? `Invalid ${ label } parameter ' ${ field } ': ${ detail } ` : `Invalid ${ label } parameters: ${ detail } ` ;
throw Object . assign ( new Error ( message ), {
statusCode : 400 ,
body : createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , message ),
});
}
/**
* Map a waiter-cap rejection to the code that tells the caller the truth.
*
* The two caps mean different things and warrant different recovery: `session` is
* genuinely about THIS session, while `owner` and `total` are process-wide budgets
* that say nothing about it. Reporting a global cap as `SESSION_BUSY` (409,
* documented as "Session is busy") sent an agent off to a different session to hit
* the identical error. `RATE_LIMITED` is the code whose whole meaning is "come back
* later", and clients and proxies already treat 429 that way.
*/
function waitCapacityResponse ( err : WaitCapacityError ) : ApiResponse < never > {
const code = err . scope === 'session' ? ApiErrorCode.SESSION_BUSY : ApiErrorCode.RATE_LIMITED ;
// The registry's message already names the scope and the limit; passing it through
// verbatim keeps the wording in one place.
return createErrorResponse ( code , err . message );
}
/**
* The signal a session is ALREADY emitting, corrected for liveness.
*
* `signalForStatus` alone is not enough here, because `Session` parks a DEAD PTY at
* `_status = 'idle'` (both `onExit` handlers do) and the object survives in the
* session map until an explicit DELETE. Trusting the status therefore answers the
* default wait with `{signal:"idle", immediate:true}` for a worker that has
* crashed — HTTP 200, no error anywhere, and the agent types its next prompt into a
* corpse — while `until=exit` blocks for the full timeout on an event that already
* happened and can never happen again.
*
* `pid === null` means no process is behind this session: it exited, it was
* detached, or it was created and never started. All three are `exit` from a
* caller's point of view — nothing is running — and in all three the agent's
* correct next move is to (re)start the worker rather than to type at it. The
* response still carries the raw `status` alongside, so nothing is hidden.
*
* ⚠️ `pid` alone is NOT enough, and on the normal configuration it is never the
* thing that fires — see `workerIsDead()`. `dead` carries the mux layer's answer.
*
* Fixing it HERE rather than in `signalForStatus` is deliberate: liveness is not
* derivable from `SessionStatus`, and the registry holds no `Session` reference.
*/
function currentSignalFor ( session : { pid : number | null ; status : SessionStatus }, dead : boolean ) : WaitSignal | null {
if ( dead || session . pid === null || session . pid === undefined ) return 'exit' ;
return signalForStatus ( session . status );
}
// ── Worker liveness for tmux-backed sessions ────────────────────────────────
//
// `session.pid` is the LOCAL `tmux attach` client, not the worker. Codeman sets
// `remain-on-exit on` for every session it creates, so when the command inside the
// pane exits, tmux keeps the pane (`pane_dead=1`), the tmux session survives, the
// attach client keeps running and `pid` never goes null — no `exit` event is emitted
// and nothing in `Session` changes. Measured on a shell worker killed with `exit 42`:
// tmux reports `pane_dead=1 status=42` while Codeman reports `pid=309406 status=idle`
// and the DEFAULT wait answers `{signal:"idle", immediate:true}` in 0 ms for a corpse.
// So the liveness check has to ask the mux layer. `pid === null` still matters: it is
// the right (and only) answer for a direct-PTY session, which has no pane to ask about.
//
// Cost control, because `isPaneDead()` is a synchronous `execSync` and `/wait` is
// polled in a loop by design:
// 1. Only mux-backed sessions are probed at all.
// 2. Only requests that actually wait probe — a plain `POST .../input` (the browser's
// hot path, thousands per session) never touches tmux.
// 3. Results are cached per pane for PANE_DEATH_TTL_MS, so a poll loop cannot turn
// into one exec per request.
// 4. The while-blocked watcher is ONE timer per session no matter how many waiters
// are parked on it, and it exists only while at least one of them is.
/** How long a pane-liveness probe is reused. Long enough to absorb a poll loop. */
const PANE_DEATH_TTL_MS = 750 ;
/** How often a session with a parked waiter is re-checked for a dead worker. */
const PANE_DEATH_POLL_MS = 3 _000 ;
/** Bounded, because a 24h server churns through panes. */
const paneDeathCache = new LRUMap < string , { dead : boolean ; at : number }>({ maxSize : 256 });
/** One watcher per pane, refcounted by the waits currently parked on it. */
const paneDeathWatchers = new Map < string , { timer : NodeJS.Timeout ; refs : number }>();
type LivenessSession = { usesMux? : boolean ; muxName? : string | null };
/**
* Whether the worker inside this session's tmux pane has exited.
*
* False for anything not tmux-backed (nothing to ask), and false when the probe is
* unavailable or throws — an unknown answer must never invent a death.
*/
function workerIsDead ( mux : InfraPort [ 'mux' ], session : LivenessSession , now : number = Date . now ()) : boolean {
const muxName = session . usesMux === false ? null : session . muxName ;
if ( ! muxName ) return false ;
// Defensive: `TerminalMultiplexer` declares it, but route-test doubles may not.
if ( typeof mux ? . isPaneDead !== 'function' ) return false ;
const cached = paneDeathCache . get ( muxName );
if ( cached && now - cached . at < PANE_DEATH_TTL_MS ) return cached . dead ;
let dead = false ;
try {
dead = mux . isPaneDead ( muxName ) === true ;
} catch {
dead = false ;
}
paneDeathCache . set ( muxName , { dead , at : now });
return dead ;
}
/**
* Release every waiter on a session whose worker has died, in the documented order.
*
* The same pair the PTY-exit listener and the delete path use, for the same reason:
* `until=exit` callers get their signal, everyone else gets `ended: true` instead of
* burning the rest of their timeout on feeds that will never produce anything.
*/
function releaseWaitersForDeadWorker ( sessionId : string ) : void {
sessionWaits . notifySignal ( sessionId , 'exit' );
sessionWaits . cancelAll ( sessionId );
}
/**
* While a wait is parked on a mux-backed session, poll for the worker dying.
*
* Without this, a worker that dies DURING a wait is invisible: no `exit` event fires
* (the attach client is still alive), no output arrives, and the caller blocks for its
* full timeout — the common orchestration case, "send a prompt and wait", where the
* worker crashes mid-turn.
*
* @returns a release function; call it in a `finally`, or the timer outlives the wait.
*/
function watchForDeadWorker ( mux : InfraPort [ 'mux' ], session : LivenessSession , sessionId : string ) : () => void {
const muxName = session . usesMux === false ? null : session . muxName ;
if ( ! muxName || typeof mux ? . isPaneDead !== 'function' ) return () => {};
const existing = paneDeathWatchers . get ( muxName );
if ( existing ) {
existing . refs ++ ;
} else {
const timer = setInterval (() => {
if ( ! workerIsDead ( mux , session )) return ;
releaseWaitersForDeadWorker ( sessionId );
}, PANE_DEATH_POLL_MS );
// Auxiliary to the waiter's own timer, which is deliberately NOT unref'd; this one
// must never be the reason the process stays up.
timer . unref ();
paneDeathWatchers . set ( muxName , { timer , refs : 1 });
}
let released = false ;
return () => {
if ( released ) return ;
released = true ;
const entry = paneDeathWatchers . get ( muxName );
if ( ! entry ) return ;
entry . refs -- ;
if ( entry . refs <= 0 ) {
clearInterval ( entry . timer );
paneDeathWatchers . delete ( muxName );
}
};
}
/** Test seam: pane-liveness state is module-level, so a suite must be able to reset it. */
export function _resetPaneLivenessState () : void {
for ( const entry of paneDeathWatchers . values ()) clearInterval ( entry . timer );
paneDeathWatchers . clear ();
paneDeathCache . clear ();
}
/** Test seam: how many panes are currently being watched for a dead worker. */
export function _paneDeathWatcherCount () : number {
return paneDeathWatchers . size ;
}
/**
* An `AbortController` that fires when the CLIENT goes away, and only then.
*
* Freeing an abandoned waiter matters because the documented pattern is a loop of
* short waits: `curl --max-time 30 ".../wait?timeout=600000"` abandons a live waiter
* every iteration until the cap is hit and an innocent session reports busy. Same for
* any proxy that cuts the connection.
*
* ⚠️ **It must listen on the RESPONSE, not the request.** `req.raw` emits `'close'`
* as soon as the request body has finished streaming, which on a POST is BEFORE the
* handler ever blocks — measured at +1ms with `aborted: false`, indistinguishable
* from a real hang-up at +0ms. Wiring the abort there cancels every send-and-wait
* instantly and silently kills the feature (it survives on GET only because a GET has
* no body to finish). `reply.raw` emits `'close'` both when the response completes
* and when the socket dies, and `writableFinished` is what tells those apart: true
* only if the response actually went out. The guard is load-bearing, not defensive.
*
* `app.inject()` never emits `'close'` at all, so this is only observable over real
* HTTP — which is why the regression test for it binds a port.
*/
function abortOnClientHangUp ( reply : FastifyReply ) : AbortController {
const controller = new AbortController ();
reply . raw . on ( 'close' , () => {
if ( ! reply . raw . writableFinished ) controller . abort ();
});
return controller ;
}
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/**
* Inject the agent skill into a case on create, surfacing only the REFUSALS.
*
* `applyAgentSkill` declines two shapes rather than writing through them ('foreign':
* an unmarked skills/codeman the user authored; 'symlink': the skill dir or its
* parent is a link). Both were silent: the user flips `agentSkillEnabled` on, nothing
* appears in the case, and there is nowhere to look for why. The ordinary outcomes
* ('installed'/'refreshed'/'unchanged') stay unlogged since they would print on every
* single session create.
*
* Injection is best-effort and stays that way: neither a refusal nor a thrown error
* may fail the create.
*/
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async function injectAgentSkill ( casePath : string , dir : AgentSkillDir ) : Promise < void > {
const skillDir = agentSkillDirFor ( casePath , dir );
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try {
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// Claude Code loads a same-named USER-LEVEL skill (`~/.claude/skills/codeman`,
// written once by `codeman skill install`) over the case copy injected below, so a
// stale user copy silently replaces every fresh injection (observed 2026-08-14: an
// old copy cost every spawned worker its lineage arc and the fast path). Keep it
// current on the same trigger. Refresh-only + marker-guarded; quiet on refusal,
// since a foreign user copy is the user's own authored skill, not a config error.
await refreshUserAgentSkill ();
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const result = await applyAgentSkill ( casePath , true , dir );
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if ( result === 'foreign' ) {
console . warn (
`[agent-skill] not injected: ${ skillDir } exists but is not Codeman-managed (no marker), refusing to touch it. Remove that copy if you want the packaged skill there.`
);
} else if ( result === 'symlink' ) {
console . warn (
`[agent-skill] not injected: ${ skillDir } (or its parent) is a symlink, refusing to write through it. Replace it with a real directory to let Codeman install the skill.`
);
}
} catch ( err : unknown ) {
console . warn ( `[agent-skill] injection failed for ${ skillDir } : ${ getErrorMessage ( err ) } ` );
}
}
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// Workspace hooks: the install-vs-refresh decision core moved to
// `applyWorkspaceHooks` in hooks-config.ts (imported above) so the non-route
// claude create paths — cron fires, legacy scheduled runs, the plan-orchestrator
// one-shots, the boot recovery sweep — share the SAME decision instead of
// bypassing the `workspaceHooksEnabled` setting. Route handlers here resolve the
// setting through the ConfigPort (tests stub it) and pass it as the second arg.
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/**
* A "Resume"/"continue" request for a NEW omp-mode session (the frontend's
* resumeHistorySession(), or anyone hitting the API directly) carries
* `continueSession: true` but no id — omp has none to give it, since Codeman
* has never tracked its own conversation UUID. Left as `--continue`, that
* picks whichever session file in the directory is newest, which silently
* drifts to the WRONG conversation the moment a second omp session (this
* one, a sibling worker, a stray manual run) has touched the same directory
* more recently. Resolve the real id up front instead, same as the
* dead-pane-respawn path in session.ts does, so even the FIRST relaunch of a
* resumed conversation is pinned rather than guessed.
*/
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export function resolveOmpConfigForCreate (
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mode : SessionMode ,
workingDir : string ,
ompConfig : OmpConfig | undefined
) : OmpConfig | undefined {
if ( mode !== 'omp' ) return undefined ;
if ( ! ompConfig || ompConfig . resumeSessionId || ! ompConfig . continueSession ) {
return ompConfig ;
}
const resolvedId = findLatestOmpSessionId ( workingDir );
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if ( ! resolvedId ) {
console . warn (
`[Session] OMP: no session file found under ${ workingDir } to pin --resume; falling back to ambiguous --continue`
);
}
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return resolvedId ? { ... ompConfig , resumeSessionId : resolvedId } : ompConfig ;
}
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/**
* The tmux history lines a full capture may read (`capture-pane -S -<n>`): the
* optional `lines` query parameter, an integer of at least 1, never more than
* the configured history limit; absent or malformed, the limit itself, as
* before. A grid tile sends its own scrollback size: its xterm keeps no more
* than that, while a capture of the whole history (tens of thousands of lines,
* cut to `tail` only afterwards) is synchronous work on this event loop.
*/
function captureHistoryLines ( raw : string | undefined , historyLimit : number ) : number {
if ( typeof raw !== 'string' || ! /^\d{1,9}$/ . test ( raw )) return historyLimit ;
const lines = Number ( raw );
return lines >= 1 ? Math . min ( lines , historyLimit ) : historyLimit ;
}
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/**
* `RemoteHost` → the wake registry's host shape. They differ in one field name only
* (`id` in host config vs `hostId` on a session's `remote`), but the rename is load-
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* bearing: the registry keys its per-host wake state on `hostId`. The proxy fields
* travel too: they are what tells the registry its probe cannot reach this host.
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*/
function wakeableHost ( host : RemoteHost ) : WakeableRemote {
return {
hostId : host.id ,
label : host.label ,
host : host.host ,
port : host.port ,
wakeMac : host.wakeMac ,
wakeCommand : host.wakeCommand ,
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jumpHost : host.jumpHost ,
socksProxy : host.socksProxy ,
extraSshOptions : host.extraSshOptions ,
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};
}
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export function registerSessionRoutes (
app : FastifyInstance ,
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ctx : SessionPort & EventPort & ConfigPort & InfraPort & AuthPort & TabLayoutPort ,
/** Test seam: inject a registry with fake IO instead of the real TCP/WoL probes. */
options : { remoteWake? : RemoteWakeRegistry } = {}
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) : RemoteWakeRegistry {
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// Wake-on-LAN for sleeping remote hosts (see remote-wake.ts). One registry per
// route registration (= one web server) — the same shape as the process-wide
// `sessionWaits` singleton, but without the global.
//
// ⚠️ The ONLY caller that may wake a host is the input route below. The
// auto-reconnect watcher and boot recovery deliberately have no access to this
// registry: waking there would re-wake the host seconds after every suspend, so
// it could never stay asleep.
const remoteWake =
options . remoteWake ??
new RemoteWakeRegistry (
createDefaultRemoteWakeDeps ({
noteReconnected : ( sessionId , success ) => {
// Duck-typed exactly like server.ts: TmuxManager owns the COD-108 backoff
// state, and the port interface does not expose it.
const mux = ctx . mux as unknown as { noteRemoteReconnect ?: ( id : string , ok : boolean ) => void };
mux . noteRemoteReconnect ? .( sessionId , success );
},
broadcast : ( event , payload ) => ctx . broadcast ( event , payload ),
log : ( message ) => console . log ( message ),
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// The session's `remote` block is a launch-time snapshot, so a wake target
// configured later (banner's config dialog, or a hand-edited remote-hosts.json)
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// is resolved here — throttled by the registry, and the host config is
// authoritative in BOTH directions (removing the field turns the feature off
// for a live session too).
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resolveRemote : async ( session ) => {
const remote = session . remote ;
if ( ! remote ) return undefined ;
const hosts = await readRemoteHosts ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR );
return rehydrateRemoteHostFields ( remote , new Map ( hosts . map (( host ) => [ host . id , host ])));
},
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})
);
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Auth
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// ========== Logout ==========
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app . post ( '/api/logout' , async ( req , reply ) => {
// Invalidate server-side session token (not just the browser cookie)
const sessionToken = req . cookies [ AUTH_COOKIE_NAME ];
if ( sessionToken ) {
ctx . authSessions ? . delete ( sessionToken );
}
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// The web-tab proxy authenticates on capabilities, not on this cookie, so a
// logout has to retire them too or every dashboard URL opened during this
// login keeps relaying without one (WebviewCapabilityStore.revokeOwner).
webviewCapabilities . revokeOwner ( ownerFor ( req ));
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reply . clearCookie ( AUTH_COOKIE_NAME , { path : '/' });
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return {};
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});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Session CRUD (list, create, rename, color, delete, detail)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// ========== Session Listing ==========
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app . get ( '/api/sessions' , async ( req ) => {
const list = ctx . getLightSessionsState ();
if ( ! isMultiUserMode ()) return list ;
const user = getAuthUser ( req );
if ( user . role === 'admin' ) return list ;
return ( list as Array < { owner? : string } > ). filter (( s ) => canAccessOwned ( user , s . owner ));
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});
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// ========== Legacy Session Tab Order (temporary synchronized compatibility bridge) ==========
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app . put ( '/api/session-order' , async ( req , reply ) : Promise < ApiResponse < { order : string [] }> > => {
try {
const { order } = parseBody ( SessionOrderUpdateSchema , req . body , 'Invalid session order' );
const user = getAuthUser ( req );
const result = await ctx . tabLayouts . putLegacyOrder (
{ owner : ownerLayoutKey ( ownerFor ( req )), isAdmin : user.role === 'admin' },
order
);
return { success : true , data : { order : result.order } };
} catch ( error ) {
if ( error instanceof TabLayoutValidationError ) {
return reply . code ( 400 ). send ( createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , error . message ));
}
throw error ;
}
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});
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// ========== Session Creation ==========
app . post ( '/api/sessions' , async ( req ) => {
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const owner = ownerFor ( req );
// Global + per-user session cap.
const capMsg = sessionCapacityMessage ( ctx . sessions , owner );
if ( capMsg ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , capMsg );
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const body = parseBody ( CreateSessionSchema , req . body );
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// The top-level `model` is Claude's per-session `--model`. Every other CLI takes its model
// in its own config object (`codexConfig.model` and so on), so a `model` here would be
// dropped without a word; refuse it before anything is written for the session.
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if ( body . model && ! cliTakesSessionModel ( body . mode ?? 'claude' )) {
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return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
'model applies to claude sessions only; other CLIs take their model in their own config object, such as codexConfig.model'
);
}
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// An attach launches nothing (the remote agent is already running), so a launch model
// or advisor would be dropped the same way, so both are refused, as they have been since
// they were added. The older launch fields (effort, envOverrides) predate this and keep
// their silent ignore here, since refusing them now would break existing callers.
if ( body . attachRemoteSession && ( body . model || body . advisorModel )) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
'model and advisorModel shape a new launch, and attachRemoteSession launches nothing; leave them out when attaching'
);
}
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let workingDir = body . workingDir || process . cwd ();
let remote = undefined ;
// COD-105 — attach to a discovered (non-owned) remote tmux session. The
// remote session is already running, so we skip the tmux-prereq probe and
// build a NON-owned SessionRemote (detach-not-kill on close). Remote CASE
// creation (owned durable sessions) is handled by the dedicated case-create
// endpoint below, which #145 consolidated remote-host resolution into.
if ( body . attachRemoteSession ) {
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// Remote hosts are admin-only infrastructure everywhere else (the list answers
// `[]` to a non-admin; write and discovery routes are `adminOnly`), and the wake
// below spawns the host's `wakeCommand` or broadcasts a packet. So the gate comes
// FIRST — before the host is even looked up — or an unprivileged account could
// invoke that executable for any configured `hostId` and only then be told the
// workingDir was outside its workspace (reproduced upstream: wake spy fired, 403).
if ( isMultiUserMode () && ! isAdmin ( req )) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . FORBIDDEN , 'Remote hosts are admin-only in multi-user mode' );
}
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const { hostId , remoteSessionName } = body . attachRemoteSession ;
const host = ( await readRemoteHosts ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR )). find (( item ) => item . id === hostId );
if ( ! host ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . NOT_FOUND , 'Remote host not found' );
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// An explicit wake request is the only thing that may wake a host, and the user
// pressing Attach IS one (see quick-start for the same gate, and
// `remote-wake.ts` for what must never call this). Without it a sleeping host
// answers with an ssh failure that blames anything but the machine being asleep.
const hostWake = await remoteWake . ensureHostAwake ( wakeableHost ( host ), {
timeoutMs : REMOTE_WAKE_REQUEST_READY_TIMEOUT_MS ,
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// No session yet, so the wake events name their requester (multi-user routing).
requestedBy : ownerFor ( req ),
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});
if ( hostWake === 'failed' ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
` ${ host . label } did not come back after a wake-on-LAN request — nothing was attached`
);
}
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workingDir = ` ${ host . username } @ ${ host . host } : ${ remoteSessionName } ` ;
remote = toAttachedSessionRemote ( host , remoteSessionName , workingDir );
}
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// Multi-user: shell mode is arbitrary command execution as the host account,
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// gated behind the same grant as bypass (section 6.3). Resolve the owner's grant
// from the store so a GRANTED regular user is not wrongly denied (AuthUser role alone can't tell).
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if (
getCli ( body . mode ?? 'claude' ) ? . capabilities . privilegedCommandGate &&
! ( await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands ( owner ))
) {
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return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . FORBIDDEN , 'Shell sessions require the can-bypass-permissions grant' );
}
// Multi-user linchpin (section 6.2): a non-admin's workingDir must resolve
// inside their own case space. Enforced BEFORE any disk-mutating call below so
// a foreign path can never be written into.
if ( ! isWorkingDirAllowed ( getAuthUser ( req ), workingDir )) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . FORBIDDEN , 'workingDir is outside your workspace' );
}
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// Validate workingDir exists and is a directory. Bounded: a workingDir on a
// network mount that stopped answering must not freeze the event loop, and
// "did not answer" is reported as such, never as "does not exist".
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if ( body . workingDir ) {
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const kind = await probePathKind ( workingDir , { pastCap : true });
if ( kind === 'unknown' ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
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describeUnknownPath ( 'workingDir' , workingDir , { pastCap : true })
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);
}
if ( kind === 'absent' ) {
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return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'workingDir does not exist' );
}
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if ( kind !== 'directory' ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'workingDir is not a directory' );
}
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}
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// envOverrides flow through Session → tmux setenv (ephemeral, per-session).
//
// For keys the caller is actively setting, strip any stale disk entry a prior
// Codeman version may have written. Scope limited to:
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// - Claude mode (OpenCode/Codex/Gemini/Antigravity don't read .claude/settings.local.json)
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// - workingDir inside CASES_DIR / the per-user case space (Codeman's managed
// territory — we never mutate .claude/settings.local.json in arbitrary user
// repos that POST /api/sessions can target, as those may have hand-authored
// values).
const managedCasesBase = resolveCasesDir ( getAuthUser ( req ));
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// `!isExternalCliMode()` is byte-identical to the eight-mode `!==` chain it replaces
// (claude and shell are the two non-external modes) and, unlike the chain, cannot fall
// behind the next CLI added.
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const canStripDisk =
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! isExternalCliMode ( body . mode ?? 'claude' ) &&
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body . envOverrides &&
Object . keys ( body . envOverrides ). length > 0 &&
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( workingDir . startsWith ( CASES_DIR + '/' ) || workingDir . startsWith ( managedCasesBase + '/' ));
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if ( canStripDisk ) {
await stripCaseEnvKeys ( workingDir , Object . keys ( body . envOverrides ! ));
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}
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// Write model override to .claude/settings.local.json if provided
if ( body . modelOverride !== undefined ) {
await updateCaseModel ( workingDir , body . modelOverride || null );
}
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// Plan-usage telemetry (App Settings → header chip): no request-time field
// here anymore, and NO disk write — a settings.local.json statusLine used
// to take precedence over the user's own global/project statusLine for ANY
// `claude` run in that directory, including entirely outside Codeman, with
// no disclosure and no way to undo it (real bug, found 2026-08-31).
// TmuxManager.createSession reads the persisted `showPlanUsageLimits`
// setting FRESH at spawn (readPlanUsageTelemetryEnabled in hooks-config.ts)
// and resolves it into an EPHEMERAL `claude --settings` CLI flag — never
// written to disk, so a plain `claude` run outside Codeman is untouched —
// and applies uniformly to every claude creation path (this route, cron,
// the Ralph Loop API, quick-start), not just this one. That resolution
// also self-heals: it strips any legacy disk-written exporter an older
// Codeman build left behind.
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// Hooks for the workspace this session runs in (install vs refresh-only is the
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// `workspaceHooksEnabled` setting; see applyWorkspaceHooks). Never for a remote
// attach (workingDir is a user@host:session pseudo-path — mkdir would create it
// as a junk local dir), and only when the caller named a workingDir: the
// process-cwd fallback is $HOME under installer-created services, and hooks
// materializing in ~/.claude/settings.local.json was never asked for.
if ( ! remote && body . workingDir && ( body . mode ?? 'claude' ) === 'claude' ) {
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await applyWorkspaceHooks ( workingDir , await ctx . getWorkspaceHooksEnabled ());
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}
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// Refuse up front if the requested CLI cannot start, rather than spawning a pane that
// dies on `command not found`. The message comes from the resolver, so it names where
// resolution actually looked (server PATH, login shell, the entry's search dirs); a
// LAUNCHER CLI answers with its own more specific reason instead — for dsh, whether the
// binary is missing, no pane-capable profile exists, or the profile the caller NAMED
// cannot drive a pane, which are three different things to go and fix.
//
// Scoped to EXTERNAL CLIs, matching what this route has always pre-flighted: claude and
// shell deliberately fall through to tmux-manager's own not-found throw instead, and
// pulling them forward here would change which error a missing claude produces.
const requestedMode = body . mode ?? 'claude' ;
if ( getCli ( requestedMode ) ? . capabilities . external ) {
const cliLaunchError = await resolveCliLaunchError (
requestedMode ,
legacyConfigForMode ( requestedMode , body as unknown as Record < string , unknown >)
);
if ( cliLaunchError ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , cliLaunchError );
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}
}
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// Agent skill (docs/agent-control-plan.md §2): ADD-ONLY on create, same shared-
// workspace rationale as the statusLine above: a create must never remove the
// skill from under other live sessions in the repo. Marker-guarded, so a user's
// own copy is never touched. Every CLI that takes the skill gets it in the directory
// that CLI scans (`capabilities.agentSkillDir`); the same remote and named-workingDir
// conditions as the hooks above, and only once the launch pre-flight passed, so a
// CLI that cannot start leaves nothing in the workspace.
const createSkillDir = agentSkillDir ( getCli ( body . mode ?? 'claude' ) ? . capabilities );
if ( ! remote && body . workingDir && createSkillDir && ( await ctx . getAgentSkillEnabled ())) {
await injectAgentSkill ( workingDir , createSkillDir );
}
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// Pre-validate resumeSessionId: check that the conversation file actually exists
// in Claude's projects directory. If not, skip resume to avoid confusing
// "No conversation found" errors from Claude CLI.
let validatedResumeId = body . resumeSessionId ;
if ( validatedResumeId ) {
const projectsDir = join ( process . env . HOME || '/tmp' , '.claude' , 'projects' );
let found = false ;
try {
const projectDirs = await fs . readdir ( projectsDir );
for ( const projDir of projectDirs ) {
const sessionFile = join ( projectsDir , projDir , ` ${ validatedResumeId } .jsonl` );
try {
const stat = await fs . stat ( sessionFile );
if ( stat . size > 4000 ) {
found = true ;
break ;
}
} catch {
// File doesn't exist in this project dir
}
}
} catch {
// Projects dir doesn't exist
}
if ( ! found ) {
console . log ( `[Session] Resume session ${ validatedResumeId } not found on disk, starting fresh` );
validatedResumeId = undefined ;
}
}
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const globalNice = await ctx . getGlobalNiceConfig ();
const modelConfig = await ctx . getModelConfig ();
const mode = body . mode || 'claude' ;
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// Synced App Settings launch defaults (capabilities.launchDefaults, codex's model and
// effort today) fill the CLI's own config object where the caller left it unset.
// Local launches only: a remote attach runs whatever the remote pane already runs.
const launchBody = remote ? body : await applyLaunchDefaults ( mode , body );
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// Where a model override comes from is a capability, and the three answers are
// genuinely different mechanisms:
// 'flag' — the CLI takes --model, so read the value the caller sent
// in that CLI's own config object.
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// 'claude-settings-file' — claude alone, whose persistent model is written to
// <case>/.claude/settings.local.json (`modelOverride`). A
// per-session `model` from the caller goes out as --model and
// wins; without one, the app-wide default applies.
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// 'none' — shell has no model; deepseek's is a composition entry in
// the profile's config tree, not a session field
// (docs/deepseek-integration.md). Both get nothing.
const modelSource = getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . model ;
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const model =
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modelSource ? . source === 'flag'
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? ( legacyConfigForMode ( mode , launchBody as unknown as Record < string , unknown >) ? .[
modelSource . param ?? 'model'
] as string | undefined )
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: modelSource ? . source === 'claude-settings-file'
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? body . model || modelConfig ? . defaultModel || undefined
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: undefined ;
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const claudeModeConfig = await ctx . getClaudeModeConfig ();
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// Section 6.3: force non-granted users to a classifier-guarded mode.
const effectiveClaudeMode = await resolveClaudeModeForUsername ( claudeModeConfig . claudeMode , owner );
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// Section 6.3: clamp Codex/Gemini/Antigravity bypass switches for a non-granted owner (no-op single-user/granted).
const {
codexConfig : gatedCodexConfig ,
geminiConfig : gatedGeminiConfig ,
antigravityConfig : gatedAntigravityConfig ,
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piConfig : gatedPiConfig ,
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grokConfig : gatedGrokConfig ,
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deepSeekConfig : gatedDeepSeekConfig ,
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} = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner (
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owner ,
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launchBody . codexConfig ,
launchBody . geminiConfig ,
launchBody . antigravityConfig ,
launchBody . piConfig ,
launchBody . grokConfig ,
launchBody . deepSeekConfig
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);
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const terminalHistoryConfig = await ctx . getTerminalHistoryConfig ();
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const session = new Session ({
workingDir ,
mode ,
name : body.name || '' ,
mux : ctx.mux ,
useMux : true ,
niceConfig : globalNice ,
model ,
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claudeMode : effectiveClaudeMode ,
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allowedTools : claudeModeConfig.allowedTools ,
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openCodeConfig : mode === 'opencode' ? launchBody.openCodeConfig : undefined ,
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codexConfig : mode === 'codex' ? gatedCodexConfig : undefined ,
geminiConfig : mode === 'gemini' ? gatedGeminiConfig : undefined ,
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antigravityConfig : mode === 'antigravity' ? gatedAntigravityConfig : undefined ,
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piConfig : mode === 'pi' ? gatedPiConfig : undefined ,
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grokConfig : mode === 'grok' ? gatedGrokConfig : undefined ,
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deepSeekConfig : mode === 'deepseek' ? gatedDeepSeekConfig : undefined ,
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ompConfig : resolveOmpConfigForCreate ( mode , workingDir , launchBody . ompConfig ),
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resumeSessionId : validatedResumeId ,
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envOverrides : await clampEnvOverridesForOwner ( owner , body . envOverrides ),
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effort : body.effort ,
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advisorModel : body.advisorModel ,
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tmuxHistoryLimit : terminalHistoryConfig.tmuxHistoryLimit ,
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remote ,
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owner ,
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parentSessionId : resolveParentSessionId ( ctx , req , body . parentSessionId , owner ),
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});
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const tabLayout = body . tabGroupId
? await ctx . addSession ( session , { tabGroupId : body.tabGroupId })
: await ctx . addSession ( session );
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ctx . store . incrementSessionsCreated ();
ctx . persistSessionState ( session );
await ctx . setupSessionListeners ( session );
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// Pre-seed the agent skill's preamble cache so its §0 bootstrap is a two-line
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// loader (see seedAgentSessionPreamble). Local sessions of a CLI that takes the
// skill; best-effort.
if ( agentSkillDir ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities ) && ! remote && ( await ctx . getAgentSkillEnabled ())) {
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await seedAgentSessionPreamble ( session . id ). catch (( err : unknown ) =>
console . warn ( `[agent-skill] preamble seed failed for ${ session . id } : ${ getErrorMessage ( err ) } ` )
);
}
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getLifecycleLog (). log ({ event : 'created' , sessionId : session.id , name : session.name });
// Use light state for broadcast + response — buffers are fetched on-demand via /terminal.
// Avoids serializing 2-3MB of terminal+text buffers per session creation.
const lightState = ctx . getSessionStateWithRespawn ( session );
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionCreated , lightState );
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// A grouped creation also returns the layout that placed it, so the browser
// draws the tab inside its group at once instead of after a re-read.
return { session : lightState , ...( body . tabGroupId ? { tabLayout } : {}) };
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});
// ========== Rename Session ==========
app . put ( '/api/sessions/:id/name' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const body = parseBody ( SessionNameSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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const name = String ( body . name || '' ). slice ( 0 , MAX_SESSION_NAME_LENGTH );
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// A no-op rename (the Session Options name field saves on blur and recomposes the same
// string) must not flip nameSource to 'manual' or append a custom-title row to the transcript.
if ( name === session . name ) return { name : session.name };
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session . name = name ;
// Also update the mux session name if applicable
ctx . mux . updateSessionName ( id , session . name );
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persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
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await syncClaudeTitle ( session );
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return { name : session.name };
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});
// ========== Set Session Color ==========
app . put ( '/api/sessions/:id/color' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const body = parseBody ( SessionColorSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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const validColors = [ 'default' , 'red' , 'orange' , 'yellow' , 'green' , 'blue' , 'purple' , 'pink' ];
if ( ! validColors . includes ( body . color )) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'Invalid color' );
}
session . setColor ( body . color as SessionColor );
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persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
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return { color : session.color };
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});
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// ========== Custom Model Endpoint Profiles (docs/custom-model-endpoints-plan.md) ==========
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//
// Applies (or clears) a session's custom OpenAI-compatible endpoint selection and
// RESTARTS the pane's CLI process — these harnesses read endpoint config at process
// start, not per-turn, so a live hot-swap isn't possible (confirmed with the
// maintainer). Endpoints come from the admin-configured custom-model-hosts store
// (chunk 3's CRUD routes), never raw client-supplied env — that's what keeps this
// route safe to let any session owner call for their own session, unlike the
// generic envOverrides field the privilegedEnvKeys clamp exists to guard.
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//
// ⚠️ Local sessions only for now. A remote session's `restartCli()` renders
// `ssh ... tmux new-session -A`, which reattaches the durable remote tmux rather than
// restarting the agent, and the env lands on the LOCAL pane running ssh, which
// forwards nothing; docker is the same attach-or-create shape. Both used to answer
// `restarted: true` and change nothing, so they are refused until those paths are
// plumbed (the env would have to ride the remote/in-container launch command).
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/custom-model' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const body = parseBody ( CustomModelSelectionSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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if ( session . remote || session . docker ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
'Custom model endpoints are not supported for remote (SSH) or Docker sessions yet'
);
}
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if ( session . isBusy ()) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . SESSION_BUSY , 'Session is busy' );
}
if ( 'clear' in body ) {
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const { previousConfigDir } = session . setCustomModel ( undefined );
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removeConfigDir ( previousConfigDir );
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const restarted = await session . restartCli ();
persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
return { customModel : session.customModel , restarted };
}
const entry = getCli ( session . mode );
if ( ! entry ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , `No CLI registry entry for mode ${ session . mode } ` );
}
if ( entry . capabilities . customModelInjection . kind === 'unsupported' ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , ` ${ session . mode } has no known custom-model mechanism` );
}
const hosts = await readCustomModelHosts ( getDataDir ());
const endpoint = hosts . find (( h ) => h . id === body . endpointId );
if ( ! endpoint ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . NOT_FOUND , 'Model endpoint not found' );
}
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const contextLength = endpoint . modelContextLengths ? .[ body . modelId ];
// Some CLIs (today: only claude) carry enough of their own fixed system-prompt/tool-
// schema overhead that a small enough real context guarantees a first-message failure
// no matter what CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS says — confirmed live at ~36.4K tokens
// against a model configured with a real 16384-token context. Warn before committing
// to a restart that's certain to fail, rather than letting the user discover it via a
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// cryptic 400 from the CLI itself. Answered by `confirmedContext` (or the legacy
// `confirmed`, which still means both) — NOT by `confirmedSwap`: this warning is
// about the caller's own session, and the swap warning below is about someone
// else's, so an answer to one is not consent to the other.
if ( ! ( body . confirmed || body . confirmedContext ) && exceedsSafeContextFloor ( entry , contextLength )) {
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return {
requiresContextWarning : true ,
modelId : body.modelId ,
contextLength ,
minSafeContextTokens : CLAUDE_MIN_SAFE_CONTEXT_TOKENS ,
};
}
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// llama.cpp runs exactly one model at a time; llama-swap unloads and reloads it on
// demand, which can take anywhere from a few seconds to over a minute — long enough
// that a session mid-swap looks indistinguishable from one that never left the native
// backend. Feature-detected via llama-swap's own `GET /running` (a plain llama.cpp
// server has no such endpoint and reads as `isLlamaSwap: false` — nothing to check).
const swapStatus = await getLlamaSwapStatus ( endpoint );
const currentlyLoaded = swapStatus . running . find (( r ) => r . state === 'ready' ) ? . model ?? swapStatus . running [ 0 ] ? . model ;
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// Distinct from targetReady below: this is ONLY about whether proceeding would evict a
// model another session is actively using — true even if nothing is loaded at all yet
// would be wrong here (nothing to evict), so this stays narrowly "a DIFFERENT model is
// currently ready".
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const swapNeeded = swapStatus . isLlamaSwap && !! currentlyLoaded && currentlyLoaded !== body . modelId ;
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// Whether the TARGET model itself is already the one loaded and ready — false whether
// nothing is loaded yet, a different model is loaded, or this one is loaded but still
// mid-load. Drives both the actual load trigger below and modelSwapInProgress in the
// response; deliberately broader than swapNeeded, which only gates the confirmation ask.
const targetReady = swapStatus . running . some (( r ) => r . model === body . modelId && r . state === 'ready' );
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// Only ask when switching would actually take the model away from another session
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// that is currently using it — never just because a swap is needed at all. Answered
// by `confirmedSwap` (or the legacy `confirmed`). ⚠ It must NOT read
// `confirmedContext`: this check runs second, and while the two shared one flag a
// user who clicked past a too-small-context warning had already, silently, agreed to
// evict another session's model.
if ( swapNeeded && ! ( body . confirmed || body . confirmedSwap )) {
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const conflicting = [... ctx . sessions . values ()]. filter (
( s ) =>
s . id !== session . id && s . customModel ? . endpointId === endpoint . id && s . customModel ? . modelId === currentlyLoaded
);
if ( conflicting . length > 0 ) {
// Applying a custom model is ungated for any session owner, so in multi-user
// mode a non-admin pointing their own session at a shared endpoint must not
// learn another user's session names in the confirm dialog — with
// autoNameSessions on, those names are that user's own prompts. The swap is
// still blocked pending confirmation regardless of ownership (a foreign
// session is just as real a disruption); only which ones get NAMED is scoped.
const requestUser = getAuthUser ( req );
const affectedSessions = conflicting
. filter (( s ) => canAccessOwned ( requestUser , s . owner ))
. map (( s ) => ({ id : s.id , name : s.name }));
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return { requiresConfirmation : true , currentlyLoadedModel : currentlyLoaded , affectedSessions };
}
}
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// A CLI whose config alone cannot select the model also gets its `model` launch param
// forced (pi/omp `custom/<id>`, grok's block name). The argv engine DROPS a token that
// fails its pattern rather than quoting it, which would silently launch the CLI on its
// own default provider again, so refuse an id the pattern cannot carry up front.
const modelSpec = entry . launch . params . model ;
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const applied = applyCustomModelInjection (
entry ,
endpoint ,
body . modelId ,
session . id ,
contextLength ,
session . workingDir
);
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if ( ! applied ) {
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return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , ` ${ session . mode } has no known custom-model mechanism` );
}
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if (
applied . launchModel !== undefined &&
modelSpec ? . type === 'token' &&
! matchesPattern ( modelSpec . pattern , applied . launchModel )
) {
removeConfigDir ( applied . configDir );
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
`Model id ${ JSON . stringify ( body . modelId ) } cannot be passed to ${ session . mode } on its command line`
);
}
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const { previousConfigDir } = session . setCustomModel (
{
endpointId : endpoint.id ,
modelId : body.modelId ,
label : endpoint.label ,
envKeys : applied.envKeys ,
configDir : applied.configDir ,
launchModel : applied.launchModel ,
},
applied . envOverrides
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);
// Clean up the OLD config dir on disk, unless the new one happens to reuse the same
// path (same session, configDir kind again) — never delete the dir we just wrote.
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if ( previousConfigDir && previousConfigDir !== applied . configDir ) {
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removeConfigDir ( previousConfigDir );
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}
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// Actually kick off llama-swap's load now, rather than waiting on the restarted CLI's
// own first prompt to do it — confirmed live that applying a selection alone never
// reached the llama-swap server at all (nothing in its own logs), since llama-swap has
// no "switch model" admin call, only a real inference request naming the model.
if ( swapStatus . isLlamaSwap && ! targetReady ) {
triggerLlamaSwapLoad ( endpoint , body . modelId );
}
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const restarted = await session . restartCli ();
persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
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return { customModel : session.customModel , restarted , modelSwapInProgress : swapStatus.isLlamaSwap && ! targetReady };
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});
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// ========== Delete Session ==========
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app . delete ( '/api/sessions/:id' , async ( req ) => {
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const query = req . query as { killMux? : string };
const killMux = query . killMux !== 'false' ; // Default to true
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// A resumed/detached-but-never-live row (e.g. a non-claude "Resume" that
// relaunched into a NEW session and wants to retire the old one it can no
// longer reattach to) has no entry in ctx.sessions at all — only in
// persisted state. Fall back to removing that persisted record directly
// rather than 404ing: the caller means "make this row go away", and a
// stale duplicate row is exactly what's left behind otherwise. Pinned
// sessions keep their existing demote-not-delete protection.
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if ( ! ctx . sessions . has ( id )) {
// Called for its existence/ownership 404 side effect only — demoteOrRemoveSession
// below re-looks-up the record by id, so the returned SessionState is unused here.
findPersistedSessionOrFail ( ctx . store , id , req );
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ctx . store . demoteOrRemoveSession ( id );
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// Mirrors the broadcast at the tail of the live-session cleanup path
// (_doCleanupSession in server.ts) — without it, other open tabs keep
// showing the retired row until their next unrelated fetch.
ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionDeleted , { id });
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return {};
}
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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// Wake state is dropped by `cleanupSession` itself (server.ts), on EVERY cleanup
// path — not here: the scheduled-run and admin paths clean up without this route.
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await ctx . cleanupSession ( session . id , killMux , 'user_delete' );
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return {};
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});
// ========== Delete All Sessions ==========
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app . delete ( '/api/sessions' , async ( req ) : Promise < ApiResponse < { killed : number }> > => {
// Security: scope the bulk sweep to sessions the caller can access — a non-admin
// must not wipe other users' sessions (canAccessOwned is allow-all for admin/single-user).
const user = getAuthUser ( req );
const sessionIds = Array . from ( ctx . sessions . values ())
. filter (( s ) => canAccessOwned ( user , s . owner ))
. map (( s ) => s . id );
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let killed = 0 ;
for ( const id of sessionIds ) {
if ( ctx . sessions . has ( id )) {
await ctx . cleanupSession ( id , true , 'user_bulk_delete' );
killed ++ ;
}
}
return { success : true , data : { killed } };
});
// ========== Get Session Detail ==========
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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// Use light state (no full buffers) — terminal buffer available via /terminal endpoint.
// Full buffers were 2-3MB and caused slowness when polled frequently (e.g. Ralph wizard).
return ctx . getSessionStateWithRespawn ( session );
});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Session Data (output, ralph state, run summary, active tools)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// ========== Get Session Output ==========
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/output' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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return {
success : true ,
data : {
textOutput : session.textOutput ,
messages : session.messages ,
errorBuffer : session.errorBuffer ,
},
};
});
// ========== Get Ralph State ==========
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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return {
success : true ,
data : {
loop : session.ralphLoopState ,
todos : session.ralphTodos ,
todoStats : session.ralphTodoStats ,
},
};
});
// ========== Get Run Summary ==========
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/run-summary' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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const tracker = ctx . runSummaryTrackers . get ( id );
if ( ! tracker ) {
// Create a fresh tracker if one doesn't exist (shouldn't happen normally)
const newTracker = new RunSummaryTracker ( id , session . name );
ctx . runSummaryTrackers . set ( id , newTracker );
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return { summary : newTracker.getSummary () };
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}
// Update session name in case it changed
tracker . setSessionName ( session . name );
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return { summary : tracker.getSummary () };
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});
// ========== Get Active Tools ==========
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/active-tools' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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return {
success : true ,
data : {
tools : session.activeTools ,
},
};
});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Session Execution (run prompt, interactive mode, shell mode)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// ========== Run Prompt ==========
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/run' , async ( req ) => {
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const { prompt } = parseBody ( RunPromptSchema , req . body );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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if ( session . isBusy ()) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . SESSION_BUSY , 'Session is busy' );
}
// Run async, don't wait
session . runPrompt ( prompt ). catch (( err ) => {
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionError , { id , error : err.message });
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});
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionRunning , { id , prompt });
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return {};
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});
// ========== Start Interactive Mode ==========
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/interactive' , async ( req ) => {
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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// Body is optional (auto-reattach callers send none) — same idiom as /interactive-respawn.
const bodyResult = req . body
? InteractiveStartSchema . safeParse ( req . body )
: { success : true as const , data : {} as { clearBreaker? : boolean } };
if ( ! bodyResult . success ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'Invalid request body' );
}
const { clearBreaker } = bodyResult . data ;
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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if ( session . isBusy ()) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . SESSION_BUSY , 'Session is busy' );
}
try {
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// Auto-detect completion phrase from CLAUDE.md BEFORE starting (only if globally
// enabled and not explicitly disabled by user).
//
// `isExternalCliMode()` is what the eight-mode `!==` chain this replaces was FOR: its
// own comment asked the next person to keep the list in step with that predicate by
// hand. Calling it instead is byte-identical today (claude and shell are the two
// non-external modes, exactly what the chain admitted) and cannot drift.
//
// ⚠️ Deliberately NOT `capabilities.ralph`, which the quick-start path below reads:
// that capability is claude-only, so using it here would stop auto-enabling Ralph for
// SHELL sessions, which this path has always done. The two paths genuinely disagree
// about shell, and they disagree upstream too — reconciling them is a behaviour change
// and belongs in its own PR, not in a refactor that is meant to change nothing.
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if (
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! isExternalCliMode ( session . mode ) &&
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ctx . store . getConfig (). ralphEnabled &&
! session . ralphTracker . autoEnableDisabled
) {
autoConfigureRalph ( session , session . workingDir , ctx );
if ( ! session . ralphTracker . enabled ) {
session . ralphTracker . enable ();
}
}
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// COD-118: ONLY an explicit user-initiated restart (body {clearBreaker:true})
// clears a tripped PTY-exit circuit breaker. This endpoint is ALSO the frontend's
// automatic re-attach path (selectSession auto-POSTs it for any pid===null
// session), so an unconditional reset here would re-arm the exact crash loop
// the breaker exists to stop — auto-reattach sends no body and must not clear.
if ( clearBreaker ) {
session . resetRespawnBreaker ();
}
// Re-attach listener wiring if a prior PTY exit detached it: the wiring exit
// handler removes ALL session listeners (incl. respawnBreakerTripped), and only
// session-create/boot-recovery paths ran setupSessionListeners before this fix —
// without this, a re-attached session's SSE/terminal/trip events go unobserved.
// setupSessionListeners is idempotent (no-op while refs are still attached).
await ctx . setupSessionListeners ( session );
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await session . startInteractive ();
getLifecycleLog (). log ({
event : 'started' ,
sessionId : id ,
name : session.name ,
mode : session.mode ,
});
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// Persist, not just broadcast. Starting a command in the pane changes
// `pid` and retracts any `paneExit` (Ark0N/Codeman#446), and the pane-exit
// watcher cannot write that retraction to disk for us: its next tick finds
// the in-memory field already cleared, reports no change and persists
// nothing, so `state.json` would keep saying the agent had exited.
ctx . persistSessionState ( session );
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionInteractive , { id });
ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionUpdated , { session : ctx.getSessionStateWithRespawn ( session ) });
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return {};
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} catch ( err ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , getErrorMessage ( err ));
}
});
// ========== Start Shell Mode ==========
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/shell' , async ( req ) => {
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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if ( session . isBusy ()) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . SESSION_BUSY , 'Session is busy' );
}
try {
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// Re-attach listener wiring if a prior PTY exit detached it (see /interactive).
await ctx . setupSessionListeners ( session );
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await session . startShell ();
getLifecycleLog (). log ({
event : 'started' ,
sessionId : id ,
name : session.name ,
mode : 'shell' ,
});
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// Persist for the same reason /interactive does: a started pane retracts
// `paneExit`, and the watcher's next tick cannot write that retraction.
ctx . persistSessionState ( session );
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionInteractive , { id , mode : 'shell' });
ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionUpdated , { session : ctx.getSessionStateWithRespawn ( session ) });
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return {};
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} catch ( err ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , getErrorMessage ( err ));
}
});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Terminal I/O (input, resize, buffer)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// ========== Wake-on-LAN: state + manual trigger ==========
//
// Both routes are session-scoped (not host-scoped) because the wake flow needs the
// SESSION: a woken host whose pane is not reattached is still a dead terminal, and an
// exhausted COD-108 backoff never retries on its own. The probe in `/reachability` is
// the same cheap TCP connect the input path uses and it NEVER wakes a host — the UI
// decides that, with the button.
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/reachability' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
const remote = session . remote ;
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if ( ! remote ) {
return { success : true , data : { reachable : true , probeable : true , wakeConfigured : 'none' as const } };
}
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const force = ( req . query as { force? : string }) ? . force === '1' ;
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// `reachable: null` + `probeable: false` for a host behind a jump host / SOCKS proxy:
// the probe cannot reach it, so the UI shows no banner and stops polling.
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const reachable = await remoteWake . checkReachable ( session , { force });
return {
success : true ,
data : {
reachable ,
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probeable : isProbeable ( remote ),
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wakeConfigured : await remoteWake . wakeConfigured ( session ),
host : remote.host ,
label : remote.label ,
},
};
});
app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/wake' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
if ( ! session . remote ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'Not a remote session' );
}
// The UI uses this to route to the host config dialog instead of a dead button.
if ( ! ( await remoteWake . hasWakeTarget ( session ))) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
'No wake-on-LAN target configured for this host (set a MAC address or a wake command)'
);
}
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// The button is pressed from the SAME dashboard the create/attach paths are, under
// the same reverse proxy — so it holds the request open the same way and needs the
// same request budget, not the 90 s session default (see remote-wake.ts).
const woke = await remoteWake . ensureAwake ( session , {
force : true ,
timeoutMs : REMOTE_WAKE_REQUEST_READY_TIMEOUT_MS ,
});
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return {
success : true ,
data : {
woke ,
reachable : await remoteWake . checkReachable ( session ),
wakeConfigured : await remoteWake . wakeConfigured ( session ),
},
};
});
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// ========== Send Input ==========
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/input' , async ( req , reply ) => {
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const { input , useMux , seq , clientId , wait , waitTimeout } = parseBody ( SessionInputWithLimitSchema , req . body );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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const inputStr = String ( input );
if ( inputStr . length > MAX_INPUT_LENGTH ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
`Input exceeds maximum length ( ${ MAX_INPUT_LENGTH } bytes)`
);
}
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// Send-and-wait (agent orchestration). This has to be ONE endpoint rather than a
// POST followed by GET .../wait: between the write and the session flipping to
// `working` there is a window in which a separate wait sees the session still
// idle and returns instantly, reporting the PREVIOUS turn as this turn's answer.
// Registering the waiter before the write closes that window.
const wantsWait =
wait === true || ( typeof wait === 'string' && wait . trim (). length > 0 ) || ( Array . isArray ( wait ) && wait . length > 0 );
let until : readonly WaitSignal [] = [];
if ( wantsWait ) {
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const resolved = resolveWaitSignals ( wait === true ? undefined : wait , {
mode : session.mode ,
... sessionHookOptions ( session ),
});
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if ( resolved . error ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , resolved . error );
until = resolved . until ;
}
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// Reliable delivery (POST fallback when the WebSocket is down): a 2xx IS the
// client's ACK, so a tagged duplicate redelivery must still return 200 but
// skip the write. Untagged requests (curl/legacy) always apply.
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const tagged = typeof clientId === 'string' && typeof seq === 'number' ;
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const duplicate = tagged && ! session . shouldApplyInput ( clientId as string , seq as number );
if ( duplicate && ! wantsWait ) {
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return {};
}
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// Wake-on-LAN (remote-wake.ts): a wake-enabled remote host that suspended leaves
// the local ssh pane STALLED, and `send-keys` succeeds against it — the bytes
// would vanish with no error anywhere. Give the registry the chance to probe the
// host, wake it, reattach, and own delivery before we write into nothing.
//
// Costs nothing for non-wake hosts (the `wakeCommand` guard) or while the host is
// known reachable inside the probe throttle window; the probe itself is a bare
// TCP connect on wake-enabled hosts only, at most once per
// REMOTE_WAKE_PROBE_MIN_INTERVAL_MS.
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if ( ! duplicate && ( await remoteWake . hasWakeTarget ( session ))) {
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if ( wantsWait ) {
// Send-and-wait keeps the response open anyway, so blocking on the wake is
// simpler and more correct than buffering (buffering would break the wait).
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// A host that never comes back is an error here, as on the create/attach
// paths: writing into the stalled pane would answer `delivered:true` plus a
// timeout, which is the combination the API docs send callers to the wrong
// recovery for.
if ( ! ( await remoteWake . ensureAwake ( session ))) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
` ${ session . remote ? . label ?? 'the remote host' } did not come back after a wake-on-LAN request — nothing was sent`
);
}
} else {
const outcome = await remoteWake . handleInput ( session , inputStr );
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// The registry holds the bytes and flushes them in order once the pane is
// reattached. The client's ACK is this 200 — a tagged retry is deduped
// (`shouldApplyInput` above already consumed the seq), so nothing is lost.
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// `buffered` is additive to the historical bare `{}`; `dropped` says the chunk
// was over the wake buffer's cap and is GONE (a 200 with no field could not
// tell delivered from buffered from dropped).
if ( outcome === 'buffered' ) return { buffered : true };
if ( outcome === 'dropped' ) return { buffered : true , dropped : true };
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}
}
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// Only a waiting request pays for the tmux probe: the browser's plain input path
// (thousands of calls per session) must stay exec-free.
const workerDead = wantsWait && workerIsDead ( ctx . mux , session );
const timeoutMs = clampWaitMs ( waitTimeout ?? undefined );
// Same slot leak as the GET routes: a client that gives up mid-wait would
// otherwise hold a waiter for the full timeout. Response-side, always — see
// abortOnClientHangUp: on THIS route a request-side listener fires the moment the
// JSON body finishes streaming and aborts every send-and-wait before it starts.
const abort = abortOnClientHangUp ( reply );
let waitPromise : Promise < SignalWaitResult > | null = null ;
if ( wantsWait ) {
try {
waitPromise = sessionWaits . waitForSignal ( id , {
until ,
timeoutMs ,
owner : ownerFor ( req ),
abortSignal : abort.signal ,
// A FRESH delivery must not be satisfied by the state the session is already
// in: it is idle right now, which is precisely why we are typing at it.
// A DUPLICATE has no new turn coming, so it answers from the current state
// instead of blocking for a transition that already happened.
requireTransition : ! duplicate ,
currentSignal : duplicate ? currentSignalFor ( session , workerDead ) : undefined ,
});
} catch ( err ) {
if ( err instanceof WaitCapacityError ) {
// Nothing has been written yet, but `shouldApplyInput` already consumed the
// seq. Give it back or the caller's retry is rejected as a duplicate and the
// input is lost by the very mechanism meant to make delivery reliable.
if ( tagged && ! duplicate ) session . forgetInputSeq ( clientId as string , seq as number );
return waitCapacityResponse ( err );
}
throw err ;
}
}
const stopDeathWatch = wantsWait ? watchForDeadWorker ( ctx . mux , session , id ) : () => {};
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// Write input to PTY. Direct write is synchronous; writeViaMux
// (tmux send-keys) is fire-and-forget to avoid blocking the HTTP response.
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// Every write here is `fromUser`: this route carries a person's prompt, or an
// agent's on their behalf, so it may name the tab (Ralph, respawn, cron and
// approvals write through the session directly and never say so).
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//
// Because the response has already been sent by then, a failure there is the
// one case the caller can never learn about — so the dedup bookkeeping is
// rolled back. Otherwise the seq stays recorded as applied and a retry, the
// very mechanism reliable delivery exists for, is rejected as a duplicate.
const undoOnFailure = () => {
if ( tagged ) session . forgetInputSeq ( clientId as string , seq as number );
};
// Whether the bytes actually reached a write path. Only meaningful on the wait
// path (the fire-and-forget branches return before the response is built), and
// reported there instead of the old `!duplicate`: a PTY that has exited fails
// BOTH writes, and telling the caller "delivered, but it timed out" points it at
// the wrong recovery — wait longer, when the truth is "restart the worker".
let delivered = false ;
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// A plain prompt (`<text>\r`) goes through the mux even when the caller did not
// ask for it: written straight into the pane it arrives as one burst, and Claude
// Code takes a long burst as a paste whose `\r` becomes a newline, so the prompt
// sat unsent (see isPlainPromptInput). The mux path types the text, presses Enter
// separately and arms the SubmitVerifier. An explicit `useMux: false` keeps the
// raw write for a caller that really wants it.
const autoMux = useMux === undefined && isPlainPromptInput ( inputStr );
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if ( duplicate ) {
// Redelivery of an already-applied input: skip the write, but still honor the
// wait, since the caller's question ("tell me when this settles") is unanswered.
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} else if (( useMux || autoMux ) && waitPromise ) {
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// The response is already staying open for the wait, so the tmux write can be
// awaited here. This is the ONE path where a writeViaMux failure is observable.
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const ok = await session . writeViaMux ( inputStr , { fromUser : true }). catch (() => false );
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if ( ok ) {
delivered = true ;
} else {
console . warn ( `[Server] writeViaMux failed for session ${ id } , falling back to direct write` );
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delivered = session . write ( inputStr , { fromUser : true });
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if ( ! delivered ) undoOnFailure ();
}
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} else if ( autoMux ) {
// Awaited, unlike the explicit useMux branch below. This shape also reaches here
// from the browser's POST fallback, which sends its frames one at a time and
// waits for each 2xx; answering only once Enter has gone out is what keeps the
// next keystroke from overtaking it.
const ok = await session . writeViaMux ( inputStr , { fromUser : true }). catch (() => false );
if ( ! ok ) {
console . warn ( `[Server] writeViaMux failed for session ${ id } , falling back to direct write` );
if ( ! session . write ( inputStr , { fromUser : true })) undoOnFailure ();
}
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} else if ( useMux ) {
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// Fire-and-forget: don't block the HTTP response on a tmux child process.
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// Fallback to a direct write on failure. Unchanged from before send-and-wait.
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session
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. writeViaMux ( inputStr , { fromUser : true })
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. then (( ok ) => {
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if ( ok ) return ;
console . warn ( `[Server] writeViaMux failed for session ${ id } , falling back to direct write` );
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if ( ! session . write ( inputStr , { fromUser : true })) undoOnFailure ();
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})
. catch (() => {
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if ( ! session . write ( inputStr , { fromUser : true })) undoOnFailure ();
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});
} else {
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// Same rollback. NOT an error response, deliberately: a session can
// legitimately have no PTY yet (created but not started), and callers have
// always been able to write to one without a 4xx.
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delivered = session . write ( inputStr , { fromUser : true });
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if ( ! delivered && tagged ) {
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session . forgetInputSeq ( clientId as string , seq as number );
}
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}
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if ( ! waitPromise ) return {};
try {
// `send-keys` SUCCEEDS against a dead pane — tmux is happy to write into a corpse
// — so a truthful `delivered` cannot come from the write's return value alone.
// This is the case the field exists for: "delivered, but it timed out" tells an
// agent to wait longer when the truth is "restart the worker".
if ( delivered && workerDead ) {
delivered = false ;
// The bytes went nowhere, so the seq must not be recorded as applied or the
// caller's retry against a restarted worker is refused as a duplicate.
if ( ! duplicate ) undoOnFailure ();
}
// Nothing was written and nothing will be: no turn is coming, so blocking for the
// full timeout would only delay the caller's real recovery by up to ten minutes.
// Releasing the waiter also hands its slot back immediately.
const selfReleased = ! delivered && ! duplicate ;
if ( selfReleased ) abort . abort ();
const result = await waitPromise ;
return {
success : true ,
data : {
delivered ,
duplicate ,
status : session.status ,
limitPaused : session.isLimitPaused ,
// Identical `wait` object to the two GET endpoints, so one client helper
// reads all three, `timeoutMs` (post-clamp) included.
//
// `aborted` is the CLIENT-facing "you hung up, nobody is reading this", and
// by that definition it is unobservable — which is exactly what the API
// reference promises. The abort above is the server releasing its own waiter
// on a delivery that failed, and the client IS reading this response, so
// reporting `aborted: true` there would break that promise and hand an agent
// a second, contradictory reason for the same outcome. `delivered: false`
// already says what happened; `ended` says the wait was released early.
wait : { ... result , aborted : selfReleased ? false : result . aborted , until : [... until ] },
},
};
} finally {
stopDeathWatch ();
}
});
// ========== Wait For A Signal (agent orchestration) ==========
//
// A bounded long-poll: block until the session hits one of `until`, then answer.
// This exists because SSE is the only "tell me when" channel Codeman has, and an
// agent driving the API from a shell tool cannot hold a stream and parse events
// inline. See docs/agent-control-plan.md.
//
// A TIMEOUT IS A 200, not an error: callers are expected to loop over short waits
// (proxies such as `tailscale serve` cut idle connections), and turning every poll
// boundary into a 4xx would make that loop indistinguishable from a real failure.
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/wait' , async ( req , reply ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const query = parseWaitQuery ( SessionWaitQuerySchema , req . query , 'wait' );
const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
// An agent polls this URL in a loop with identical parameters. Any intermediary
// applying heuristic freshness to the 200 would serve the stored `timedOut:true`
// body to the next iteration instantly, turning the loop into a busy spin that
// never observes the signal.
reply . header ( 'Cache-Control' , 'no-store' );
// Shared with the `wait` field on POST .../input: unknown token is a 400,
// hook-only signals are rejected explicitly but dropped from the default.
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const { until , error } = resolveWaitSignals ( query . until , { mode : session.mode , ... sessionHookOptions ( session ) });
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if ( error ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , error );
// The value actually applied after clamping, echoed below: a caller that asked
// for 30 minutes and silently got 10 could not otherwise tell a poll boundary
// from a wedged worker, and would kill a session that was working fine.
const timeoutMs = clampWaitMs ( query . timeout );
// Free the waiter when the caller hangs up; the response can no longer be sent by
// then, so freeing the slot is the entire purpose.
const abort = abortOnClientHangUp ( reply );
// A worker that dies while this request is parked emits nothing at all (the tmux
// attach client survives it), so a wait would otherwise run to its full timeout.
const stopDeathWatch = watchForDeadWorker ( ctx . mux , session , id );
try {
const result = await sessionWaits . waitForSignal ( id , {
until ,
timeoutMs ,
owner : ownerFor ( req ),
abortSignal : abort.signal ,
requireTransition : query.fresh === '1' || query . fresh === 'true' ,
// Read BEFORE awaiting: this is the state the caller is asking about.
currentSignal : currentSignalFor ( session , workerIsDead ( ctx . mux , session )),
});
return {
success : true ,
data : {
sessionId : id ,
// Post-wait status, so a caller that timed out still learns where things stand.
status : session.status ,
// A session paused on a usage limit emits nothing until its reset, so a
// timeout here is expected rather than a stall worth retrying hard.
limitPaused : session.isLimitPaused ,
// One shape across all three endpoints, so a single `is_done(resp)` helper
// works against any of them. `result.timeoutMs` is the value actually
// applied after clamping, which is what makes the clamp observable.
wait : { ... result , until : [... until ] },
},
};
} catch ( err ) {
if ( err instanceof WaitCapacityError ) return waitCapacityResponse ( err );
throw err ;
} finally {
stopDeathWatch ();
}
});
// ========== Wait For Output (agent orchestration) ==========
//
// The companion to /wait: block until a literal string appears in this session's
// output. Same 200-on-timeout contract. Fed by the `terminal` listener in
// session-listener-wiring.ts, so what this scans is byte-for-byte what the pane
// printed, ANSI stripped.
//
// ⚠️ A tmux repaint replays text already on screen, so `from=now` can match
// something printed before the request. Callers need a marker unique per call.
app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/wait-output' , async ( req , reply ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
// Reject `regex` loudly instead of ignoring it. Matching is deliberately literal
// (no ReDoS surface on a caller-supplied pattern over a live stream), and an agent
// that assumed otherwise would silently wait on the wrong thing.
if ( req . query && typeof req . query === 'object' && 'regex' in req . query ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
'regex is not supported; use match=<literal substring> (optionally with nocase=1)'
);
}
const query = parseWaitQuery ( SessionWaitOutputQuerySchema , req . query , 'wait-output' );
const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
// Same reason as /wait: this URL is polled in a loop with identical parameters.
reply . header ( 'Cache-Control' , 'no-store' );
const timeoutMs = clampWaitMs ( query . timeout );
const abort = abortOnClientHangUp ( reply );
const owner = ownerFor ( req );
// Output waiters are the ones a dead worker strands hardest: the feed simply stops.
const stopDeathWatch = watchForDeadWorker ( ctx . mux , session , id );
try {
// Check the cap BEFORE touching the buffer. `session.terminalBuffer` is
// `BufferAccumulator.value`, which joins the WHOLE accumulator (up to 32MB)
// before the slice below takes its tail — so a request that is going to be
// rejected anyway must not pay for a full materialization first, or the cap
// provides no backpressure at all against a `from=buffer` loop.
sessionWaits . assertCapacity ( id , owner );
// `from=buffer` scans what already scrolled past before blocking. Bounded to a
// tail: the buffer runs to 32MB and this is a per-request ANSI strip.
let initialText : string | undefined ;
if ( query . from === 'buffer' ) {
const buffer = session . terminalBuffer ;
initialText =
buffer . length > MAX_BUFFER_SCAN_BYTES ? buffer . slice ( buffer . length - MAX_BUFFER_SCAN_BYTES ) : buffer ;
}
const result = await sessionWaits . waitForOutput ( id , {
match : query.match ,
nocase : query.nocase === '1' || query . nocase === 'true' ,
timeoutMs ,
owner ,
abortSignal : abort.signal ,
initialText ,
});
return {
success : true ,
data : {
sessionId : id ,
status : session.status ,
limitPaused : session.isLimitPaused ,
// Same envelope as /wait; this one carries `matched`/`snippet`/`match`
// where the signal wait carries `signal`/`until`.
wait : { ... result , match : query.match },
},
};
} catch ( err ) {
if ( err instanceof WaitCapacityError ) return waitCapacityResponse ( err );
throw err ;
} finally {
stopDeathWatch ();
}
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});
// ========== Send Named Key (tmux send-keys -H) ==========
// Sends raw hex bytes to tmux pane for keys like Shift+Enter / Ctrl+Enter.
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// Uses send-keys -H (hex) to inject a newline chord: 0x0a (line feed) by default, or the CLI's
// own `capabilities.newline`. Claude Code's Ink input recognizes 0x0a as "insert newline" vs
// 0x0d (carriage return = submit).
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/send-key' , async ( req ) => {
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const body = req . body as Record < string , unknown >;
const key = typeof body ? . key === 'string' ? body . key : '' ;
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if ( key !== 'S-Enter' && key !== 'C-Enter' ) {
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return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , `Key not allowed: ${ key } ` );
}
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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const muxName = session . muxName ;
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if ( ! muxName ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'No tmux session' );
}
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// Key names map to hex byte sequences. Ctrl+Enter is always a line feed; Shift+Enter is the
// CLI's own newline chord (`capabilities.newline`, default line feed), so a CLI that wants
// Esc+Enter declares it in the registry instead of being special-cased here.
const NEWLINE_HEX : Record < NewlineSequence , string [] > = {
'line-feed' : [ '0a' ], // \n
'esc-enter' : [ '1b' , '0d' ], // ESC CR, the Alt/Option+Enter chord
};
const hex =
key === 'C-Enter'
? NEWLINE_HEX [ 'line-feed' ]
: NEWLINE_HEX [ getCli ( session . mode ) ? . capabilities . newline ?? 'line-feed' ];
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try {
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// Route through the dedicated Codeman socket — bare `tmux` would target the
// user's default server and never find this session (same #80 regression class).
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await new Promise < void >(( resolve , reject ) => {
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execFile (
'tmux' ,
[ '-L' , ctx . mux . muxSocket , 'send-keys' , '-H' , '-t' , muxName , ... hex ],
{ timeout : 5000 },
( err ) => {
if ( err ) reject ( err );
else resolve ();
}
);
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});
} catch ( err ) {
console . error ( '[Server] send-key failed:' , err );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INTERNAL_ERROR , 'tmux send-keys failed' );
}
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// The bytes bypassed the session's write path, so tell the auto-name
// tracker about them or the two lines of a prompt join with no separator.
session . trackUserInput ( hex . map (( byte ) => String . fromCharCode ( parseInt ( byte , 16 ))). join ( '' ));
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return {};
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});
// ========== Resize Terminal ==========
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/resize' , async ( req ) => {
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const { cols , rows , viewportType , force } = parseBody ( ResizeSchema , req . body );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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session . resize ( cols , rows , { viewportType , force });
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// Answer with the geometry the PTY ACTUALLY holds, which is not always the
// one asked for: `Session.resize` declines small-viewport requests while a
// desktop connection holds an active sizing claim. A browser terminal left
// at a shape the PTY refused renders garbled output, not merely wrong-sized
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// output, so the client adopts this (issue #464). A session with no pane
// reports nothing rather than the constructor defaults — see `ptyGeometry`.
return session . ptyGeometry ?? {};
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});
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// ========== Get Last Response (from transcript JSONL) ==========
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// How far apart a ~/.claude/history.jsonl entry and a pane's Enter may be and
// still be the same submission. Claude appends to history as it accepts the
// prompt, so the true gap is milliseconds — this is slack for a loaded box,
// not a search radius.
const CLAUDE_SUBMIT_MATCH_MS = 10 _000 ;
// history.jsonl grows forever; only the tail can hold entries near a submit.
const CLAUDE_HISTORY_TAIL_BYTES = 256 * 1024 ;
// Resolves the Claude conversation id THIS pane is currently on by matching
// ~/.claude/history.jsonl (which logs every submitted prompt as
// {project, sessionId, timestamp}) against the pane's last Enter. After
// `/clear` Claude keeps writing to a new <uuid>.jsonl, and history.jsonl is
// the only source-of-truth update that does not rely on project-local hooks
// (we intentionally don't install hooks in arbitrary user repos, see the
// POST /api/sessions comment).
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//
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// The pane's own Enter is what makes an entry OURS. `project` alone is not:
// a cwd is shared by every other Codeman tab on it, by tabs long since
// closed, and by any plain `claude` the user runs in their own terminal —
// adopting the newest entry for the cwd pinned the viewer to whichever of
// those conversations was typed in last, so the eye showed a stranger's
// transcript. With no correlated entry we keep the id we have; a viewer one
// turn behind beats a viewer showing someone else's conversation.
const claudeHistoryPinCache = new LRUMap < string , { submitAt : number ; claudeSessionId : string }>({ maxSize : 1024 });
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async function resolveActiveClaudeSessionIdFromHistory (
session : Session ,
projectsDir : string
) : Promise < string | null > {
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// A pane whose conversation id came from its OWN hook needs no correlation:
// $CODEMAN_SESSION_ID (the pane's env) -> data.session_id (the CLI's own
// stdin JSON) is a first-hand binding that never looks at cwd, so it cannot
// be stolen by a sibling pane, a closed tab, or a bare `claude` in a
// terminal. Guessing can only be worse than the fact. This is also what
// closes the hole below for a pane driven straight from tmux: it never
// reaches `if (!submitAt)`.
if ( session . claudeSessionIdIsFirstHand ) return null ;
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const submitAt = session . lastSubmitAt ;
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if ( ! submitAt ) return null ; // no anchor at all — nothing to credit
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const cached = claudeHistoryPinCache . get ( session . id );
if ( cached && cached . submitAt === submitAt ) return cached . claudeSessionId ;
// Ids another live pane is already pinned to can never be ours, and every
// pane sharing this cwd competes for the entry we are about to claim —
// including non-Claude panes, since a shell pane can run `claude` too.
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const otherClaudeIds = new Set < string >();
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const otherSubmits : number [] = [];
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for ( const s of ctx . sessions . values ()) {
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if ( s . id === session . id || s . workingDir !== session . workingDir ) continue ;
if ( s . claudeSessionId ) otherClaudeIds . add ( s . claudeSessionId );
if ( s . lastSubmitAt ) otherSubmits . push ( s . lastSubmitAt );
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}
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const historyPath = join ( homedir (), '.claude' , 'history.jsonl' );
const stat = await fs . stat ( historyPath ). catch (() => null );
if ( ! stat || stat . size === 0 ) return null ;
const tail = await readFileTail ( historyPath , Buffer . alloc ( CLAUDE_HISTORY_TAIL_BYTES ), stat . size );
if ( ! tail ) return null ;
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let best : { sessionId : string ; dist : number } | undefined ;
for ( const line of tail . split ( '\n' )) {
if ( ! line ) continue ;
let entry : { project? : string ; sessionId? : string ; timestamp? : number };
try {
entry = JSON . parse ( line ) as typeof entry ;
} catch {
continue ; // the first tail line is usually cut mid-JSON
}
const { sessionId , timestamp } = entry ;
if ( entry . project !== session . workingDir ) continue ;
if ( typeof sessionId !== 'string' || ! sessionId ) continue ;
if ( typeof timestamp !== 'number' ) continue ;
if ( otherClaudeIds . has ( sessionId )) continue ;
const dist = Math . abs ( timestamp - submitAt );
if ( dist > CLAUDE_SUBMIT_MATCH_MS ) continue ;
if ( otherSubmits . some (( other ) => Math . abs ( timestamp - other ) < dist )) continue ; // another pane is closer
if ( ! best || dist <= best . dist ) best = { sessionId , dist }; // ties: the newer entry wins
}
if ( ! best ) return null ;
// Sanity: the conversation we switch to must exist on disk and must not be
// staler than the one we are leaving. A `/clear` successor never is.
const currentSessionId = session . claudeSessionId || session . id ;
if ( best . sessionId !== currentSessionId ) {
const projectDirs = await fs . readdir ( projectsDir ). catch (() => null );
if ( ! projectDirs ) return null ;
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let candidateMtime = 0 ;
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let currentMtime = 0 ;
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for ( const projDir of projectDirs ) {
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const candidateStat = await fs . stat ( join ( projectsDir , projDir , ` ${ best . sessionId } .jsonl` )). catch (() => null );
if ( candidateStat && candidateStat . mtimeMs > candidateMtime ) candidateMtime = candidateStat . mtimeMs ;
const currentStat = await fs . stat ( join ( projectsDir , projDir , ` ${ currentSessionId } .jsonl` )). catch (() => null );
if ( currentStat && currentStat . mtimeMs > currentMtime ) currentMtime = currentStat . mtimeMs ;
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}
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if ( candidateMtime === 0 ) return null ; // transcript not written yet — retry next poll
if ( currentMtime > 0 && candidateMtime < currentMtime ) return null ;
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}
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claudeHistoryPinCache . set ( session . id , { submitAt , claudeSessionId : best.sessionId });
return best . sessionId ;
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}
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interface ClaudeResponseMessage {
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kind : 'prompt' | 'response' ;
label : 'Prompt' | 'Response' ;
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role : 'user' | 'assistant' ;
text : string ;
timestamp? : string ;
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turn : number ;
queued? : boolean ;
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}
interface ClaudeTranscriptEntry {
type ?: string ;
timestamp? : string ;
isMeta? : boolean ;
isSidechain? : boolean ;
isCompactSummary? : boolean ;
message ?: { content? : unknown };
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// A prompt typed while Claude is working is absorbed mid-turn and recorded
// ONLY here — the CLI never re-emits it as a `user` row. Every field stays
// optional and unvalidated: `queued_command` is not a documented CLI
// contract, so a missing/renamed field must mean "skip", which is also what
// the CLI's own non-human queue entries (commandMode 'task-notification',
// no `origin` key) require. Shape observed on Claude Code 2.1.220-2.1.251.
attachment ?: {
type ?: string ;
prompt? : string ;
commandMode? : string ;
timestamp? : string ;
origin ?: { kind? : string };
};
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}
function extractClaudeText ( content : unknown , separator : string ) : string {
if ( typeof content === 'string' ) return content ;
if ( ! Array . isArray ( content )) return '' ;
return content
. filter (
( block ) : block is { type : string ; text : string } =>
!! block &&
typeof block === 'object' &&
( block as { type ?: string }). type === 'text' &&
typeof ( block as { text? : string }). text === 'string'
)
. map (( block ) => block . text )
. join ( separator );
}
function isClaudeSyntheticUserMessage ( entry : ClaudeTranscriptEntry , text : string ) : boolean {
if ( entry . isMeta || entry . isCompactSummary ) return true ;
return /^(?:<local-command|<command-name>|<task-notification>|<system-reminder>|<teammate-message\b|Another Claude session sent a message:|Base directory for this skill:)/i . test (
text
);
}
/**
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* Claude writes an append-only event log: tool results arrive as user rows,
* thinking/tool_use rows carry no text, and a prompt typed while the agent is
* working is only ever recorded as an `attachment/queued_command` row. But one
* assistant row IS one whole model message: measured across ~/.claude/projects
* (CLI 2.1.220-2.1.251) no assistant row carries more than one content block
* and no message id carries more than one text block, so there is nothing to
* reassemble. Emit one card per row and group them with `turn` instead of
* concatenating a human turn's replies into a single card (#169), which fused
* up to 74 distinct model messages into one card. Splitting is safe for
* markdown: no adjacent pair of assistant text rows in the corpus continues a
* table, a list, or an open code fence.
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*/
function parseClaudeResponseTranscript (
content : string ,
full : boolean
) : { text : string ; timestamp : string ; messages? : ClaudeResponseMessage [] } {
let lastText = '' ;
let lastTimestamp = '' ;
const messages : ClaudeResponseMessage [] = [];
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// #169's replay guards, kept: they now SKIP a duplicated row instead of
// concatenating it into the previous card.
const currentUserFragments = new Set < string >();
const currentAssistantFragments = new Set < string >();
// Turn 0 is reserved for anything emitted before the first human prompt.
let turn = 0 ;
const pushUserMessage = ( text : string , timestamp : string | undefined , queued : boolean ) : void => {
// A run of consecutive human inputs (a mid-turn queued burst) is ONE turn,
// so the viewer renders it under one badge instead of one badge per line.
if ( messages . at ( - 1 ) ? . role !== 'user' ) turn += 1 ;
const message : ClaudeResponseMessage = { kind : 'prompt' , label : 'Prompt' , role : 'user' , text , timestamp , turn };
if ( queued ) message . queued = true ;
messages . push ( message );
currentUserFragments . add ( text );
currentAssistantFragments . clear ();
};
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for ( const line of content . split ( '\n' )) {
if ( ! line ) continue ;
let entry : ClaudeTranscriptEntry ;
try {
entry = JSON . parse ( line ) as ClaudeTranscriptEntry ;
} catch {
continue ;
}
// Sidechains belong to agents/forks, not the main conversation. Meta user
// rows include repeated image dimensions and other UI-generated context.
if ( entry . isSidechain ) continue ;
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// A prompt typed while Claude is working is absorbed mid-turn and lives
// ONLY in an attachment row, so it was lost outright. `origin.kind` and
// `commandMode` separate the human's queue entries from the CLI's own:
// measured over 57 real transcripts on 2026-09-01, 322 queued_command rows
// split 163 `prompt`/`human` and 159 `task-notification`, and not one of
// those 159 carries an `origin` key. The 163 human rows become 162 user
// cards here — one is a verbatim repeat inside a still-unanswered user run
// and is collapsed by the dedup guard below — out of 353 user cards total.
if ( entry . type === 'attachment' ) {
if ( ! full ) continue ;
const queued = entry . attachment ;
if ( ! queued || queued . type !== 'queued_command' ) continue ;
if ( queued . origin ? . kind !== 'human' || queued . commandMode !== 'prompt' ) continue ;
const text = typeof queued . prompt === 'string' ? queued . prompt . trim () : '' ;
if ( ! text || isClaudeSyntheticUserMessage ( entry , text )) continue ;
if ( currentUserFragments . has ( text )) continue ;
pushUserMessage ( text , queued . timestamp || entry . timestamp , true );
continue ;
}
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if ( entry . type === 'user' ) {
const text = extractClaudeText ( entry . message ? . content , '\n' ). trim ();
// A tool_result block has no text block and naturally drops out here.
if ( ! text || isClaudeSyntheticUserMessage ( entry , text )) continue ;
if ( ! full ) continue ;
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// Claude replays the initial user row while restoring a transcript, and
// a CLI that also wrote an absorbed prompt as a user row would double it.
// Both collapse here. The same prompt sent again AFTER a reply is a
// legitimate second turn, because that reply cleared the set.
if ( currentUserFragments . has ( text )) continue ;
pushUserMessage ( text , entry . timestamp , false );
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continue ;
}
if ( entry . type !== 'assistant' ) continue ;
const text = extractClaudeText ( entry . message ? . content , '\n\n' ). trim ();
if ( ! text ) continue ;
lastText = text ;
lastTimestamp = entry . timestamp || '' ;
if ( ! full ) continue ;
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// Replayed snapshots repeat an identical text block inside one turn.
if ( currentAssistantFragments . has ( text )) continue ;
messages . push ({ kind : 'response' , label : 'Response' , role : 'assistant' , text , timestamp : entry.timestamp , turn });
currentAssistantFragments . add ( text );
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currentUserFragments . clear ();
}
return full ? { text : lastText , timestamp : lastTimestamp , messages } : { text : lastText , timestamp : lastTimestamp };
}
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/**
* Mirror a rename into the conversation's `/resume` title (claude-session-title.ts).
* Local Claude-format transcripts only: a remote pane's transcript lives on the remote host and a
* docker pane's inside the container (HOME=/home/agent), never under the host's projects dir. Best
* effort: the tab rename has already happened and must not fail on this.
*/
async function syncClaudeTitle ( session : Session ) : Promise < void > {
if ( getCli ( session . mode ) ? . capabilities . transcript !== 'claude-jsonl' || session . remote || session . docker ) return ;
try {
const projectsDir = join ( process . env . HOME || '/tmp' , '.claude' , 'projects' );
const hookPath = ctx . getTranscriptPath ( session . id );
const transcript = hookPath
? { sessionId : basename ( hookPath , '.jsonl' ), path : hookPath }
: await findClaudeTranscript ( projectsDir , session . claudeSessionId || session . id , session . id );
if ( transcript ) await appendClaudeCustomTitle ( transcript . path , transcript . sessionId , session . name );
} catch ( err ) {
console . warn ( `[Session] Could not carry rename into the Claude transcript for ${ session . id } :` , err );
}
}
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/** Locate a top-level Claude transcript, including recovered tmux sessions. */
async function findClaudeTranscript (
projectsDir : string ,
conversationId : string ,
codemanSessionId : string
) : Promise < { sessionId : string ; path : string } | null > {
let projectDirs : import ( 'node:fs' ). Dirent [];
try {
projectDirs = await fs . readdir ( projectsDir , { withFileTypes : true });
} catch {
return null ;
}
const safeIds = [... new Set ([ conversationId , codemanSessionId ])]. filter (( value ) => /^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$/ . test ( value ));
for ( const candidateId of safeIds ) {
for ( const projectDir of projectDirs ) {
if ( ! projectDir . isDirectory ()) continue ;
const jsonlPath = join ( projectsDir , projectDir . name , ` ${ candidateId } .jsonl` );
try {
const stat = await fs . stat ( jsonlPath );
if ( stat . isFile ()) return { sessionId : candidateId , path : jsonlPath };
} catch {
/* continue */
}
}
}
// If mux-sessions.json was lost or stale, reconcileSessions() historically
// recovered `codeman-40568a29` as `restored-40568a29` and used the server cwd.
// The tmux name still carries the first eight UUID characters, which safely
// reconnects the viewer when exactly one matching top-level transcript exists.
const restoredMatch = /^restored-([a-f0-9]{8,})$/i . exec ( codemanSessionId );
if ( ! restoredMatch ) return null ;
const fragment = restoredMatch [ 1 ]. toLowerCase ();
const candidates : Array < { sessionId : string ; path : string ; mtimeMs : number } > = [];
const uuidPattern = /^[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[1-5][a-f0-9]{3}-[89ab][a-f0-9]{3}-[a-f0-9]{12}$/i ;
for ( const projectDir of projectDirs ) {
if ( ! projectDir . isDirectory ()) continue ;
const dirPath = join ( projectsDir , projectDir . name );
let files : import ( 'node:fs' ). Dirent [];
try {
files = await fs . readdir ( dirPath , { withFileTypes : true });
} catch {
continue ;
}
for ( const file of files ) {
if ( ! file . isFile () || ! file . name . endsWith ( '.jsonl' )) continue ;
const candidateId = file . name . slice ( 0 , - '.jsonl' . length );
if ( ! candidateId . toLowerCase (). startsWith ( fragment ) || ! uuidPattern . test ( candidateId )) continue ;
const path = join ( dirPath , file . name );
const stat = await fs . stat ( path ). catch (() => null );
if ( stat ) candidates . push ({ sessionId : candidateId , path , mtimeMs : stat.mtimeMs });
}
}
const candidateIds = new Set ( candidates . map (( candidate ) => candidate . sessionId ));
if ( candidateIds . size !== 1 ) return null ;
candidates . sort (( a , b ) => b . mtimeMs - a . mtimeMs );
return candidates [ 0 ] ?? null ;
}
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app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/last-response' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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// Codex sessions don't write to ~/.claude/projects — their transcripts
// live in ~/.codex/sessions/**. Branch to a Codex-specific reader so the
// response-viewer works for Codex panes too.
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if ( getCli ( session . mode ) ? . capabilities . transcript === 'codex-rollout' ) {
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const codexQuery = req . query as { context? : string };
return await readCodexLastResponse ( session , codexQuery . context === 'full' );
}
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// DeepSeek Harness writes a real structured transcript under
// `$DSH_HOME/sessions/**`, so read that rather than segmenting the pane.
// ⚠️ For dsh the pane fallback is not merely coarse, it is WRONG: dsh-TUI
// paints a full-screen splash, and the segmenter served its ASCII-art logo
// back as the worker's answer (measured), which an agent polling for a
// reply reads as a reply. So an EMPTY transcript result still wins over the
// pane — "nothing said yet" is the honest answer. Only `null`, meaning a
// Node too old to decode zstd, falls through to the segmenter below.
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// ⚠️ Local sessions only: a docker case's harness writes its transcript
// inside the CONTAINER's ~/.dsh (the workspace bind-mount does not cover
// it) and a remote-SSH case's lives on the remote host, so the local
// reader would scan a $DSH_HOME that can never hold this session's file
// and return "nothing said yet" forever — an agent polling that worker
// would starve on an answer that exists. Those configurations keep the
// pane segmenter below: coarse, but the real conversation.
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if ( getCli ( session . mode ) ? . capabilities . transcript === 'deepseek-zstd' && ! session . docker && ! session . remote ) {
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const deepSeekQuery = req . query as { context? : string };
const full = deepSeekQuery . context === 'full' ;
const transcript = await readDeepSeekLastResponse ( session , { blocks : full });
if ( transcript ) {
return {
text : transcript.text ,
timestamp : transcript.timestamp ,
hasContext : transcript.text.length > 0 || transcript . blocks . length > 0 ,
messages : full ? transcript.blocks : undefined ,
};
}
}
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// OpenCode / Gemini / Antigravity / Pi render their own TUIs and write no
// Claude transcript, so the scan below finds nothing and the response viewer
// renders permanently empty for them. Segment the terminal buffer instead —
// the pane IS the transcript for these CLIs. Codex is already handled above,
// where a real rollout file is the better source.
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if ( isExternalCliTranscriptMode ( session . mode )) {
const externalQuery = req . query as { context? : string };
const blocks = parseExternalCliTranscript ( session . terminalBuffer , session . mode );
return {
text : getLastTranscriptResponse ( blocks ),
timestamp : '' ,
hasContext : blocks.length > 0 ,
messages : externalQuery.context === 'full' ? blocks : undefined ,
};
}
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// Scan ~/.claude/projects/*/ for the transcript file
const projectsDir = join ( process . env . HOME || '/tmp' , '.claude' , 'projects' );
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// Adopt the current conversation id if the user ran `/clear` — Claude CLI's
// interactive PTY emits no JSON on stdout, so without this lookup the
// stored id stays pinned to the pre-/clear transcript.
const activeId = await resolveActiveClaudeSessionIdFromHistory ( session , projectsDir );
if ( activeId && activeId !== session . claudeSessionId ) {
session . adoptClaudeSessionId ( activeId );
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// Flush the Enter that vouched for this adoption to state.json. A `/clear`
// emits no completion event, so without this the anchor could still be
// unpersisted when the server restarts — and recovery would fall back to
// the launch conversation.
ctx . persistSessionState ( session );
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// Docker sessions: keep the case's resume seed following the live conversation.
if ( session . docker ) {
void persistDockerCaseClaudeSessionId ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR , session . docker . containerName , activeId ). catch (
() => {}
);
}
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}
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const query = req . query as { context? : string };
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// `turn` is the brief view's context: the last ANSWERED turn's assistant
// messages, so a multi-row answer is not reduced to its final row. `text`
// stays the last assistant row in every mode (agent pollers hash it).
const wantsMessages = query . context === 'full' || query . context === 'turn' ;
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const claudeSessionId = session . claudeSessionId || session . id ;
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const transcript = await findClaudeTranscript ( projectsDir , claudeSessionId , session . id );
if ( ! transcript ) {
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return wantsMessages ? { text : '' , timestamp : '' , messages : [] } : { text : '' , timestamp : '' };
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}
if ( transcript . sessionId !== session . claudeSessionId && transcript . sessionId !== session . id ) {
session . adoptClaudeSessionId ( transcript . sessionId );
if ( session . docker ) {
void persistDockerCaseClaudeSessionId (
CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR ,
session . docker . containerName ,
transcript . sessionId
). catch (() => {});
}
}
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try {
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const content = await fs . readFile ( transcript . path , 'utf8' );
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const parsed = parseClaudeResponseTranscript ( content , wantsMessages );
if ( query . context === 'turn' ) {
return {
text : parsed.text ,
timestamp : parsed.timestamp ,
messages : selectLastAnsweredTurn ( parsed . messages ?? []),
};
}
return parsed ;
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} catch {
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return wantsMessages ? { text : '' , timestamp : '' , messages : [] } : { text : '' , timestamp : '' };
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}
});
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function isCodexInjectedContext ( text : string ) : boolean {
return (
/^# AGENTS\.md instructions\b/i . test ( text ) ||
/^<environment_context\b/i . test ( text ) ||
/^<turn_aborted\b/i . test ( text ) ||
/^<codex_internal_context\b/i . test ( text ) ||
/^<recommended_plugins\b/i . test ( text ) ||
/^<user_instructions\b/i . test ( text ) ||
/^# Options\b/i . test ( text )
);
}
// ── Codex response-viewer support ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Read the rollout's session_meta identity fields (plus turn_context cwd as
// a fallback when the huge session_meta line got truncated by the head read).
function readCodexRolloutMeta ( head : string ) : { cwd? : string ; originator? : string } {
let cwd : string | undefined ;
let originator : string | undefined ;
for ( const line of head . split ( '\n' )) {
if ( ! line ) continue ;
try {
const entry = JSON . parse ( line ) as {
type ?: string ;
payload ?: { cwd? : string ; originator? : string };
};
if ( entry . type === 'session_meta' ) {
cwd ??= entry . payload ? . cwd ;
originator ??= entry . payload ? . originator ;
} else if ( entry . type === 'turn_context' ) {
cwd ??= entry . payload ? . cwd ;
}
} catch {
// Malformed or truncated head line — keep scanning.
}
if ( cwd && originator ) break ;
}
return { cwd , originator };
}
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// The pane's last Enter (Session.lastSubmitAt) correlated against
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// ~/.codex/history.jsonl, which logs every submitted user message as
// {session_id, ts}. This identifies the thread the pane is ACTUALLY on and
// is the only signal that survives /resume, /new and /fork typed inside the
// codex TUI itself. An entry is credited to this pane only when its Enter is
// the closest among all codex panes, so a menu keystroke in another pane
// can't steal the attribution.
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const codexHistoryPinCache = new LRUMap < string , { submitAt : number ; threadId : string }>({ maxSize : 1024 });
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async function resolveCodexThreadFromHistory (
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session : { id : string ; lastSubmitAt? : number },
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codexHome : string
) : Promise < string | null > {
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const submitAt = session . lastSubmitAt || 0 ;
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if ( ! submitAt ) return null ;
const cached = codexHistoryPinCache . get ( session . id );
if ( cached && cached . submitAt === submitAt ) return cached . threadId ;
const histPath = join ( codexHome , 'history.jsonl' );
const st = await fs . stat ( histPath ). catch (() => null );
if ( ! st || st . size === 0 ) return null ;
const tail = await readFileTail ( histPath , Buffer . alloc ( 65536 ), st . size );
if ( ! tail ) return null ;
const WINDOW_MS = 15 _000 ;
const otherSubmits : number [] = [];
for ( const s of ctx . sessions . values ()) {
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if ( s . id !== session . id && getCli ( s . mode ) ? . capabilities . transcript === 'codex-rollout' && s . lastSubmitAt ) {
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otherSubmits . push ( s . lastSubmitAt );
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}
}
let best : { threadId : string ; dist : number } | undefined ;
for ( const line of tail . split ( '\n' )) {
if ( ! line ) continue ;
let e : { session_id? : string ; ts? : number };
try {
e = JSON . parse ( line );
} catch {
continue ; // first tail line may be cut mid-JSON
}
if ( ! e . session_id || typeof e . ts !== 'number' ) continue ;
const tsMs = e . ts * 1000 ; // history timestamps are unix seconds
const dist = Math . abs ( tsMs - submitAt );
if ( dist > WINDOW_MS ) continue ;
if ( otherSubmits . some (( o ) => Math . abs ( tsMs - o ) < dist )) continue ; // another pane is closer
if ( ! best || dist < best . dist ) best = { threadId : e.session_id , dist };
}
if ( ! best ) return null ;
codexHistoryPinCache . set ( session . id , { submitAt , threadId : best.threadId });
return best . threadId ;
}
// Locate THIS pane's rollout, in order of confidence:
// 0. history match — the thread the pane last submitted a message to
// (see resolveCodexThreadFromHistory); tracks the pane through
// /resume //new //fork typed inside the TUI.
// 1. originator match — Codeman spawns codex panes with
// CODEX_INTERNAL_ORIGINATOR_OVERRIDE=codeman_<sessionId>, which codex
// writes into session_meta.originator of every rollout it creates
// (including new files after /new in the same pane; newest match wins).
// 2. resume-id match — resumed rollouts keep their ORIGINAL session_meta
// (codex appends without rewriting it), so originator matching can't
// see them; but the rollout uuid is in the filename and we know the id.
// 3. legacy cwd+mtime heuristic — panes started before this feature, or
// TUI-resumed threads before their first tracked submit. Case-blind
// cwd compare (codex records the launch-time case, /mnt paths vary)
// and rollouts claimed by OTHER codeman panes are excluded.
async function findActiveCodexFile ( session : {
id : string ;
workingDir : string ;
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lastSubmitAt? : number ;
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codexConfig ?: { resumeSessionId? : string };
}) : Promise < string | null > {
const codexHome = process . env . CODEX_HOME || join ( process . env . HOME || '/tmp' , '.codex' );
const sessionsDir = join ( codexHome , 'sessions' );
const files : Array < { path : string ; mtimeMs : number } > = [];
const walk = async ( dir : string ) : Promise < void > => {
let entries : import ( 'node:fs' ). Dirent [];
try {
entries = await fs . readdir ( dir , { withFileTypes : true });
} catch {
return ;
}
for ( const entry of entries ) {
const fullPath = join ( dir , entry . name );
if ( entry . isDirectory ()) {
await walk ( fullPath );
continue ;
}
if ( ! entry . isFile () || ! entry . name . endsWith ( '.jsonl' )) continue ;
const st = await fs . stat ( fullPath ). catch (() => null );
if ( ! st || st . size < 100 ) continue ;
files . push ({ path : fullPath , mtimeMs : st.mtimeMs });
}
};
await walk ( sessionsDir );
files . sort (( a , b ) => b . mtimeMs - a . mtimeMs );
const historyThreadId = await resolveCodexThreadFromHistory ( session , codexHome );
if ( historyThreadId ) {
const hit = files . find (( f ) => basename ( f . path ). endsWith ( `- ${ historyThreadId } .jsonl` ));
if ( hit ) return hit . path ;
}
const rawResumeId = session . codexConfig ? . resumeSessionId ;
const resumeId =
rawResumeId && /^[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{12}$/ . test ( rawResumeId )
? rawResumeId
: undefined ;
const idMatch = resumeId ? files . find (( f ) => basename ( f . path ). endsWith ( `- ${ resumeId } .jsonl` )) : undefined ;
// Scan newest-first for our originator; anything strictly older than the
// id match can never beat it, so the head reads stop there (mtime ties are
// still scanned — a /new rollout may land in the same clock tick). The
// 128 KiB head budget covers the session_meta line, which embeds full
// base_instructions (observed max ~22 KiB on codex 0.144).
const originator = `codeman_ ${ session . id } ` ;
const wantCwd = session . workingDir . toLowerCase ();
const headBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 131072 );
let cwdFallback : { path : string ; mtimeMs : number } | undefined ;
for ( const f of files ) {
if ( idMatch && f . mtimeMs < idMatch . mtimeMs ) break ;
const meta = await readCodexRolloutMetaCached ( f . path , headBuf );
if ( ! meta ) continue ;
if ( meta . originator === originator ) return f . path ; // newest-first → first hit wins
if (
! cwdFallback &&
! idMatch &&
meta . cwd ? . toLowerCase () === wantCwd &&
// A rollout stamped by another codeman pane belongs to that pane.
! ( meta . originator ? . startsWith ( 'codeman_' ) && meta . originator !== originator )
) {
cwdFallback = f ;
}
}
return idMatch ? . path ?? cwdFallback ? . path ?? null ;
}
// session_meta is written once when codex creates the rollout and never
// rewritten (verified: resume appends without touching it), so the parsed
// identity of a given path can be cached forever. This turns the per-request
// scan into stat calls plus head reads for new files only.
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const codexRolloutMetaCache = new LRUMap < string , { cwd ?: string ; originator ?: string }>({ maxSize : 4096 });
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async function readCodexRolloutMetaCached (
filePath : string ,
headBuf : Buffer
) : Promise < { cwd? : string ; originator? : string } | null > {
const cached = codexRolloutMetaCache . get ( filePath );
if ( cached ) return cached ;
const head = await readFileHead ( filePath , headBuf );
if ( ! head ) return null ;
const meta = readCodexRolloutMeta ( head );
// Don't cache a still-incomplete head: a rollout being created may not
// have flushed session_meta/turn_context yet.
if ( ! meta . cwd && ! meta . originator ) return meta ;
codexRolloutMetaCache . set ( filePath , meta );
return meta ;
}
function extractCodexBlockText ( content : unknown , kinds : string []) : string {
if ( typeof content === 'string' ) return content ;
if ( ! Array . isArray ( content )) return '' ;
return content
. filter (
( b ) : b is { type : string ; text : string } =>
!! b &&
typeof b === 'object' &&
kinds . includes (( b as { type ?: string }). type || '' ) &&
typeof ( b as { text? : string }). text === 'string'
)
. map (( b ) => b . text )
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. join ( '\n\n' );
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}
// Single pass over a Codex rollout: track the last assistant message (for the
// default eye view) and, when `full`, the whole user/assistant thread.
//
// User turns come from event_msg/user_message when available: codex emits one
// per REAL user input, and injected context (AGENTS.md, environment_context,
// compaction summaries, …) never appears there — so no filtering heuristics.
// response_item user rows duplicate those inputs mixed with the injections;
// they are kept only as a fallback for old rollouts without event_msg rows.
async function readCodexLastResponse (
session : { id : string ; workingDir : string ; codexConfig ?: { resumeSessionId? : string } },
full : boolean
) : Promise < {
text : string ;
timestamp : string ;
messages? : Array < { role : string ; text : string ; timestamp? : string } > ;
} > {
const empty = full ? { text : '' , timestamp : '' , messages : [] } : { text : '' , timestamp : '' };
const filePath = await findActiveCodexFile ( session );
if ( ! filePath ) return empty ;
let content : string ;
try {
content = await fs . readFile ( filePath , 'utf8' );
} catch {
return empty ;
}
let lastText = '' ;
let lastTimestamp = '' ;
const messages : Array < { role : string ; text : string ; timestamp? : string ; legacyUser? : boolean } > = [];
// Multiset of event-sourced user texts: a real input appears BOTH as an
// event_msg and as a response_item row, so each event text cancels exactly
// one legacy twin. Legacy rows without an event twin (turns written by an
// older codex appending to the same rollout) survive — a file-wide boolean
// would wrongly drop them.
const eventUserTexts = new Map < string , number >();
for ( const line of content . split ( '\n' )) {
if ( ! line ) continue ;
let entry : {
timestamp? : string ;
type ?: string ;
payload ?: {
type ?: string ;
role? : string ;
content? : unknown ;
message? : unknown ;
images? : unknown ;
local_images? : unknown ;
};
};
try {
entry = JSON . parse ( line );
} catch {
continue ;
}
if ( full && entry . type === 'event_msg' && entry . payload ? . type === 'user_message' ) {
let text = typeof entry . payload . message === 'string' ? entry . payload . message . trim () : '' ;
if ( text && isCodexInjectedContext ( text )) continue ;
if ( text ) eventUserTexts . set ( text , ( eventUserTexts . get ( text ) || 0 ) + 1 );
// Image-only (or image+text) inputs: the text field alone would make
// the turn vanish, so surface a placeholder.
const imageCount =
( Array . isArray ( entry . payload . images ) ? entry.payload.images.length : 0 ) +
( Array . isArray ( entry . payload . local_images ) ? entry.payload.local_images.length : 0 );
if ( imageCount > 0 ) text = text ? ` ${ text } \ n \ n*[image × ${ imageCount } ]*` : `*[image × ${ imageCount } ]*` ;
if ( text ) messages . push ({ role : 'user' , text , timestamp : entry.timestamp });
continue ;
}
if ( entry . type !== 'response_item' || entry . payload ? . type !== 'message' ) continue ;
const role = entry . payload ? . role ;
if ( role === 'assistant' ) {
const text = extractCodexBlockText ( entry . payload ? . content , [ 'output_text' , 'text' ]);
if ( text ) {
lastText = text ;
lastTimestamp = entry . timestamp || '' ;
if ( full ) messages . push ({ role : 'assistant' , text , timestamp : entry.timestamp });
}
} else if ( role === 'user' && full ) {
const text = extractCodexBlockText ( entry . payload ? . content , [ 'input_text' , 'text' ]). trim ();
// Drop Codex's injected context turns (AGENTS.md, environment_context, …)
// so the thread shows real user prompts only.
if ( text && ! isCodexInjectedContext ( text )) {
messages . push ({ role : 'user' , text , timestamp : entry.timestamp , legacyUser : true });
}
}
}
const thread = messages
. filter (( m ) => {
if ( ! m . legacyUser ) return true ;
const n = eventUserTexts . get ( m . text ) || 0 ;
if ( n > 0 ) {
eventUserTexts . set ( m . text , n - 1 );
return false ; // duplicate of an event_msg row already in the thread
}
return true ;
})
. map (({ role , text , timestamp }) => ({ role , text , timestamp }));
return full
? { text : lastText , timestamp : lastTimestamp , messages : thread }
: { text : lastText , timestamp : lastTimestamp };
}
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// ========== Get Terminal Buffer ==========
// Query params:
// tail=<bytes> - Only return last N bytes (faster initial load)
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// full=1 - Explicitly request the entire tmux scrollback (COD-47)
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// alt=recording - With full=1: if the pane is in the alternate screen, load
// the visible frame over the byte recording instead
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app . get ( '/api/sessions/:id/terminal' , async ( req , reply ) => {
const routeStartedAt = performance . now ();
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const query = req . query as { tail? : string ; full? : string ; lines? : string ; alt? : string };
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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// `full=1` is the EXPLICIT full-history signal (COD-47): capture the ENTIRE
// tmux scrollback so history beyond the server byte buffer can be recovered.
// Requests WITHOUT it — shell selection/tab switches (`tail=`) and legacy
// no-param callers — keep the fast visible-frame capture.
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const tailBytes = query . tail ? parseInt ( query . tail , 10 ) : 0 ;
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let isFullReload = query . full === '1' || query . full === 'true' ;
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const { tmuxHistoryLimit , terminalBufferMaxBytes } = await ctx . getTerminalHistoryConfig ();
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// Prepend the live tmux pane buffer so tab-switch replay shows the current
// on-screen frame, not just the accumulated byte history. This matters for
// TUI modes (codex/opencode) that repaint only their latest frame: the
// accumulated buffer alone replays as the idle banner. We clear the viewport
// (`\x1b[H\x1b[2J`) between the history and the live pane so they don't
// overlap. `captureActivePaneBuffer` is a no-op ('') under test mode and
// returns null when unavailable, in which case we fall back to history.
const muxName = session . muxName ;
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const captureStartedAt = performance . now ();
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// The visible path used to pass no options at all. It passes one now for a
// single reason: `capturedGeometry` comes BACK on it, and the response has
// to tell the client what size the frame it is about to render was built
// for. See PaneCaptureOptions.capturedGeometry.
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// `lines` bounds only the history a FULL capture reads; the visible-frame
// path reads no history and is untouched by it.
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let captureOpts : PaneCaptureOptions = isFullReload
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? {
fullHistory : true ,
historyLimitLines : captureHistoryLines ( query . lines , tmuxHistoryLimit ),
maxCaptureBytes : terminalBufferMaxBytes ,
}
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: {};
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// A remote session's local pane only sees the remote tmux client's repaints,
// so its own scrollback is a fraction of the real one: read that from the
// remote tmux and splice it above the local frame. Null (host unreachable,
// no remote session, back-off) keeps the local capture as before.
if ( isFullReload && session . remote && muxName && captureOpts . historyLimitLines !== undefined ) {
const remoteScrollback = await fetchRemoteScrollback (
session . remote ,
session . id ,
captureOpts . historyLimitLines ,
terminalBufferMaxBytes
);
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if ( remoteScrollback !== null ) {
captureOpts . scrollbackOverride = remoteScrollback . scrollback ;
captureOpts . scrollbackOverrideScreen = remoteScrollback . screen ;
}
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}
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const capture = ( opts : PaneCaptureOptions ) : string | null =>
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muxName && typeof ctx . mux . captureActivePaneBuffer === 'function'
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? ctx . mux . captureActivePaneBuffer ( muxName , opts )
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: null ;
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let liveMuxBuffer = capture ( captureOpts );
// tmux adds no history while a pane is in the alternate screen, and a
// nested tmux client (a remote SSH or Docker case, or `tmux` run by hand
// in a shell) holds its pane there for good, so the full capture above is
// one screen plus whatever came before. The byte recording still carries
// the scrollback, so a caller that opts in (a shell's automatic load,
// `alt=recording`) gets the old visible-frame load over it, tailed, rather
// than losing everything above the screen. `alternate_on` cannot tell a
// nested tmux from vim or less, so those take this path too while open:
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// the load the shell had before tmux-rendered loads existed. Not when the
// history came from the remote tmux (`scrollbackOverride`): a remote pane is
// in the alternate screen only because it hosts that tmux's client, and
// the fallback would throw the remote scrollback away.
if (
isFullReload &&
query . alt === 'recording' &&
captureOpts . scrollbackOverride === undefined &&
captureOpts . capturedAlternateOn === true
) {
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isFullReload = false ;
captureOpts = {};
liveMuxBuffer = capture ( captureOpts );
}
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const captureFinishedAt = performance . now ();
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const hasLiveMuxBuffer = liveMuxBuffer !== null && liveMuxBuffer . length > 0 ;
const source : 'history' | 'mux-visible' | 'mux-full-history' = hasLiveMuxBuffer
? isFullReload
? 'mux-full-history'
: 'mux-visible'
: 'history' ;
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// What the three row-preserving skips below must key on. `isFullReload` is
// only what the CLIENT ASKED FOR: when the capture comes back null — ENOBUFS,
// a timeout, a vanished pane, or a session with no mux at all — rawBuffer
// falls back to the byte history, which is a stream of successive frames with
// no row alignment to protect and every reason to be stripped.
const isFullCapture = isFullReload && hasLiveMuxBuffer ;
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let rawBuffer : string ;
if ( liveMuxBuffer !== null && liveMuxBuffer . length > 0 ) {
// Full-history capture is the RENDERED form of everything already in the
// byte buffer (up to tmux eviction) — return it alone. Prepending the byte
// history would replay the whole conversation twice: `\x1b[2J` clears only
// the viewport, not xterm scrollback. The history+clear+frame concat stays
// for the visible-frame path, where the single pane frame lacks history.
rawBuffer = isFullReload
? liveMuxBuffer
: session.terminalBufferLength > 0
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? ` ${ session . terminalBuffer } \ x1b[H \ x1b[2J ${ liveMuxBuffer } `
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: liveMuxBuffer ;
} else {
rawBuffer = session . terminalBuffer ;
}
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const fullSize = rawBuffer . length ;
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let truncated = false ;
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// WHY the reason and not just the boolean (#258): `truncated` is set at two
// sites that mean opposite things to a user. 'tail' is an intentional
// partial replay and the rest is still retained, so a `full=1` pull recovers
// it. 'capped' means we hit the byte ceiling — and on a full-history capture
// that is already everything tmux holds, so the oldest output is genuinely
// out of reach rather than one click away. Collapsing both into one flag is
// why the UI could only ever say "truncated for performance".
let truncationReason : 'capped' | 'tail' | null = null ;
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let cleanBuffer : string ;
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// A `lines=` bound shallower than tmux's history left the older lines in
// tmux: an intentional partial read, so 'tail', and a later pull with a
// deeper (or no) bound recovers them. Without this a bounded window looks
// like the whole history to the client. The byte cap below still wins.
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// Only a bound the CLIENT set and below the configured ceiling counts:
// without `lines=` the bound is the ceiling itself, and on tmux before 3.7
// a live pane can hold more than a lowered ceiling, which no request can
// read, so calling that a recoverable cut would offer a button that can
// never return more.
// `historyLinesCut` tells the client this happened, apart from any byte
// cut below: `fullSize` counts only what tmux returned, so the bytes a
// later `tail` cut are not all that is left, and the client must not name
// them as the remainder.
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const capturedHistoryLines = captureOpts . capturedHistoryLines ;
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const historyLinesCut =
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isFullCapture &&
captureOpts . historyLimitLines !== undefined &&
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captureOpts . historyLimitLines < tmuxHistoryLimit &&
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capturedHistoryLines !== undefined &&
capturedHistoryLines > captureOpts . historyLimitLines ;
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if ( historyLinesCut ) {
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truncated = true ;
truncationReason = 'tail' ;
}
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// Cap the payload EARLY — before the regex normalization passes below run
// over it. A full-history tmux capture can be tens of MB of scrollback;
// normalizing all of it would stall the event loop only to discard most
// bytes anyway. Keep the most RECENT bytes (slice from the end) and align
// to a line boundary so we never start mid-ANSI-escape.
if ( terminalBufferMaxBytes > 0 && rawBuffer . length > terminalBufferMaxBytes ) {
rawBuffer = rawBuffer . slice ( - terminalBufferMaxBytes );
truncated = true ;
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truncationReason = 'capped' ;
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const capNewline = rawBuffer . indexOf ( '\n' );
if ( capNewline > 0 && capNewline < 4096 ) {
rawBuffer = rawBuffer . slice ( capNewline + 1 );
}
}
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// Strip redundant Ink spinner/status redraws BEFORE tailing.
// During long thinking phases, Ink rewrites the same rows thousands of times
// (500KB+). Without stripping, tail mode returns only spinner frames and
// the terminal appears empty when switching tabs.
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// A full reload's buffer IS the rendered pane, one line per screen row, and
// it ends with an absolute cursor move back to the pane's own position.
// Every transform below that can DELETE A LINE would shift the rows out from
// under that position, leaving the caret a row off — on the composer's
// border rather than its input line. Redraw-bloat stripping exists for a
// byte stream of successive frames; a capture holds no successive frames.
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let strippedBuffer =
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isFullCapture || getCli ( session . mode ) ? . capabilities . stripInkBloat === false
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? rawBuffer
: stripInkRedrawBloat ( rawBuffer );
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// Same strip as the live stream (session.ts), so a buffer recorded before the
// live-side strip existed cannot re-park xterm on replay. See stripReplayBuffer.
strippedBuffer = stripReplayBuffer ( strippedBuffer , session . mode , session . usesMux );
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if ( tailBytes > 0 && strippedBuffer . length > tailBytes ) {
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// Fast path: tail from the end, skip expensive banner search on full 2MB buffer.
// Banner is near the top and gets discarded by tail anyway.
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cleanBuffer = strippedBuffer . slice ( - tailBytes );
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truncated = true ;
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// 'capped' already means the oldest bytes are gone for good; a tail cut on
// top of it does not soften that, so the stronger reason wins.
truncationReason ??= 'tail' ;
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// Avoid starting mid-ANSI-escape: find first newline within the first 4KB
// and start from there. This prevents xterm.js from parsing a partial escape
// sequence which corrupts cursor position for all subsequent Ink redraws.
const firstNewline = cleanBuffer . indexOf ( '\n' );
if ( firstNewline > 0 && firstNewline < 4096 ) {
cleanBuffer = cleanBuffer . slice ( firstNewline + 1 );
}
} else {
// Full buffer: clean junk before actual Claude content
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cleanBuffer = strippedBuffer ;
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// Find where Claude banner starts (has color codes before "Claude")
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// Skipped for a full reload: the banner sits at whatever row the pane has
// it, and cutting to it would drop the blank rows above and move every
// row up by that many.
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const claudeMatch = isFullCapture ? null : cleanBuffer . match ( CLAUDE_BANNER_PATTERN );
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if ( claudeMatch && claudeMatch . index !== undefined && claudeMatch . index > 0 ) {
let lineStart = claudeMatch . index ;
while ( lineStart > 0 && cleanBuffer [ lineStart - 1 ] !== '\n' ) {
lineStart -- ;
}
cleanBuffer = cleanBuffer . slice ( lineStart );
}
}
// Remove Ctrl+L and leading whitespace (cheap on tailed subset)
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// Leading whitespace goes too, except on a full reload where a leading
// blank line is the pane's own first row and dropping it shifts every row
// up by one.
cleanBuffer = cleanBuffer . replace ( CTRL_L_PATTERN , '' );
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if ( ! isFullCapture ) cleanBuffer = cleanBuffer . replace ( LEADING_WHITESPACE_PATTERN , '' );
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const finishedAt = performance . now ();
reply . header (
'Server-Timing' ,
`capture;dur= ${ ( captureFinishedAt - captureStartedAt ). toFixed ( 1 ) } , ` +
`prepare;dur= ${ ( finishedAt - captureFinishedAt ). toFixed ( 1 ) } , ` +
`total;dur= ${ ( finishedAt - routeStartedAt ). toFixed ( 1 ) } `
);
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return {
terminalBuffer : cleanBuffer ,
status : session.status ,
fullSize ,
truncated ,
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truncationReason ,
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// The `lines=` bound left older lines in tmux (see above): the remainder
// is more than `fullSize - retainedBytes`, by an amount unknown here.
historyLinesCut ,
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// `retainedBytes` is what this response actually carries; `fullSize` is
// what existed before the cut. The gap is what the indicator reports.
retainedBytes : cleanBuffer.length ,
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source ,
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// The pane geometry this frame was drawn for. A visible-frame capture
// positions every row absolutely, so a client whose terminal has fewer
// rows than this overwrites its last line with the overflow and loses
// the rows underneath. The client compares these against its own size.
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//
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// BOTH FIELDS ARE ABSENT unless this response really carries a capture,
// and that is the honest answer rather than a gap to paper over. Two
// separate things can leave a frame unpositioned. The cursor query is
// what produces the absolute addressing in the first place, so a capture
// that lost it returned a raw frame with no row positioning in it. And a
// capture can report geometry and STILL hand back nothing: the
// full-history path returns '' for a pane holding nothing visible, which
// drops `source` to `history` while `capturedGeometry` is already
// written, so the geometry has to be suppressed HERE rather than trusted
// to be missing. Naming a size for a body that is the byte stream would
// describe a frame that was never drawn and invite the client to repair
// damage that does not exist.
captureCols : hasLiveMuxBuffer ? captureOpts.capturedGeometry?.cols : undefined ,
captureRows : hasLiveMuxBuffer ? captureOpts.capturedGeometry?.rows : undefined ,
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// Rows tmux holds above the visible frame, which is the most a `full=1`
// pull can add. `truncated` measures the BYTE stream, and for a pane that
// keeps no scrollback (a fullscreen CLI in the alternate screen) the bytes
// a tail cut drops are old repaints that no request can bring back, so a
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// client must not offer to load them. Absent when the pane was not read,
// and for a remote session: its local pane hosts the remote tmux client in
// the alternate screen, so it always reports 0, while a `full=1` load reads
// the real scrollback from the remote tmux (`fetchRemoteScrollback`).
paneHistoryLines : hasLiveMuxBuffer && ! session . remote ? captureOpts.capturedHistoryLines : undefined ,
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};
});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Session Settings (auto-clear, auto-compact, image watcher, flicker filter)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// ========== Auto-Clear ==========
app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/auto-clear' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const body = parseBody ( AutoClearSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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session . setAutoClear ( body . enabled , body . threshold );
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persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
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return {
success : true ,
data : {
autoClear : {
enabled : session.autoClearEnabled ,
threshold : session.autoClearThreshold ,
},
},
};
});
// ========== Auto-Compact ==========
app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/auto-compact' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const body = parseBody ( AutoCompactSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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session . setAutoCompact ( body . enabled , body . threshold , body . prompt );
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persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
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return {
success : true ,
data : {
autoCompact : {
enabled : session.autoCompactEnabled ,
threshold : session.autoCompactThreshold ,
prompt : session.autoCompactPrompt ,
},
},
};
});
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// ========== Auto-Resume (usage-limit pause) ==========
app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/auto-resume' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const body = parseBody ( AutoResumeSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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session . setAutoResume ( body . enabled );
persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
return {
success : true ,
data : {
autoResume : {
enabled : session.autoResumeEnabled ,
resumeAt : session.autoResumeAt ?? undefined ,
},
},
};
});
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// ========== Pin (float to top of the session manager list, COD-139) ==========
app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/pin' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
const body = parseBody ( PinSessionSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = ctx . sessions . get ( id );
if ( session ) {
if ( ! canAccessOwned ( getAuthUser ( req ), session . owner )) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . NOT_FOUND , `Session ${ id } not found` );
}
session . setPinned ( body . pinned );
// Persist + broadcast session:updated (keeps tabs/state consistent), then a
// dedicated session:pinned event so the session manager list re-sorts live.
persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionPinned , {
id ,
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pinned : session.pinned ,
pinnedAt : session.pinnedAt ?? undefined ,
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});
return {
success : true ,
data : {
pinned : session.pinned ,
pinnedAt : session.pinnedAt ?? undefined ,
},
};
}
// COD-142 keeps a pinned session's record after kill (demoteOrRemoveSession),
// so pin toggles must also work WITHOUT a live Session — otherwise a
// pinned-then-killed record could never be unpinned (cleanup skips pinned
// records, and the record has no live session to route through).
const persisted = ctx . store . getSession ( id );
if ( ! persisted || ! canAccessOwned ( getAuthUser ( req ), persisted . owner )) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . NOT_FOUND , `Session ${ id } not found` );
}
const pinnedAt = body . pinned ? Date . now () : undefined ;
ctx . store . setSession ( id , { ... persisted , pinned : body.pinned || undefined , pinnedAt });
ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionPinned , { id , pinned : body.pinned , pinnedAt });
return { success : true , data : { pinned : body.pinned , pinnedAt } };
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});
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// ========== Image Watcher ==========
app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/image-watcher' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const body = parseBody ( ImageWatcherSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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if ( body . enabled ) {
imageWatcher . watchSession ( session . id , session . workingDir );
} else {
imageWatcher . unwatchSession ( session . id );
}
// Store state on session for persistence
session . imageWatcherEnabled = body . enabled ;
ctx . persistSessionState ( session );
return {
success : true ,
data : {
imageWatcherEnabled : body.enabled ,
},
};
});
// ========== Flicker Filter ==========
app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/flicker-filter' , async ( req ) => {
const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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const body = parseBody ( FlickerFilterSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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session . flickerFilterEnabled = body . enabled ;
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persistAndBroadcastSession ( ctx , session );
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return {
success : true ,
data : {
flickerFilterEnabled : body.enabled ,
},
};
});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Quick Actions (quick-run, quick-start)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// ========== Quick Run ==========
app . post ( '/api/run' , async ( req ) => {
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const runOwner = ownerFor ( req );
const capMsg = sessionCapacityMessage ( ctx . sessions , runOwner );
if ( capMsg ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . SESSION_BUSY , capMsg );
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const {
prompt ,
workingDir ,
envOverrides : runEnvOverrides ,
} = parseBody ( QuickRunSchema , req . body , 'Invalid request body' );
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if ( ! prompt . trim ()) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'prompt is required' );
}
const dir = workingDir || process . cwd ();
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// Multi-user: confine a non-admin's one-shot working dir to their space.
if ( ! isWorkingDirAllowed ( getAuthUser ( req ), dir )) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . FORBIDDEN , 'workingDir is outside your workspace' );
}
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// Validate workingDir exists and is a directory
if ( workingDir ) {
try {
const stat = statSync ( dir );
if ( ! stat . isDirectory ()) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'workingDir is not a directory' );
}
} catch {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'workingDir does not exist' );
}
}
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// Section 6.3: the one-shot spawn path (runPrompt/buildPromptArgs) respects the
// session's claudeMode, so resolve it for the owner (bypass -> auto for non-granted).
const runClaudeModeConfig = await ctx . getClaudeModeConfig ();
const runClaudeMode = await resolveClaudeModeForUsername ( runClaudeModeConfig . claudeMode , runOwner );
const session = new Session ({
workingDir : dir ,
envOverrides : runEnvOverrides ,
claudeMode : runClaudeMode ,
allowedTools : runClaudeModeConfig.allowedTools ,
owner : runOwner ,
});
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await ctx . addSession ( session );
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ctx . store . incrementSessionsCreated ();
ctx . persistSessionState ( session );
await ctx . setupSessionListeners ( session );
getLifecycleLog (). log ({
event : 'created' ,
sessionId : session.id ,
name : session.name ,
reason : 'run_prompt' ,
});
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionCreated , ctx . getSessionStateWithRespawn ( session ));
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try {
const result = await session . runPrompt ( prompt );
// Clean up session after completion to prevent memory leak
await ctx . cleanupSession ( session . id , true , 'run_prompt_complete' );
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return { sessionId : session.id , ... result };
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} catch ( err ) {
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// Clean up session on error too. The session is destroyed here, so its id
// is only useful for log correlation — carry it in the error message.
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await ctx . cleanupSession ( session . id , true , 'run_prompt_error' );
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return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , ` ${ getErrorMessage ( err ) } (session ${ session . id } )` );
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}
});
// ========== Quick Start ==========
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app . post ( '/api/quick-start' , async ( req ) => {
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const owner = ownerFor ( req );
const capMsg = sessionCapacityMessage ( ctx . sessions , owner );
if ( capMsg ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . SESSION_BUSY , capMsg );
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const {
caseName = 'testcase' ,
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sessionName ,
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mode = 'claude' ,
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modelOverride ,
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openCodeConfig ,
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codexConfig ,
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geminiConfig ,
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antigravityConfig ,
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piConfig ,
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grokConfig ,
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deepSeekConfig ,
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ompConfig ,
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envOverrides ,
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effort ,
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advisorModel ,
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parentSessionId ,
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agentOrigin ,
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customModel ,
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tabGroupId ,
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} = parseBody ( QuickStartSchema , req . body );
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// Resolved ONCE here: the same value labels a case directory this request creates
// (agent-case-marker.ts) and draws the tab lineage line on the session below.
const qsParentSessionId = resolveParentSessionId ( ctx , req , parentSessionId , owner );
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// Multi-user: shell mode is arbitrary host-account execution, gated by the grant.
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// Resolve the owner's grant from the store so a GRANTED regular user is not wrongly denied.
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if ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . privilegedCommandGate && ! ( await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands ( owner ))) {
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return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . FORBIDDEN , 'Shell sessions require the can-bypass-permissions grant' );
}
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// Resolve the remote case FIRST — the CLI executes on the REMOTE host over ssh,
// so the LOCAL availability gates below (isCodexAvailable() etc.) don't apply and
// would wrongly reject a machine that hasn't got the CLI installed locally.
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let remote = undefined ;
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let docker = undefined ;
let dockerResumeId : string | undefined ;
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let casePath : string | null = null ;
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// Security: fold ownership INTO the match (don't early-return) so a NON-OWNED
// same-named remote/docker case is skipped and control falls through to the caller's
// own LOCAL case — remote/docker names are globally unique but local names are
// per-user, so a name collision must not shadow the caller's own case. canAccessOwned
// is allow-all for admins/single-user, so flag-OFF stays byte-identical.
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const remoteCases = await readRemoteCases ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR );
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const remoteCase = remoteCases . find (
( item ) => item . name === caseName && canAccessOwned ( getAuthUser ( req ), item . owner )
);
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const dockerCase = remoteCase
? undefined
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: ( await readDockerCases ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR )). find (
( item ) => item . name === caseName && canAccessOwned ( getAuthUser ( req ), item . owner )
);
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if ( remoteCase ) {
const host = ( await readRemoteHosts ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR )). find (( item ) => item . id === remoteCase . hostId );
if ( ! host ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . NOT_FOUND , 'Remote host not found' );
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// Per-session config that is applied to the LOCAL tmux/CLI wrapper (env vars via
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// tmux setenv, effort/model CLI args, codex/gemini/antigravity/opencode config) does NOT
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// cross ssh, so it would silently no-op. Reject rather than pretend it worked —
// remote command/env customization goes through the per-host command override.
if (
( envOverrides && Object . keys ( envOverrides ). length > 0 ) ||
effort ||
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advisorModel ||
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modelOverride !== undefined ||
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codexConfig ||
geminiConfig ||
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antigravityConfig ||
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piConfig ||
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grokConfig ||
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deepSeekConfig ||
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ompConfig ||
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openCodeConfig ||
customModel
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) {
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return createErrorResponse (
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ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
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'envOverrides, effort, advisorModel, modelOverride, per-CLI config, and custom model endpoints are not supported for remote cases (they do not cross ssh). Configure the remote command via the host command override instead.'
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);
}
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// The user pressing "Run" on a case whose host is asleep IS an explicit wake
// request (docs/remote-sessions.md §Wake-on-LAN), and the tmux probe below would
// otherwise fail with "could not verify tmux on remote host …" — an ssh failure
// that blames tmux for a machine that is merely suspended. Wired HERE, in the HTTP
// route, and deliberately NOT in the shared session service: `cron-service.ts`
// builds sessions through the service, and a wake down there would re-wake the
// host on every schedule (the failure invariant #1 exists to prevent).
const hostWake = await remoteWake . ensureHostAwake ( wakeableHost ( host ), {
timeoutMs : REMOTE_WAKE_REQUEST_READY_TIMEOUT_MS ,
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// No session yet, so the wake events name their requester (multi-user routing).
requestedBy : ownerFor ( req ),
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});
if ( hostWake === 'failed' ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
` ${ host . label } did not come back after a wake-on-LAN request — the session was not started`
);
}
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// tmux is a hard prerequisite on the remote host (the agent runs inside a remote
// tmux server so it survives ssh drops). Probe before spawning so a missing tmux
// surfaces a clear, structured error instead of a dead "tmux: command not found" pane.
const tmuxCheck = await checkRemoteTmuxAvailable ( host );
if ( ! tmuxCheck . ok ) {
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// An unreachable host and a host without tmux fail the same way over ssh, so the
// probe's own message would send the user hunting for a tmux install. Ask the
// registry (which just probed, when it woke the host) which of the two it is.
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// `=== false` on purpose: a proxied host answers `null` (the probe cannot reach
// it), and an unknown verdict must not replace the real ssh error with
// "not reachable" over a host that is fine.
if (( await remoteWake . checkHostReachable ( wakeableHost ( host ))) === false ) {
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return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
hostWake === 'no-target'
? ` ${ host . label } ( ${ host . host } ) is not reachable, and this host has no wake-on-LAN target — configure a MAC address or a wake command first`
: ` ${ host . label } ( ${ host . host } ) is not reachable`
);
}
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return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , tmuxCheck . error || 'remote host is missing tmux' );
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}
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casePath = remoteCase . remotePath ;
remote = toSessionRemote ( host , remoteCase );
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} else if ( dockerCase ) {
// Docker case: the CLI executes INSIDE a container via local tmux + `docker
// exec`, so the LOCAL availability gates below don't apply. Mirror the remote
// branch's rejection of per-session config that would not cross into the
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// container (it would silently no-op). (Ownership is enforced in the .find above.)
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const host = ( await readDockerHosts ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR )). find (( item ) => item . id === dockerCase . hostId );
if ( ! host ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . NOT_FOUND , 'Docker host not found' );
if (
( envOverrides && Object . keys ( envOverrides ). length > 0 ) ||
effort ||
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advisorModel ||
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codexConfig ||
geminiConfig ||
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antigravityConfig ||
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piConfig ||
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grokConfig ||
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deepSeekConfig ||
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ompConfig ||
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openCodeConfig ||
customModel
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) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
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'envOverrides, effort, advisorModel, per-CLI config, and custom model endpoints are not supported for docker cases (they do not cross into the container). Configure the container via the docker host command override instead.'
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);
}
const availability = await checkDockerAvailable ( host . engine );
if ( ! availability . ok ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
availability . error || 'docker daemon is not available'
);
}
const sessionDocker = toSessionDocker ( host , dockerCase );
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// An ADOPTED container skips every image-side gate: we never run `docker
// create`, so the image is the user's business, and `ensureAgentBaseImage`
// would build/require an image that has nothing to do with their container.
// The prerequisite that DOES still hold is tmux inside it, so probe the live
// container (not the image) and refuse before launch rather than dead-paning.
if ( sessionDocker . owned === false ) {
const probe = await probeAdoptableContainer ( sessionDocker , [ mode ]);
if ( ! probe . ok ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , probe . error || 'container is not usable' );
}
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// The probe already exec'd into the container; carry its facts onto the
// live session so the launch chain does not have to re-ask.
sessionDocker . runsAsRoot = probe . runsAsRoot ;
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// No `mode !== 'shell'` arm: a mode with no binary of its own is reported
// available by the probe unconditionally, so this reads the same answer for it.
if ( ! probe . availableModes ? . includes ( mode )) {
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return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
`" ${ mode } " is not installed in container " ${ sessionDocker . containerName } ". Adoption never modifies the container — install it inside, or pick another mode.`
);
}
} else {
// Ensure the base image exists, auto-building the default image on first use so
// it is never a blocker. Dedup'd with any build kicked off at case-create, so
// this awaits the SAME in-flight build rather than starting a second one.
const ensured = await ensureAgentBaseImage ( sessionDocker , sessionDocker . image , {
onProgress : ( line ) => ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . DockerImageBuildProgress , { name : dockerCase.name , line }),
});
if ( ! ensured . ok ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , ensured . error || 'base image not available' );
}
if ( ensured . built ) {
ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . DockerImageBuildComplete , { name : dockerCase.name , image : sessionDocker.image });
}
// tmux is a hard prerequisite (the in-container tmux makes reconnect durable).
// Skip the extra container-run probe for our OWN default image (the baked
// Dockerfile always contains tmux); still verify a custom image.
if ( sessionDocker . image !== DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE ) {
const tmuxCheck = await checkDockerTmuxAvailable ( sessionDocker );
if ( ! tmuxCheck . ok ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , tmuxCheck . error || 'base image is missing tmux' );
}
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}
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}
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// Config drift (docs/docker-cases-plan.md §4): the desired create-config no
// longer matches the existing container's codeman.confighash label. Refuse to
// silently launch into the stale container — the frontend confirms a recreate
// (POST /api/docker-cases/:name/recreate; workspace + transcripts ride bind
// mounts and the conversation resumes), or the user reverts the host edit.
const drift = await checkDockerConfigDrift ( sessionDocker );
if ( drift . exists && drift . drifted ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . CONFLICT ,
`Container config for case " ${ dockerCase . name } " changed since the container was created. Recreate the container to apply it (workspace and conversation survive), or revert the docker host edit.`
);
}
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casePath = dockerCase . hostWorkspacePath ; // a REAL host dir (bind-mounted into the container)
docker = sessionDocker ;
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// Seed only Claude's resume id. Codex, Gemini, and the other CLIs have
// separate conversation stores and must never receive a Claude UUID.
if ( mode === 'claude' && sessionDocker . resumeOnStart && dockerCase . lastClaudeSessionId ) {
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dockerResumeId = dockerCase . lastClaudeSessionId ;
}
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} else {
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// Same pre-flight as POST /api/sessions: refuse before spawning a pane that would die
// on `command not found`, with the resolver's own diagnostics, and a launcher CLI's
// more specific reason (dsh: binary vs no pane-capable profile vs the profile the
// caller named). External CLIs only — claude and shell fall through to tmux-manager's
// own not-found throw, exactly as before.
if ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . external ) {
const qsLaunchError = await resolveCliLaunchError (
mode ,
legacyConfigForMode ( mode , {
openCodeConfig ,
codexConfig ,
geminiConfig ,
antigravityConfig ,
piConfig ,
grokConfig ,
deepSeekConfig ,
} as unknown as Record < string , unknown >)
);
if ( qsLaunchError ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , qsLaunchError );
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}
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}
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// Resolve case path: check linked-cases registry first, then fall back to CASES_DIR.
// This mirrors the behaviour of resolveCasePath() in case-routes so that linked
// external project directories are honoured by quick-start just like regular case routes.
let linkedCases : Record < string , string > = {};
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try {
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const raw = await fs . readFile ( LINKED_CASES_FILE , 'utf-8' );
linkedCases = JSON . parse ( raw );
} catch {
// File missing or unparseable — treat as empty registry
}
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// Multi-user: the linked-cases registry is ownerless/global, so only admins may
// resolve a name to an arbitrary linked path. A non-admin resolves inside their
// OWN case space only (single-user: isAdmin true, so linked cases still honoured).
const linked = isAdmin ( req ) ? linkedCases [ caseName ] : undefined ;
casePath = linked || validatePathWithinBase ( caseName , resolveCasesDir ( getAuthUser ( req )));
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if ( ! casePath ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'Invalid case path' );
}
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}
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// By this point casePath is guaranteed non-null: for remote cases it was set from remoteCase.remotePath,
// for local cases the !casePath guard above returned early. TypeScript can't narrow across the if/else.
const resolvedCasePath = casePath as string ;
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// Multi-user linchpin (section 6.2): confine the resolved workingDir to the caller's
// own case space BEFORE any mkdir/scaffold below creates or mutates it. Applies to
// LOCAL and DOCKER cases (docker.hostWorkspacePath is a real host dir the file routes
// trust); skipped for REMOTE, whose path is an ssh path that would spuriously fail
// realpath confinement. No-op for admins / single-user mode.
if ( ! remote && ! isWorkingDirAllowed ( getAuthUser ( req ), resolvedCasePath )) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . FORBIDDEN , 'case path is outside your workspace' );
}
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// Bounded probe of a local case folder: a linked case can sit on a network mount
// that stopped answering, and a synchronous check there froze the whole server.
// Only a DEFINITE absence may scaffold a new case; "did not answer" must not
// create one over the top of where the real case is mounted.
const localCaseState = remote || docker ? undefined : await probePathKind ( resolvedCasePath , { pastCap : true });
if ( localCaseState === 'unknown' ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
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describeUnknownPath ( 'Case folder' , resolvedCasePath , { pastCap : true })
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);
}
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// Create case folder and CLAUDE.md if it doesn't exist (only for non-linked, non-remote,
// non-docker cases — docker workspaces are scaffolded in their own block below)
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if ( localCaseState === 'absent' ) {
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try {
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mkdirSync ( resolvedCasePath , { recursive : true });
mkdirSync ( join ( resolvedCasePath , 'src' ), { recursive : true });
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// Read settings to get custom template path
const templatePath = await ctx . getDefaultClaudeMdPath ();
const claudeMd = generateClaudeMd ( caseName , '' , templatePath );
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writeFileSync ( join ( resolvedCasePath , 'CLAUDE.md' ), claudeMd );
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// Write .claude/settings.local.json with hooks for desktop notifications
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// (Claude-specific — OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Pi, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP use their own systems)
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if (
mode !== 'opencode' &&
mode !== 'codex' &&
mode !== 'gemini' &&
mode !== 'antigravity' &&
mode !== 'pi' &&
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mode !== 'grok' &&
mode !== 'omp'
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) {
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await writeHooksConfig ( resolvedCasePath );
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}
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// Label a directory an AGENT asked us to create, so the scratch workspaces a
// long orchestration leaves behind can be told apart from the user's real
// projects later (see agent-case-marker.ts). This is the only branch that may
// write it: it is the only one that creates the directory, and a pre-existing
// case must never be labelled. Best-effort — a failed marker must not fail the
// spawn it decorates.
const qsAgentOrigin = resolveAgentCaseOrigin ( req , agentOrigin , qsParentSessionId );
if ( qsAgentOrigin ) {
await writeAgentCaseMarker (
resolvedCasePath ,
buildAgentCaseMarker ({
createdBy : qsAgentOrigin ,
parentSessionId : qsParentSessionId ,
parentSessionName : qsParentSessionId ? ctx . sessions . get ( qsParentSessionId ) ? . name : undefined ,
mode ,
owner ,
})
);
}
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . CaseCreated , { name : caseName , path : resolvedCasePath });
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} catch ( err ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , `Failed to create case: ${ getErrorMessage ( err ) } ` );
}
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} else if ( ! remote && ! docker && mode !== 'opencode' ) {
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// EXISTING case directory (a linked case, a cloned repo, anything Codeman did
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// not scaffold): install-or-refresh per the setting (see applyWorkspaceHooks).
// Other modes keep the narrower COD-91 self-heal unconditionally: only claude
// reads `.claude` hooks, so a shell/codex quick-start should not author a block
// of its own. Skipped for remote cases — resolvedCasePath is a REMOTE path that
// doesn't exist on the local filesystem.
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if ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . hooks === 'always' ) {
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await applyWorkspaceHooks ( resolvedCasePath , await ctx . getWorkspaceHooksEnabled ());
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} else {
await refreshStaleCodemanHooks ( resolvedCasePath ). catch (() => {});
}
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}
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// Agent skill injection (docs/agent-control-plan.md §2): ADD-ONLY on create,
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// marker-guarded (a user's own copy is never touched). Each CLI that takes the
// skill gets it in the directory it scans (`capabilities.agentSkillDir`:
// `.claude/skills` for claude, `.agents/skills` for most others); skipped for
// remote cases, whose casePath lives on another host. Docker cases qualify:
// hostWorkspacePath is a real host dir and the skill crosses the bind mount.
const quickStartSkillDir = agentSkillDir ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities );
if ( ! remote && quickStartSkillDir && ( await ctx . getAgentSkillEnabled ())) {
await injectAgentSkill ( resolvedCasePath , quickStartSkillDir );
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}
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// Docker cases: the workspace is a REAL host dir bind-mounted into the container.
// Scaffold hooks (+ a CLAUDE.md) if MISSING so in-container permission prompts and
// hook-idle detection fire (decision: wire hooks now). Never clobbers an existing
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// configured project. Claude mode ONLY — only claude reads `.claude` hooks, so a
// shell or external-CLI quick-start must not author a block of its own (the same
// rule the existing-case branch above states; this branch used to exclude just
// the five external CLIs and let `shell` through).
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if ( docker && docker . hooksEnabled && getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . hooks === 'always' ) {
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try {
if ( ! existsSync ( join ( resolvedCasePath , 'CLAUDE.md' ))) {
const templatePath = await ctx . getDefaultClaudeMdPath ();
writeFileSync ( join ( resolvedCasePath , 'CLAUDE.md' ), generateClaudeMd ( caseName , '' , templatePath ));
}
if ( ! existsSync ( join ( resolvedCasePath , '.claude' , 'settings.local.json' ))) {
await writeHooksConfig ( resolvedCasePath );
} else {
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// A settings file with no hooks in it is the same dead-surface case as a
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// linked case. This branch is already gated on `docker.hooksEnabled`, and
// applyWorkspaceHooks adds the user-level gate on top.
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await applyWorkspaceHooks ( resolvedCasePath , await ctx . getWorkspaceHooksEnabled ());
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}
} catch {
/* non-fatal — the session still runs, hooks may be degraded */
}
}
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// Model override → <case>/.claude/settings.local.json (claude-mode; local AND
// docker — the docker workspace is a real host dir, so the settings file crosses
// the bind mount and the in-container claude reads it). Remote was rejected above.
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if ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . model . source === 'claude-settings-file' && modelOverride !== undefined ) {
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await updateCaseModel ( resolvedCasePath , modelOverride || null );
}
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// Strip stale disk entries for keys this request is actively setting (Claude only —
// see POST /api/sessions for full rationale).
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// Same chain, same replacement as the create path above: byte-identical, drift-proof.
if ( ! isExternalCliMode ( mode ) && ! remote && envOverrides && Object . keys ( envOverrides ). length > 0 ) {
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await stripCaseEnvKeys ( resolvedCasePath , Object . keys ( envOverrides ));
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}
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// Create a new session with the case as working directory
// Apply global Nice priority config and model config from settings
const niceConfig = await ctx . getGlobalNiceConfig ();
const qsModelConfig = await ctx . getModelConfig ();
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// Synced App Settings launch defaults, as on the create path: local launches only, so
// never a remote or Docker case, and never a custom model endpoint launch.
const qsRequestConfigs = {
openCodeConfig ,
codexConfig ,
geminiConfig ,
antigravityConfig ,
piConfig ,
grokConfig ,
deepSeekConfig ,
ompConfig ,
};
const qsLaunchConfigs =
remote || docker ? qsRequestConfigs : await applyLaunchDefaults ( mode , qsRequestConfigs , !! customModel );
// ⚠️ The model is read from a bag WITHOUT ompConfig, as it always was here: quick-start
// has never taken omp's session model from ompConfig (the create path does). Kept as
// found rather than changed in passing.
const { ompConfig : qsLaunchOmpConfig , ... qsModelConfigs } = qsLaunchConfigs ;
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// See the create path for why this is a capability rather than a mode ladder.
const qsModelSource = getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . model ;
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const qsModel =
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qsModelSource ? . source === 'flag'
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? ( legacyConfigForMode ( mode , qsModelConfigs as unknown as Record < string , unknown >) ? .[
qsModelSource . param ?? 'model'
] as string | undefined )
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: qsModelSource ? . source === 'claude-settings-file'
? qsModelConfig ? . defaultModel || undefined
: undefined ;
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const qsClaudeModeConfig = await ctx . getClaudeModeConfig ();
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const qsEffectiveClaudeMode = await resolveClaudeModeForUsername ( qsClaudeModeConfig . claudeMode , owner );
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// Section 6.3: clamp Codex/Gemini/Antigravity bypass switches for a non-granted owner (no-op single-user/granted).
const {
codexConfig : qsGatedCodexConfig ,
geminiConfig : qsGatedGeminiConfig ,
antigravityConfig : qsGatedAntigravityConfig ,
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piConfig : qsGatedPiConfig ,
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grokConfig : qsGatedGrokConfig ,
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deepSeekConfig : qsGatedDeepSeekConfig ,
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} = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner (
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owner ,
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qsLaunchConfigs . codexConfig ,
qsLaunchConfigs . geminiConfig ,
qsLaunchConfigs . antigravityConfig ,
qsLaunchConfigs . piConfig ,
qsLaunchConfigs . grokConfig ,
qsLaunchConfigs . deepSeekConfig
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);
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const qsTerminalHistoryConfig = await ctx . getTerminalHistoryConfig ();
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const qsGatedEnvOverrides = await clampEnvOverridesForOwner ( owner , envOverrides );
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const qsResolvedOmpConfig = resolveOmpConfigForCreate ( mode , resolvedCasePath , qsLaunchOmpConfig );
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// Custom Model Endpoint Profiles, applied AT CREATE TIME (docs/custom-model-endpoints-plan.md)
// rather than via the dedicated restart-in-place route (POST /api/sessions/:id/custom-
// model, still what an ALREADY-RUNNING session uses to switch later): computing the
// injection before the process exists and launching directly on it avoids the visible
// native-boot-then-restart the restart-after-launch design otherwise shows on every
// custom-model run — most jarring on a CLI like Codex whose TUI fully reinitializes.
// Mirrors the dedicated route's own checks (llama-swap conflict, unsupported CLI,
// unknown endpoint, a model id the CLI's argv pattern can't carry) rather than trusting
// a lighter version of them, since this is the same server-side authority reached a
// different way, not a separate, less-checked path.
let qsCustomModelEnvOverrides = qsGatedEnvOverrides ;
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// Only the INJECTED keys (never the caller's envOverrides merged in) — this is what
// setCustomModel() bookkeeping must be given below. The Session constructor already
// applies qsCustomModelEnvOverrides (the full merged set) directly; re-merging that
// full set into setCustomModel() would put CLAUDE_CODE_EFFORT_LEVEL back after the
// constructor stripped it (see setCustomModel()'s own doc comment in session.ts).
let qsCustomModelAppliedEnvOverrides : Record < string , string > | undefined ;
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let qsCustomModelLaunchModel : string | undefined ;
let qsCustomModelSessionId : string | undefined ;
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let qsCustomModelSwapInProgress = false ;
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let qsCustomModelBookkeeping :
| {
endpointId : string ;
modelId : string ;
label? : string ;
envKeys : string [];
configDir? : string ;
launchModel? : string ;
}
| undefined ;
if ( customModel ) {
const cmEntry = getCli ( mode );
if ( ! cmEntry ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , `No CLI registry entry for mode ${ mode } ` );
if ( cmEntry . capabilities . customModelInjection . kind === 'unsupported' ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , ` ${ mode } has no known custom-model mechanism` );
}
const cmHosts = await readCustomModelHosts ( CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR );
const cmEndpoint = cmHosts . find (( h ) => h . id === customModel . endpointId );
if ( ! cmEndpoint ) return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . NOT_FOUND , 'Model endpoint not found' );
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const cmContextLength = cmEndpoint . modelContextLengths ? .[ customModel . modelId ];
// See the dedicated route's own comment for the full reasoning: some CLIs' own fixed
// overhead can exceed a small enough real context on the very first message,
// regardless of contextLengthVar. Warn before creating a session that's certain to
// fail immediately.
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// See the dedicated route above for why this reads `confirmedContext` and never
// `confirmedSwap`.
if (
! ( customModel . confirmed || customModel . confirmedContext ) &&
exceedsSafeContextFloor ( cmEntry , cmContextLength )
) {
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return {
requiresContextWarning : true ,
modelId : customModel.modelId ,
contextLength : cmContextLength ,
minSafeContextTokens : CLAUDE_MIN_SAFE_CONTEXT_TOKENS ,
};
}
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// See the dedicated route's own comment for the full reasoning: llama.cpp runs one
// model at a time, llama-swap swaps on demand, and switching away from what another
// live session is actively using deserves a warning, not a silent switch. There is no
// "self" to exclude from the affected-sessions scan here — this session doesn't exist
// yet.
const cmSwapStatus = await getLlamaSwapStatus ( cmEndpoint );
const cmCurrentlyLoaded =
cmSwapStatus . running . find (( r ) => r . state === 'ready' ) ? . model ?? cmSwapStatus . running [ 0 ] ? . model ;
const cmSwapNeeded = cmSwapStatus . isLlamaSwap && !! cmCurrentlyLoaded && cmCurrentlyLoaded !== customModel . modelId ;
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// Broader than cmSwapNeeded (which only gates the confirmation ask above): true
// whenever the TARGET model isn't already loaded and ready, including when nothing
// is loaded at all yet. Drives the actual load trigger below.
const cmTargetReady = cmSwapStatus . running . some (( r ) => r . model === customModel . modelId && r . state === 'ready' );
qsCustomModelSwapInProgress = cmSwapStatus . isLlamaSwap && ! cmTargetReady ;
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if ( cmSwapNeeded && ! ( customModel . confirmed || customModel . confirmedSwap )) {
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const cmConflicting = [... ctx . sessions . values ()]. filter (
( s ) => s . customModel ? . endpointId === cmEndpoint . id && s . customModel ? . modelId === cmCurrentlyLoaded
);
if ( cmConflicting . length > 0 ) {
// Same reasoning as the dedicated /custom-model route above: the swap is
// still blocked pending confirmation regardless of ownership, but a
// non-admin caller only learns the names of sessions they can access.
const cmRequestUser = getAuthUser ( req );
const cmAffectedSessions = cmConflicting
. filter (( s ) => canAccessOwned ( cmRequestUser , s . owner ))
. map (( s ) => ({ id : s.id , name : s.name }));
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return {
requiresConfirmation : true ,
currentlyLoadedModel : cmCurrentlyLoaded ,
affectedSessions : cmAffectedSessions ,
};
}
}
// Minted ourselves (rather than left to Session's own default) so the injection
// below — and any configDir it writes — can target the REAL id the session launches
// with, not a placeholder: `new Session({ id: ... })` accepts an explicit id for
// exactly this reason.
qsCustomModelSessionId = randomUUID ();
const cmApplied = applyCustomModelInjection (
cmEntry ,
cmEndpoint ,
customModel . modelId ,
qsCustomModelSessionId ,
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cmContextLength ,
resolvedCasePath
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);
if ( ! cmApplied ) {
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , ` ${ mode } has no known custom-model mechanism` );
}
const cmModelSpec = cmEntry . launch . params . model ;
if (
cmApplied . launchModel !== undefined &&
cmModelSpec ? . type === 'token' &&
! matchesPattern ( cmModelSpec . pattern , cmApplied . launchModel )
) {
removeConfigDir ( cmApplied . configDir );
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
`Model id ${ JSON . stringify ( customModel . modelId ) } cannot be passed to ${ mode } on its command line`
);
}
qsCustomModelEnvOverrides = { ... qsGatedEnvOverrides , ... cmApplied . envOverrides };
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qsCustomModelAppliedEnvOverrides = cmApplied . envOverrides ;
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qsCustomModelLaunchModel = cmApplied . launchModel ;
qsCustomModelBookkeeping = {
endpointId : cmEndpoint.id ,
modelId : customModel.modelId ,
label : cmEndpoint.label ,
envKeys : cmApplied.envKeys ,
configDir : cmApplied.configDir ,
launchModel : cmApplied.launchModel ,
};
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// Actually kick off llama-swap's load now — see the dedicated apply route's own
// comment on triggerLlamaSwapLoad for why this can't just wait on the launched CLI's
// first prompt. Fired here, before the session is even created, so the load starts
// concurrently with Claude/Codex/etc. booting rather than after.
if ( qsCustomModelSwapInProgress ) {
triggerLlamaSwapLoad ( cmEndpoint , customModel . modelId );
}
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}
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const qsSessionOptions : ConstructorParameters < typeof Session >[ 0 ] = {
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id : qsCustomModelSessionId ,
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workingDir : resolvedCasePath ,
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name : sessionName ? sessionName . slice ( 0 , MAX_SESSION_NAME_LENGTH ) : '' ,
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mux : ctx.mux ,
useMux : true ,
mode : mode ,
niceConfig : niceConfig ,
model : qsModel ,
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claudeMode : qsEffectiveClaudeMode ,
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allowedTools : qsClaudeModeConfig.allowedTools ,
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owner ,
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openCodeConfig : mode === 'opencode' ? qsLaunchConfigs.openCodeConfig : undefined ,
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codexConfig : mode === 'codex' ? qsGatedCodexConfig : undefined ,
geminiConfig : mode === 'gemini' ? qsGatedGeminiConfig : undefined ,
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antigravityConfig : mode === 'antigravity' ? qsGatedAntigravityConfig : undefined ,
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piConfig : mode === 'pi' ? qsGatedPiConfig : undefined ,
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grokConfig : mode === 'grok' ? qsGatedGrokConfig : undefined ,
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deepSeekConfig : mode === 'deepseek' ? qsGatedDeepSeekConfig : undefined ,
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ompConfig : qsResolvedOmpConfig ,
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envOverrides : qsCustomModelEnvOverrides ,
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effort ,
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advisorModel ,
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remote ,
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docker ,
resumeSessionId : dockerResumeId ,
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tmuxHistoryLimit : qsTerminalHistoryConfig.tmuxHistoryLimit ,
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parentSessionId : qsParentSessionId ,
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};
// Force the custom-model selection's launchModel (pi/omp `custom/<id>`, grok's
// `[model.<name>]` block name) onto whichever config field the registry says the
// CLI's `model` launch param lives in — mirrors Session._withCustomModelLaunchModel,
// which the restart-in-place path already uses, rather than a hardcoded per-CLI
// branch here that a CLI landing its injection recipe later would silently miss.
if ( qsCustomModelLaunchModel !== undefined ) {
const qsCustomModelField = getCli ( mode ) ? . launch . legacyConfigField ;
if ( qsCustomModelField ) {
const qsSessionOptionsBag = qsSessionOptions as unknown as Record < string , unknown >;
qsSessionOptionsBag [ qsCustomModelField ] = {
...(( qsSessionOptionsBag [ qsCustomModelField ] as Record < string , unknown >) ?? {}),
model : qsCustomModelLaunchModel ,
};
} else {
qsSessionOptions . model = qsCustomModelLaunchModel ;
}
}
const session = new Session ( qsSessionOptions );
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// Records the selection for session.customModel/getCustomModelForPersist() and future
// clear/switch calls — the actual env vars and launch-model config are already part of
// the launch above (constructor envOverrides, piConfig/grokConfig/ompConfig.model), so
// this is bookkeeping only, never a restart: setCustomModel() is synchronous state, no
// tmux IO of its own (see its own doc comment in session.ts).
if ( qsCustomModelBookkeeping ) {
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session . setCustomModel ( qsCustomModelBookkeeping , qsCustomModelAppliedEnvOverrides );
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}
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// Auto-detect completion phrase from CLAUDE.md BEFORE broadcasting
// so the initial state already has the phrase configured (only if globally enabled)
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if ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . ralph && ! remote && ! docker && ctx . store . getConfig (). ralphEnabled ) {
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autoConfigureRalph ( session , resolvedCasePath , ctx );
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if ( ! session . ralphTracker . enabled ) {
session . ralphTracker . enable ();
session . ralphTracker . enableAutoEnable (); // Allow re-enabling on restart
}
}
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const tabLayout = tabGroupId ? await ctx . addSession ( session , { tabGroupId }) : await ctx . addSession ( session );
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ctx . store . incrementSessionsCreated ();
ctx . persistSessionState ( session );
await ctx . setupSessionListeners ( session );
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// Pre-seed the agent skill's preamble cache so its §0 bootstrap is a two-line
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// loader (see seedAgentSessionPreamble). Local sessions of a CLI that takes the
// skill; best-effort.
if ( agentSkillDir ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities ) && ! remote && ! docker && ( await ctx . getAgentSkillEnabled ())) {
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await seedAgentSessionPreamble ( session . id ). catch (( err : unknown ) =>
console . warn ( `[agent-skill] preamble seed failed for ${ session . id } : ${ getErrorMessage ( err ) } ` )
);
}
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getLifecycleLog (). log ({
event : 'created' ,
sessionId : session.id ,
name : session.name ,
reason : 'quick_start' ,
});
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionCreated , ctx . getSessionStateWithRespawn ( session ));
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// Start in the appropriate mode
try {
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if ( getCli ( mode ) ? . capabilities . startMode === 'shell' ) {
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await session . startShell ();
getLifecycleLog (). log ({
event : 'started' ,
sessionId : session.id ,
name : session.name ,
mode : 'shell' ,
});
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionInteractive , { id : session.id , mode : 'shell' });
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} else {
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// every non-shell mode ('claude', the external CLIs) uses startInteractive()
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await session . startInteractive ();
getLifecycleLog (). log ({
event : 'started' ,
sessionId : session.id ,
name : session.name ,
mode ,
});
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionInteractive , { id : session.id , mode });
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}
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ctx . broadcast ( SseEvent . SessionUpdated , { session : ctx.getSessionStateWithRespawn ( session ) });
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// Docker + claude: the pane command pins the conversation id (--session-id /
// --resume, claudeDockerPaneCommand), so persist it as the case's resume seed
// NOW — a later container stop/reboot relaunch resumes this conversation even
// if no in-container hook ever reaches the host (loopback bind, no bridge
// listener). Hook/last-response adoption updates it again after /clear.
if ( docker && mode === 'claude' ) {
void persistDockerCaseClaudeSessionId (
CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR ,
docker . containerName ,
session . claudeSessionId || session . id
). catch (() => {});
}
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// Save lastUsedCase to settings for TUI/web sync
try {
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const settingsFilePath = SETTINGS_PATH ;
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let settings : Record < string , unknown > = {};
try {
settings = JSON . parse ( await fs . readFile ( settingsFilePath , 'utf-8' ));
} catch ( err ) {
if (( err as NodeJS . ErrnoException ). code !== 'ENOENT' ) throw err ;
}
settings . lastUsedCase = caseName ;
const dir = dirname ( settingsFilePath );
if ( ! existsSync ( dir )) {
mkdirSync ( dir , { recursive : true });
}
// Use async write to avoid blocking event loop
fs . writeFile ( settingsFilePath , JSON . stringify ( settings , null , 2 )). catch (( err ) => {
// Non-critical but log for debugging
console . warn ( '[Server] Failed to save settings (lastUsedCase):' , err );
});
} catch ( err ) {
// Non-critical but log for debugging
console . warn ( '[Server] Failed to prepare settings update:' , err );
}
return {
sessionId : session.id ,
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casePath : resolvedCasePath ,
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caseName ,
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...( customModel ? { modelSwapInProgress : qsCustomModelSwapInProgress } : {}),
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...( tabGroupId ? { tabLayout } : {}),
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};
} catch ( err ) {
// Clean up session on error to prevent orphaned resources
await ctx . cleanupSession ( session . id , true , 'quick_start_error' );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED , getErrorMessage ( err ));
}
});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// History — list past Claude conversations for resume
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/** Extract the text of the first user message from a JSONL transcript head. */
function extractFirstUserPrompt ( head : string ) : string | undefined {
const MAX_PROMPT_LEN = 120 ;
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// Iterate lines without allocating a full split array
let start = 0 ;
while ( start < head . length ) {
const end = head . indexOf ( '\n' , start );
const line = end === - 1 ? head . slice ( start ) : head . slice ( start , end );
start = end === - 1 ? head.length : end + 1 ;
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if ( ! line . includes ( '"type":"user"' )) continue ;
try {
const entry = JSON . parse ( line );
if ( entry . type !== 'user' || ! entry . message ) continue ;
const content = entry . message . content ;
let text : string | undefined ;
if ( typeof content === 'string' ) {
text = content ;
} else if ( Array . isArray ( content )) {
const textBlock = content . find (( b : { type : string }) => b . type === 'text' );
if ( textBlock ) text = textBlock . text ;
}
if ( ! text ) continue ;
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// Strip XML-like system/command tags and ANSI escapes from transcripts
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text = text
. replace ( /<[^>]+>/g , '' )
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. replace ( new RegExp ( String . raw ` \ x1b \ [[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z]` , 'g' ), '' )
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. trim ()
. replace ( /\s+/g , ' ' );
if ( ! text ) continue ;
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// Skip system-injected messages, slash command artifacts, and expanded skill prompts
if (
/^(Caveat:|init\b|clear\b|resume\b|\/[a-z][\w-]*\b|You are a |\[Request |Set model to )/i . test ( text ) ||
/^(Please )?(analyze|review) this codebase/i . test ( text ) ||
/^(Read|Implement the following) .+, then (search|list|check) /i . test ( text ) ||
/^\d+ vulnerabilit/i . test ( text ) ||
/\btoolu_/ . test ( text ) ||
/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/ . test ( text ) ||
/\b(sk-ant-|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|API_KEY=|SECRET|TOKEN=)/i . test ( text ) ||
text . length < 8
)
continue ;
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return text . length > MAX_PROMPT_LEN ? text . slice ( 0 , MAX_PROMPT_LEN ) + '\u2026' : text ;
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} catch {
// Malformed line — skip
}
}
return undefined ;
}
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/**
* Is this `entrypoint` value an automated/SDK-driven invocation?
*
* ⚠️ Deliberately a BLOCKLIST on the SDK shape, not an allowlist on `'cli'`.
* The exclusion below hides rows, so an allowlist fails CLOSED on any value
* Claude Code has not shipped yet: the day it stamps a new interactive
* entrypoint (a rename, or a second interactive host), every transcript stops
* matching `'cli'` and the whole Past Sessions list goes blank with nothing in
* the UI to explain it. A blocklist fails OPEN instead — an automated
* entrypoint we do not recognize yet costs a few noisy rows, which is the
* annoyance this filter set out to fix rather than a broken feature.
*
* Observed values: `cli` (interactive), `sdk-cli` / `sdk-py` (automated).
*/
function isAutomatedEntrypoint ( entrypoint : string ) : boolean {
return /^sdk(-|$)/ . test ( entrypoint );
}
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/**
* The `entrypoint` field Claude Code stamps on its own message records:
* 'cli' for a real interactive session, something else (e.g. 'sdk-py') for
* an SDK/automated invocation. Used to exclude non-interactive transcripts
* (CI review bots, etc.) from the resumable history list — they were never
* something a user can resume into.
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*
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* Scans every `"type":"user"`/`"type":"assistant"` line with an entrypoint
* field — not just the first one — and returns 'cli' the moment ANY of them
* carries it. A transcript is excluded only when every entrypoint-bearing
* message says something else; "first field wins" would misattribute a
* transcript that started under an older Claude Code version (no entrypoint
* on its true first message) and later picked up a non-'cli' entrypoint on
* some later message, wrongly hiding a genuinely interactive session. This
* deliberately errs toward keeping a session visible: one real interactive
* message anywhere is enough. Returns undefined ("unknown", fail-open) only
* when nothing scanned carries the field at all.
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*/
function extractTranscriptEntrypoint ( text : string ) : string | undefined {
let start = 0 ;
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let sawNonCli : string | undefined ;
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while ( start < text . length ) {
const end = text . indexOf ( '\n' , start );
const line = end === - 1 ? text . slice ( start ) : text . slice ( start , end );
start = end === - 1 ? text.length : end + 1 ;
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if ( ! line . includes ( '"type":"user"' ) && ! line . includes ( '"type":"assistant"' )) continue ;
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if ( ! line . includes ( '"entrypoint"' )) continue ;
try {
const entry = JSON . parse ( line );
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if (( entry . type === 'user' || entry . type === 'assistant' ) && typeof entry . entrypoint === 'string' ) {
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if ( entry . entrypoint === 'cli' ) return 'cli' ;
sawNonCli ??= entry . entrypoint ;
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}
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} catch {
// Malformed/truncated line — skip
}
}
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return sawNonCli ;
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}
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/** Git/worktree facts recovered from a transcript. Every field is optional —
* "unknown" must stay distinguishable from "not a worktree" (#265/#266). */
type TranscriptGitInfo = {
/** The literal `cwd` Claude Code stamped on its own records. */
cwd? : string ;
gitBranch? : string ;
worktreeName? : string ;
/** Main repo root the worktree belongs to. */
worktreeRepo? : string ;
};
/** `<repo>/.claude/worktrees/<name>` — the layout Claude Code's own worktree feature creates. */
const CLAUDE_WORKTREE_PATH = /^(.*)\/\.claude\/worktrees\/([^/]+)\/?$/ ;
/**
* Recover cwd / branch / worktree from a transcript chunk.
*
* Claude Code stamps `"cwd"` and `"gitBranch"` on every user/assistant record,
* and writes a dedicated `worktree-state` record when the session was started
* through its own worktree feature. This reads buffers `scanProjectDir` has
* ALREADY loaded, so it costs no extra file I/O.
*
* Why this matters beyond a label: `decodeProjectKey()` reconstructs a path by
* stat-walking the filesystem and falls back to `$HOME` when nothing resolves.
* A deleted worktree is the normal end of a worktree's life, so every past
* worktree session used to collapse onto `$HOME` (#265). The transcript value
* is the literal cwd — non-lossy, and it survives the directory being removed.
*
* cwd is taken from the FIRST record that carries it (a session's cwd does not
* move); gitBranch from the LAST (a branch genuinely changes mid-session, and
* the newest value in the scanned chunk is the closest to current).
*/
function extractTranscriptGitInfo ( text : string ) : TranscriptGitInfo {
const info : TranscriptGitInfo = {};
let start = 0 ;
while ( start < text . length ) {
const end = text . indexOf ( '\n' , start );
const line = end === - 1 ? text . slice ( start ) : text . slice ( start , end );
start = end === - 1 ? text.length : end + 1 ;
// Highest-confidence source: Claude's own worktree record. Names the
// worktree explicitly, so it beats anything inferred from the path.
if ( line . includes ( '"worktree-state"' )) {
try {
const rec = JSON . parse ( line ) as {
worktreeSession ?: { worktreeName? : unknown ; worktreePath? : unknown ; originalCwd? : unknown };
};
const ws = rec . worktreeSession ;
if ( ws ) {
if ( typeof ws . worktreeName === 'string' ) info . worktreeName ||= ws . worktreeName ;
if ( typeof ws . originalCwd === 'string' ) info . worktreeRepo ||= ws . originalCwd ;
if ( typeof ws . worktreePath === 'string' ) info . cwd ||= ws . worktreePath ;
}
} catch {
// Malformed/truncated line — skip
}
continue ;
}
if ( ! line . includes ( '"cwd"' ) && ! line . includes ( '"gitBranch"' )) continue ;
if ( ! line . includes ( '"type":"user"' ) && ! line . includes ( '"type":"assistant"' )) continue ;
try {
const rec = JSON . parse ( line ) as { cwd? : unknown ; gitBranch? : unknown };
if ( ! info . cwd && typeof rec . cwd === 'string' && rec . cwd ) info . cwd = rec . cwd ;
// Last one wins — closest to the session's current branch.
if ( typeof rec . gitBranch === 'string' && rec . gitBranch ) info . gitBranch = rec . gitBranch ;
} catch {
// Malformed/truncated line — skip
}
}
// No explicit worktree record: infer from Claude's own worktree path layout.
// A worktree created by hand (`git worktree add` anywhere) has no recoverable
// NAME here — it still gets a branch, and the badge degrades to branch-only
// rather than guessing.
if ( ! info . worktreeName && info . cwd ) {
const m = CLAUDE_WORKTREE_PATH . exec ( info . cwd );
if ( m ) {
info . worktreeName = m [ 2 ];
info . worktreeRepo ||= m [ 1 ];
}
}
return info ;
}
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/**
* Extract the text of the LAST user message from a JSONL transcript chunk
* (COD-145). Mirrors `extractFirstUserPrompt` exactly — same user-message
* detection, same noise/secret/slash-command filters, same 120-char cap — but
* keeps the last qualifying match instead of returning on the first. Scan the
* file tail for this (the most recent prompt lives near the end).
*/
function extractLastUserPrompt ( text : string ) : string | undefined {
const MAX_PROMPT_LEN = 120 ;
let result : string | undefined ;
let start = 0 ;
while ( start < text . length ) {
const end = text . indexOf ( '\n' , start );
const line = end === - 1 ? text . slice ( start ) : text . slice ( start , end );
start = end === - 1 ? text.length : end + 1 ;
if ( ! line . includes ( '"type":"user"' )) continue ;
try {
const entry = JSON . parse ( line );
if ( entry . type !== 'user' || ! entry . message ) continue ;
const content = entry . message . content ;
let msgText : string | undefined ;
if ( typeof content === 'string' ) {
msgText = content ;
} else if ( Array . isArray ( content )) {
const textBlock = content . find (( b : { type : string }) => b . type === 'text' );
if ( textBlock ) msgText = textBlock . text ;
}
if ( ! msgText ) continue ;
msgText = msgText
. replace ( /<[^>]+>/g , '' )
. replace ( new RegExp ( String . raw ` \ x1b \ [[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z]` , 'g' ), '' )
. trim ()
. replace ( /\s+/g , ' ' );
if ( ! msgText ) continue ;
if (
/^(Caveat:|init\b|clear\b|resume\b|\/[a-z][\w-]*\b|You are a |\[Request |Set model to )/i . test ( msgText ) ||
/^(Please )?(analyze|review) this codebase/i . test ( msgText ) ||
/^(Read|Implement the following) .+, then (search|list|check) /i . test ( msgText ) ||
/^\d+ vulnerabilit/i . test ( msgText ) ||
/\btoolu_/ . test ( msgText ) ||
/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/ . test ( msgText ) ||
/\b(sk-ant-|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|API_KEY=|SECRET|TOKEN=)/i . test ( msgText ) ||
msgText . length < 8
)
continue ;
result = msgText . length > MAX_PROMPT_LEN ? msgText . slice ( 0 , MAX_PROMPT_LEN ) + '…' : msgText ;
} catch {
// Malformed line — skip
}
}
return result ;
}
2026-04-03 11:02:43 +08:00
/**
* Decode a Claude project key (e.g. "-Users-teigen-Documents-Workspace-AI-project-Mirror")
* back to a filesystem path ("/Users/teigen/Documents/Workspace/AI_project/Mirror").
*
* Claude CLI encodes both '/' and '_' as '-', so each '-' in the key could be
* any of: '/' (path separator), '_' (underscore), or '-' (literal dash).
*
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* Strategy: recursive backtracking with longest-match-first preference.
* At each segment boundary, try joining as many segments as possible (with '_'
* or '-') into a single existing directory name. If a shorter match leads to a
* dead end, backtrack and try the next-shorter candidate.
*
* Why backtracking: when both `diary/` and `diary-app/` exist as siblings, the
* naive shortest-match would pick `diary` and then fail to find `app` inside,
* leaving the rest of the key unresolved. Longest-first picks `diary-app`.
2026-04-03 11:02:43 +08:00
*/
async function decodeProjectKey ( projKey : string ) : Promise < string > {
const encoded = projKey . startsWith ( '-' ) ? projKey . slice ( 1 ) : projKey ;
const segments = encoded . split ( '-' );
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const isDirCache = new Map < string , boolean >();
const isDir = async ( p : string ) : Promise < boolean > => {
const cached = isDirCache . get ( p );
if ( cached !== undefined ) return cached ;
const result = await fs
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. stat ( p )
. then (( s ) => s . isDirectory ())
. catch (() => false );
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isDirCache . set ( p , result );
return result ;
};
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// Recursive backtracking: returns the deepest valid path that consumes all
// segments. Tries the longest segment-join first at each step so that
// dash-containing directory names win over shorter same-prefix siblings.
async function tryDecode ( idx : number , current : string ) : Promise < string | null > {
if ( idx >= segments . length ) return current ;
const maxLook = Math . min ( idx + 4 , segments . length );
// Longest first: end = maxLook-1 down to idx
for ( let end = maxLook - 1 ; end >= idx ; end -- ) {
const candidates : string [] = [];
if ( end === idx ) {
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// Skip an EMPTY segment: `isDir(current + '/' + '')` stats `current + '/'`,
// which always succeeds, so the empty candidate would match unconditionally
// and swallow the doubled dash that is the whole signature of a dotdir. It
// then resolves "/home/x/.sib" to "/home/x//sib" whenever a non-dot sibling
// exists, and shadows the dotdir branch below in every other case.
if ( segments [ idx ] !== '' ) candidates . push ( segments [ idx ]);
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} else {
candidates . push ( segments . slice ( idx , end + 1 ). join ( '-' ));
candidates . push ( segments . slice ( idx , end + 1 ). join ( '_' ));
}
for ( const child of candidates ) {
const candidate = current + '/' + child ;
if ( await isDir ( candidate )) {
const result = await tryDecode ( end + 1 , candidate );
if ( result ) return result ;
}
}
}
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// The encoder maps both '/' and '.' to '-', so a literal '.' in the
// original path (e.g. "/home/timkjr/.codeman") collapses into an empty
// split segment here. Retry this window as a dotdir/dotfile: ".<join>".
if ( segments [ idx ] === '' && idx + 1 < segments . length ) {
const dotMaxLook = Math . min ( idx + 1 + 4 , segments . length );
for ( let end = dotMaxLook - 1 ; end >= idx + 1 ; end -- ) {
const dotCandidates =
end === idx + 1
? [ segments [ idx + 1 ]]
: [ segments . slice ( idx + 1 , end + 1 ). join ( '-' ), segments . slice ( idx + 1 , end + 1 ). join ( '_' )];
for ( const child of dotCandidates ) {
const candidate = current + '/.' + child ;
if ( await isDir ( candidate )) {
const result = await tryDecode ( end + 1 , candidate );
if ( result ) return result ;
}
}
}
}
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return null ;
}
const decoded = await tryDecode ( 0 , '' );
if ( decoded ) return decoded ;
// Fallback: greedy shortest-match (original behavior) — best effort when
// no fully-valid path exists (e.g. directory was deleted after the
// conversation was recorded).
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let current = '' ;
let i = 0 ;
while ( i < segments . length ) {
let matched = false ;
const maxLook = Math . min ( i + 4 , segments . length );
for ( let end = i ; end < maxLook ; end ++ ) {
const candidates : string [] = [];
if ( end === i ) {
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// Same empty-segment skip as tryDecode above. This loop is shortest-match
// first, so without it the empty candidate matches on the very first try
// and sets `matched`, leaving the dotdir branch below permanently dead.
if ( segments [ i ] !== '' ) candidates . push ( segments [ i ]);
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} else {
candidates . push ( segments . slice ( i , end + 1 ). join ( '_' ));
candidates . push ( segments . slice ( i , end + 1 ). join ( '-' ));
}
for ( const child of candidates ) {
const candidate = current + '/' + child ;
if ( await isDir ( candidate )) {
current = candidate ;
i = end + 1 ;
matched = true ;
break ;
}
}
if ( matched ) break ;
}
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if ( ! matched && segments [ i ] === '' && i + 1 < segments . length ) {
const dotMaxLook = Math . min ( i + 1 + 4 , segments . length );
for ( let end = i + 1 ; end < dotMaxLook ; end ++ ) {
const dotCandidates =
end === i + 1
? [ segments [ i + 1 ]]
: [ segments . slice ( i + 1 , end + 1 ). join ( '_' ), segments . slice ( i + 1 , end + 1 ). join ( '-' )];
for ( const child of dotCandidates ) {
const candidate = current + '/.' + child ;
if ( await isDir ( candidate )) {
current = candidate ;
i = end + 1 ;
matched = true ;
break ;
}
}
if ( matched ) break ;
}
}
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if ( ! matched ) {
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if ( segments [ i ] === '' ) {
// Nothing on disk matched (the usual reason this fallback runs at all is
// that the directory was deleted). An empty segment still means the
// encoder ate a literal '.', so guess the dotdir form rather than
// appending a bare '/' and emitting a "//" path.
if ( i + 1 < segments . length ) {
current = current + '/.' + segments [ i + 1 ];
i += 2 ;
} else {
i ++ ;
}
} else {
current = current + '/' + segments [ i ];
i ++ ;
}
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}
}
const finalExists = await fs
. access ( current )
. then (() => true )
. catch (() => false );
return finalExists ? current : process.env.HOME || '/tmp' ;
}
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/** Read the first `buf.length` bytes of a file for content sniffing. */
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async function readFileHead ( path : string , buf : Buffer ) : Promise < string | null > {
try {
const fd = await fs . open ( path , 'r' );
const { bytesRead } = await fd . read ( buf , 0 , buf . length , 0 );
await fd . close ();
return buf . toString ( 'utf8' , 0 , bytesRead );
} catch {
return null ;
}
}
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/** Read the last `buf.length` bytes of a file (for tail-scanning user prompts). */
async function readFileTail ( path : string , buf : Buffer , fileSize : number ) : Promise < string | null > {
try {
const fd = await fs . open ( path , 'r' );
const offset = Math . max ( 0 , fileSize - buf . length );
const { bytesRead } = await fd . read ( buf , 0 , buf . length , offset );
await fd . close ();
const text = buf . toString ( 'utf8' , 0 , bytesRead );
// Skip first partial line when we didn't read from the start
if ( offset > 0 ) {
const nl = text . indexOf ( '\n' );
return nl >= 0 ? text . slice ( nl + 1 ) : null ;
}
return text ;
} catch {
return null ;
}
}
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type HistorySession = {
sessionId : string ;
workingDir : string ;
projectKey : string ;
sizeBytes : number ;
lastModified : string ;
firstPrompt? : string ;
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lastPrompt? : string ;
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/** True when workingDir came from the transcript rather than decodeProjectKey's guess. */
workingDirExact? : boolean ;
gitBranch? : string ;
worktreeName? : string ;
worktreeRepo? : string ;
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};
// Scan a single project directory and return all valid history sessions in it.
// Reused by both the global overview and the single-folder drill-down.
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async function scanProjectDir (
projPath : string ,
projDir : string ,
smallHeadBuf : Buffer ,
headBuf : Buffer
) : Promise < HistorySession [] > {
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const out : HistorySession [] = [];
const stat = await fs . stat ( projPath ). catch (() => null );
if ( ! stat ? . isDirectory ()) return out ;
const workingDir = await decodeProjectKey ( projDir );
const entries = await fs . readdir ( projPath ). catch (() => [] as string []);
for ( const entry of entries ) {
if ( ! entry . endsWith ( '.jsonl' )) continue ;
const sessionId = entry . replace ( '.jsonl' , '' );
if ( ! /^[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{12}$/ . test ( sessionId )) continue ;
const filePath = join ( projPath , entry );
const fileStat = await fs . stat ( filePath ). catch (() => null );
if ( ! fileStat ) continue ;
if ( fileStat . size < 4000 ) continue ;
const hasConversation = ( text : string ) =>
text . includes ( '"type":"user"' ) || text . includes ( '"type":"assistant"' ) || text . includes ( '"type":"summary"' );
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// Two-tier head read: try the cheap smallHeadBuf (16KB) size first -- enough
// for the vast majority of transcripts -- and only escalate to the full
// headBuf (128KB) when that wasn't enough. Reading 128KB unconditionally for
// EVERY file in the directory roughly quadrupled the cost of a full scan
// (measured against a real ~/.claude/projects tree: ~4x both bytes read and
// wall time) to fix a problem only ~28% of files actually have. Escalating
// resolves the restart-bookkeeping case (the reason 128KB exists at all)
// without ever touching the tail-read fallback below for most of that 28%.
let head = await readFileHead ( filePath , smallHeadBuf );
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let foundContent = head ? hasConversation ( head ) : false ;
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let firstPrompt = head ? extractFirstUserPrompt ( head ) : undefined ;
if (( ! foundContent || ! firstPrompt ) && head !== null && fileStat . size > smallHeadBuf . length ) {
const biggerHead = await readFileHead ( filePath , headBuf );
if ( biggerHead ) {
head = biggerHead ;
if ( ! foundContent ) foundContent = hasConversation ( head );
if ( ! firstPrompt ) firstPrompt = extractFirstUserPrompt ( head );
}
}
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let tail : string | null = null ;
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// `head === null` (a failed read -- e.g. EMFILE while scanning hundreds of
// files) must also get a shot at the tail, not just "file bigger than the
// head buffer". Losing this dropped the session from history entirely
// instead of giving it a second chance, for any file at or under the head
// buffer size whose head read happened to fail.
if ( ! foundContent && ( head === null || fileStat . size > headBuf . length )) {
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const tailBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 32768 );
tail = await readFileTail ( filePath , tailBuf , fileStat . size );
if ( tail ) foundContent = hasConversation ( tail );
}
if ( ! foundContent ) continue ;
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// firstPrompt was already attempted from head (both tiers) above; this is
// purely the tail fallback for whatever's left unresolved.
if ( ! firstPrompt && ( head === null || fileStat . size > headBuf . length )) {
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if ( ! tail ) {
const tailBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 32768 );
tail = await readFileTail ( filePath , tailBuf , fileStat . size );
}
if ( tail ) firstPrompt = extractFirstUserPrompt ( tail );
}
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// COD-145: last (most recent) user prompt lives near the END of the file, so
// prefer the tail. For large files where no tail was read yet, read one
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// (mirrors the firstPrompt > headBuf.length block). Small files fit in `head`,
// which then contains the whole transcript — scan it for the last match instead.
if ( ! tail && fileStat . size > headBuf . length ) {
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const tailBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 32768 );
tail = await readFileTail ( filePath , tailBuf , fileStat . size );
}
const lastPrompt =
( tail ? extractLastUserPrompt ( tail ) : undefined ) ?? ( head ? extractLastUserPrompt ( head ) : undefined );
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// Automated/SDK-driven invocations (CI review bots, etc.) write transcripts
// into the same ~/.claude/projects tree as interactive sessions but were
// never something a user can resume into — no PTY, no running process, and
// their "conversation" is typically a single one-shot prompt (often with a
// full diff embedded, which is exactly why it dwarfs this scanner's read
// windows and shows up above as blank or as an identical boilerplate
// sentence across many rows). Checked last, so it reuses whatever `head`/
// `tail` the prompt extraction above already read rather than triggering
// an extra file read. Missing entrypoint (older transcripts) reads as
// interactive — fail open, matching every other gating check in this
// codebase.
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//
// head and tail are checked independently and merged with "cli wins" (not
// a first-truthy-value `??` chain): a large file's head might land on a
// non-'cli' message while a real interactive message sits in the tail (or
// vice versa), and either one being 'cli' is enough to keep the session.
const headEntrypoint = head ? extractTranscriptEntrypoint ( head ) : undefined ;
const tailEntrypoint = tail ? extractTranscriptEntrypoint ( tail ) : undefined ;
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const entrypoint =
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headEntrypoint === 'cli' || tailEntrypoint === 'cli' ? 'cli' : ( headEntrypoint ?? tailEntrypoint );
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if ( entrypoint && isAutomatedEntrypoint ( entrypoint )) continue ;
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// Git/worktree facts from the buffers already read above — no extra I/O.
// head first (cwd is stamped near the top; median offset ~1KB), tail as the
// fallback for transcripts whose head read failed or came up empty.
const headGit = head ? extractTranscriptGitInfo ( head ) : {};
const tailGit = tail ? extractTranscriptGitInfo ( tail ) : {};
const git : TranscriptGitInfo = {
cwd : headGit.cwd ?? tailGit . cwd ,
// Last-wins within a chunk; across chunks the tail is the newer one.
gitBranch : tailGit.gitBranch ?? headGit . gitBranch ,
worktreeName : headGit.worktreeName ?? tailGit . worktreeName ,
worktreeRepo : headGit.worktreeRepo ?? tailGit . worktreeRepo ,
};
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out . push ({
sessionId ,
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// The transcript's literal cwd beats decodeProjectKey's stat-walked guess,
// which silently collapses to $HOME once the directory is gone (#265).
// Absent cwd falls back to the old behaviour rather than inventing a path.
workingDir : git.cwd ?? workingDir ,
workingDirExact : git.cwd !== undefined ,
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projectKey : projDir ,
sizeBytes : fileStat.size ,
lastModified : fileStat.mtime.toISOString (),
firstPrompt ,
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lastPrompt ,
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gitBranch : git.gitBranch ,
worktreeName : git.worktreeName ,
worktreeRepo : git.worktreeRepo ,
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});
}
return out ;
}
app . get ( '/api/history/sessions' , async ( req ) => {
const query = req . query as { projectKey? : string ; offset? : string ; limit? : string };
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const projectsDir = join ( process . env . HOME || '/tmp' , '.claude' , 'projects' );
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// scanProjectDir tries smallHeadBuf (16KB, the original size) first for every
// file and only escalates to headBuf (128KB) when that wasn't enough — see the
// comment at the escalation site in scanProjectDir for why unconditional 128KB
// reads were too expensive to keep. 128KB matches the existing precedent
// elsewhere in this file (line ~1431).
const smallHeadBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 16384 );
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const headBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 131072 );
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// Multi-user: this scans the host-wide ~/.claude/projects tree, so a non-admin
// must only see history whose decoded workingDir is inside their own case space.
// Do NOT trust the caller-supplied projectKey — confine on the decoded path.
// No-op for admins / single-user mode.
const user = getAuthUser ( req );
const scopeHistory = isMultiUserMode () && user . role !== 'admin' ;
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// Single-folder drill-down: when projectKey is provided, scan only that
// directory, bypass the 50-cap, and honor offset/limit pagination.
if ( query . projectKey ) {
// Validate projectKey format to prevent path traversal
if ( ! /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/ . test ( query . projectKey )) {
return { sessions : [], total : 0 };
}
const offset = Math . max ( 0 , parseInt ( query . offset || '0' , 10 ) || 0 );
const limit = Math . min ( 100 , Math . max ( 1 , parseInt ( query . limit || '20' , 10 ) || 20 ));
const projPath = join ( projectsDir , query . projectKey );
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let all = await scanProjectDir ( projPath , query . projectKey , smallHeadBuf , headBuf );
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// Confine to the caller's workspace (a projectKey maps to a single foreign cwd).
if ( scopeHistory ) all = all . filter (( r ) => isWorkingDirAllowed ( user , r . workingDir ));
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all . sort (( a , b ) => new Date ( b . lastModified ). getTime () - new Date ( a . lastModified ). getTime ());
return { sessions : all.slice ( offset , offset + limit ), total : all.length };
}
// Global overview: scan all projects, return up to 50 most-recent sessions.
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let results : HistorySession [] = [];
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try {
const projectDirs = await fs . readdir ( projectsDir );
for ( const projDir of projectDirs ) {
const projPath = join ( projectsDir , projDir );
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const list = await scanProjectDir ( projPath , projDir , smallHeadBuf , headBuf );
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results . push (... list );
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}
} catch {
// Projects dir may not exist
}
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// Multi-user: drop rows outside the non-admin caller's own case space.
if ( scopeHistory ) results = results . filter (( r ) => isWorkingDirAllowed ( user , r . workingDir ));
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results . sort (( a , b ) => new Date ( b . lastModified ). getTime () - new Date ( a . lastModified ). getTime ());
return { sessions : results.slice ( 0 , 50 ) };
});
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/**
* Gather the four read-only views the unified list is merged from, plus mux
* stats. This is the expensive half (the lifecycle log and a scan of every
* Claude transcript), factored out of the route handler because the
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* past-session search index rebuilds itself from the very same inputs, off
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* the request path, see session-history-index.ts.
*/
async function gatherUnifiedInputs () : Promise < {
live : LiveSessionInput [];
persisted : PersistedSessionInput [];
lifecycle : LifecycleInput [];
history : HistoryInput [];
mux : MuxStatInput [];
} > {
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// Live (in-memory) sessions.
const live : LiveSessionInput [] = [... ctx . sessions . values ()]. map (( s ) => {
const st = s . toState ();
return {
id : st.id ,
name : st.name ,
mode : st.mode ,
status : st.status ,
isWorking : s.isWorking ,
workingDir : st.workingDir ,
createdAt : st.createdAt ,
lastActivityAt : st.lastActivityAt ,
claudeSessionId : s.claudeSessionId ?? undefined ,
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pinned : st.pinned ,
pinnedAt : st.pinnedAt ,
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};
});
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// Persisted sessions (state.json). resumeSessionId is the Claude
// conversation UUID a resumed session continues — feed it to the merge's
// alias map so its transcript row folds into this session.
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//
// codex keeps its thread id in `codexConfig` instead, and state.json stores
// that, so read it here as well. Without it a resumed codex session that has
// been demoted to a persisted-only record loses its alias and duplicates: the
// originator fallback below cannot rescue that one, because a RESUMED rollout
// keeps the original session_meta (see findActiveCodexFile) and so still
// names whichever pane first created the thread.
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const persisted : PersistedSessionInput [] = Object . values ( ctx . store . getState (). sessions ). map (( p ) => ({
id : p.id ,
name : p.name ,
mode : p.mode ,
status : p.status ,
workingDir : p.workingDir ,
createdAt : p.createdAt ,
lastActivityAt : p.lastActivityAt ,
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claudeSessionId : p.resumeSessionId || p . codexConfig ? . resumeSessionId ,
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pinned : p.pinned ,
pinnedAt : p.pinnedAt ,
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}));
// Lifecycle audit log (newest-first, capped).
let lifecycle : LifecycleInput [] = [];
try {
const entries = await getLifecycleLog (). query ({ limit : 2000 });
lifecycle = entries . map (( e ) => ({
sessionId : e.sessionId ,
name : e.name ,
mode : e.mode ,
ts : e.ts ,
event : e.event ,
}));
} catch {
// Lifecycle log may be unavailable; treat as empty.
}
// Transcript history (~/.claude/projects) — reuse the same scanner as the overview.
const history : HistoryInput [] = [];
try {
const projectsDir = join ( process . env . HOME || '/tmp' , '.claude' , 'projects' );
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// See the sibling allocation above for why there are two sizes.
const smallHeadBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 16384 );
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const headBuf = Buffer . alloc ( 131072 );
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const projectDirs = await fs . readdir ( projectsDir );
for ( const projDir of projectDirs ) {
const projPath = join ( projectsDir , projDir );
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const list = await scanProjectDir ( projPath , projDir , smallHeadBuf , headBuf );
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for ( const h of list ) {
history . push ({
sessionId : h.sessionId ,
workingDir : h.workingDir ,
sizeBytes : h.sizeBytes ,
lastModified : h.lastModified ,
firstPrompt : h.firstPrompt ,
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lastPrompt : h.lastPrompt ,
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projectKey : h.projectKey ,
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gitBranch : h.gitBranch ,
worktreeName : h.worktreeName ,
worktreeRepo : h.worktreeRepo ,
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});
}
}
} catch {
// Projects dir may not exist.
}
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// OMP's own session files (~/.omp/agent/sessions) — the non-claude twin
// of the scan above; see omp-transcript.ts for why this exists at all.
try {
for ( const h of scanOmpSessionsHistory ()) {
history . push ({
sessionId : h.sessionId ,
workingDir : h.workingDir ,
sizeBytes : h.sizeBytes ,
lastModified : h.lastModified ,
firstPrompt : h.firstPrompt ,
lastPrompt : h.lastPrompt ,
mode : 'omp' ,
});
}
} catch {
// Best-effort, same as the claude scan above.
}
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// Codex's own rollout store (~/.codex/sessions) — the same treatment omp
// gets above, and for the same reason: codex writes no Claude transcript, so
// without this a codex conversation disappears from the list as soon as its
// session record does. `resumeId` is the rollout's own thread id, which is
// what `codex resume` takes; see codex-transcript.ts.
try {
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const codexRows = await scanCodexSessionsHistory ();
for ( const h of codexRows ) {
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history . push ({
sessionId : h.sessionId ,
workingDir : h.workingDir ,
sizeBytes : h.sizeBytes ,
lastModified : h.lastModified ,
firstPrompt : h.firstPrompt ,
lastPrompt : h.lastPrompt ,
mode : 'codex' ,
resumeId : h.sessionId ,
});
}
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// Fold a FRESH codex pane into its own rollout row. A resumed one already
// folds, because Session sets `claudeSessionId` from the resume id it was
// given; a fresh one has no thread id until codex writes the rollout, so
// the link has to come from the other side. Codeman spawns every codex pane
// with CODEX_INTERNAL_ORIGINATOR_OVERRIDE=codeman_<sessionId>, and codex
// stamps that into session_meta.originator, so the rollout names the pane.
//
// Newest rollout wins: `/new` typed inside the TUI leaves several rollouts
// carrying the same originator, and the pane is on the most recent one.
// Rows arrive newest-first, so the first match is it.
//
// Never overwrites an id a session already knows — that one came from the
// resume path and is authoritative.
const codexThreads = codexThreadBySessionId ( codexRows );
for ( const row of [... live , ... persisted ]) {
if ( row . claudeSessionId && row . claudeSessionId !== row . id ) continue ;
const threadId = codexThreads . get ( row . id );
if ( threadId ) row . claudeSessionId = threadId ;
}
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} catch {
// Best-effort, same as the two scans above.
}
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// Mux process stats (best-effort; guard against mocks lacking the method).
let mux : MuxStatInput [] = [];
try {
const getStats = ( ctx . mux as { getSessionsWithStats ?: () => Promise < unknown [] > }). getSessionsWithStats ;
if ( typeof getStats === 'function' ) {
const muxSessions = ( await getStats . call ( ctx . mux )) as Array < {
sessionId : string ;
muxName? : string ;
mode? : string ;
remote? : unknown ;
stats ?: { memoryMB : number ; cpuPercent : number };
} > ;
mux = muxSessions . map (( m ) => ({
sessionId : m.sessionId ,
muxName : m.muxName ,
mode : m.mode ,
remote : m.remote !== undefined ? true : undefined ,
stats : m.stats ? { memoryMB : m.stats.memoryMB , cpuPercent : m.stats.cpuPercent } : undefined ,
}));
}
} catch {
// Mux stats are optional.
}
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return { live , persisted , lifecycle , history , mux };
}
/**
* Publish a merged unified list as the past-session search index (issue #261).
* The snapshot is stored UNSCOPED with a per-row owner, so it must only ever be
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* built from an unscoped merge, `harvestSources()` in search-routes re-applies
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* the ownership check on read.
*/
function publishHistorySessionIndex ( merged : UnifiedSessionItem []) : void {
const ownerById = new Map < string , string | undefined >();
const stored = ctx . store . getState (). sessions as Record < string , { id : string ; owner ?: string }>;
for ( const p of Object . values ( stored )) ownerById . set ( p . id , p . owner );
// Live wins: a session's owner on disk can lag the running one.
for ( const s of ctx . sessions . values ()) ownerById . set ( s . id , s . owner );
const liveIds = new Set ( ctx . sessions . keys ());
setHistorySessionIndex ( buildHistorySessionIndexItems ( merged , ownerById , liveIds ));
}
// Rebuild hook for the search route: it kicks this (fire-and-forget) when the
// snapshot goes stale, so a search never pays for the scan itself.
setHistoryIndexRefresher ( async () => {
if ( ctx . testMode ) return ;
publishHistorySessionIndex ( mergeUnifiedSessions ( await gatherUnifiedInputs ()));
});
// Unified, read-only session list: merges live + persisted + lifecycle +
// transcript history + mux stats into one de-duplicated, searchable list
// (COD-121). Pure merge/filter logic lives in unified-session-service.ts.
app . get ( '/api/sessions/unified' , async ( req ) => {
const query = req . query as { q? : string ; offset? : string ; limit? : string };
if ( ctx . testMode ) {
return { sessions : [], total : 0 };
}
const { live , persisted , lifecycle , history , mux } = await gatherUnifiedInputs ();
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// Multi-user: a non-admin only sees their own sessions; host-wide transcript
// history (not tied to an owned session) is admin-only.
let sLive = live ;
let sPersisted = persisted ;
let sLifecycle = lifecycle ;
let sHistory = history ;
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let scoped = false ;
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const uUser = getAuthUser ( req );
if ( isMultiUserMode () && uUser . role !== 'admin' ) {
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scoped = true ;
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const ownedLive = new Set (
[... ctx . sessions . values ()]. filter (( s ) => canAccessOwned ( uUser , s . owner )). map (( s ) => s . id )
);
const stored = ctx . store . getState (). sessions as Record < string , { id : string ; owner ?: string }>;
const ownedPersisted = new Set (
Object . values ( stored )
. filter (( p ) => canAccessOwned ( uUser , p . owner ))
. map (( p ) => p . id )
);
const isOwned = ( id : string ) => ownedLive . has ( id ) || ownedPersisted . has ( id );
sLive = live . filter (( l ) => isOwned ( l . id ));
sPersisted = persisted . filter (( p ) => isOwned ( p . id ));
sLifecycle = lifecycle . filter (( e ) => isOwned ( e . sessionId ));
sHistory = [];
}
const merged = mergeUnifiedSessions ({
live : sLive ,
persisted : sPersisted ,
lifecycle : sLifecycle ,
history : sHistory ,
mux ,
});
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// Refresh the search index off the back of this request, the home screen
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// fetches this endpoint whenever it opens, which is the same screen the
// search box lives on, so the snapshot is warm before anyone types. A scoped
// merge is a per-user subset and would corrupt the shared snapshot, so that
// path re-merges unscoped instead (multi-user is opt-in and rarely hit).
publishHistorySessionIndex ( scoped ? mergeUnifiedSessions ({ live , persisted , lifecycle , history , mux }) : merged );
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const offset = query . offset !== undefined ? parseInt ( query . offset , 10 ) : undefined ;
const limit = query . limit !== undefined ? parseInt ( query . limit , 10 ) : undefined ;
return filterAndPaginate ( merged , {
q : query.q ,
offset : Number.isNaN ( offset as number ) ? undefined : offset ,
limit : Number.isNaN ( limit as number ) ? undefined : limit ,
});
});
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// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Paste Image (clipboard / drag-drop upload)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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const ALLOWED_IMAGE_EXTS = new Set ([ '.png' , '.jpg' , '.jpeg' , '.gif' , '.webp' , '.bmp' , '.heic' , '.heif' ]);
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// Single-sourced from the attachment registry (what the file viewer can also play),
// so an uploaded video is a type that previews. 3gp/mkv are deliberately out: they
// would upload but not preview, and a phone's camera roll produces neither.
const ALLOWED_VIDEO_EXTS = new Set ([... VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS ]. map (( e ) => `. ${ e } ` ));
const VIDEO_MIME_EXT : Record < string , string > = {
mp4 : '.mp4' ,
quicktime : '.mov' ,
'x-m4v' : '.m4v' ,
webm : '.webm' ,
ogg : '.ogv' ,
};
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// The per-file size cap (MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES) is enforced by @fastify/multipart (registered in server.ts).
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app . post ( '/api/sessions/:id/paste-image' , async ( req , reply ) => {
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// CSRF defense: state-changing routes must come from same origin.
// Cookies are SameSite=lax, multipart/form-data is a "simple" CORS request
// (no preflight), so a cross-origin <form enctype="multipart/form-data">
// submit attaches the session cookie unimpeded. Reject unless Origin/Referer
// matches req.host. Non-browser clients (no Origin AND no Referer) must
// supply X-Codeman-CSRF — a header browsers cannot add cross-origin without
// a preflight, which our CORS config does not allow from other origins.
const reqHost = req . headers . host ;
const origin = req . headers . origin ;
const referer = req . headers . referer ;
let csrfOk = false ;
if ( origin ) {
try {
csrfOk = new URL ( origin ). host === reqHost ;
} catch {
/* invalid Origin → not ok */
}
} else if ( referer ) {
try {
csrfOk = new URL ( referer ). host === reqHost ;
} catch {
/* invalid Referer → not ok */
}
} else {
csrfOk = !! req . headers [ 'x-codeman-csrf' ];
}
if ( ! csrfOk ) {
reply . code ( 403 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'CSRF check failed' );
}
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const { id } = req . params as { id : string };
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// `?kind=video` selects the disk-streamed path (see below). It is read here so the
// rate check draws on the right bucket before any work: videos get 3/min, images 30.
const isVideo = ( req . query as { kind? : string }). kind === 'video' ;
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// Rate limit per (IP, sessionId). Defends against disk-fill DoS — even an
// authenticated client can otherwise loop large uploads. Videos get their own,
// far lower bucket because the per-file cap is 1GB (see the bucket constants).
const rateKey = ` ${ req . ip } : ${ id } ` ;
if ( ! ( isVideo ? consumeVideoToken ( rateKey ) : consumePasteToken ( rateKey ))) {
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reply . code ( 429 );
reply . header ( 'Retry-After' , '60' );
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return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
isVideo
? 'Rate limit exceeded (3 video uploads/min per session)'
: 'Rate limit exceeded (30 uploads/min per session)'
);
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}
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const session = findSessionOrFail ( ctx , id , req );
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// The file lands on THIS host under the session's working directory, which
// for a remote (SSH) session is the remote path: the agent there could never
// read it, and the write would land in a same-named local directory or fail.
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// An owned Docker case is fine, its workspace is bind-mounted at the same
// absolute path; an adopted container (owned: false) mounts nothing, so its
// agent reads the file only if the container exposes that host path.
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if ( session . remote ) {
reply . code ( 400 );
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
'Prompt uploads are not supported for remote (SSH) sessions'
);
}
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// The upload is written under session.workingDir (ensureUploadDir below), and
// a live session's workspace can sit on a network mount that stopped answering.
// Probe it bounded before the first disk touch, as #516 requires for a path the
// user named, so one dead mount cannot freeze a libuv threadpool worker per
// upload. Only "unknown" (the mount is not answering) is refused here, the way
// the create route does; absent / not-a-directory keep ensureUploadDir's own
// errors, since a live session's workspace should be neither.
if (( await probePathKind ( session . workingDir , { pastCap : true })) === 'unknown' ) {
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . OPERATION_FAILED ,
describeUnknownPath ( 'Workspace' , session . workingDir , { pastCap : true })
);
}
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if ( ! req . isMultipart ()) {
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reply . code ( 400 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'Expected multipart/form-data' );
}
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// Read the single file part. @fastify/multipart enforces the per-file size
// cap (MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES) and the 1-file/4-field count limits (server.ts),
// replacing a hand-rolled
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// boundary scanner with several bugs: literal boundary matches anywhere in
// body, LF-only clients silently corrupted the last byte (hard-coded \r\n
// offsets), no part-count cap.
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// `?kind=video` (read above for the rate check) is the ONLY way onto the video
// path: it selects the larger, disk-streamed budget before the part is seen
// (busboy takes its limits up front), and it admits video types alone, so an
// image can never ride the video cap through memory. Without it the route is
// byte-identical to the image-only version. Truncation is checked on the stream
// below rather than thrown, since the file is being written as it arrives.
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let part : import ( '@fastify/multipart' ). MultipartFile | undefined ;
try {
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part = await req . file (
isVideo ? { limits : { fileSize : MAX_PASTE_VIDEO_BYTES }, throwFileSizeLimit : false } : undefined
);
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} catch ( err : unknown ) {
reply . code ( 413 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , getErrorMessage ( err ) || 'Invalid multipart payload' );
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}
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if ( ! part ) {
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reply . code ( 400 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'No image uploaded' );
}
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if ( part . fieldname !== 'image' ) {
reply . code ( 400 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , `Unexpected field " ${ part . fieldname } ", expected "image"` );
}
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if ( isVideo ) {
let ext = '' ;
if ( part . filename ) {
const origExt = extname ( part . filename ). toLowerCase ();
if ( ALLOWED_VIDEO_EXTS . has ( origExt )) ext = origExt ;
}
const videoMime = ( part . mimetype || '' ). toLowerCase (). match ( /^video\/(mp4|quicktime|x-m4v|webm|ogg)$/ );
if ( videoMime ) ext = VIDEO_MIME_EXT [ videoMime [ 1 ]] ?? ext ;
if ( ! ext ) {
reply . code ( 400 );
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
`Unsupported video type. Allowed: ${ [... ALLOWED_VIDEO_EXTS ]. join ( ', ' ) } `
);
}
const imageDir = await ensureUploadDir ( session . workingDir );
if ( ! imageDir ) {
reply . code ( 403 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , ` ${ UPLOADS_DIR } is not a regular directory` );
}
const { filename , filepath , fh } = await openPasteFile ( imageDir , ext );
// Written as it arrives: a phone video is far too large to buffer the way an
// image is. The container is judged on the first 12 bytes as soon as they are
// in, so a mislabeled upload stops touching disk at its first chunk; the rest
// of the body is drained unwritten (as busboy does past its own size limit),
// which is what lets the answer reach the client. A transfer that dies midway
// (the phone left the network) leaves no partial file behind.
const head = Buffer . alloc ( 12 );
let headLen = 0 ;
let mislabeled = false ;
try {
for await ( const chunk of part . file ) {
if ( mislabeled ) continue ;
if ( headLen < head . length ) {
headLen += chunk . copy ( head , headLen , 0 , head . length - headLen );
mislabeled = headLen === head . length && ! imageMagicMatchesExt ( head , ext );
if ( mislabeled ) continue ;
}
// writeFile loops until the whole chunk is on disk; a bare write() may be short.
await fh . writeFile ( chunk );
}
} catch ( err : unknown ) {
await fs . unlink ( filepath ). catch (() => {});
throw err ;
} finally {
await fh . close ();
}
let failure : { status : number ; message : string } | null = null ;
if ( headLen === 0 ) failure = { status : 400 , message : 'Empty file' };
else if ( ! imageMagicMatchesExt ( head . subarray ( 0 , headLen ), ext )) {
console . warn (
`[paste-image] video magic mismatch: filename= ${ JSON . stringify ( part . filename ) } mime= ${ JSON . stringify ( part . mimetype ) } declaredExt= ${ ext } magic= ${ head . subarray ( 0 , headLen ). toString ( 'hex' ) } `
);
failure = { status : 415 , message : `Video bytes do not match declared type ${ ext } ` };
} else if ( part . file . truncated ) {
const maxMb = Math . round ( MAX_PASTE_VIDEO_BYTES / ( 1024 * 1024 ));
failure = { status : 413 , message : `File too large (max ${ maxMb } MB)` };
}
if ( failure ) {
await fs . unlink ( filepath ). catch (() => {});
reply . code ( failure . status );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , failure . message );
}
return { path : filepath , filename };
}
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let imageBytes : Buffer ;
try {
imageBytes = await part . toBuffer ();
} catch ( err : unknown ) {
reply . code ( 413 );
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const maxMb = Math . round ( MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES / ( 1024 * 1024 ));
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , getErrorMessage ( err ) || `File too large (max ${ maxMb } MB)` );
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}
if ( imageBytes . length === 0 ) {
reply . code ( 400 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'Empty file' );
}
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// Determine extension from filename or Content-Type.
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let ext = '.png' ;
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if ( part . filename ) {
const origExt = extname ( part . filename ). toLowerCase ();
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if ( ALLOWED_IMAGE_EXTS . has ( origExt )) ext = origExt ;
}
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const mimeMatch = ( part . mimetype || '' ). toLowerCase (). match ( /^image\/(png|jpeg|jpg|webp|gif|bmp|heic|heif)$/ );
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if ( mimeMatch ) {
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const map : Record < string , string > = {
png : '.png' ,
jpeg : '.jpg' ,
jpg : '.jpg' ,
webp : '.webp' ,
gif : '.gif' ,
bmp : '.bmp' ,
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heic : '.heic' ,
heif : '.heif' ,
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};
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ext = map [ mimeMatch [ 1 ]] ?? ext ;
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}
if ( ! ALLOWED_IMAGE_EXTS . has ( ext )) {
reply . code ( 400 );
return createErrorResponse (
ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT ,
`Unsupported image type: ${ ext } . Allowed: ${ [... ALLOWED_IMAGE_EXTS ]. join ( ', ' ) } `
);
}
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// Route HEIC on the raw bytes, NOT the declared ext/mime: on some Android
// galleries (e.g. MIUI) a HEIF comes back mislabeled as image/jpeg, and
// browsers that cannot decode HEIF upload the original file as-is — so a
// HEIC payload can arrive under any declared type. Filename and
// Content-Type are attacker-supplied anyway; only the bytes are trusted.
if ( imageMagicMatchesExt ( imageBytes , '.heic' )) {
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try {
imageBytes = await convertHeicToJpeg ( imageBytes );
ext = '.jpg' ;
} catch ( err : unknown ) {
console . warn (
`[paste-image] HEIC conversion failed: filename= ${ JSON . stringify ( part . filename ) } mime= ${ JSON . stringify ( part . mimetype ) } error= ${ getErrorMessage ( err ) } `
);
reply . code ( 415 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , 'Could not convert HEIC image to JPEG' );
}
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} else if ( ! imageMagicMatchesExt ( imageBytes , ext )) {
// Sniff actual bytes — a polyglot HTML/PNG would otherwise pass and
// serve back with image/png MIME. Log the real header so format
// mismatches can be pinned down without a reproduce-and-guess loop. The
// client re-encodes images to JPEG/PNG before upload, so this is rare.
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console . warn (
`[paste-image] magic mismatch: filename= ${ JSON . stringify ( part . filename ) } mime= ${ JSON . stringify ( part . mimetype ) } declaredExt= ${ ext } magic= ${ imageBytes . subarray ( 0 , 12 ). toString ( 'hex' ) } `
);
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reply . code ( 415 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , `Image bytes do not match declared type ${ ext } ` );
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}
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// {workingDir}/.codeman-uploads/, see ensureUploadDir.
const imageDir = await ensureUploadDir ( session . workingDir );
if ( ! imageDir ) {
reply . code ( 403 );
return createErrorResponse ( ApiErrorCode . INVALID_INPUT , ` ${ UPLOADS_DIR } is not a regular directory` );
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}
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const { filename , filepath , fh } = await openPasteFile ( imageDir , ext );
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try {
await fh . writeFile ( imageBytes );
} finally {
await fh . close ();
}
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return { path : filepath , filename };
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});
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// Returned so the server can own the registry's LIFETIME (drop state when a session is
// cleaned up on any of its paths, resolve in-flight wakes on shutdown). The wake-CAPABLE
// code stays here: `test/remote-wake.test.ts` pins that `server.ts` calls nothing but
// `drop`/`stop` on this handle, so no timer path can reach a wake through it.
return remoteWake ;
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}